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In 2001, goodwill amortization in the US was eliminated in favor of an impairment-only approach, 
which, according to critics, gives managers vast discretion and opportunities for earnings 
management. Prior research suggests that discretionary asset write-offs are associated with 
economic factors and managers’ financial reporting objectives. Based on a systematic literature 
review, this study investigates for a comprehensive sample of US firms the determinants of goodwill 
write-off behavior. Regression analysis shows that write-off behavior is significantly explained by 
firms’ economic properties. Only in large, high-profile firms, incentives appear to be significant 
determinants. These findings suggest that the impairment-only approach does capture goodwill 
impairment at least to some extent.
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Preface 
Accounting for goodwill, the premium paid in business combinations over the value of 
the purchased identifiable net assets of the acquired business, is one of the most contro-
versial issues in financial reporting. Generations of accounting academics and standard 
setters have struggled with the challenge of developing a theoretically consistent account-
ing treatment for goodwill. In the quest to promulgate high-quality accounting standards 
that generate relevant and reliable information for investors' decision-making needs, the 
U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the European International Ac-
counting Standards Board (IASB) have recently adopted a dramatic change of policy: 
Goodwill is no longer amortized over its useful life. Rather, goodwill is carried on the 
books at historical cost until an impairment test indicates that its carrying value is no 
longer supported by the fair value of the business units to which it has been allocated. 
This shift to an impairment-only approach has triggered heated debates for various rea-
sons. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it has been shaped by the lobbying efforts from 
financial statement preparers as much as by conceptual considerations. Due to the late-
l 990s merger wave, goodwill is currently one of the most significant items in many 
firms' balance sheets. Critics argue that the impairment treatment brings unprecedented 
discretionary freedom to the process of measuring accounting income. At the same time, 
the increasing frequency in recent years of publicly disclosed accounting manipulations 
suggests that investors' faith in managers using their financial reporting discretion to 
paint accurate pictures of their companies' financial condition is at an all-time low. Pre-
ceding the adoption of the new standards on goodwill accounting in fiscal 2002, market 
participants were curious to see how firms would how firms would apply these standards 
once they were in effect. 
Against this background, Thorsten Sellhorn empirically analyzes the factors associated 
with publicly traded U.S. firms' write-off behavior. Based on a conceptual review of the 
debate surrounding goodwill, he first analyzes in detail the empirical literature on good-
will and acquisition accounting in order to ascertain how managers and capital market 
participants perceive different aspects of accounting for business combinations. Under 
the assumption that goodwill impairment charges taken under SF AS 142 are discretion-
ary asset write-offs, Thorsten Sellhorn then investigates what can be learned from prior 
research relating to such events. In this context, he systemizes the theoretical underpin-
nings of different financial reporting incentives, on which a wealth of empirical research 
on earnings management is based. This systematic literature review extends far beyond 
the boundaries of the discretionary write-off literature and is a self-contained scientific 
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achievement on its own. Since financial reporting incentives can only manifest them-
selves where accounting standards involve choices, estimates, or judgment, Thorsten 
Sellhorn then carries out a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of SF AS 142 with regard to 
such discretionary parameters. He confirms the priors of most academics and other inter-
ested parties regarding the impairment-only approach: Management is unconstrained in 
determining the existence and amount of a goodwill write-off and thereby can produce 
accounting results that promote their own interests. 
Based hereon, Thorsten Sellhorn carries out cross-sectional tests of a number of hypothe-
ses about how U. S. publicly traded firms make the transition to SFAS 142 in the adop-
tion year 2002. His findings might come as a reassurance to standard-setters, including 
the IASB: On average, write-off behavior appears to be driven by sample firms' eco-
nomic developments rather than by managers' financial reporting incentives. However, 
closer inspection reveals that a certain portion of the sample, specifically the large, high-
profile firms apparently use the goodwill write-off decision to manage their earnings. 
Thorsten Sellhorn' s thesis contributes to the accounting literature in several ways. First, 
his analyses of the goodwill and discretionary write-off literatures represent systematic 
and concise summaries of two diverse and complex areas of research. Second, his 
investigation of SF AS 142 provides a much-needed confirmation for the popular notion 
that this new approach to goodwill accounting is fraught with discretion and might 
therefore produce potentially unreliable results. Third, his empirical findings give 
important insights into management behavior not only with regard to goodwill 
accounting, but also relating to the adoption of a mandatory accounting change, the effect 
of which is recorded "below the line" as a change in accounting principle. His findings 
also show how conflicting incentives influence financial reporting behavior. 
With the year 2005 approaching, many European firms are preparing to apply the IASB's 
International Financial Reporting Standards for the first time. The recently adopted 
IFRS 3 prescribes a goodwill accounting treatment essentially similar to that required by 
SFAS 142. It will be interesting to investigate whether Thorsten Sellhorn's results re-
garding U.S. firms' goodwill write-off behavior generalize to the European setting and 
how any deviations might be explained. 
Bochum, June 2004 Bernhard Pellens 
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Bochum, Germany. It emerged during my first four years as a research and teaching as-
sistant at the Chair for International Accounting. My doctoral advisor, Prof. Dr. Bernhard 
Pellens, successfully aroused my interest in goodwill accounting with basically the first 
assignment that he gave me. I thank him for taking an active interest in my pursuits, for 
being an interested, encouraging, and extremely competent discussant, and for regularly 
excelling at being a great "Cheffe" in all respects. 
I am also indebted to Prof. Dr. Hannes Streim, who served as a second examiner of my 
thesis and, in doing so, taught me to look at my chosen topic from a different perspective. 
In addition, I thank Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. mult. Walther Busse von Colbe, Prof. Dr. Jochen 
Hundsdoerfer, Prof. Dr. Wim Kosters, and Prof. Dr. Stephan Paul for conducting my oral 
doctoral examinations. 
Usually in forewords, companions from the professional environment and private friends 
are acknowledged in separate paragraphs. During recent years, I have been in the 
enviable position of seeing the line between these categories become indistinct. From 
among my great colleagues, I find it difficult to single anyone out. However, I feel I have 
to do so nonetheless: Dr. Rolf Uwe Fillbier and Dr. Joachim Gassen, true friends, have 
contributed critically to making these last five years a time that I will always treasure. 
Already "old hands" when I came along, they saw me through all phases, painful and 
otherwise, of my dissertation project. They could not even be deterred from proof-
reading the manuscript and contributing valuable, and some invaluable, suggestions and 
comments. Special thanks go to Joachim, first, for calling my attention to the fact that 
something like "empirical accounting research" exists and is actually pretty interesting, 
second, for helping me find out how it might be conducted, and, third, for rapping me on 
the knuckles when I was about to go astray. 
I am also indebted to Dr. Franca Ruhwedel, my officemate in our beginning years, who 
tolerated my quirks with warm cordiality. She was also my fellow sufferer until she de-
cided, long before I was able to, that she needed to stop whining and just write up the 
dam thing. Marc Richard, always helpful, cheerful, and sometimes refreshingly tongue-
in-cheek, Kerstin Basche, fellow lunchtime runner, and Stefan Neuhaus, self-proclaimed 
"Snowboardgott", also helped my dissertation along by relieving me of some burdens in 
the sweltering summer of 2003, when cool air and time became very precious commodi-
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aware of. Our secretaries, Beate PreuB and Steffi Horten, who have always ensured that 
our potentially unorganized lot remained functional, and our student assistants, too nu-
merous over the years to be listed in full, who procured huge stacks of literature as well 
as an aesthetic and very imaginative doctoral cap, are equally acknowledged. 
In 2002, I had the opportunity of presenting an embryonic outline of my dissertation pro-
ject at the PricewaterhouseCoopers doctoral colloquium of the European Accounting 
Association in Kalundborg, Denmark. I thank the workshop faculty, professors Philip 
Brown, Christian Leuz, Jan Mouritsen, and Peter Pope, for their comments and sugges-
tions. I also acknowledge the contributions of my fellow student participants in the finan-
cial accounting section. Further, I thank the directors of the Institut fiir Untemehmungs-
:fiihrung und Untemehmensforschung and its executive secretary, Dr. Martin Seidler, as 
well as Peter Lang Publishing Group, impersonated by editor Dr. Hermann Ohlein, for 
admitting my dissertation into this series. 
There are, of course, friends and loved ones beyond the workplace. Among them, I thank 
Maurizio Agresti, Andree Elsner, and those who would almost be Marcus3 for providing 
much-needed perspective and tons of downright, plain fun! 
However, my greatest debts I owe to my family, especially to my fiancee Melania and to 
my parents, who were always there for me, took pride in my endeavors (some more than 
others), and supported me in every way possible. I have small hope of being able to pay 
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Zusammenfassung in deutscher Sprache 
Goodwi/l-Wertberichtigung 
- Eine empirische Untersuchung aujJerplanmiifJiger Abschreibungen nach SF AS 142 -
SFAS 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, wurde im Juni 2001 vom Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (F ASB) veroffentlicht. Der Standard bildet den vorlaufigen 
Abschluss einer Jahrzehnte wahrenden Debatte ilber die angemessene Bilan-
zierungsweise fur den erworbenen (derivativen) Geschafts- oder Firmenwert (Goodwill). 
Das US-amerikanische Rechnungslegungsgremium vollzog damit eine Abkehr von der 
bis dato international ilblichen Vorgehensweise, den Goodwill planmaJ3ig ilber seine 
voraussichtliche Nutzungsdauer zu amortisieren. Nach dem nunmehr stattdessen gelten-
den Impairment-only Approach ist der Finnenwert regelmaJ3ig einem Niederstwerttest zu 
unterziehen und bei Vorliegen einer Wertminderung auBerplanmaJ3ig abzuschreiben. 
Diese Refonn der Goodwill-Bilanzierung stieB auf ein ilberwiegend skeptisches Echo bei 
Bilanzadressaten und anderen Interessengruppen. Wahrend die theoretisch-
konzeptionelle ZweckmaBigkeit der neuen Vorgehensweise kaum bezweifelt wird, bek-
lagen Kritiker das enonne AusmaB bilanzpolitischer Ennessensspielraume, welches der 
Goodwill-Niederstwerttest dem Bilanzierenden eroffnet. Die ebenfalls ermessensbe-
haftete Vorgangerregel SF AS 121, Accounting for the Impainnent of Long-Lived Assets 
and for Long-Lived Assets to Be Disposed Of, wurde immerhin <lurch die planmaBige 
Abschreibungspflicht des Goodwills entscharft, welche sicherstellte, dass dieser dubiose 
Bilanzposten ilber einen prognostizierbaren, wenn auch willkurlichen Zeitraum ergeb-
niswirksam aufzulosen war. SFAS 142 indes bietet die Moglichkeit, den Goodwill unter 
Umstanden aufunbestimmte Zeit in der Bilanz zu fl.ihren. 
US-GAAP-Anwender hatten den neuen Standard im Geschaftsjahr 2002 erstmals zu be-
folgen. Auf Grund der speziell bei Erstanwendung sich bietenden erheblichen Ermes-
sensspielraume sowie der abwartenden Haltung, mit der viele Bilanzadressaten der 
Neuregelung begegnen, bot sich den Untemehrnen die einmalige Gelegenheit, ihr Wert-
berichtigungsverhalten mit ihren bilanzpolitischen Ameizen und Zielvorstellungen ab-
zustimmen. In diesem Kontext wird in der vorliegenden Studie analysiert, wie die Man-
ager einer umfangreichen Stichprobe borsennotierter US-Konzeme dieses bilanzpoli-
tische Potenzial nutzen und zu welchem Grade die Wertberichtigungsentscheidung ta-
tsachlich okonomische Gegebenheiten widerspiegelt. 
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Zwecks Herleitung von Hypothesen Ober das erwartete Wertberichtigungsverhalten wer-
den in der vorliegenden Arbeit zwei unterschiedliche Forschungsbereiche analysiert: In 
Kapitel 2 zeigt eine Auswertung empirischer Befunde zur Goodwill-Debatte, <lass Man-
ager insbesondere die ergebnismindemden Konsequenzen der Goodwill-Bilanzierung 
fiirchten und daher entsprechende Aufwendungen zu vermeiden und/oder zeitlich 
aufzuschieben suchen. Diesem Verhalten liegt offenbar die Annahme zu Grunde, Kapi-
talmarktteilnehmer beurteilten die Vorteilhaftigkeit von Transaktionen primar anhand der 
mit ihnen verbundenen bilanziellen Auswirkungen und seien auBer Stancle, entspre-
chende realokonomische lmplikationen zu durchschauen. Kapitalmarktstudien zeichnen 
indes ein anderes Bild: lnvestoren durchschauen offenbar derart ,,kosmetische" Bi-
lanzpolitik und ziehen fiir ihre Erwartungsbildung vielfiiltige, Ober den veroffentlichten 
Abschluss hinaus gehende lnformationsquellen heran. 
In Kapitel 3 wird die erstmalige Goodwill-Wertberichtigung beim Ubergang auf SFAS 
142 als Musterbeispiel einer ermessensbehafteten auBerplanmliBigen Abschreibung ( dis-
cretionary asset write-off) charakterisiert. Diese Gruppe von bilanziellen Vorglingen ist 
<lurch hohe und im Zeitablauf steigende okonomische Signifikanz gekennzeichnet und 
basiert auf Rechnungslegungsregeln, die in ho hem MaBe auf Einschlitzungen und Erwar-
tungen des Managements zuruckgreifen und daher bilanzpolitisch gestaltbar erscheinen. 
Sie sind nicht zuletzt auf Grund ihres hervorgehobenen Ausweises in den Rechenwerken 
zum Gegenstand umfangreicher empirischer Analysen geworden. Beruhend auf der An-
nahme, dass die W ertberichtigungsentscheidung weitgehend ins Ermessen des Manage-
ments gestellt ist, wurden primar die Bestimmungsgrtinde sowie die Kapitalmarktein-
schlitzung des Wertberichtigungsverhaltens empirisch Oberpruft. Durch eine kritische 
Analyse dieser Untersuchungen sollen die lmplikationen des in der Vergangenheit beo-
bachteten Wertberichtigungsverhaltens fiir die erstmalige Anwendung von SFAS 142 
herausgearbeitet sowie ein theoretisches Fundament fiir die Hypothesenbildung gelegt 
werden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass auBerplanmliBige Wertberichtigungen vielfach oko-
nomische Wertminderungen reflektieren, hliufig jedoch in hoherem MaBe <lurch die bi-
lanzpolitischen Anreize des Managements erklarbar sind. Diese Anreize werden in zwei 
Gruppen unterteilt: Zurn einen versuchen Manager, rechnungswesenbasierte Vertragsfol-
gen ( erfolgsabhlingige Entlohnungskomponenten, restriktive Klauseln in Kreditvereinba-
rungen) zu steuern; zum anderen ist ihnen an der Beeinflussung des lnvestorenpublikums 
gelegen. Als vielleicht bestlindigstes Forschungsergebnis erweist sich, <lass ermessensbe-
haftete auBerplanmliBige Abschreibungen vielfach im Anschluss an Wechsel in der 
Unternehmensspitze erfolgen, moglicherweise um Investoren die Beendigung verlust-
bringender Engagements und damit eine bevorstehende Trendwende zu signalisieren. 
Kapitalmarktuntersuchungen zeigen, dass derartige Wertberichtigungen vielfach an-
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tizipiert werden, und dass AusmaB und Richtung einer Aktienkursreaktion entscheidend 
von der Art der vermittelten Informationen abhangt. 
Die Erwartung, die erstmalige Anwendung von SFAS 142 werde durch bilanzpolitisches 
Verhalten gepriigt sein, beruht auf der Annahme, dass der neue Standard tatsiichlich in 
hohem MaBe schwer objektivierbare Ermessensentscheidungen erfordert. Zu diesem 
Zwecke ist Kapitel 4 der eingehenden Analyse des Impairment-only Approach gewid-
met, um die Vielzahl der bilanzpolitisch nutzbaren Parameter aufzuzeigen. Die Unter-
suchung zeigt, dass nahezu alle Ebenen der Wertberichtigungsentscheidung auf schwer 
nachpriifbaren Einschiitzungen und Erwartungen des Managements fuBen. Dies gilt ins-
besondere im Geschaftsjahr der erstmaligen Anwendung, in welchem zentrale Weichen-
stellungen hinsichtlich Methodik und Bewertungsparametern erfolgen. 
Kapitel 5 schlieBlich ist einer empirischen Untersuchung der erstmaligen Wertberichti-
gungsentscheidung bei einer umfangreichen Stichprobe borsennotierter US-Konzerne, 
die einen Goodwill ausweisen, gewidmet. Aus den im zweiten und dritten Kapitel 
vorgestellten theoretischen und empirischen Befunden werden zuniichst Hypothesen fiber 
die Bestimmungsgriinde des Wertberichtigungsverhaltens abgeleitet. Diese )assen sich in 
drei Kategorien unterteilen: Erstens hat der in SFAS 142 geforderte Niederstwerttest die 
Aufgabe, okonomischen Wertverfall des Goodwills zu diagnostizieren. Aus diesem 
Grunde wird erwartet, dass die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Unternehmen, aus-
gedriickt in Kennzahlen der bilanziellen und aktienkursbasierten Performance, einen 
Zusammenhang mit der Wertberichtigungsentscheidung aufweist. Zweitens ist anzuneh-
men, dass sich das Management bei der Wertberichtigungsentscheidung von erwarteten, 
aus einer etwaigen Abschreibung resultierenden Vertragsfolgen leiten liisst. Folglich liegt 
die Vermutung nahe, dass zwischen dem Wertberichtigungsverhalten und Variablen, die 
derartige Vertragsfolgen repriisentieren, eine Relation besteht. Drittens, sofern Manager 
qua Wertberichtigungsentscheidung auf die Erwartungen des Kapitalmarktpublikums 
Einfluss nehmen wollen, ist davon auszugehen, dass KenngroBen fiir entsprechende An-
reize in einer Wechselbeziehung zum Wertberichtigungsverhalten stehen. 
Die Ergebnisse deskriptiver Untersuchungen, univariater Vergleichstests sowie von Pro-
bit- und Tobit-Regressionen legen den Schluss nahe, dass die erstmalige SFAS 142-
Wertberichtigungsentscheidung dem Grunde sowie der Hohe nach primar okonomischen 
Wertverfall widerspiegelt, welcher sich bis zu zwei Jahre im Voraus dokumentieren !asst. 
Abschreibende Unternehmen sind zudem groBer und hoher verschuldet als diejenigen, 
deren Management sich gegen eine Wertberichtigung entscheidet. Diese Resultate sind 
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auch bei Abwandlung der Testmethodik und bei Verwendung altemativer Variablendefi-
nitionen stabil. 
Eine Vertragsfolgen-basierte Motivation der Wertberichtigungsentscheidung !asst sich 
nicht nachzuweisen, was moglicherweise darin begriindet ist, dass wegen fehlender 
Datenverfiigbarkeit auf ungenaue Stellvertretervariablen zurilckgegriffen werden musste. 
Ferner fehlen substanzielle Hinweise darauf, dass Untemehmen, die ihre Ergebnisziele 
iibertreffen, ihr Wertberichtigungsverhalten an dem iiberschieBenden Betrag orientieren. 
Speziell bei der Untersuchung von Untergruppen der Stichprobe zeigt sich, dass bestim-
mte kapitalmarktbasierte Anreize das Wertberichtigungsverhalten zumindest teilweise 
beeinflusst zu haben scheinen. Dies dokumentiert sich darin, dass insbesondere groBen 
Untemehmen offenbar daran gelegen ist, den Ausweis eines Jahresfehlbetrages zu ver-
meiden und, wo dies nicht gelingt, kiinftige Perioden durch Vorwegnahme drohenden 
Abschreibungspotenzials zu schonen. Offenbar sind diese Untemehmen daran interess-
iert, kiinftige Jahresergebnisse und Managementvergiitungen vor drohenden Wert-
berichtigungen zu bewahren. 
Zusammenfassend ist zu konstatieren, dass der in SF AS 142 kodifizierte Impairment-
only Approach offenbar erfolgreich Wertminderungen feststellt, die moglicherweise 
unter der Vorgiingerregel verborgen geblieben waren. Sofem dariiber hinaus bilanzpoli-
tische Motive die Wertberichtigungsentscheidung entscheidend gepragt haben, ist dies 
auf der Grundlage der bier gewahlten Hypothesen und der angewandten Methodik nur 
eingeschriinkt und lediglich fiir bestimmte Untergruppen der Stichprobe festzustellen. 
In kiinftigen Forschungsarbeiten auf diesem Gebiet konnten insbesondere die Marktreak-
tionen auf erstmalige SF AS 142-Wertberichtigungen einer Untersuchung unterzogen 
werden. Auch ware zu priifen, ob und inwieweit sich die Bestimmungsgriinde kiinftiger 
Wertberichtigungsentscheidungen von den bei der erstmaligen Anwendung vorherr-
schenden Determinanten unterscheiden. Ferner konnte ein diesbeziiglicher Vergleich von 
SFAS 142 und der Vorgangerregel SFAS 121 Aufschliisse dariiber geben, ob das FASB 
die angestrebte Qualitiitsverbesserung der Rechnungslegungsregeln in diesem Punkte 
erreichen konnte. 
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''No one returns with good-will to the place 
which has done him a mischief" 
Phaedrus (1'1 century A.D.), 
Fables, Book i, Fable 18, I. 
In the first quarter of 2002, media giant AOL Time Warner shocked the financial world 
by announcing a $54 billion write-off of goodwill. Due to a fourth-quarter goodwill 
charge of another $45.5 billion, the company ended up posting the largest one-year loss 
in U.S. corporate history- a $100 billion deficit roughly equal to the GDP ofHungary. 1 
Deutsche Telekom AG, the Gennan telecommunications group, soon followed suit: In 
November of 2002, it announced a three-quarter loss of €24.5 billion, unprecedented in 
Gennany after World War II. Much of this deficit was due to goodwill write-offs related 
to the finn's acquisition of U.S. mobile telecommunications finns VoiceStream and 
Powertel in 2001. These charges were announced immediately after a new CEO had 
taken office. In the preceding months, financial analysts had repeatedly urged manage-
ment to write off the inflated goodwill on Deutsche Telekom's books. The stock price 
dropped on the announcement day of the write-off but bounced back up the day after. 
Commentators suggest that the write-offs allowed the new CEO to start with a "clean 
slate". The finn finished the year with a net loss of€24.6 billion.2 
Both finns' write-offs were recorded in the adoption year of new accounting rules: 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SF AS) 142, Goodwill and Other Intangi-
ble Assets, introduced in June 2001, requires that finns no longer amortize goodwill over 
its useful life but review it for impainnent at least annually.3 The standard took effect for 
fiscal years beginning on or after December 15, 2001.4 Finns were given a full year to 
These events were covered in the business press; for example, see Kort (2003) and Taub (2003). 
Refer to Deutsche Telekom AG's consolidated U.S. GAAP financial statements for the period ending 
on December 31, 2002, filed with the SEC on form 20-F. 
Under previous rules, goodwill was amortized over a useful life not to exceed 40 years. See Account-
ing Principles Board (APB) Opinion 17, Intangible Assets, par. 29. It is important to note that im-
pairment tests for goodwill had also been required before SFAS 142. See Henning, Shaw and Stock 
(2002, p. 3). However, these tests only had to be conducted when indicators ofa decline in value were 
present. Pre-SFAS 142 accounting rules for goodwill are explained in greater detail in section 
2.3.2 .2.1 below. 
At the same time, SFAS 141, Business Combinations, became applicable. Among other provisions, it 
eliminated the popular pooling-of-interests method of accounting for business combinations. 
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apply its provisions to the goodwill balances on their books. Any write-offs resulting 
from this transitional test were disclosed as the effect of a change in accounting principle. 
According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 5 this "impairment-only ap-
proach" provides financial information that more faithfully reflects the economic impact 
of acquired goodwill on firm value than does the previously prevalent goodwill amortiza-
tion. The goodwill impairment test prescribed by SFAS 142 is expected to adequately 
capture goodwill impairment.6 Apparently, this reasoning and its desire to converge its 
standards with U.S. GAAP convinced the International Accounting Standards Board7 to 
prescribe widely similar rules in its International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 3, 
Business Combinations, in March 2004.8 
The outcome of a five-year standard-setting process, SF AS 142 was the subject of heated 
discussion, both before and after its final publication. 9 The standard setter's long-
standing determination to ban the much-abused and conceptually flawed pooling-of-
interests method collided with firms' desire to circumvent the earnings strain associated 
with goodwill amortization. 10 Amongst an academic dispute regarding the economic sub-
stance of the goodwill asset, 11 the F ASB ultimately concluded that an impairment-only 
approach was theoretically superior to amortizing goodwill over some arbitrary estimate 





The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is the private-sector organization responsible for 
developing financial reporting standards for firms required to file financial statements with the U. S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). For details, refer to Miller, Redding and Bahnson 
(1998). See also Pellens (2001, pp. 102-13). 
See SFAS 142.B99. 
The International Accounting Standards Board (FASB), based in London, is a private-sector standard-
setting body. Recent European Union (EU) regulation requires that, from 2005, its pronouncements 
be applied in the consolidated financial statements of most firms listed on capital markets within the 
EU. For a detailed description of these requirements, refer to Kahle (2003) and Kirsch (2003). 
Along with IFRS 3, amendments to !AS 36, Impairment of Assets, and IAS 38, Intangible Assets, 
were adopted. Interestingly, several of the IASB members passing IFRS 3, including James J. Leisen• 
ring and Anthony T. Cope, formerly served with the FASB when it issued SFAS 141 and 142. 
For a detailed summary of that debate and a historical perspective on goodwill accounting, refer to 
section 2.3 below. 
Under the pooling-of-interests method, no goodwill is recorded. A comparison of the financial state• 
ment effects of the pooling-of-interests method and the purchase method is presented in section 2.3. I . 
In Germany, much of the debate surrounding goodwill accounting focused on the question whether 
goodwill was a "Vermtlgensgegenstand" (the German asset concept) at all. Refer to section 2.2 below. 
One of the F ASB 's main arguments for abandoning amortization was that "at least part of goodwill 
may be a nonwasting asset and thus may have an indefinite life" (SFAS 142.B7l). 
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of political horse-trading. 13 Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that SF AS 142 represents 
one more step towards a fair value-based accounting model. 14 
In the aftennath, attention turned to the details of SFAS 142. It was frequently argued 
that, while conceptually sound, 15 the standard provided finns with almost unprecedented 
discretion regarding the decision whether and how much of goodwill to write off. 16 
Given SEC Chainnan Levitt's (1998) harangue against financial statement manipulation, 
most commentators were concerned that managers would use this discretion to engage in 
earnings management to achieve their financial reporting objectives, thwarting the 
FASB' s effort to promote financial statement reliability.17 However, the analyst commu-
nity greeted SFAS 142 with downright indifference, 18 although goodwill charges are 
likely to become less predictable and, as a consequence, bottom-line earnings more vola-
tile, which might impair earnings (and forecast) quality. 
In Gennany, considerable debate surrounded the issue of whether consolidated U.S. 
GAAP financial statements established under SFAS 142 fulfill the requirements of sec-
tion 292a par. 2 Handelsgesetzbuch19, which would relieve finns from the obligation of 
establishing additional Gennan GAAP consolidated accounts. Among other criteria, such 
foreign-GAAP statements would have to be established according to "internationally 
accepted accounting principles", e.g. U. S. GAAP, and be consistent with EU financial 









See, for example, Beresford (2001), Busse von Colbe (2001a), and Pellens and Sellhorn (2001b, p. 
713). 
See, for example, Hitz and Kuhner (2002, pp. 279-81 ). 
Conceptual criticism that did occur focused mainly on the commingling of purchased and internally 
generated goodwill, the argument that the useful life of goodwill is indefinite, and the decision not to 
allow goodwill to be written up to fair value. See Pellens and Sellhorn (2001a, pp. 1685-6). 
See, for example, Hommel (2001b, p. 1944) and Teitler-Feinberg (2001, p. 336). 
See, for example, Hitz and Kuhner (2002, p. 285) and the literature cited there. 
According to Alich (2001), some analysts view goodwill as irrelevant to firm valuation, recommend-
ing that investors focus on earnings numbers that exclude goodwill charges, such as earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). 
The Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) is the German Commercial Code. It contains, among other regula-
tions, the accounting rules applicable to German firms' individual and consolidated financial state-
ments. 
The German Accounting Standards Committee (GASC) assumed an affirmative stance on this issue 
when it adopted its German Accounting Standard (GAS) la, Exempting Consolidated Financial 
Statements in accordance with § 292a of the Commercial Code, in January of 2002. Altenburger 
(2002), Arbeitsgruppe "Normierung der Rechnungslegung" (2002), Busse von Colbe (2001c), Klein-
diek (2001), Pellens and Sellhom (200\a, pp. 1686-8), and others contribute to the related discussion. 
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1.2 Research question and contribution 
As of January 1, 2002,21 publicly traded U.S. firms carried on their books goodwill bal-
ances in excess of $1.4 trillion.22 In this dissertation, concerns about earnings manage-
ment potential inherent in SF AS 142 are investigated by a detailed analysis of its discre-
tionary parameters. An empirical analysis of the factors associated with the transitional 
SFAS 142 goodwill write-off behavior exhibited by publicly traded U.S. firms is con-
ducted in order to assess whether firms used the new rules to manage their earnings.23 It 
is hypothesized that a firm's write-off behavior is influenced by economic determinants 
(i.e. goodwill impairment) as well as two groups of financial reporting incentives.24 The 
first group stems from positive accounting theory, according to which managers have 
incentive to influence reported accounting numbers because economic consequences 
arise from firms' accounting-based contracts with third parties. These contracts include 
compensation agreements as well as debt covenants. The second cluster of incentives 
rests on the notion that managers attempt to influence the perceptions of capital market 
participants, including investors and rating agencies, about their firms' future prospects. 
The initial application of this standard represents a unique setting to investigate the fi-
nancial reporting behavior of managers with regard to a variety of fundamental account-
ing issues. First, the analysis contributes to a large body of literature concerned with the 
determinants of discretionary financial reporting decisions in general.25 However, much 







SFAS 142 was adopted as of this date by calendar-year firms. 
These data pertain to 22,078 firms included in the Compustat Industrial Annual tape. Jennings, Le-
Clere and Thompson (200 I, p. 22) point out that goodwill is likely to be even more relevant in the fu-
ture since most of the large acquisitions in the past had been accounted for as poolings of interests. 
Had the purchase method been used, substantial goodwill amounts would have been recognized. 
Goodwill write-off behavior under previous accounting standards is not investigated here because the 
SFAS 142 adoption setting is fundamentally different in several respects from prior years. For exam-
ple, prior goodwill write-offs were recorded in addition to annual amortization charges, biasing their 
potential amounts downwards. In addition, incentives are different when pre-SFAS 142 impairment 
charges are reported "above the line" versus "below the line" as an accounting change. For a compari-
son of the two accounting regimes, refer to Segal (2003). See also Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002). 
These determinants are discussed in detail in section 3.3.2 below. 
This research is referred to as the "earnings management" literature. Beside the determinants of earn-
ings management behavior, researchers in this area are also interested in capital market responses to 
that behavior. Comprehensive reviews include Beneish (2001), Dechow and Skinner (2000), Fields, 
Lys and Vincent (2001), Healy and Wahlen (1999), and Schipper (1989). Refer to section 3.3. l.2. 
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agement. 26 Studies of specific accounts appear to be more promising tests of discretion-
ary financial reporting behavior. 27 
Second, a distinct subset of the research focuses on the determinants and consequences of 
discretionary asset write-offs. 28 Researchers find this area interesting largely because of, 
first, the economic significance of the write-offs and their resulting effect on firms' fi-
nancial statements,29 second, the flexibility in (or, in some cases, even the absence of) 
applicable accounting guidance, 30 and, third, the recent issuance of new accounting pro-
nouncements. 31 The present study adds to this field by focusing on write-off behavior 
that not only relates to a balance sheet item of outstanding economic magnitude, but that 
is furthermore guided by discretionary accounting rules only recently introduced.32 
Third, choosing the adoption year of a new accounting standard provides the opportunity 
to study the strategic nature of financial reporting decisions. It is argued that the require-
ment of consistency implies that firms' choice of parameters for the transitional impair-
ment test limits their ability to modify these parameters in the future to accommodate 
changing financial reporting incentives. 33 
Fourth, the initial application of SFAS 142 yields fresh insights into the age-old debate 
on accounting for business combinations and the residual intangible item known as 
"goodwill". Bottom-line income of acquisitive firms, ceteris paribus, will be either 









Models of total accruals, originally used by Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986), as well as models of 
discretionary accruals, introduced by Jones (1991), are widely used in the research. These models are 
frequently criticized with respect to their lack of power and reliability to measure the extent of earn-
ings management. McNichols (2000) provides an excellent discussion. See also section 3.3.2.2 below. 
See, for example, Beneish (2001, p. 11), Bernard and Skinner (I 996, p. 324), and McNichols (2000, 
pp. 333-5). 
Alciatore et al. (1998) and Wilson (1996) review of the related literature. Refer to section 3.3 below. 
See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 121) and Riedl (2002, p. 2). 
See Alciatore et al. (1998, pp. 1-2). 
See Alciatore et al. (1998, pp. 1-2). For essentially the same reasons, Healy and Wahlen (1999, S. 
372) argue that charges such as loan loss provisions of banks and claim loss reserves of insurance 
companies are interesting objects of study. 
SFAS 142 requires that the implied fair value of goodwill be assessed. According to Wilson (1996, p. 
173), goodwill is inherently difficult to value since it cannot be measured directly or even observed in 
an active market. With specific regard to SFAS 142, Riedl (2002, p. 4) argues that write-offs of 
goodwill generated under this standard, perhaps even more than other asset write-offs, are subject to 
management discretion, which makes them ideal earnings management instruments. 
An important criterion in the FASB's Conceptual Framework, consistency stands for "(c]onformity 
from period to period with unchanging policies and procedures." See SFAC 2, Qualitative Character-
istics of Accounting Information, Glossary of Terms. 
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Firms' perspectives on goodwill accounting and the purchase/pooling controversy have 
the potential to yield predictions as to their exercise of discretion in applying SF AS 142. 
Finally, since any transitional impairment is reported as the effect of a change in account-
ing principle, 34 issues regarding the use of non-recurring items to manage financial re-
ports also arise in this setting.35 It has been maintained that such transitory items are less 
costly to manage than other, more persistent accounts.36 
1.3 Outline 
This dissertation proceeds as delineated in Figure I. 
Chapter 1-lntroductlon 
Chapter 2-The goodwill debate 
What are manager's financial reporting 
incentives with respect to goodwill 
accounting in general? 
Does goodwill accounting matter to 
financial statement users? 
Chapter 3-Empirical research on 
discretionary asset write-offs 
What are manager's financial reporting 
incentives, especially with respect to 
discretionary asset write-offs? 
Do such write-offs matter to financial 
statement users? 
Chapter 4-Discretionary properties of the impairment-only approach 
Are SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs a suitable and likely earnings management object? 
Chapter 5-Empirical investigation of write-off determinants 
To what extent are the transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off decision and the 
write-off amount, if any, related to managements' financial reporting objectives? 
Chapter &-Conclusion 





The charge appears in the income statement between the captions "extraordinary items" and "net 
income". While any goodwill impairment had to be measured as of January I, 2002, it might not have 
been disclosed until far into 2003 , as a restatement of the first-quarter report of the adoption year. See 
SFAS 142.55-6. Therefore, this information might have been ignored by capital market participants as 
"old news", a fact that might have made management less reluctant to disclose it. 
It has been alleged that firms use labels such as "non-recurring" and "unusual" to mask items that 
reduce reported income. This behavior is sometimes referred to as "classificatory smoothing". For ex-
ample, refer to Bamea, Ronen and Sadan (1976) and section 3.3.2.4.4. Under U. S. GAAP, the ge-
neric term "non-recurring items" comprises unusual/infrequent items, extraordinary items, discontin-
ued operations, and accounting changes. See White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, pp. 52-61). 
See Bartov (1993, p. 840) and Marquardt and Wiedman (2002, p. 5). For a discussion of this notion, 
refer to 3.3 .2.4.8 below. 
Thorsten Sellhorn - 978-3-631-75498-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:09:55AM
via free access
In chapter 2, the enduring debate about goodwill and the related controversy surround-
ing the purchase and pooling-of-interests methods of accounting for business combina-
tions are summarized. The reflections are intended to establish why goodwill is viewed 
as a material and controversial item, the accounting treatment of which might affect 
management's utility, e.g. by influencing how financial statement users perceive firm 
performance. Much of the chapter is dedicated to reviewing the research in this area and 
to drawing conclusions from the findings. 
The main purpose of chapter 3 is to establish a theoretical basis for hypothesis develop-
ment and to highlight the contribution of this study. For this purpose, a broad body of 
research on discretionary asset write-offs and certain related one-time charges is re-
viewed. The first branch of this literature focuses on the determinants of these high-
profile accounting events, attempting to discriminate between economic explanations 
(impairment) and factors that indicate earnings management. The second research pro-
gram, complementary to the first, analyzes how capital market participants respond to 
discretionary asset write-offs. For both aspects, the respective motivations and research 
questions are outlined, followed by analyses of the theoretical underpinnings and hy-
potheses. A discussion of the findings and their implications concludes the chapter. 
In chapter 4, the main provisions of SF AS I 42 are analyzed. Much of this dissertation 
rests on the notion that write-off behavior is influenced by financial reporting incentives. 
Therefore, it is critical to show that a transitional goodwill write-off recorded under 
SF AS I 42 can be characterized as a discretionary write-off with respect to its existence, 
amount, and timing. Consequently, the bulk of the chapter focuses on an in-depth analy-
sis of SF AS I 42, isolating the parameters involving estimates, judgment, and other areas 
of managerial discretion. 
The discretionary nature of the impairment-only approach exposed, an empirical investi-
gation of firms' initial application of the goodwill impairment test under SFAS 142 is 
presented in chapter 5. Hypotheses are developed to predict the occurrence and, if any, 
magnitude of goodwill write-offs, depending on economic factors and firm characteris-
tics that represent various financial reporting incentives. Sample selection and data are 
discussed next. After that, descriptive statistics, univariate comparisons, and multivariate 
regression results are presented and certain econometric issues and other limitations are 
addressed. 
In chapter 6, the findings of the study are summarized and suggestions for further re-
search are discussed. 
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2 The goodwill debate 
2.1 Chapter overview 
As noted above, goodwill accounts for a massive portion of total assets in many firms. 
The accounting for this balance sheet item, affecting a firm's financial position as well as 
earnings performance, is controversial today and has been for many years. Until recently, 
accounting standards in most jurisdictions, including the U.S ., allowed certain acquisi-
tions to be accounted for using the pooling-of-interests method, 37 under which goodwill 
does not arise. Today, the purchase method is widely established internationally as the 
only method of accounting for business combinations.38 Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robin-
son (2000b) document that using the pooling method generates enormous amounts of 
unrecognized assets. Recording and amortizing these assets, as required under the pur-
chase method, would produce significant balance sheet and income statement effects.39 
From the viewpoint of most firms, these effects are undesirable. 40 
In this chapter, the issues central to the enduring controversy related to the accounting for 
business combinations and any resulting goodwill are presented.41 With regard to the 
research question outlined in section 1.2 above, this chapter contributes evidence on 
managers' financial reporting incentives as well as investors' views pertaining to this 
specific accounting issue. The chapter is organized as follows: In section 2.2, the concept 
of goodwill and possible viewpoints regarding its economic characteristics are intro-
duced. Section 2.3 contains a summary of the main arguments brought forth by various 
contributors to the debate on accounting for goodwill and the purchase/pooling choice. 
First, the financial statement effects of the purchase and pooling methods of accounting 
for business combinations and goodwill are illustrated. Second, accounting alternatives 
for goodwill are derived conceptually from its economic attributes. Third, the historical 
development and present status of relevant accounting rules in selected jurisdictions is 






For ease of exposition, this method is hereafter referred to as the "pooling method". 
Despite mounting criticism, the pooling method is still permitted under German GAAP. 
For a simple simulation of these effects, refer to section 2.3.1 below. 
Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2000b, pp. 12-16) analyze 269 pooling acquisitions made during 
the period 1992-1997. They document that key ratios (ROE, EPS, and MTB ratio) of the acquirer de-
teriorate significantly when calculated "as if' the purchase method had been used. See also Pellens 
and Sellhom (1999). 
This controversy is hereafter referred to as the "goodwill debate" and its subject, accounting for busi-
ness combinations and goodwill, as "goodwill accounting". 
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standard-setting decisions are established.42 Fourth, financial statement preparers' stance 
on the goodwill debate is reviewed. Finally, a theoretical perspective, taking users' be-
havior into account, on preparers' arguments is developed. Section 2.4 contains a review 
of empirical evidence relevant to two aspects of the goodwill debate: First, evidence on 
managers' financial reporting incentives surrounding goodwill and the purchase/pooling 
choice is analyzed. Second, investors' views regarding these accounting issues are in-
ferred from empirical findings. The assumption underlying this literature review is that 
managers' and investors' standpoints in the goodwill debate are informative about man-
agers' expected behavior upon transition to the impairment-only approach under SF AS 
142. Finally, in section 2.5, the implications from this chapter are summarized. 
2.2 The concept of goodwill 
The concept of goodwill is central to this dissertation. Therefore, a brief review of termi-
nological and conceptual issues seems warranted.43 According to some, the "term 'good-
will' defies precise definition"44 and is "neither 'fowl nor fish'". 45 Depending on the con-
text, it is used in at least three different ways that are not without overlap and lack clear-
cut separating lines. 
First, goodwill is an accounting concept. It is a technical residual that results when the 
value of a firm's net assets (assets less liabilities) is subtracted from firm value as a 
whole.46 The two components of this difference are defined in terms of the recognition 
and measurement rules of a given financial reporting system. Whenever goodwill arises 
from the acquisition of one entity or business by another, the term "purchased" or "ac-
quired" goodwill denotes the goodwill inherent in the acquired entity.47 Absent an acqui-








A strictly positivistic approach is adopted, i.e. the emphasis is on explanation, as opposed to norma-
tive prescription, of accounting practice. The term "accounting practice" is used here to comprise 
firms' actual financial reporting and lobbying behavior as well as standard-setters' decision processes. 
For a detailed, historical and linguistic review of the term "goodwill" and its synonyms, refer to 
Grliber (1981, pp. 5-17). 
Gomes (1988, p. 23). See also Huijgen (1996, p. 54). 
Falk and Gordon (1977, p. 443). 
See Hoyle, Schaefer and Doupnik (1998, p. 52): "Traditionally, the term goodwill has referred to a 
computationally derived excess payment". Kieso, Weygandt and Warfield (2001, p. 608) introduce 
labels such as "plug" or "gap filler" to highlight these characteristics. See also LUdenbach and 
Frowein (2003, p. 217). 
The term "acquisition" is used here in a non-technical way and refers to a wide variety of instances in 
which an entity purchases another entity's shares (share deal), assets (asset deal), or another group of 
assets that constitutes a business. 
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will is not recorded under most accounting regimes, this dissertation focuses on pur-
chased goodwill. 48 
Definitions of purchased goodwill are widely similar across major accounting regimes.49 







"The excess of the cost of an acquired entity over the net of the amounts assigned to 
assets acquired and liabilities assumed shall be recognized as an asset referred to as 
goodwill" (SFAS 141.43).51 
"Any excess of the cost of the acquisition over the acquirer's interest in the fair 
value of the identifiable assets and liabilities acquired as at the date of the exchange 
transaction should be described as goodwill and recognized as an asset" 
(IAS 22.41).52 
Measuring a firm's internally generated goodwill involves a great deal of subjectivity, which casts 
doubt on the reliability of such information. See also Brunovs and Kirsch (1991, p. 139) and Kieso, 
Weygandt and Warfield (2001, p. 608). In the words of Chauvin and Hirschey (1994, p. 161), inter-
nally generated goodwill is not capitalized because "opponents refer to internally-generated goodwill 
numbers as soft and not based upon independent, arm's length transactions." 
Brunovs and Kirsch (1991, p. 139) note this fact for the standards in English-speaking countries. 
The prevalent German term is "Geschafts- oder Firmenwert". 
Under the predecessor standards, goodwill was defined very similarly: "[T]he excess of the cost of the 
acquired company over the sum of the amounts assigned to identifiable assets acquired less liabilities 
assumed should be recorded as goodwill" (APB Opinion 16, Business Combinations, par. 87). ,,[T]he 
excess of the cost of an acquired company over the sum of identifiable net assets" (APB Opinion 
17.1). 
In its December 2002 Exposure Draft (ED) 3, Business Combinations, the IASB refers to the cost of 
goodwill as "the excess of the cost of the business combination over the acquirer's interest in the net 
fair value of the identifiable assets, liabilities and contingent liabilities [ ... ]" (ED 3.50). This defini-
tion was carried over into the final standard; see IFRS 3 .5 I (b ). 
The German standard setters' definitions are largely equivalent: For asset deals accounted for in a 
firm's separate financial statements, section 255 par. 4 HGB states: ,,Ats Geschafts- oder Firmenwert 
darf der Unterschiedsbetrag angesetzt werden, um den die fllr die Obernahme eines Untemehmens 
bewirkte Gegenleistung den Wert der einzelnen VermOgensgegenstande des Untemehmens abzUglich 
der Schulden im Zeitpunkt der Obemahme Ubersteigt". 
The following definition applies to acquisitions effected by share deals and accounted for in consoli-
dated financial statements: ,,Ein bei der Verrechnung nach Absatz I Satz 2 Nr. 2 entstehender oder ein 
nach Zuschreibung oder Verrechnung nach Absatz 1 Satz 3 verbleibender Unterschiedsbetrag ist in 
der Konzembilanz, wenn er auf der Aktivseite entsteht, als Geschafts- oder Firmenwert ... auszu-
weisen" (section 301 par. 3 HGB). 
The German private-sector standard setter, the German Accounting Standards Committee (GASC), 
defines goodwill in par. 27 of its German Accounting Standard (GAS) 4, Purchase Accounting, as 
follows: ,, When the cost of acquisition exceeds the interest of the acquirer in the net amount of the 
fair values of the assets and liabilities acquired, the excess should be recognised as goodwill in the 
consolidated balance sheet". 
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Consistent with this ''technical" view, in these definitions provided in standard setters' 
pronouncements no attempt is made to specify the factors influencing the acquirer's deci-
sion to incur such an excess payment or to characterize its economic nature, probably 
because "the conditions that can influence a purchase price are virtually unlimited".53 
Recognizing the shadowy existence of internally generated goodwill, standard textbook 
definitions also center on purchased goodwill. 
"The excess of acquisition cost over the parent's equity in the fair value of the iden-
tifiable net assets of the subsidiary on the date of acquisition".54 
"Whenever the price paid in a purchase exceeds total fair market value, all of the 
subsidiary's assets and liabilities are consolidated at fair market value with the addi-
tional payment allocated to the intangible asset goodwill".55 
"(T]he excess of cost over fair value of the identifiable net assets acquired."56 
Note that goodwill is consistently based on the acquirer's share in the net assets of the 
acquiree and on the purchase price paid for that share. Only recently, the IASB proposed 
to deviate from that concept when it re-introduced the notion of"full goodwill".57 Under 
this approach goodwill would be calculated as the excess of the acquiree's total value 
over the fair value of all of its net assets, even where less than I 00% of the acquiree is 
purchased. In effect, goodwill would be assigned to minority interests in equity.58 
Second, goodwill can be interpreted from a valuation perspective. It denotes the differ-
ence between the values generated by two conceptually different valuation methods, an 
earning-capacity value and a net asset value. 59 In this respect, it is structurally similar to 










See Hoyle, Schaefer and Doupnik (1998, p. 52). One notable exception is IFRS 3.52, which states that 
goodwill "represents a payment made by the acquirer in anticipation of future economic benefits from 
assets that are not capable of being individually identified and separately recognized." 
Jeter and Chaney (2001, p. 936). 
Hoyle, Schaefer and Doupnik ( 1998, p. 52). 
Kieso, Weygandt and Warfield (2001, p. 608). 
That concept had been briefly discussed in Europe in the late 1980s when the European Community's 
financial reporting directives were transformed into national laws. For example, refer to Kommission 
Rechnungswesen (1985, p. 273). Busse von Colbe and Ordelheide (1993, p. 245) also briefly mention 
this "reine Neubewertungsmethode". 
Refer to Pellens, Basche and Sellhorn (2003) for a description, historical overview and criticism of 
this concept. See also Grllnberger and Grilnberger (2003). 
The German terms are "Ertragswert" and "Substanzwert", respectively. For example, refer to Ball-
wieser (1998, p. 283) and, in the specific goodwill context, MOhrle (1999, pp. 22-31). 
See also Holthausen and Watts (2001, p. 54). 
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from concrete, prescribed definitions of firm value and the value of net assets.61 Under a 
valuation approach, goodwill represents the present value of a firm's future earnings in 
excess of a normal rate ofretum.62 This excess earning capacity cannot be separated from 
the business as a whole. It stems from imperfect markets, since all firms would earn a 
normal rate of return in the absence of market imperfections.63 
With the introduction of SFAS 142 and the IASB's IFRS 3, this valuation notion of 
goodwill has attained greater significance in accounting, because firms are required to 
test goodwill associated with their reporting units64 for impairment. In that process, re-
porting units must be valued as a whole unless quoted market prices are observable.65 
Third, goodwill is a broader management concept. When the economic characteristics of 
goodwill, i.e. the reasons behind the existence of this technical accounting residual, are 
analyzed, several factors are usually cited. These factors represent sources of future ex-
cess earnings that can be exploited by management.66 These include, in no particular or-
der, a loyal customer base, 67 potential for restructuring, 68 synergies between the ac-
quirer' s and the acquiree's operations,69 real options,70 the creative ability of a research 
group,71 specific market conditions that surrounded the acquisition,72 a favorable loca-















In that sense, it corresponds to the accounting concept of internally generated goodwill. 
See, for example, Baker, Lembke and King (1996, pp. 11, 14), Beams, Brozovsky and Shoulders 
(2000, p. 18), Chauvin and Hirschey (1994, p. 162), Choi and Lee (1991, p. 226), Gomes (1988, p. 
24), Hendriksen and van Breda (2001 , pp. 640-2), Hoyle, Schaefer and Doupnik (1998, p. 52), and 
Jensen et al. {I 994, p. 15). 
See Falk and Gordon (1977, p. 448). 
The IASB' s term is "cash-generating units". 
Refer to section 4.5.1 for details. 
This is the point made by Gynther (1969, p. 247), who stresses that goodwill is not the discounted 
value of projected excess earnings, but a summary label for the reasons behind such excess earning 
capacity. See also Lee (1971, p. 324). 
This notion is among the oldest concepts of goodwill. See Catlett and Olson (1968, p. 9). See also 
Gomes (1988, p. 23). 
See, for example, Johnson and Petrone (1998). 
See, for example, Johnson and Petrone ( 1998). 
Refer to Sellhorn (2000, p. 890). 
See Chauvin and Hirschey (1994, p. 162) and Hoyle, Schaefer and Doupnik (1998, p. 52). 
See Hoyle, Schaefer and Doupnik ( 1998, p. 52). 
See Gomes {I 988, p. 23). 
See Baker, Lembke and King (1996, p. 11). 
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Perhaps the most influential attempt at systematically decomposing goodwill was made 
by Johnson and Petrone (1998), who identified six elements:76 (1) Excess of the fair val-
ues over the book values of the acquiree's recognized net assets, (2) fair values of other 
net assets not recognized by the acquiree, (3) fair value of the "going concern" element 
of the acquiree's existing business, (4) fair value of synergies from combining the ac-
quirer's and acquiree' s businesses and net assets, (5) overvaluation of the consideration 
paid by the acquirer, and (6) overpayment (or underpayment) by the acquirer.77 
This decomposition perhaps highlights the differences between the three concepts of 
goodwill (see Figure 2): The first and second components are no part of goodwill from an 
accounting standpoint, but potentially from a valuation perspective, depending on how 
net asset value is measured. The third and fourth components, in aggregate referred to as 
"core goodwill" by Johnson and Petrone ( 1998), are part of goodwill under each of the 
concepts. Finally, the fifth and sixth components belong to goodwill from an accounting 
























Accounting concept of goodwill 
Figure 2: Concepts and components of goodwill 
German academics have for a long time debated the "accounting characteristics" of 






According to Colley and Volkan (1988, p. 36), Falk and Gordon (1977) have compiled the "most 
comprehensive list of empirically identifiable factors as well as elements (characteristics) of goodwill 
... in the literature." Refer to Falk and Gordon (1977, p. 453) in particular. For a review of work on 
the constituting factors of goodwill, see also Davis (I 997, pp. 333 , 336). Perhaps one of the earliest 
systematic overviews of goodwill components that is based on pertinent jurisdiction is provided by 
Preinreich ( I 936). 
Refer to Johnson and Petrone (I 998, pp. 294-6). Sellhom (2000) expands on this approach. See also 
Alvarez and Biberacher (2002) and Busse von Colbe et al. (2003, p. 236). 
This concept has been integrated into SF AS 14 J.B I 02-6. For a similar concept, refer to WBhe ( 1980). 
See, for example, Baetge, Kirsch and Thiele (2002a, pp. 238-9), Breidert (1994, pp. 166-71), DBring 
(1993), Doralt (1976), Grllber (1981), Kinne (1989, pp. 166-73), Krllmling (1998, pp. 63-9), KUting 
(1995a, 1995b, 1997, 2000), MBhrle (1999, pp. 17-20), Moxter (1993), MUiier-Dahl (1981), Ordel-
heide (1997, 1998), SBfling (1988), Streim (1988, pp. 72-4), Weber and ZUndorf (1989), WBhe 
(1980), and Zielke (1995). Refer to Arnold (1997, pp. 103-22), Ludz (1997, pp. 68-89) and Sauthoff 
(I 996, pp. 168-75) for summaries of the pertinent arguments and the related literature. 
Thorsten Sellhorn - 978-3-631-75498-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:09:55AM
via free access
represents a "Vermogensgegenstand", the German asset concept, at all. Alternatively, 
goodwill is viewed as an accrued item ("Rechnungsabgrenzungsposten"), as some form 
of accounting "aide memoire" ("Bilanzierungshilfe"), as an equity adjustment, or, resign-
ing, as a one-of-a-kind "idiosyncratic item" ("Wert eigener Art") or "aliud".79 At present, 
this theoretical debate seems unresolved. 80 In Anglo-American accounting regimes, an 
equally fruitless and ongoing discussion has been conducted for decades. 81 
2. 3 Main issues 
In this section, the main issues surrounding the goodwill debate are introduced. To pro-
vide a basic understanding of the controversial financial statement repercussions of 
goodwill accounting and the directly related coexistence of the purchase and pooling 
methods, a simple numerical example is presented first. Second, the arguments put for-
ward by participants in the discussion are summarized. Third, these arguments are evalu-
ated from a theoretical perspective. 
2.3.1 Pooling and purchase methods illustrated 
Under the purchase method, "the assets and liabilities of the acquired firm are valued at 
fair market values, including the recording of goodwill implied by any excess of pur-
chase price over the net fair value". Under the pooling method, "the assets and liabilities 
of the combining firm are carried forward at their historical book values. This method, 
which requires the use of stock as the medium of exchange, is sometimes justified as the 
uniting of two groups of shareholders into a single 'pooled' entity, with no group being 
dominant". 82 
The following simplified example illustrates the APB's point that the "accounting treat-
ment of a combination may affect significantly the reported financial position and net 
income of the combined corporation for prior, current, and future periods":83 Firm A and 






Refer to the extensive literature reviews by Baetge, Kirsch and Thiele (2002a, pp. 260-4), Baetge, 
Kirsch and Thiele (2002b, pp. 238-9), and Krolak (2000, pp. 8-16). 
See Busse von Colbe (2001b, par. 5) and Weber and ZUndorf (1989, pp. 333-4). 
See, for example, Brunovs and Kirsch (1991), Colley and Volkan (1988), Falk and Gordon (1977), 
Gynther (1969), Hodgson, Okunev and Willett (1993), Huijgen (1996), Krolak (2000, pp. 16-9), Lee 
(1971), Ma and Hopkins (1988), McCarthy and Schneider (1995, pp. 70-72), Miller (1973), Mujka-
novic (2001, pp. 814-6). Most of these authors provide further, partially historical references. 
Jeter and Chaney (2001, p. 939 [both quotes]). The pooling method is discussed by Rammert (1999). 
APB Opinion 16.2. 
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dividual balance sheets, in monetary units (MU), after the transaction has taken place at 
the end of year t. 84 
Assets 


















Table 1: Individual balance sheets for Firm A and Firm B subsequent to the business 
combination 
Under the assumption that the fair values of Firm B's assets exceed their respective car-
rying values by the amount of 150 MU, accounting for the business combination using 
the pooling and purchase methods yields the consolidated balance sheets displayed in 
Table 2. 











Total 1,500 1,950 Total 1,500 1,950 
Table 2: Balance sheets for the combined firm under the pooling and purchase methods 
The example shows that total assets and equity of the combined firm are lower when the 
pooling method is used to account for the business combination. The difference can be 
explained by the amount of the fair value adjustments (l 50 MU) and of goodwill (300 
MU) that are recorded under the purchase method. 
Three further assumptions are made to illustrate the effect on earnings in later periods: 
The goodwill asset is amortized over its expected 5-year useful life. The combined firm's 
earnings before goodwill amortization are I 00 MU in each of the five years following the 
business combination. Half of annual earnings (after goodwill amortization) are distrib-
uted as dividends each year. Table 3 shows the balance sheet and income statement ef-




The example draws on Pellens and Sellhom (1999, pp. 2126-30). See also Ayers, Lefanowicz and 
Robinson (2000b), Davis (1996, pp. 52-3), Desai et al. (2001, pp. 6-7), Hopkins, Houston and Peters 
(2000, p. 258, 260), Huijgen (1996, pp. 87-93), Telkamp and Bruns (2000, p. 745), and Yater (2001, 
pp. 1843-4). 
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Pooling-of-interests method t+l t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
Equity 750 800 850 900 950 1.000 
Total assets 1,500 1,550 1,600 1,650 1,700 1,750 
Goodwill 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Earnings before goodwill amortization 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Goodwill amortization 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Earnings 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Dividend 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Debt-to-equity ratio 1.00 0.94 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.75 
Return on equity (earnings/ equity) 13.3% 12.5% 11.8% II.I% 10.5% 10.0% 
Purchase method t+l t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
Equity 1,200 1,220 1,240 1,260 1,280 1,300 
Total assets 1,950 1,970 1,990 2,010 2,030 2,050 
Goodwill 300 240 180 120 60 0 
Earnings before goodwill amortization 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Goodwill amortization 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Earnings 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Dividend 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Debt-to-equity ratio 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.58 
Return on e9ui!}'. {earnings/ e9ui!}'.} 3.3% 3.3% 3.2% 3.2% 3.1% 3.1% 
Table 3: Financial statement effects of the pooling and purchase methods 
Two key financial ratios are observed: While the purchase method has a favorable effect 
on the combined firm's debt-to-equity (DTE) ratio, which is low and declines steadily, 
the pooling method generates a much higher ROE. The latter finding results from two 
effects: First, the combined firm's equity is comparably low because no fair value ad-
justments were made and no goodwill was recognized. Since equity is the denominator in 
the ROE formula, ROE is higher. Second, the numerator in the ROE formula, earnings, is 
undiminished by any goodwill amortization and, not explicitly considered here, by any 
additional depreciation resulting from fair value adjustments to depreciable assets. De-
pending on the amount of the difference between the acquired firm's book value of net 
assets and the purchase price (called the acquisition premium),85 pooling accounting can 
make a business combination look much more profitable than it would appear in case of 
the purchase method. However, from a balance sheet perspective, purchase firms appear 
to be more solid due to lower financial leverage. 
2.3.2 Arguments raised in the discussion 
In the U.S. and other countries, the accounting methods applicable to business combina-
tions and the related issue of accounting for goodwill have been the subject of a "century-
85 See Davis ( 1996, p. 50). 
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old controversy". 86 While much of this debate centers on conceptual issues rooted in ac-
counting theory, financial statement preparers have also been concerned from a practical 
standpoint about the financial statement effects of alternative methods of accounting for 
goodwill. Since issues addressed in the fonner portion of the discussion are largely nor-
mative in nature, little infonnation can be derived from them regarding the incentives of 
managers with respect to goodwill accounting. Therefore, this section focuses largely on 
the practical aspects of the debate and the relevant assertions of the preparers of financial 
statements. However, the conceptual issues are briefly reviewed first in order to establish 
a common ground from which the practical aspects can be understood and discussed.87 
2.3.2.1 Conceptual issues 
The discussion focuses on purchased goodwill, the accounting concept, as defined in 
section 2.2 above. There are different ways to account for goodwill acquired in a busi-
ness combination (see Figure 3). 











Figure 3: Methods of accounting for goodwill acquired in a business combination 
Common to all of them is the fundamental problem of initial measurement of this techni-
cal residual, which involves a comparison of two components: The purchase price and 
the fair value of net identifiable assets acquired. Measuring purchase price might be con-
troversial in a stock-for-stock acquisition and/or when it is unclear whether incidental 
expenses, such as accounting and legal fees, should be included. 
Once measured, the subsequent treatment of goodwill conceptually depends on its eco-






Colley and Volkan (1988, p. 35). Hopkins, Houston and Peters (2000, p. 258) observe a "decades-old 
controversy". Brunovs and Kirsch (1991, p. 137) cite evidence according to which references to good-
will were made as early as 1417. 
For a summary of these issues, refer to Brunovs and Kirsch (1991, pp. 137-55) and Davis (1992, pp. 
78-83). 
Refer to section 2.2 above. 
In this context, "write off' is a neutral term that does not necessarily imply a charge against earnings. 
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ized as an asset on the balance sheet.90 Under the first alternative, goodwill could be ei-
ther charged directly against equity, bypassing the income statement, or deducted from 
earnings, reducing current income by the excess purchase price paid in the business com-
bination. The popular pooling method is a variant of the direct write-off to equity. 91 The 
direct write-off of goodwill avoids goodwill-related earnings charges in future periods. 
While the write-off to earnings generates such charges in the acquisition year, both the 
direct write-off to equity and the pooling method pennanently circumvent any goodwill-
related earnings effects of the business combination.92 
When goodwill is capitalized, the issue of its subsequent accounting treatment arises. In 
principle, goodwill could be either carried indefinitely as a pennanent asset (similar, for 
example, to land) or reduced gradually via amortization. At the heart of this decision is 
the conceptual question whether goodwill is subject to "wear and tear", i.e. whether it has 
a finite useful life or is valuable into infinity. 93 When the useful life of goodwill either is 
assumed to last pennanently (infinite useful life) or cannot be estimated (indefinite useful 
life), goodwill is subjected to recurring impainnent tests in order to detect any extraordi-
nary deterioration in value. 
On the other hand, an amortization approach assumes that the useful life of goodwill is 
both finite and reasonably estimable. Again, much flexibility is involved in this process, 
and any estimate of useful life must be regarded as more or less arbitrary. In addition, the 
appropriate method of amortization must be detennined. The widely used straight-line 
method of amortization would suggest that goodwill not only declines in value over its 





It has been mentioned briefly in section 2.2 above that, in Germany, it is a much-disputed issue 
whether goodwill fulfills the criteria of the German asset concept. Although relatively little disagree-
ment exists in the U. S. regarding the asset nature of goodwill, this question used to be subject to con-
siderable debate. For a summary, refer to Catlett and Olson (1968, ch. 2). See also Davis (1997, pp. 
334-5). 
Refer to the example in section 2.3 .1 above. The main difference between the pooling method and the 
direct charge of goodwill to reserves (see, for example, section 301 par. 1 HGB) is that, under 
pooling, the assets and liabilities of the acquiree are carried over at book value and not remeasured to 
fair value. Any difference between purchase price and the acquiree' s stated capital is charged 
completely to the combined entity's reserves. 
As an added benefit, the pooling method creates " instant earnings" because it allows the combining 
entities' earnings to be aggregated as of the beginning of the reporting period in which the business 
combination occurred. See Jeter and Chaney (2001, p. 29). It must be noted that, in contrast to the 
pooling method, the direct write-off to equity does not prevent future earnings charges resulting from 
amortization of any acquired intangible assets or depreciation of any fair value adjustments. 
See, for example, Duvall et al. (1992, p. 1 ). 
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no way of avoiding goodwill-related earnings charges under this approach, the yearly 
amount of these charges can be controlled by selecting an appropriate useful life.94 
2.3.2.2 Status quo of accounting rules 
Depending on conceptual preferences and lobbyism in the standard-setting process, stan-
dard setters select from among the available accounting alternatives for goodwill. In this 
section, the development of the relevant rules applicable in the U. S. and selected other 
jurisdictions are described briefly.95 
2.3.2.2.1 United States 
Prior to the issuance of SFAS 141 and 142, accounting for business combinations and 
goodwill was governed by APB Opinions 16, Business Combinations, and 17, Intangible 
Assets, both issued in August 1970. Based on conceptual groundwork by Wyatt (l 963) 
and Catlett and Olson (1968), the APB argued that goodwill is an asset that should be 
recorded by the combined entity. However, where the ownership interests of two or more 
relatively equal companies are combined by exchange of equity securities, firms should 
be permitted to carry over their assets and liabilities at book value under the pooling 
method, provided that 12 criteria are met.96 The pooling method was used frequently97 
during a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the 1960s. Since concerns arose that the 
method was inappropriately applied to business combinations that did not, in fact, repre-







See, for example, Duvall et al . (1992, p. 2). 
See, for example, Hommel (2001a), Klein (2000), Krolak (2000), Kilting and Wirth (2003 , pp. 480-
4), Kilting and Harth (1999a, 1999b), Lachnit et al. (1999), Lopatta (2000), and Sellhorn (2000). 
Comparative textbook representations are given in Baetge, Kirsch and Thiele (2002b, pp. 238-45), 
Coenenberg (2003, ch. 9), Pellens (200 I, pp. 292-304, 3 I 0-20, 495-9), and Schildbach (2001 , ch. G). 
While IAS/IFRS and German standards are reviewed in some detail, a brief reference to U. K. ac-
counting rules is given in fn. 129 below. 
These criteria are contained in APB Opinion 16.45-8. In essence, they restrict certain financing and 
investing opportunities, such as share repurchases, and provide target firms with additional bargaining 
power in the negotiations. They are usually grouped into three categories: (I) Characteristics of the 
combining companies, (2) specifics of the stock-for-stock transaction, and (3) restrictions on post-
combination activities. For details, refer to Bocking, Klein and Lopatta (2001, p. 20), Desai et al. 
(2001, pp. 7-8), Rammer! (1999, p. 622), Vincent (1997, p. 5), and Weber (2000). Lys and Vincent 
(1995, pp. 365-8) document in a case study setting that satisfying these criteria can be costly. 
According to some, the use was excessive. See, for example, Davis (I 997, p. 332). 
For a detailed description of the development of the purchase and pooling methods, refer to Wyatt 
(1963) and Catlett and Olson (1968). Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 232) document that the pooling 
method was introduced in 1943 to prevent utility firms from incorporating asset revaluations and 
goodwill (representing "monopoly rents") into their asset bases used to calculate allowable profits. 
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Goodwill arising from business combinations accounted for using the purchase method 
was subjected to an amortization approach, owing to the APB's belief that "the value of 
intangible assets at any one date eventually disappears and that the recorded costs of in-
tangible assets should be amortized by systematic charges to income over the periods 
estimated to be benefited."99 The amortization period was arbitrarily100 restricted to 40 
years, 101 and amortization was required to follow the straight-line method unless it could 
be demonstrated that another method was more appropriate. 102 In addition to continual 
reviews of the amortization period, APB Opinion 17.31 states that an "( e ]stimation of 
value and future benefits of an intangible asset may indicate that the unamortized cost 
should be reduced significantly by a deduction in determining net income". However, no 
guidance was provided on how this impairment test should be conducted. 103 
In March 1995, the F ASB added to these provisions by issuing SF AS 121, Accounting 
for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be Disposed Of 
That statement required that (a portion of) goodwill be tested for impairment along with 
assets or asset groups with which it was associated. 104 Notably, goodwill impairment was 
avoided when the first test step indicated that the sum of the expected undiscounted cash 
flows generated by an asset or asset group exceeded their carrying value (including good-
will). 105 Once impaired, goodwill was not allowed to be written back up to avoid a 
blending of purchased and internally generated goodwill. 106 
APB Opinions 16 and 17 were extremely controversial for two reasons:107 First, the strict 
pooling criteria made it costly for firms to structure business combinations in a way that 
99 See APB Opinion I 7.27. Therefore, "(a]llocating the cost of goodwill .. . over time is necessary be-
cause the value almost inevitably becomes zero at some future date" (APB Opinion 17.23). 
100 "Since the date at which the value becomes zero is indeterminate, the end of the useful life must nec-
essarily be set arbitrarily at some point or within some range of time for accounting purposes" (APB 
Opinion 17.23). 
IOI See APB Opinion 17.29. Additional, shorter limit were imposed by the SEC on certain industries. 
102 See APB Opinion 17.30. 
103 See also Kilting, Brakensiek and Wirth (2000) and Segal (2003, p. 8). Henning, Shaw and Stock 
(2002, p. 3) conclude that the test had to be applied at the enterprise level. They note that "[t]hree 
methodologies evolved in practice: a market value method, undiscounted cash flow methods, and dis-
counted cash flow methods." 
104 See SFAS 121.12. SFAS 121.4-5 specified certain impairment indicators, i.e. "events or changes in 
circumstances (that] indicate that the carrying amount ofan asset may not be recoverable." 
105 See SFAS 121.6. However, in such circumstances a review of the amortization period might nonethe-
less be in order. 
106 See SFAS 121.1 I. 
107 See, for example, Davis (1997, p. 332) and Vincent (1997, p. 5). 
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allowed them to qualify for this desired accounting treatment. Second, the upper limit on 
the amortization period forced firms "stuck" with the purchase method to incur relatively 
large periodic goodwill charges against earnings. Commentators suggest that these dis-
puted rules eventually led to the demise of the APB, which was replaced in 1973 by the 
FASB.1os 
However, the F ASB itself did not change these provisions until 2001, when it issued 
SFAS 141 and 142 after a five-year standard-setting process and intense discussions with 
constituents. 109 These standards not only introduce an impairment-only approach to 
goodwill but also prohibit use of the pooling method entirely. The SEC, in August 1996, 
had urged the F ASB to reconsider the accounting treatment of business combinations, 110 
primarily due to an increase in merger and acquisition activity and the resulting aware-
ness that economically similar transactions could be accounted for using different meth-
ods that generated dramatically different financial statement results. 111 Taken together, 
SFAS 141 and 142 alleviate some of firms' formerly voiced concerns about the account-
ing treatment of goodwill. 112 While the pooling method is no longer allowed, depriving 
firms of the option to avoid recording goodwill, 113 amortization is also no longer manda-
tory. The impairment-only approach causes goodwill charges to no longer be an annual 
108 See Vincent (1997, p. 5). 
109 These standards are the subject of chapter 4 below. SFAS 142.B2-B15 gives an overview of the 
project history that eventually resulted in the issuance of SF AS 141 and 142. Jennings, LeClere and 
Thompson (2001, pp. 21-2) note that this process involved two exposure drafts, numerous public 
hearings and several field visits. Schoderbek and Slaubaugh's (2001) instructional assignment pro-
vides students with an opportunity to study contextual factors influencing the standard-setting process 
preceding SFAS 142. 
110 SeeVincent(l997,p. 5). 
Ill See SFAS 142.B5. 
112 These concerns are described in more detail in section 2.3 .2.3 below. 
113 
22 
However, it is interesting to note that firms' ability to immediately write off certain acquired R&D in 
process activities is not restricted under the new rules. SF AS 141 .42 carries over "the requirement in 
paragraph 5 of FASB Interpretation (FIN) No. 4, Applicability of F ASB Statement No. 2 to Business 
Combinations Accounted for by the Purchase Method, that the amounts assigned to tangible and in-
tangible assets to be used in a particular research and development project that have no alternative fu-
ture use shall be charged to expense at the acquisition date" (emphasis in original). However, the 
F ASB recently announced its intention to revoke FIN 4 in order to achieve convergence with IFRS. 
Deng and Lev ( 1998, p. 17) argue that "the accounting procedure of immediately expensing acquired 
R&D-in-process ... allows firms to use purchase accounting while approaching in substance the con-
sequences of pooling." This statement is true with the exception that, while the immediate write-off of 
R&D reduces income in the acquisition year, the pooling method does not. Consistent with this argu-
ment, Hopkins, Houston and Peters (2000, pp. 263-4, 268) document that, for purchase business com-
binations in which any premiums are written off as in-process R&D, test persons' stock price assess-
ments do not differ statistically from those for pooling business combinations. 
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burden on earnings but a more or less discretionary item. 114 This fact has led commenta-
tors to suggest that SPAS 141 and 142 represented a mere concession to lobbyists. 115 
2.3.2.2.2 International Accounting Standards 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) addresses the accounting for 
business combinations in IAS 22, Business Combinations.' 16 Under that standard, busi-
ness combinations that are acquisitions are accounted for using the purchase method. 
However, in unusual circumstances, when an acquirer cannot be identified in a transac-
tion of equally sized parties (uniting of interests), the pooling method is required. 117 
Goodwill arising in a purchase acquisition is capitalized as an asset, 118 amortized over its 
useful life and tested for impairment according to IAS 36, Impairment of Assets.119 IAS 
36 requires that goodwill be reviewed for impairment whenever indicators suggest that 
the fair value of a cash-generating unit with which goodwill is associated is not recover-
able. 120 An impairment loss must be recognized in the amount by which the carrying 
amount of the cash-generating unit (including goodwill) exceeds its recoverable 
amount. 121 A rebuttable presumption exists that the useful life of goodwill does not ex-
ceed 20 years. 122 The straight-line method is required unless persuasive evidence sug-
gests that another method reflects the pattern of value decline more appropriately.123 In 
contrast to U.S. GAAP, IAS 36 requires that a goodwill impairment loss be reversed if it 
114 In chapter 4 below, the discretionary nature of the impairment-only approach to goodwill is explored 
in more detail. Jennings et al. ( 1996, p. 513) provide evidence that this approach was recommended as 
early as 1991. See also Wang (1995, p. 46). 
115 See, for example, Beresford's (2001) powerful account of political involvement in the standard-
setting process preceding SFAS 142. See also Busse von Colbe (2001a), Pellens and Sellhom (2001b, 
p. 713). 
116 IAS 22 was revised in July 1998 and became effective for annual financial statements covering peri-
ods beginning on or after I July 1999. It was issued by the IASB' s predecessor, the International Ac-
counting Standards Committee (IASC), which reconstituted itself in 2001 and was renamed IASB. 
For an overview of that process, refer to Mandler (2003). 
117 See !AS 22.8, 13-6, 77-83 . See also Bocking, Klein and Lopatta (2001, pp. 19-20) and Yater (2001, 
pp. 1841-2). 
118 Mujkanovic (2001, pp. 814-6) takes issue with this notion, arguing that goodwill lacks the characteris-
tics of an asset. 
119 See !AS 22.41-58. 
120 See !AS 36.79-83 . For an introduction to IAS 36, refer to KUting, Dawo and Wirth (2003). 
121 See IAS 36.8. The recoverable amount is the higher of the cash-generating unit's net selling price and 
its value in use. 
122 See IAS 22.44. Where a longer amortization period is used, goodwill must be tested for impairment at 
least annually, in addition to the requirements oflAS 36. 
123 See IAS 22.45 . 
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was caused by a specific, exceptional external event, the effect of which has been subse-
quently overturned. 124 
In July 2001, the IASB initiated a project to revise the provisions of IAS 22 and align 
them with U. S. GAAP. This process resulted in Exposure Draft (ED) 3, Business Com-
binations, published in December 2002. 125 The final standard, IFRS 3, was issued in 
March 2004, entering into effect by fiscal 2005 .126 IFRS 3 essentially mirrors the provi-
sions of SF AS 141 and 142 in that it eliminates the pooling method and proposes an im-
pairment-only approach to goodwill. The impairment test procedure itself, regulated in 
IAS 36, remained essentially unchanged. IAS 36 prescribes a one-step test, which devi-
ates from the two-step procedure required in SFAS 142. 
2.3.2.2.3 Germany 
In Germany, accounting for goodwill has traditionally been characterized by an abun-
dance of accounting choices. The German Commercial Code, while requiring the pur-
chase method in most cases, allows firms to opt for the pooling method when at least 
90% of the acquiree' s net assets are purchased in a stock-for-stock business combination 
with no significant cash adjustment. 127 Goodwill arising in consolidated financial state-
ments can be treated in accordance with most of the alternatives discussed in section 
2.3.2. l above. 128 According to section 309 par. 1 HGB, goodwill can be written off di-
124 See IAS 36.109-12. 
125 Along with ED 3, accompanying amendments of IAS 36, Impairment of Assets, and IAS 38, Intangi-
ble Assets, were proposed. 
126 Amendments of IAS 36 and IAS 38 were adopted at the same time. Articles reviewing ED 3 include 
Bieker and Esser (2003), BrOcks and Wiederhold (2003), Fladt and Feige (2003), GrUnberger and 
GrUnberger (2002), IDW (2003), Pellens and Sellhom (2003), Streim, Bieker and Esser (2004), and 
WUstemann and Duhr (2003). The American Accounting Association's (AAA) Financial Accounting 
Standards Committee has authored a commentary on the proposal. See AAA Financial Accounting 
Standards Committee (2003). For summaries and critiques of the final standard, see Bieker and Esser 
(2004), Kilting and Wirth (2004), and BrUcks and Wiederhold (2004). 
127 See sections 301-2 HGB. See also Adler, During and Schmaltz (1995/2000, section 302 HGB), Bock-
ing, Klein and Lopatta (2001, p. 19), Busse von Colbe et al. (2003, pp. 346-52), Kiiting, Dusemond 
and Nardmann (1994, pp. 4-5), Mujkanovic (1999), and Yater (2001, p. 1841). 
128 In this respect, the German legislator carried over most of the choices provided in section 30 of the 
European "Consolidated accounts" directive (83/349/EWG). Kilting (2000), Kilting, Dusemond and 
Nardmann (1994) and Rammert and Wilhelm (1991a, 1991b) review the methods used by selected 
German firms. However, as will be discussed shortly, an impairment-only approach to goodwill ac-
counting was not commonly considered to be consistent with the directive. 
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reedy to reserves, 129 amortized over its useful life or charged to earnings over a period 
not to exceed four years. 130 An impainnent loss must be recorded when a pennanent de-
cline in goodwill value occurs. 131 Considerable debate surrounds the issue whether 
goodwill write-offs can be reversed. 132 
In August 2000, the Gennan private-sector standard setter, the Gennan Accounting Stan-
dards Board (GASB), issued Gennan Accounting Standard (GAS) 4, Acquisition Ac-
counting in Consolidated Financial Statements. 133 According to GAS 4.8, acquisitions 
are accounted for under the purchase method. 134 The accounting procedures prescribed 
with respect to goodwill are widely similar to those of IAS 22 and 36, one notable excep-
tion being that a disaggregation of the finn into cash-generating units or other subunits is 
not required, but only recommended. 135 Similar to IAS 36, subsequent write-ups are re-
quired under certain restrictive criteria. 136 
129 Apparently, this option is behind the fact that the pooling method never gained much popularity in 
Germany. See Bocking, Klein and Lopatta (2001, p. 17 fit. 3). The benefits of avoiding goodwill 
charges are less costly for firms to attain under this alternative than when the pooling criteria must be 
satisfied. Interestingly, the U. K. was among the few countries that also used to permit firms to use 
this accounting treatment for goodwill. Higson ( 1998, p. I 4 I) notes that "UK companies clearly en-
joyed [this] netting option, since they have almost invariably chosen it." Lee (1973, 1974) provides 
early evidence on this phenomenon. Exposure Draft (ED) 47, in which the U. K. Accounting Stan-
dards Board (ASB) proposed to abandon this option in 1990, met with strong opposition. Nobes 
(1992, pp. 155-7) and Warnock (1999) document the political influence exercised in this standard-
setting process. See also Huijgen (1996, p. 62). 
130 The direct write-off to equity is not available to goodwill recorded in a firm's individual financial 
statements. See section 255 par. 4 HGB. 
131 See sections 298 par. I, 253 par. 2 HGB. No impairment testing procedure is specified. The write-off 
is optional when the decline in value is deemed to be other than permanent. See also Adler, DUring 
and Schmaltz (1995/2000, par. 24 on section 309 HGB), Arnold (1997, pp. 165-8), Breidert (1994, 
pp. 176-8), Busse von Colbe (2001 b, par. 19), Busse von Colbe et al. (2003, p. 247), DOrschell and 
Schulte (2002, pp. 1669-75), IDW (2000), Kraft (2002, par. 33), Krolak (2000, pp. 105-8, 120-4), 
Ludz (1997, pp. 326-7), and Weber and ZUndorf(l989, p. 336). FOrschle and Hoffmann (2003, par. 
17-8) suggest a testing procedure similar to that required by IAS 22 and 36. See also Weber and ZUn-
dorf (I 998, par. 29-31 ). 
132 See FOrschle and Hoffmann (2003, par. 19) and the literature cited there. See also Arnold (1997, pp. 
168-9), Breidert (1994, pp. 177-8), Busse von Colbe et al. (2003, pp. 251-2), Kraft (2002, par. 35), 
and Ludz (1997, pp. 327-9). 
133 The standard was published in December 2000 by the Federal Ministry of Justice and is therefore 
regarded as an authoritative pronouncement. It (or the proposal preceding its issuance) is reviewed by 
Bocking, Klein and Lopatta (2000), FUlbier (2000), and Moxter (2001). 
134 Since the standard only applies to acquisitions, it does not address the question whether the pooling 
method should be permitted to account for business combinations that are not acquisitions. See also 
Bocking, Klein and Lopatta (2001, p. 25). 
135 See GAS 4.35 . 
136 See GAS 4.37. 
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2.3.2.3 Practical issues 
As explained above, pre-SFAS 142 U. S. GAAP and most other accounting regimes, 
including IAS, required that goodwill be amortized over its useful life. Therefore, much 
of the debate has centered on the issue that purchased goodwill must be charged against 
earnings in the years subsequent to acquisitions accounted for using the purchase method. 
Beams, Brozovsky and Shoulders (2000) have neatly summarized the problem that pre-
parers of financial statements have with goodwill amortization: 137 
"Once goodwill is on the books of a company, it can become a nuisance and a seri-
ous drag on earnings".138 
Firms domiciled in countries where this accounting treatment is mandatory claim that 
competitive disadvantages arise from the resulting earnings dilution. The primary con-
cern is an adverse stock price effect due to the earnings effect of goodwill amortiza-
tion.139 Similarly, acquirers using the purchase method feel discriminated against in rela-
tion to those using the pooling method' 40 and to foreign firms that are subject to less 
strict accounting rules. 141 For example, it has been claimed that U. K. firms can afford to 
outbid U.S. firms in offers for mergers and acquisitions because U. K. standards at the 
time allowed the direct write-off of goodwill to equity. 142 This suggestion implies that U. 
K. firms will incur higher marginal costs in acquisitions, allegedly because they believe 
that these costs are offset by benefits resulting from a favorable accounting treatment. 143 
137 Consequently, the following arguments are referred to as the "preparer's perspective" by Duvall et al. 
( I 992, p. 2). 
138 Beams, Brozovsky and Shoulders (2000, p. 18). In the words of Ellis (200 I, p. 112), "there is a con• 
tinued obsession with pooling-of-interests and EPS accretion, rather than price paid, value received, 
and the economic implications of future growth." 
139 Desai et al. (2001 , p. I) maintain that the FASB eliminated goodwill amortization "at least partially in 
response to concerns that goodwill amortization adversely affects share prices of acquirers." See also 
Blackburn Norris and Ayres (2000, p. 79), Brown, Tucker and Pfeiffer (1999, p. 13), Clinch (1997, p. 
346), Davis (1996, pp. 50, 54), and Duvall et al. (1992, p. 2). Hopkins, Houston and Peters (2000, p. 
258) cite additional references. 
14° FASB (1976) reports that 66% of 122 firms responding to a survey agreed with the statement that 
many business combinations accounted for by the pooling method would not have been consummated 
if the purchase method would have had to be applied to them. Hong, Kaplan and Mandelker (I 978, 
pp. 33-4) cite several early articles expressing the view that "companies using pooling-of-interests ac-
counting would have higher stock prices than were justified." Rammer! (1999, p. 628) interprets the 
pooling method as an instrument for "window dressing". 
141 See, for example, Davis (1997, p. 338). 
142 This choice was provided by Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) 22. It was aban-
doned when Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 10, Goodwill and intangible Assets, was issued in 
1997. 
143 For empirical evidence on this suggestion, refer to sections 2.4 .3.3 .1 and 2.4.3.4.2 below. 
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Apparently, these perceived drawbacks of goodwill amortization make firms reluctant to 
disclose this specific charge even when required to do so by the SEC. 144 
Likewise, the financial press claims that managers are indeed concerned about having to 
take goodwill write-offs. 145 Explaining the mechanics of the goodwill impairment test 
under SFAS 142, the author concludes that, if company B's likelihood of having to re-
cord a goodwill impairment loss pertaining to a contemplated acquisition in the near fu-
ture is higher than company A's, "it would be less likely to offer a large premium than 
company A." 
Consequently, firms have argued in favor of the pooling method, allegedly because this 
method allows them to avoid this goodwill-related "drag on earnings". 146 As explained 
above, the pooling method allows firms to avoid recording goodwill in an acquisition, 
even when the purchase price paid exceeds the fair values of the net assets acquired. As a 
result, acquiring firms' earnings subsequent to the business combination remain undimin-
ished by the fact that a premium over the acquiree' s book value has been paid. 
2.3.3 Theoretical analysis of arguments raised 
While managers are apparently worried about how goodwill accounting affects their fi-
nancial statements, some academics have been unwilling to acknowledge the validity of 
these concerns, arguing that users of financial statements do not behave as suggested by 
financial statement preparers' arguments. 147 When firm value is a function of expected 
future cash flows, a combined firm's market value of equity should not depend on the 
method applied to account for the transaction, provided that the accounting method cho-
sen will not affect the expected future cash flows of the combined entity. Accounting 
choices or changes that have no direct cash-flow effects are referred to as "cosmetic". 148 
144 Duvall et al. (1992, p. 6) report that, out ofa sample of485 firms having goodwill, only 115 (23.7%) 
disclosed the amount of goodwill amortization anywhere within their financial statements. Only 24 of 
these disclosures were made in the income statement. 
145 See Osterland (2002). 
146 According to Deng and Lev (1998, p. 17), it "is widely known that acquiring managers generally 
prefer the ' pooling' method of recording acquisitions over the 'purchase' method, since pooling 
avoids the recognition of goodwill and the subsequent drain on earnings from goodwill amortization". 
See also Nathan (1988, p. 187). 
147 Duvall et al. (I 992, p. 2) refer to the following arguments as the "user's perspective". 
148 See, for example, Lev and Ohlson (1982, p. 250). A typical example of an accounting choice that 
does affect cash flow directly is the choice between the LIFO and FIFO methods of inventory valua-
tion. This choice directly affects taxable income in the U.S. See, for example, Lindahl, Emby and 
Ashton ( 1988). 
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Stated differently, proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) in its semi-
strong form maintain that security prices fully reflect all publicly available information 
and are immediately updated to impound "news", regardless of the source of informa-
tion.149 If this hypothesis holds, investors should be indifferent whether a given business 
combination is accounted for using the pooling method or the purchase method, provided 
that the choice of accounting method has no cash flow effects. 150 They would be able to 
"see through" the financial statement presentation, using alternative sources of informa-
tion to assess the underlying economics ( cash flows) of the deal and value the combined 
firm accordingly.151 Managers, then, should not incur costs either by lobbying with stan-
dard setters in favor of the pooling method or by structuring a business combination to 
satisfy the pooling requirements. 152 
Preparers' concerns appear to be in stark contrast with this view: Managers apparently 
assume that investors fixate on earnings, which leads them to argue that the lower earn-
ings implied by purchase accounting depress stock prices. 153 Stated differently, "inves-
tors and financial analysts focus on earnings per share (EPS) and price-to-earnings (PIE) 
ratios in valuing companies. " 154 This functional fixation hypothesis "maintains that indi-
vidual investors interpret earnings numbers the same way regardless of the accounting 
procedures used to calculate them."155 If all investors made decisions in this way, there 
would be a mechanical relation between earnings and stock prices (mechanistic hypothe-
sis). Investors exhibiting this behavioral pattern are "fooled" or "misled" by firms' ac-
counting methods and choices and therefore referred to as "unsophisticated" or "na-
149 See Fama (1970). The implications of this paradigm for accounting research are discussed by Beaver 
(1981), Brown (2001, pp. 13-4), Kothari (2001, pp. I 10-1), and Mayer-Sommer (1979). Also, refer to 
section 3.3.2.4.1 below for a discussion of the relation between the EMH and "cosmetic" accounting 
differences. 
150 See, for example, Jenkins (I 999). 
151 Brown, Tucker and Pfeiffer (1999, p. 13) argue as follows: "Given a properly specified conditional 
expectation of securities returns, as well as information efficiency in the securities market, we would 
not expect to observe any systematic relations between goodwill amortization and subsequent securi-
ties returns." See also Davis (1996, p. 53). Early research, including Beaver and Dukes (I 973), sug-
gests that investors can "see through" cash-neutral accounting differences. In the words of Kaplan and 
Roll (1972, p. 245): "Earnings manipulation may be fun, but its profitability is doubtful." See also 
Archibald (1972) and Lindahl, Emby and Ashton (1988) . 
152 See Wyatt (I 983, p. 60). 
153 See Martinez-Jerez (2001, p. 24). 
154 Vincent (I 997, p. 5). 
155 See Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 160). 
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i:Ve". 156 The mechanistic hypothesis is consistent with the classical approach to account-
ing theory.157 However, it directly contradicts the efficient market hypothesis. 158 
In summary, the extent to which preparers' concerns are justified depends on two empiri-
cal questions: First, stock price effects are expected to the extent that the accounting 
method used changes investors' expectations regarding the finn, either by providing in-
cremental infonnation on the finn's future cash flows or by changing these cash flows 
directly. 159 Second, in the absence of such cash flow effects, stock price effects are ex-
pected only when the EMH is not descriptive and, instead, the functional fixation hy-
pothesis explains the behavior of at least some investors. 160 
The method used to account for a given business combination does not automatically 
affect the direct cash flows of the combined finn. 161 Because the pooling method is only 
available in stock-for-stock acquisitions, 162 tax differences do not arise since amortization 
of goodwill resulting from such acquisitions is not tax deductible. 163 As Nobes (1996) 
points out, goodwill charges arising from goodwill in a finn's consolidated financial 
156 See Watts (1992, p. 3) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 160). Hand (1990) investigates an 
"extended functional fixation hypothesis", which he contrasts with the "traditional" one. The 
extended version assumes that not all investors are equally (un)sophisticated. Then, stock price 
implications of accounting data depend on the degree of sophistication of the marginal investor 
setting a firm's stock price. 
157 See, for example, White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 168). 
158 Kothari (200 I, pp. 186-207) reviews of a body of literature that tests market efficiency in an account-
ing context. With specific regard to the literature relevant here, on accounting method differ-
ences/changes and the functional fixation hypothesis, Kothari (200 I, p. 199) concludes that the evi-
dence "rules out noticeable magnitudes of market fixation on reported financial statement numbers." 
This literature is reviewed in more detail in section 2.4 .4. 
159 See, for example, Day and Hartnett (1999/2000, p. 199). 
160 Martinez-Jerez (200 I, p. 5) argues in essentially the same way when he specifies three conditions 
under which the choice of pooling or purchase should have no impact on the capital market assess-
ment of a merger: Capital markets are efficient, the purchase/pooling choice does not proxy for the 
economic attributes of the deal, the purchase/pooling choice does not affect the contracting environ-
ment of the firm. 
161 See Desai et al. (2001 , p. 2) and Vincent (1997, p. 5). 
162 See APB Opinion 16.45 . 
163 See Blackburn Norris and Ayres (2000, p. 79 fu. I), Hong, Kaplan and Mandelker (1978, p. 31), 
Hopkins, Houston and Peters (2000, p. 258 fu. 2), Lindenberg and Ross (1999, p. 32), and Robinson 
and Shane (1990, p. 31). For the U. K., see Nobes (1992, p. 156 fu. 13). With respect to cash acquisi-
tions, Davis (I 996, p. 53) points out that those accounted for as purchases are taxable, meaning that 
goodwill amortization is tax deductible. This fact results, ceteris paribus, in a future tax benefit for the 
acquirer. However, due to the acquisition's taxability, the sellers will incur capital gains taxes that 
should, ceteris paribus, raise purchase price. Therefore, the net tax effect on future cash flows is diffi-
cult to assess. It seems justified to assume that no future cash flow effects are associated with the pur-
chase/pooling choice. 
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statements are tax deductible in virtually no jurisdiction, since consolidated financial 
statements are in most cases irrelevant for tax purposes. 164 Authors suggesting tax de-
ductibility of goodwill either refer to purchased goodwill in a company's individual fi-
nancial statements or are mistaken. 165 
However, indirect cash flow differences between the two methods might arise from con-
tracts between the company and internal or external participants which are stated in ac-
counting terms. Such contracts include debt covenants and compensation agreements. 166 
Due to such interdependencies, Lev and Ohlson (1982) conclude that "the conventional 
dichotomy between accounting changes having 'cosmetic' and those having real (cash-
flow) effects is clearly simplistic."167 
In addition, the choice of accounting method might lead investors to alter their expecta-
tions about the firm's future prospects. Management might be signaling information with 
their exercise of that choice, exercising their discretion about reported accounting num-
bers so as to reduce the information asymmetry that might exist in their favor about the 
distribution of future cash flows. 168 
Goodwill accounting might present a special challenge which will make it problematic 
even for sophisticated investors to "see through" the cosmetic earnings effect. It has been 
argued that, while financial statement users have no difficulties in disentangling goodwill 
amortization from other, "real" expenses for relatively recent acquisitions, they are much 
less able to unravel the financial statement effects of the purchase method when acquisi-
tions occurred several periods ago. 169 This difficulty might lead them to penalize finns 
using the purchase method for their, ceteris paribus, lower earnings relative to firms us-
164 See also Nobes and Norton (1996) for a summary of the tax treatments of goodwill in different 
jurisdictions. 
165 Nobes (1996) explicitly directs this criticism at Dunne and Ndubizu (1995) but notes that a large 
number of other papers suffer from the same problem. See Nobes (1996, p. 591). Beatty and Weber 
(2004, fn. I) note that SF AS 142 did not affect the accounting treatment of goodwill amortization. 
166 For example, Aboody, Kasznik and Williams (2000) claim that the form of top management compen-
sation may affect the choice of accounting in mergers. This "contracting" theory is explored in more 
detail in section 3.3.2.3 below. 
167 Lev and Ohlson (1982, p. 250). 
168 For an application of the information asymmetry and signaling arguments to accounting research, 
refer to Gonedes (1978) and Watts and Zimmerman (I 986, pp. 165-6). A literature review is provided 
by Gonedes and Dopuch (1974). 
169 Duvall et al. (1992) document that accounting information related to goodwill (e.g. book value, amor-
tization expense and amortization policy) is frequently difficult to infer from published financial 
statements. 
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ing the pooling method.170 Interestingly, in Hopkins, Houston and Peters' (2000) experi-
mental setting, analysts could accurately recall the total amount of goodwill and of amor-
tization included in the most recent income statement. Consequently, the authors argue 
that the failure to adjust income for the effect of amortization was not necessarily, as has 
been suggested in the literature, 171 because investors could not find information about 
goodwill or goodwill amortization in later years. 172 Rather, they maintain that people use 
simplifying strategies in complex task environments and that people tend to use data the 
way they are provided.173 
2.4 Empirical evidence relevant to the goodwill debate 
2.4.1 Overview 
The discussion presented in sections 2.3.2.3 and 2.3.3 above has not only influenced 
standard setting, but has also motivated a vast area of research. It suggests two empirical 
issues relevant to this dissertation: First, the arguments produced by financial statement 
preparers imply this group's belief that the financial statement effects of alternative 
goodwill accounting treatments influence the behavior of financial statement users, even 
in the absence of cash flow effects. 174 Preparers' financial reporting decisions will be 
influenced by the expected impact of such user behavior on preparers' utility. Empirical 
research into the actual determinants of preparers' goodwill-related accounting decisions 
provides evidence on whether these decisions are actually influenced by how preparers 
believe that users will respond to them. Second, another empirical question is how finan-
cial statement users' actually view goodwill-related accounting issues that do not impact 
cash flows. Empirical research into actual user behavior allows researchers to infer 
whether preparers' beliefs and concerns are justified. 
170 This assertion presents a challenge to the semi-strong form information efficiency hypothesis. See 
Desai et al. (2001, p. 2 fu . 3). 
171 See Palepu (1987, p. 88) and Lys and Vincent (1997, p. 374). 
172 See Hopkins, Houston and Peters (2000, p. 259). 
173 See Hopkins, Houston and Peters (2000, p. 263). 
174 This belief is contrary to what the EMH suggests. Refer to section 3.3.2.4.1 for the importance of 
managers' beliefs. White, Sondhi and Fried (1997, p. 224 fu. 14) note, albeit in a different context, 
"that market efficiency does not mean that everyone (in this case, management) believes it is effi-
cient." 
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The evidence reviewed in this section addresses both of these issues. 175 Obviously, the 
extent to which inferences from prior research findings generalize to the transitional 
SFAS 142 setting is limited. However, the findings are nonetheless expected to improve 
formulation of hypotheses about managers' transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-off 
behavior for two reasons: First, this research provides insights into different aspects of 
managers' financial reporting behavior regarding goodwill in general. Actual manage-
ment behavior is more informative in this respect than managers' publicly stated asser-
tions. Second, from the empirical findings inferences can be drawn about financial state-
ment users' actual position regarding goodwill accounting, regardless of what preparers 
believe this position to be. Observing users' actual responses to goodwill accounting 
might even challenge managers' formerly held beliefs and thereby influence their good-
will-related financial reporting behavior in the context of SFAS 142. In summary, these 
findings are expected to contribute to an understanding of how managers are likely to 
exercise their discretion regarding the accounting for goodwill in the year in which SF AS 
142 is initially applied. 176 
As with other areas of financial reporting, empirical research on goodwill accounting 
cannot lead to prescriptions how goodwill should be accounted for. 177 Also, as White, 
Sondhi and Fried (2003) point out, "any transactions ... or change in market prices [in-
duced by accounting data make] some people better off than others. Thus, deciding the 
best alternative necessarily [involves] judgment affecting social consequence and the 
general welfare, which [are] deemed to be 'political' in nature and beyond the realm of 
academic research". 178 Therefore, the purpose of the following literature review is ex-
175 Reviews of the relevant literature include Clinch (1997) and Davis (1997). While every effort is made 
to give a comprehensive overview of this field of research, it cannot be ruled out that individual stud-
ies have escaped consideration, given the enormous wealth ofliterature published on these issues. 
176 The research presented in this section draws on theories about the determinants and consequences of 
financial reporting decisions in general. These theories are not reviewed before chapter I, where they 
are placed in the context of discretionary asset write-off studies. The focus of this section is predomi-
nantly on research results and implications for the question at hand as opposed to theoretical and 
methodological considerations. Transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs are argued to have more in 
common conceptually with other discretionary asset write-offs, which are the subject of chapter 1, 
than with the wide array of goodwill-related financial reporting decisions reviewed here. 
177 See Clinch (1997, p. 342), Holthausen and Watts (2001). 
178 White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 170). See also Huijgen (1996, p. 30): "Although [market-based 
accounting research] is capable of showing the welfare implications of accounting disclosures, it is 
the task of policymakers to ultimately judge whether these welfare implications are desirable." 
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pressly not to generate nonnative prescriptions about how business combinations and 
goodwill should be accounted for. 179 
2.4.2 Research questions 
The degree of persuasiveness of this body of literature depends on how directly the re-
spective studies analyze preparers' and users' attitudes towards goodwill write-offs re-
corded in the year of transition to an impairment only-based goodwill accounting stan-
dard. The evidence reviewed here relates to preparers' and users' past behavior with re-
gard to a wide array of goodwill-related accounting decisions. The research questions 
pursued can be summarized as shown in Figure 4. 




What are preparers' beliefs regarding 
users' views of goodwill write-offs? 
• Survey of preparers 
• Studies of preparers' past 
behavior 
• What determined goodwill 
write-off behavior? 
• What influenced their other 
goodwill-related accounting 
decisions? 
- Choice of amortization 
periods and methods 
- Purchase price allocation 
• What influenced their 
purchase/pooling decisions? 
• For which goodwill-related 




What are users' actual perceptions 
of goodwill write-offs? 
• Survey of users 
• Studies of users' past behavior 
• How did they respond to 
(announcements of) goodwill 
impairment write-offs? 
• Are goodwill and goodwill-
related charges associated 
with stock prices? 
• How did investors respond 
to the purchase/pooling 
decision? 
• How did investors respond 
to mandated changes in 
goodwill-related accounting 
rules? 
Figure 4: Empirical evidence on the goodwill debate 
Perhaps most directly related to the problem at hand are studies of the factors influencing 
goodwill write-off behavior, preferably under SFAS 142. 180 In addition, research on 
managers' goodwill-related accounting decisions involving issues such as the choice of 
179 White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, pp. 165-6) summarize this "classical approach" to accounting re-
search from an American point of view. Much of the academic literature on goodwill accounting in 
Germany has adopted this methodology. Refer to section 2.2. Furthermore, the focus is not on criticiz-
ing the research questions and methods used to arrive at the findings presented. Instead, most of the 
results are taken at face value, and their respective contributions to the question at hand are analyzed. 
180 The only such studies to date, to my knowledge, are Henning, Shaw and Stock's (2002) and Segal's 
(2003 ). The determinants of goodwill write-offs under an earlier accounting regime are the subject of 
Francis, Hanna and Vincent's (1996) analysis. 
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acquisition accounting method, amortization periods and procedures, or the approach 
used to allocate the purchase price after an acquisition, is also potentially infonnative. 
Finally, inferences can be drawn from management's lobbying behavior in the standard-
setting process preceding goodwill-related accounting rules. 
Since, as discussed above, managers' incentives are primarily shaped by their beliefs 
concerning investors' reactions to their goodwill-related accounting decisions, studies of 
investors' actual past reactions to such decisions are, strictly speaking, not direct evi-
dence in this context. However, to the extent that managers are aware of research on in-
vestors' actual past reactions to goodwill-related accounting decisions, deem this re-
search credible, and believe the findings to be indicative of investors' future behavior, 
their beliefs are likely to be influenced by that research. Therefore, analyses of investors' 
actual past reactions to different goodwill-related accounting decisions are also reviewed 
here. However, it is noted here that individual investors' perceptions are not observed 
directly. Instead, stock price behavior is used as an aggregate proxy for the unobservable 
perceptions and reactions of investors in most cases. 
The predictive ability of these findings for managers' SFAS 142 goodwill write-off be-
havior is open to debate. In essence, it depends on the extent to which the empirical and 
institutional setting investigated in this dissertation is perceived to differ from the settings 
analyzed in prior studies. First, an impainnent-only approach to goodwill accounting as 
prescribed under SFAS 142 is largely unprecedented, even internationally. Managers as 
well as capital market participants, e.g. financial analysts, had no experience, prior to the 
date of adoption, in applying these rules and interpreting the data reported under them, 
respectively. Therefore, results from previous research might not generalize because 
most of them originate from different time periods, accounting regimes, and economic 
settings. Second, the fact that the period of initial application of a new accounting stan-
dard is analyzed, with the transition effects being reported as changes in accounting prin-
ciple, might have certain implications in itself. 181 
2.4.3 Direct evidence 
In this section, a body of literature on managers' past goodwill-related accounting deci-
sions and their detenninants is summarized. This literature provides relatively direct evi-
dence of how managers think goodwill-related accounting issues are perceived by finan-
cial statement users. 
181 Refer to section 3.3.2.4.8 below. 
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2.4.3.1 Survey evidence 
Conceptually, the most direct way of learning about managers' beliefs regarding users' 
perception of transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs would be to elicit their views in 
a survey. To my knowledge, such survey evidence does not exist at present. It is doubt-
ful, even if a sufficient number of managers could be motivated to participate in that type 
of survey, whether their responses would be entirely and verifiably truthful. When the 
FASB issued SFAS 141 and 142, the financial press conducted polls to elicit constitu-
ents' views on the subject. However, while these results are interesting to note in passing, 
they are by no means representative and are therefore not further relied on here.182 
However, scientific survey evidence of managers' attitudes toward goodwill accounting 
in a more general setting does exist. Gore, Taib and Taylor (2000) use a postal question-
naire to explicitly analyze management's beliefs regarding a proposed change in manda-
tory goodwill accounting standards in the U. K. 183 Usable responses from 212 firms 
show, among other things, "that corporate managements' goodwill accounting prefer-
ences are .. influenced to a great extent by their beliefs about how the stock market (rep-
resented by financial analysts) would respond to the financial statement impact of 
changes in standards." 184 Specifically, responding managers believe "that analysts would 
downgrade their rating if their company's profits were lower due to enforced goodwill 
amortisation".185 The authors form hypotheses regarding cross-sectional differences in 
manager preferences for either capitalization-based or immediate write-off approaches to 
goodwill accounting. Cross-sectional regression analysis shows that these preferences are 
significantly related to contracting-based incentives as well as capital markets-based in-
182 For example, CFO magazine established on its website (www.cfo.com) a whole section on the new 
rules and conducted an online survey of managers' expectations regarding the new rules. (The results 
are reported in the "Discussion" section of the website.) Two polls are worth mentioning here: (I) 
Asked whether they expected to take a goodwill write-off during the adoption period, responding 
managers answered "yes" (127 votes/42%), "no" (I 14/38%) and "not sure" (57/19%). Interestingly, 
these results reflect managers ' expectations as of October 2001, suggesting that most managers (81%) 
were already sure what write-off behavior would be long before they had actually had the opportunity 
to conduct an impairment test. (2) In another poll, CFO magazine asked about managers' main con-
cerns with regard to the new rules. The responses, as of June 200 I, suggest that managers find most 
troublesome the costly appraisal of reporting units ( 172 votes/51 %). Other concerns include the 
stricter amortization requirements for intangible assets (46/14%), possible SEC scrutiny of the pur-
chase price allocation (41 /12%), the elimination of the pooling method (2517%), and investors' al-
leged ignorance ofrelated disclosures (55/16%). 
183 See Gore, Taib and Taylor (2000, pp. 216-7). 
184 Gore, Taib and Taylor (2000, p. 224). 
185 Gore, Taib and Taylor (2000, p. 224). 
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centives. 186 More specifically, the authors find that managers' preferences are related to 
the way in which the proposed accounting rules would affect that restrictiveness of their 
firms' accounting-based debt covenants and their own accounting-based compensa-
tion. 187 Furthennore, the results indicate managers' belief that analysts are misled by 
goodwill accounting: Among other things, analysts are believed to penalize firms for the 
earnings drag caused by goodwill amortization and to favor, in an international setting, 
firms that write off goodwill to reserves. 
2.4.3.2 Determinants of goodwill write-offs 
Given the scarce survey evidence, other areas of research are reviewed for evidence of 
preparers' beliefs regarding users' perception of goodwill write-offs. These beliefs can, 
to some extent, be deduced from preparers' past reporting behavior in conjunction with 
this decision. If managers believe that, ceteris paribus, transitional goodwill write-offs 
(especially when they occur unexpectedly early and are unexpectedly large) will cause 
negative reactions by investors, they will use their financial reporting discretion to avoid, 
delay and/or understate these charges. Conversely, if management supposes that, ceteris 
paribus, transitional goodwill write-offs will produce positive stock price effects, they 
will record these charges, using their discretion to accelerate and/or overstate them. 188 
Therefore, the analysis in section 3.3 of what previous research implies about managers' 
goodwill write-off behavior is referred to here. The primary finding reported by Francis, 
Hanna and Vincent (1996) is that "incentives ... play a substantial role in explaining 
goodwill write-offs". 189 They provide evidence that, consistent with a "big bath" conjec-
ture, a previous change in top management is positively related to the amount of good-
will write-off, while unexpectedly good earnings performance is negatively associated 
with it. 190 The authors note that the latter finding contradicts the income smoothing hy-
186 See Gore, Taib and Taylor (2000, p. 221 ). The latter incentives are referred to by the authors as "in-
formation effect" incentives (p. 217). 
187 Theoretical background on these incentives is given in section 3.3.2.3 below. 
188 Similarly, if managers think goodwill write-offs are viewed as noise in the transition period whereas 
goodwill write-offs occurring in later periods are not, goodwill write-off behavior will be detennined, 
as outlined above, by how managers believe users will view these charges in later periods. 
189 Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 134). 
190 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 125). 
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pothesis, under which unexpectedly good perfonnance would be predicted to trigger a 
write-off that brings earnings in line with expectations. 191 
In one of the first, preliminary studies of SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs, Henning, Shaw 
and Stock (2002) report that, of a "transition sample" consisting of 1,482 firms, 681 
firms announced the results of their transitional impainnent tests as early as the first 
quarter of 2002. 192 205 (30.1 % ) of these finns indicated that they were going to record an 
impainnent loss. The authors further indicate an association of write-off behavior with 
prior stock perfonnance: Over 90% of transition finns with significantly negative abnor-
mal stock returns decided to recognize goodwill impainnents. 193 These finns also wrote 
off larger portions of their goodwills and had higher debt-to-capital ratios. The authors 
note that managers apparently maximized transitional goodwill impainnent, consistent 
with "big bath" behavior, because the impairment is displayed "below the line" in the 
adoption year. 194 
Using an approach similar to that of Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996), Segal (2003) 
analyzes, among other things, the detenninants of goodwill write-offs in the adoption 
year of SF AS 142. This component ofSegal's approach is similar to the one proposed in 
this dissertation. Segal largely extends the Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) study by 
adding more recent SFAS 121 data and including SFAS 142 data. However, he focuses 
on finns that publicly announced SFAS 142 write-offs, which results in a biased sample. 
Also, the sample only includes write-offs announced during the first half of 2002, which 
neglects finns that made use of the whole year available to them to complete the impair-
ment test under SFAS 142. 
Segal (2003) investigates whether certain economic factors (impainnent) as well as fi-
nancial reporting incentives are associated with the amount written off. 195 In terms of 
191 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 133). The amount of goodwill write-off is further found to 
be higher when the firm has a history of previous write-offs. See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, 
p. 125). However, Francis, Hanna and Vincent's (1996) might have to interpreted with caution be-
cause they do not examine a really comprehensive set of potential incentives. For example, they focus 
on capital market-related incentives, failing to address incentives suggested by contracting theory. 
192 It must be noted that the authors address a wide array of research questions in this paper, of which the 
determinants of transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off behavior are only a minor component. Also, 
they do not include the entire transition period, but focus on a "transition sample" of first-quarter dis-
closures. Their findings do not generalize because firms did not have to complete their transitional 
goodwill impairment test before the end of the adoption year. 
193 See Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002, p. 20). This percentage was significantly lower for firms with 
insignificantly negative or even positive abnormal returns. 
194 See Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002, p. 21). 
195 See Segal (2003, pp. 15-7). 
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economic variables, he hypothesizes that poor historical finn and industry perfonnance 
makes a write-off more likely. With regard to financial reporting incentives, he conjec-
tures that a change in top management as well as unexpectedly high (income smoothing) 
and low (big bath) earnings will tend to induce a write-off, while the amount written off 
will tend to be limited by debt covenant restrictions. In contrast to Francis, Hanna and 
Vincent (1996), he finds that the income smoothing variable is a significant explanatory 
factor of goodwill write-offs, suggesting that managers record write-offs in an attempt to 
smooth their companies' earnings over time. Since financial reporting incentives play a 
more significant role in explaining SFAS 121 write-offs in his study, Segal concludes 
that "SFAS No. 142 write downs are more associated with economic variables [than 
SFAS No. 121 write-offs] and less associated with reporting incentives." 196 
In a recent working paper that adopts an approach widely similar to the one pusued here, 
Beatty and Weber (2004) interpret finns ' adoption ofSFAS 142 not so much as a good-
will-related accounting decision but rather as a tradeoff between the timing of expense 
recognition and the question where to report an expense item. Consequently, they ab-
stract from goodwill-specific issues relating to SFAS 142 adoption. They find that finns 
have incentive to accelerate expense recognition (and secure the benefit of below-the-line 
treatment) where debt covenants, bonus plans, or delisting status are affected by goodwill 
impainnent. Conversely, finns are found to defer expense recognition (and report good-
will impainnent within income from continuing operations) where the CEO has been 
recently appointed and where a finn's earnings from continuing operations are highly 
priced. 
2.4.3.3 Determinants of other goodwill-related financial reporting decisions 
As discussed in section 2.3.2.3 above, managers are widely assumed to believe that in-
vestors respond negatively to the future earnings drag from goodwill charges subsequent 
to acquisitions. 197 The above-mentioned survey conducted by Gore, Taib and Taylor 
(2000) sheds some light on "the effects on management preferences of their beliefs about 
revisions in market perceptions of their companies resulting from changes in goodwill 
accounting" in a general sense.198 It documents that the responding U. K. finn managers' 
inclination towards different goodwill-related accounting approaches is in part influenced 
196 Segal (2003 , p. 26). 
197 See, for example, Davis ( I 996, p. 50): "[T]he question is whether the acquirer's share price will be 
affected ... by the big negative impact of goodwill amortization on the bottom line? Many merger par• 
ticipants and observers appear to think so." For further references, see Davis (I 996, p. 51). 
198 Gore, Taib and Taylor (2000, p. 13). 
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by how they expect financial statement users to behave when these different approaches 
becoming mandated accounting rules. Again, it must be noted that, since their focus is 
not on goodwill write-offs, their findings do not necessarily generalize to the issue fo-
cused on here. 199 However, their results do suggest that managers are generally con-
cerned with a potential adverse effect of goodwill-related charges on earnings.20° Cross-
sectional differences in managers' choices among accepted goodwill-related accounting 
rules allow inferences regarding managers' beliefs pertaining to users' perception of 
goodwill-related accounting decisions. Similarly, management's beliefs can be inferred 
from the way they exercise their goodwill-related financial reporting discretion. 
2.4.3.3. I Influence of goodwill accounting rules on acquisition premiums 
The underlying theme of the goodwill debate is that the availability of favorable good-
will-related accounting treatments puts firms at a competitive advantage over firms that 
are subject to less beneficial rules. That advantage is argued to translate into a willing-
ness to bid higher in acquisitions. For example, an argument frequently put forward is 
that those firms are put at a competitive advantage which either have the option of apply-
ing the pooling method instead of the purchase method or which, when required to use 
purchase accounting, can charge any resulting goodwill directly against equity. Firms 
domiciled in jurisdictions where purchase accounting is mandatory and goodwill must be 
charged against income, then, are viewed to be at a competitive disadvantage. This al-
leged disadvantage refers primarily to the international takeover market. While the ac-
quirer's determination of purchase price is not strictly an accounting issue, the related 
evidence is relevant here and is therefore reviewed in some detail next.201 
199 For example, the survey is primarily concerned with what managers believe a mandated accounting 
change, not some voluntary goodwill-related accounting decision given a fixed set of rules, will do to 
users' perception of their firm. Also, the authors did not specifically elicit management's belief re-
garding users' perception of goodwill write-offs. 
200 To reiterate this point, this does not say anything about the empirical validity of the EMH. However, 
it does suggest that managers' belief in the EMH might not be very strong, and that the occurrence of 
earnings management behavior inconsistent with the EMH cannot be ruled out a priori. 
201 The question whether managers are willing to pay for the avoidance of down-the-road goodwill 
charges is relevant in its own right, and must be viewed independently of users' actual reaction to 
those, allegedly overpaid, transactions. It calls for a direct analysis of managers' goodwill-related ac-
counting decisions, which in turn will yield insights into managers' beliefs and incentives. If empiri-
cal evidence can document that the availability of favorable accounting treatment influences manag-
ers' willingness to pay, this suggests that the "cosmetic" costs associated with future goodwill charges 
are perceived to outweigh the "real" benefits of a lower acquisition price. A related issue is the choice 
of payment method. See, for example, Gregory (2000). 
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Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), in an analysis of 1,273 acquisitions ofU. S. firms by do-
mestic (1,114) and foreign (159) acquirers during the period 1970-87, show that foreign 
buyers pay substantially higher purchase prices than U.S. acquirers.202 They investigate 
several explanatory factors, not including, however, the accounting treatment of the ac-
quisition in the acquirer's financial statements. Since most of these potential determi-
nants (industry characteristics, tax effects, exchange rate levels, and bidder experience) 
fail to explain the purchase price difference, there is potential that the accounting treat-
ment is, at least partially, responsible for this effect. Other researchers have tried to ex-
plicitly consider the accounting treatment as an explanatory variable. 
Choi and Lee (1991) examine whether national differences in accounting standards on 
the treatment of purchased goodwill help explain any differences in merger premiums.203 
In an analysis of 1,160 acquisitions ofU. S. firms by domestic (1,056) and U. K. (104) 
acquirers announced during the period 1985-89, they find that U. K. firms pay higher 
premiums in acquisitions than do U. S. firms, concluding that these "higher premium 
differences on the part of U.K. acquirers do appear to be associated with not having to 
amortize goodwill to reported eamings."204 In addition, premiums paid by U. K. firms 
tend to be more highly associated with goodwill than those paid by U. S. firms. Clinch 
( 1997) criticizes that Choi and Lee (1991) do "not explicitly specify and test the link be-
tween goodwill accounting and subsequent economic consequences. "205 While the au-
thors do speculate that goodwill-related accounting rules encourage U. S. acquirers to bid 
less than U. K acquirers because of possible compensation repercussions of goodwill 
amortization,206 they do not explicitly test this conjecture,207 e.g. by analyzing the rela-
tion between compensation schemes and merger premiums. Clinch (1997) concludes that 
the results of Choi and Lee ( 1991) are difficult to interpret because the amount of pre-
mium paid might be influenced by several factors, to which the accounting treatment of 
goodwill might or might not belong.208 This point is acknowledged by the authors who 
202 See Harris and Ravenscraft (1991, p. 842). 
203 Choi and Lee (1991, p. 223) estimate the merger premium as "the difference between the total offer-
ing price quoted on the deal announcement date and the market value of the acquired firm ... prior to 
the announcement date". This measure is different from what is commonly referred to as "acquisition 
premium" in accounting, the difference between purchase price and book value of net assets. 
204 Choi and Lee (1991, pp. 235-6). 
205 Clinch (1997, p. 346). 
206 See Choi and Lee (1991, p. 226). 
207 See Clinch (I 997, p. 347). 
208 See Clinch ( 1997, p. 346). For example, he cites differences in "the tax treatment of acquired subsidi-
aries" as a possibility. 
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note that "[ o ]ther variables such as strategic considerations may very well account for the 
merger premium differences observed."209 
A follow-up study by Lee and Choi (1992) yields similarly ambiguous results. Lee and 
Choi (1992) replicate Choi and Lee's (1991) analysis for a small sample of German, 
Japanese and U.S. acquirers. Again, the firms domiciled in the more "favorable" ac-
counting environment (Germany) pay, on average, higher premiums than those operating 
under an accounting system where application of the pooling method is either prohibited 
or subject to restrictive criteria, and where goodwill amortization is mandatory. The au-
thors interpret this finding as showing "that goodwill accounting does explain merger 
premia."210 Again, the authors are careful to point out that, while the accounting treat-
ment of goodwill might be an important determinant of the amount of merger premium 
paid, other factors, not controlled for in their regression models211 might be driving this 
behavior much more strongly.212 
Dunne and Ndubizu (1995) further corroborate the notion that "unfavorable" accounting 
rules put firms at a competitive disadvantage in the international market for corporate 
acquisitions. They study the effect of international differences in accounting treatments 
of goodwill on prices paid in acquisitions. Their sample consists of 95 acquisitions of 
U. S. firms by foreign bidders from seven different countries during the period 1983-88. 
Firms that have the option to write off goodwill directly to reserves apparently transfer 
greater wealth to target shareholders than do firms required to amortize goodwill against 
earnings. 213 
2.4.3.3.2 Determinants of purchase price allocation decisions 
While most of the studies summarized below report evidence from the Asia-Pacific 
area,214 the fact that the purchase price allocation process involves considerable discre-
tion is by no means limited to this region. 
209 Choi and Lee (I 991, p. 236). 
210 Lee and Choi (I 992, p. 220). 
211 Control variables, e.g. industrial affiliations and mode of payment, are presented in Lee and Choi 
(1992, pp. 228-9). 
212 See Lee and Choi (I 992, p. 233), referring to "strategic considerations and cost of capital differ-
ences." 
213 The authors also investigate the effects of differing tax treatments. As noted in section 2.3.3 above, 
Nobes (1996) criticizes Dunne and Ndubizu's (1995) failure to distinguish between goodwill from 
consolidations and other purchased goodwill, because only the latter is deductible for tax purposes. 
214 Goodwill-related rules for Australia and New Zealand are nearly identical. See Dunstan (1999, p. 5). 
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Wong and Wong (2001) investigate the detenninants of New Zealandian firms' account-
ing choices relating to allocating the acquisition price in a business combination to iden-
tifiable assets and goodwill.215 They point out that the presence of accounting-based debt 
covenants that restrict the ratio of consolidated debt to consolidated tangible assets is 
widely assumed to induce managers to allocate only the smallest possible portion of the 
purchase price to goodwill, suggesting a negative relation between leverage (a proxy for 
the restrictiveness of the covenant) and acquired goodwill.216 However, the authors point 
out that such relation might also be due to 'joint effects between each of these variables 
and the firm's investment opportunity set" represented by assets-in-place and the market-
to-book (MTB) ratio.217 Their empirical results indicate an "endogenous relation among 
the finn's asset structure, financing policy, and acquired goodwill",218 casting doubt on 
whether certain findings in prior research were interpreted correctly as supporting the 
debt covenant hypothesis. 
Dunstan's (1999) paper directly addresses the inference problems identified by Wong 
and Wong (2001).219 Her analysis "provides insight into the factors that motivate man-
agement' s discretionary accounting policy choices for goodwill." 220 She investigates 
"both ex ante and ex post explanations for the accounting treatment .. of goodwill"221 in 
163 Australian acquisitions occurring during the period 1988-94. Specifically, she is in-
terested in "the determinants of the decision to proportionately allocate the purchase 
price between goodwill and identifiable assets."222 Her ex ante explanations deal with the 
question if, in the absence of any earnings management and due to the acquired invest-
ment opportunity set (i.e., the economic nature of the given acquisition), the portion of 
purchase price recorded as goodwill is likely to be higher in some acquisitions than in 
others. In contrast, her ex post explanations are intended to clarify how managers are 
likely to exercise their discretion within the accepted set of accounting procedures, given 
the ex ante restrictions imposed on this discretion. The latter hypotheses include variants 
215 See Wong and Wong (2001, pp. 191-2). 
216 See Wong and Wong (2001, p. 180). 
217 Wong and Wong(2001, p. 191). 
218 WongandWong(200l,p. 191). 
219 Dunstan's (I 999, pp. 5-6) paper contains an at-length review of the pre-publication version of Wong 
and Wong's (2001) article. 
220 Dunstan (I 999, p. 33). 
221 Dunstan (1999, p. 2). 
222 Dunstan (I 999, p. 3). 
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of the bonus plan and debt covenant hypotheses.223 In summary, Dunstan (1999) reports 
that her overall model explains 8.5% (R2) of the cross-sectional variation in the propor-
tion of purchase price recorded as goodwill. Not all of the individual hypotheses are sup-
ported. 224 Of the ex post predictions, the debt covenant hypothesis is sustained.225 Ac-
cording to the data, managers allocate more of the purchase price to tangible assets (and 
less to goodwill) when they operate under debt covenants that restrict the ratio of total 
liabilities to total tangible assets.226 Further, Dunstan (1999) finds a positive indirect rela-
tion between the investment opportunity set of the acquirer, represented by the proportion 
of growth options, and goodwill. The rationale is that high growth option firms, due to 
their assumed lower leverage (higher relevance of equity financing) and non-existence of 
accounting-based compensation plans (higher relevance of market-based performance 
measures in compensation schemes), have less incentive to minimize reported good-
will.227 
Wines and Ferguson (1993) document firms' reluctance to incur goodwill amortization 
expenses by examining the accounting procedures adopted for goodwill and identifiable 
intangible assets by a sample of 150 Australian listed companies over the period I 985-
89. They find that, while goodwill accounting policies tended to converge over that pe-
riod, the opposite seemed to be true of accounting policies for identifiable intangible as-
sets. Increasingly, firms chose, in conflict with then effective GAAP, to recognize and 
not amortize identifiable intangible assets, often reclassified from goodwill, allegedly "in 
an effort to reduce the impact on reported operating profits of the requirement for the 
amortization of goodwill balances."228 
Grinyer, Russell and Walker (1991) analyze the determinants of the purchase price allo-
cation decision for a sample of 392 U. K. firm years during the period 1982-86. During 
that time, U. K. GAAP allowed firms to choose between immediately writing off good-
223 See Dunstan (1999, pp. 14-7). For a detailed explanation of these hypotheses, refer to sections 
3.3.2.3.3 and 3.3.2.3.4 below, respectively. 
224 See Dunstan (I 999, pp. 30-2). The intuitive ex ante prediction that the goodwill proportion would be 
positively associated with the level of growth options (versus assets in place) acquired, is supported. 
However, this finding does not allow any conclusions as to management's financial reporting incen-
tives. 
225 See Dunstan ( 1999, pp. 31-2). 
226 See Dunstan (1999, p. 14). Apparently, this type of restriction is common in Australian debt cove-
nants. See also Wong and Wong (2001). 
227 See Dunstan (I 999, pp. 17-8). 
228 Wines and Ferguson ( 1993, p. I 04). 
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will against reserves versus capitalizing and amortizing it.229 Due to considerable discre-
tion with regard to purchase price allocation, managers could effectively control the por-
tion of purchase price to be allocated to separable assets and, consequently, to goodwill. 
The authors find that finns with high leverage tended to allocate a greater portion of pur-
chase price to separable assets, strengthening their leverage-related balance sheet ra-
tios. 230 Grinyer, Russell and Walker (1991) conclude that the presence of accounting-
based debt covenants influences managers' purchase price allocation decisions.231 
2.4.3.3.3 Determinants of amortization parameters 
Exploiting a unique institutional setting, 232 Day and Hartnett (1999/2000) investigate 
"what might motivate the use of differential amortisation methods amongst firms and 
whether some sort of cash effect (direct or indirect) might feasibly flow from the [aban-
donment of the inverted-sum-of-years-digits method]."233 The hypotheses draw on the 
positive accounting theory introduced in section 3.3 .2.3 below. Specifically, the bonus 
plan, debt covenant, and political costs hypotheses as well as a contracting efficiency 
perspective are proposed. 234 The authors find significant differences in the goodwill-
related properties of the nine firms using the inverted-sum-of-years-digits method com-
pared to 38 other firms that do not use deferred amortization methods.235 While the po-
litical costs and debt covenant hypotheses are rejected, goodwill expense and the good-
will asset are significantly larger in firms that use the inverted-sum-of-years-digits 
method. 236 This finding is consistent with predictions from both the bonus plan and con-
tracting efficiency hypotheses, which creates interpretation problems. At best, the data 
229 Due to a unique provision in the U. K. Companies Act, firms were able to mitigate the equity-
decreasing effect of the immediate write-off under certain circumstances. Therefore, the immediate 
write-off gave firms the opportunity to obtain the favorable income statement effect of no amortiza-
tion without having to incur fully the adverse balance sheet effect of reduced equity reserves. 
23° Conversely, firms that did not face the equity-decreasing consequences of the immediate write-off 
alternative tended to allocate a greater portion of purchase price to goodwill . 
231 See also the at-length review in Dunstan (I 999, pp. 3-5). 
232 The setting is unique insofar as the authors exploit the window of opportunity that opened in Australia 
during the first half of the 1990s and closed when Australian accounting regulators banned the con-
troversial inverted-sum-of-years-digits method of goodwill amortization in 1996. This procedure es-
sentially defers most of the goodwill amortization towards the end of the goodwill's useful life, 
thereby minimizing the present value of total goodwill-related charges. The debate is outlined in con-
siderable detail in Day and Hartnett ( 1999/2000, pp. 195-8). See also Brown ( 1995). 
233 Day and Hartnett (1999/2000, p. 200 [emphasis in original]). 
234 See Day and Hartnett (1999/2000, pp. 200-2). 
23l It must be noted that the small sample size might call into question the economic, if not the statistical, 
significance of the results. 
236 See Day and Hartnett ( 1999/2000, pp. 204-8). 
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documents that managers, for whatever reason, will defer goodwill-related charges when 
it is nearly costless to do so due to a downright choice in applicable accounting guidance. 
Hall (1993a) explores the determinants of goodwill amortization period under APB 17 in 
a cross-sectional study of 149 firms that reported goodwill amortization in 1985. His 
hypotheses also draw on the positive accounting theory introduced in section 3.3.2.3 
below. Hall's (1993a) results indicate that the choice is affected by firm size and by the 
proximity of a firm's accounting data to violating covenant restrictions. Henning and 
Shaw (2003) analyze the determinants of goodwill amortization behavior from a different 
angle. On a sample of 1,741 acquisitions from 1990-94, they test whether the choice of 
amortization period predicts the acquirer's post-acquisition earnings and, therefore, might 
be interpreted as strategic. Their findings suggest that firms with expectations of high 
post-acquisition earnings are likely to amortize goodwill more aggressively, presumably 
because they can "afford" the earnings dilution caused by shorter amortization periods. 
2.4.3.4 Determinants of the purchase/pooling choice 
As discussed in section 2.3.2.3 above, it is a common conjecture that managers prefer the 
pooling method of accounting for business combinations because under this procedure, 
no goodwill is recognized and no future goodwill charges occur. Since the effects of the 
purchase/pooling decision mirror the effects of other goodwill-related accounting deci-
sions, it is plausible to assume that determinants of the purchase/pooling choice are also 
likely to influence other goodwill-related accounting decisions such as the goodwill 
write-offs under SFAS 142. Therefore, empirical findings surrounding the pur-
chase/pooling choice are presented next. Special emphasis is placed on research findings 
that document managers ' willingness to bear substantial costs to obtain the pooling 
treatment, which indicates that managers perceive this treatment to involve substantial 
benefits.237 
2. 4. 3. 4. I Factors influencing the purchase/pooling choice 
According to Weber (2000), research on the factors associated with the decision to use 
the pooling method provides evidence that "man[a]gers use pooling-of-interests to in-
crease future accounting income." 238 This is also the bottom-line of Robinson and 
Shane's (1990) summary of five early studies, reviewed in this section, of "an income 
237 See Lys and Vincent (1995, p. 368). 
238 Weber (2000, p. 6). 
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maximization hypothesis as a decision rule for predicting the acquisition accounting 
method".239 
In an early "progress report", Gagnon (1967) tries to find a predictor for whether a 
merger will be accounted for as a purchase or as a pooling, in order to be able to infer the 
decision rule that underlies the choice of treatment. Especially, he is interested in distin-
guishing between the income maximization and income smoothing hypotheses.240 Using 
data on "approximately 500 mergers"241 occurring in the period 1955-58, he applies dis-
criminant analysis to infer the separating characteristics of pooling and purchase acquisi-
tions. His results suggest that firms whose future expected earnings are likely to be de-
creased by the future amortization of a high acquisition premium tend towards using the 
pooling method. 242 These findings are corroborated in Gagnon's (1971) later study. 
Copeland and Wojdak (1969) discuss Gagnon's (1967) article and replicate Gagnon's 
study with more current data (1966-1967). They find as well that "firms record mergers 
by the method that maximizes reported income".243 Anderson and Louderback (1975) 
test whether the Copeland and Wojdak (1969) results still hold after APB Opinion 16 
restricted the purchase/pooling choice. They compare 114 mergers in the pre-APB Opin-
ion 16 period with 64 transactions taking place after that rule was issued. They conclude 
that, although "the two treatments are no longer alternatives" post-APB Opinion 16, "the 
lack of significant decline in (pooling transactions] is evidence that managements have 
continued to select and 'follow GAAP' in a manner consistent with the income 
maximizing hypothesis."244 
Crawford (1987) invokes contracting theory to explain the purchase/pooling choice. He 
reports results "consistent with the hypothesis that managers consider the effect on their 
compensation packages when they choose a merger's structure ... [but) ... weakly consis-
tent with the hypothesis that merger structure is influenced by the presence of debt cove-
239 Robinson and Shane ( 1990, pp. 26-8). 
240 See Gagnon ( 1967, pp. 191-6). 
241 Gagnon (1967, p. 196). 
242 Sapienza (1967) and Wyatt (1967) provide discussions of the Gagnon (1967) paper. Sapienza (1967, 
p. 205) argues that the purchase/pooling choice was not actually a choice during the period analyzed, 
because "widespread knowledge of the pooling concept was not the case". Also, he notes that the 
pooling method might in some cases have been adopted for tax reasons. Wyatt's ( I 967, pp. 211-2) 
most notable criticism relates to the notion that the accounting treatment of a given acquisition is de-
termined jointly with other variables of the transaction. Therefore, simulating, as Gagnon (1967) does, 
the accounting acquisition premium that would have arisen had a given acquisition been accounted 
for as a purchase versus as a pooling, generates potentially irrelevant values. 
243 Copeland and Wojdak (1969, p. 195). 
244 Anderson and Louderback (1978, p. 343). 
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nants".245 This latter finding is somewhat contrary to the results reported in most of the 
other studies described below. 
Davis (1990) analyzes 108 pooling and 69 purchase method mergers completed during 
the period 1971-82. He finds that "leverage for the purchase method sample ... is signifi-
cantly higher than for the pooling method sample".246 Similar to Aboody, Kasznik and 
Williams (2000), Desai et al. (2001) and Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2000a),247 
this could be interpreted as supportive of the debt covenant hypothesis, since highly lev-
eraged firms have incentive to recognize the asset step-up often occurring under the pur-
chase method, thereby reducing leverage. However, Davis (1990) concludes that "highly 
leveraged firms may prefer purchase method accounting to reduce profits. "248 The author 
goes on to argue, consistent with the political costs hypothesis, that reduced reported 
earnings will also reduce "regulators' attention".249 However, it is not made clear why 
especially highly leveraged firms should have an interest in escaping regulators' scru-
tiny_2so 
Dunne (l 990) investigates the factors influencing the purchase/pooling choice of 158 
acquirers during the period 1983-85. She expects that manager-ownership, accounting-
based compensation, debt covenant, and political cost considerations affect that decision. 
Her findings indicate that manager-controlled firms 251 tend to opt for the income-
increasing pooling method.252 Also, Dunne finds that, "when management chooses be-
tween the two accounting treatments for a business combination, they consider the ac-
counting method's effect on their compensation."253 High-debt firms tend to use the pur-
chase method, possibly in an attempt to strengthen their asset bases.254 Finally, the evi-
245 Crawford (1987, p. 109), as quoted by Robinson and Shane (1990, p. 28). 
246 Davis (I 990, p. 705). 
241 These studies are reviewed shortly. 
248 Davis (1990, p. 708). 
249 Davis ( I 990, p. 696). 
250 Usually, firm size is assumed to be positively related to a firm's exposure to adverse regulation. Refer 
to section 3.3.2.3 .5 below. This is also acknowledged by the author. See Davis (1990, p. 704). An-
other reported finding is that the relative bargaining strength of the firms engaged in a merger appears 
to influence the choice of accounting method to report that merger. According to his results, acquirers 
having high bargaining power tend towards using the purchase method. See Davis ( 1990, p. 696). 
251 In a manager-controlled firm, management has only a limited stake in the firm's equity. 
252 See Dunne (1990, p. 125). 
253 Dunne (1990, p. 126). 
254 See Dunne (1990, p. 126). 
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dence suggests that "firms with higher earnings may prefer purchase accounting because 
of political cost considerations."255 
Using a case study approach, Lys and Vincent (I 995) discuss at length possible motives 
of AT&T to obtain pooling treatment for its acquisition of NCR, among others share-
holder communications, debt covenants and bonus plans.256 They conclude that "AT&T's 
willingness to pay a premium for the pooling-of-interests method of accounting was to 
avoid a sustained decrease in EPS because of the importance of investors' percep-
tions."257 The authors find no evidence to suggest that the income-increasing choice was 
due to debt covenants, but "cannot dismiss the possibility that the preference was due to 
executive compensation".258 
Aboody, Kasznik and Williams (2000) provide evidence that the purchase/pooling choice 
does not appear to be driven by managers' beliefs regarding investors' perceptions but 
rather by contracting incentives.259 Specifically, managers subject to accounting earn-
ings-based compensation schemes are more likely than others to incur costs to obtain 
pooling treatment for acquisitions, especially where there is a large gap between purchase 
price and the target's net assets that will lead to a future "earnings penalty". However, 
managers rewarded on the basis of their firms' stock performance do not appear to be 
concerned with the allegedly negative accounting effects of the purchase method, sug-
gesting that they do not believe investors to respond negatively to this method. The find-
ings also suggest that firms with high DTE ratios tend towards using the purchase 
method, according to the authors because of its favorable balance sheet effects. The au-
thors also find that the likelihood to use pooling decreases in the potential costs of com-
plying with the pooling criteria. With regard to the question of main interest here, 
Aboody, Kasznik and Williams's (2000) findings suggest that, while managers are will-
ing to incur costs to obtain pooling treatment, this is mainly due to contracting considera-
tions and not necessarily to investors being assumed to respond negatively to goodwill 
and the accompanying earnings drag. 
255 Dunne ( 1990, p. 127). 
256 Refer to Lys and Vincent (1995, pp. 369-74). 
257 Lys and Vincent (1995, p. 377 [emphasis in original] , pp. 373-4). 
258 Lys and Vincent (1995, p. 377). 
259 Refer to Aboody, Kasznik and Williams (2000, pp. 283-4). 
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Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2000a) also investigate the factors that influence the 
purchase/pooling choice. Results for a sample of 198 stock-for-stock acquisitions 260 
made during the period 1990-96 suggest that "acquiring firms select their accounting 
method to enhance the financial statement presentation of the combined firm".261 Spe-
cifically, in transactions where large premiums over acquired net assets are paid, firms 
tend towards the pooling method, supposedly in order to avoid the severe "earnings pen-
alty" from future depreciation and amortization. Conversely, where the target firm's lev-
erage is high, the purchase method tends to be used more frequently, purportedly since it 
improves the DTE ratio.262 
Desai et al. (2001) also report that "acquirers in purchase mergers have higher leverage 
relative to pooling acquirers. "263 In addition, their analysis of 129 purchase and 366 pool-
ing mergers completed between 1978 and 1999 documents that the targets in pooling 
mergers have superior prior stock and accounting performance. This might suggest that 
acquirers that "acquire performance" have incentive to use an income-increasing ac-
counting method to report the acquisition.264 Desai et al. (2001) declare that these "char-
acteristics significantly influence the choice of accounting method in a merger. "265 
Overall, the evidence summarized here is again consistent with the notion that managers 
are concerned about the financial statement effects of goodwill-related accounting 
decisions. Especially, they fear an erosion of earnings due to future amortization and, 
albeit documented less frequently, an increase in financial leverage, possibly due to the 
existence of accounting-based debt covenants. 
2.4.3.4.2 Managers' willingness to "purchase" the pooling method 
Some of the earlier studies discussed in the previous section have interpreted the pur-
chase/pooling decision as a downright choice. However, when APB Opinion 16 was is-
sued in 1970, the pooling method was made mandatory for transaction that satisfied cer-
tain restrictive - and potentially costly-to-satisfy - criteria.266 At that time, a costless 
260 While 49 of these acquisitions were accounted for under the purchase method, 149 were subjected to 
the pooling treatment. 
261 Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2000a, p. 27). 
262 These findings correspond to those reported by Aboody, Kasznik and Williams (2000). 
263 Desai et al. (200 I , p. 5). 
264 Desai et al. (2001, p. 17) use the term "income maximization hypothesis". 
265 Desai et al. (200 I, p. 5). 
266 Refer to section 2.3.2.2.1 above. 
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"choice" between the two treatments ceased to exist. The fact that the pooling method did 
not lose much of its appeal in the aftermath suggests that managers were willing to incur 
the pooling costs, possibly because the benefits associated with this favorable accounting 
treatment outweighed the costs to meet the pooling criteria. In this section, evidence is 
presented, first, on the costs of obtaining pooling treatment and, second, on managers' 
willingness to incur these costs. 
Davis (l 996) notes that application of the pooling method is subject to "12 restrictive 
provisions, some of which can be quite difficult and costly to satisfy."267 In addition to 
direct transaction costs, structuring an acquisition to fulfill these conditions is "likely to 
be costly for shareholders because it requires the firm to forego valuable real options", 
such as "the ability to do share repurchases and asset divestures". 268 Moreover, as Desai 
et al. (2001) point out, an acquirer's ability to satisfy the pooling criteria in effect hinged 
on the cooperation of the target's management, which often entailed higher premiums in 
pooling mergers.269 Another interesting cost item is pointed out by Gagnon (1967): He 
argues that, before APB Opinion 16 specified criteria to govern the purchase/pooling 
decision, a company had to "convince both the SEC and its independent [auditors] that 
[the pooling] treatment [was] appropriate under the circumstances."27° Finally, Martinez-
Jerez (2001) argues that the pooling method increases shareholders' monitoring costs due 
to reduced financial statement transparency.271 Using a case study approach, Lys and 
Vincent (l 995) give an extensive overview of the incremental costs of pooling in 
AT&T's acquisition ofNCR.272 
In view of the substantial costs of meeting the pooling criteria, researchers have argued 
that managers' willingness to incur these costs could be viewed as evidence of their 
strong belief in the desirable accounting effects of this method. This belief is highlighted 
by the frequently made assertion that several acquisitions were made contingent on the 
267 Davis ( I 996, p. 51 ). 
268 Martinez-Jerez (200 I, p. 6). In a similar vein, Robinson and Shane ( 1990, p. 29) refer more generally 
to "an opportunity cost associated with satisfying one or more APBO No. 16 criteria". 
269 See Desai et al. (2001, pp. 2-3) and Nathan (1988, p. 187). Unless stated otherwise, "premium" in this 
context does not refer to the difference between purchase price and fair value of acquired net assets 
(i.e., goodwill plus any fair value increments) but to some market-based measure of the acquirer's 
willingness to pay more than the target's market value before the market learned of the acquisition 
plan. 
270 Gagnon (1967, p. 189). 
271 See Martinez-Jerez (200 I, p. 8). Transparency is reduced because the acquired assets and liabilities 
are not adjusted to their fair values but carried over at their book values. 
272 See Lys and Vincent (1995, pp. 367-8). 
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availability of the pooling treatment. 273 However, the exact nature of these perceived 
benefits is open to debate. Nathan (1988) suggests managers' belief in the mechanistic 
hypothesis when he notes: "Managers of acquiring finns will pay to pool if they believe 
the market is fooled by the higher net income number. Whether the market actually is 
fooled (implying market inefficiency) is an empirical question".274 However, if managers 
are found to "pay to pool" although shareholders consistently penalize this behavior, this 
is evidence that managers, acting in a self-interested way, derive private benefits from the 
pooling treatment.275 Next, studies on managers' willingness to incur the pooling costs 
are analyzed. Shareholders' reactions to the purchase/pooling decision are reviewed in 
section 2.4.4.4 below. 
Evidently, the substantial extra costs of obtaining the pooling treatment are willingly in-
curred by many finns. In their detailed account of AT&T's acquisition of NCR, Lys and 
Vincent (1995) document that AT&T's management was willing to expend "between $50 
and $500 million of corporate assets" for the perceived benefits of pooling. 276 
Desai et al. (2001) analyze whether finns are "willing to 'pay' to report higher earnings 
even in the absence of any incremental effect on cash flow" for a large sample of stock-
for-stock mergers spanning the period 1978-97. 277 They find no significant association 
between the acquisition premium278 and the choice between the purchase and pooling 
methods, after other significant influencing factors of that choice are controlled for.279 
All this indicates is that managers are not necessarily, on average, willing to incur sig-
nificant costs in the fonn of a higher merger premium for the ability to use pooling. Simi-
larly, Aboody, Kasznik and Williams' (2000) conclude that "finns for which the pooling 
requirement of no post-acquisition share repurchases appears to be binding ... are less 
likely than others to use pooling. "280 Of course, the notion that the perceived pooling 
benefits are likely to be foregone when opportunity costs are higher stands to economic 
reason. However, pending further analysis, these results should not be taken as evidence 
273 See, for example, Gagnon (1967, p. 189). Empirical evidence on this fact is presented by Nathan 
(1988, p. 198). 
274 Nathan (1988, p. 187 fn. 2 [emphasis in original]). See also Robinson and Shane (1990, p. 29). 
275 See Robinson and Shane (1990, p. 29). 
276 Lys and Vincent (1995, p. 373). 
277 Desai et al. (200 I, p. 2). 
278 Desai et al. (2001 p. I I): "Merger (Acquisition) Premium is measured as the target's matching-firm-
adjusted return ... over two holding periods." 
279 See Desai et al. (200 I, p. 5). 
280 Aboody, Kasznik and Williams (2000, p. 284). 
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that managers believe the accounting choice does not matter to investors. Only, in certain 
circwnstances they deem the pooling costs to exceed the benefits. 
Robinson and Shane ( 1990) investigate whether benefits derived from the accounting 
treatment are reflected in bid premiwns for target firms. Their sample consists of 59 
pooling and 36 purchase acquisitions occurring during the period 1972-82. They con-
clude that "the acquisitions accounted for as poolings involved higher average bid premia 
than the acquisitions accounted for as purchases." The authors attribute this difference to 
the fact that "bidders are willing to pay for benefits derived from accounting method." 
However, pointing to an identification problem, they caution that the difference may be 
due to omitted intervening variables that jointly determine bid premia and accounting 
method, e.g. the percentage of shares acquired,281 or to the possibility that "higher bid 
premia lead to a higher probability of pooling."282 The latter suggestions would contra-
dict the notion that the accounting treatment of a given acquisition is determined before 
the transaction actually takes place, and is established jointly with other variables of the 
transaction. 283 
In a more recent paper, Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2000b) document firms' 
willingness to pay higher acquisition premiwns in mergers accounted for using the 
pooling method. They address the identification problem documented above by 
"controlling for known economic determinants of acquisition price and differences across 
purchase and pooling acquisitions" and report that "on average, firms incur in excess of 
$60 million in additional acquisition premiums to structure the average sample 
acquisition as a pooling-of-interests."284 
Nathan ( 1988) is interested in the impact of APB Opinions 16 and 17 on the purchase 
prices paid in stock-for-stock pooling acquisitions in the period 1963-78. While his study 
is not exactly an investigation of the purchase/pooling choice ( only pooling transactions 
are examined), he does contribute insights of relevance here. He predicts that the in-
creased restrictiveness of the pooling criteria brought about by APB Opinion 16 increases 
offer prices because the acquirer must secure, certainly at a price, the target's cooperation 
in fulfilling these criteria. In addition, he hypothesizes that the pooling method's income-
increasing properties induce managers, who are subject to loan covenants and account-
281 See also Clinch (1997, p. 347). 
282 Robinson and Shane (1990, p. 47 [all quotes]). 
281 See Wyatt (I 967, pp. 211-2). 
284 Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2000b, p. 30 [both quotes]). 
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ing-based compensation contracts, to offer higher premiums285 for larger amounts of po-
tential goodwill that pooling would avoid, a proxy for the accounting benefits of this 
method.286 Linear regression results suggest that the offer premium, contrary to the pre-
diction, is negatively related to the amount of potential goodwill, especially in post-APB 
Opinion 16 acquisitions.287 Nathan (1988) draws on arguments advanced by Walkling 
and Edmister (1985) to explain his findings:288 First, low-goodwill firms might appear to 
be bargain purchases that can be had at not much more than their replacement value, 
making them more attractive for bidders. Second, low potential goodwill might be an 
indicator of poor management, suggesting to acquirers a high potential for value-
increasing restructuring efforts. Additional tests of the income maximization hypothesis 
show that, after APB Opinion 16 prohibited pooling transactions paid for with preferred 
stock, the frequency of common-stock pooling acquisitions and not that of preferred-
stock purchase acquisitions increased. 289 Nathan (1988) concludes that management, on 
average, preferred incurring the costs of common-stock versus preferred-stock pay-
ment 290 over foregoing the perceived benefits of the income-increasing pooling 
method.291 Overall, the findings seem to indicate that the perceived accounting benefits 
derived from the pooling treatment exceed the costs from the dilution of control. How-
ever, the author fails to find substantiation for the hypothesis that higher potential good-
will increases the acquirers' offer premiums. 
Overall, the evidence presented is largely consistent with the assumption that "managers 
prefer [the pooling] method and are willing to incur significant costs to avoid the recog-
nition of additional assets and expenses associated with the purchase method".292 
285 Nathan (I 988, p. 187) defines the premium as the "offer price per share minus the target's 
preannouncement share price .. . divided by the target's preannouncement share price". 
286 See Nathan (1988, p. 188). This relation is expected to be more pronounced after APB Opinion 16 
became effective than before. 
287 Several control variables that have been shown in prior research to be related to the size of offer pre-
mium are included in the models. See Nathan (1988, pp. 188-9). 
288 See Nathan (1988, pp. 193-5). 
289 See Nathan (I 988, pp. 195-7). 
290 These costs are, in effect, "opportunity cost associated with the dilution of control due to the use of 
common stock". Robinson and Shane (1990, p. 47). 
291 See Nathan (1988, p. 198). 
292 Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2000b, p. 2). 
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2.4.3.5 Managers' lobbying for goodwill-related accounting rules 
A final source of information about managers' beliefs regarding the stock market effects 
of their goodwill-related accounting decisions is their lobbying behavior with financial 
accounting standard-setters and other regulatory agencies. It is straightforward to assume 
that managers lobby for the accounting rules they consider most beneficial for them.293 
Any cross-sectional variation in firms' lobbying behavior is likely to help reveal the de-
terminants of managers' goodwill-related accounting preferences. 
The influence of "political lobbying" on the standard-setting process has interested re-
searchers for a long time. It is frequently argued that several U.S. accounting rules can 
only be interpreted as the results of such lobbying taking place.294 As discussed in section 
2.3.2.2.1 above, there is a wealth of, mostly anecdotal, evidence that the impairment-only 
approach adopted in SFAS 142 is the outcome of political lobbying. It is maintained that 
the de facto opportunity to avoid or at least defer goodwill charges resulting from the 
abolishment of the goodwill amortization requirement was the political price the F ASB 
had to pay to compensate firms for the elimination of the pooling method. Dennis R. 
Beresford, former chairman of the F ASB, documents the extent of political involvement 
in standard setting.295 For example, he notes that Senator Phil Gramm, then chairman of 
the responsible Senate committee, personally recommended that an impairment-only 
approach to goodwill accounting be required.296 Furthermore, the SEC Chief Accountant 
is cited demanding that the F ASB abandon the pooling method because SEC staff 
"spends nearly 40 percent of its time dealing with interpreting the complicated pooling 
criteria under APB Opinion No. l 6."297 A representative of the so-called "new economy" 
argued strongly in favor of retaining the pooling method, because " [t]he elimination of 
pooling will constrain companies from engaging in business combinations that make 
sense".298 Another claimed that the U.S. "are the premier capital market of the world, 
and pooling has no doubt contributed to our fast growth and expansion. "299 
293 For example, refer to Watts and Zimmerman (1978). 
294 First and foremost, SFAS 123, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, comes to mind in this 
respect. Zeff (2002, p. 50) argues that, "under the gun from key members of Congress, the F ASB 
could do no more than issue SFAS No. 123, ... requiring footnote disclosure of the estimated dilutive 
effect of stock options on reported earnings" . See also Zeff(1997) and the literature cite there. 
295 Refer to Beresford (200 I) . 
296 See Beresford (200 I, p. 74). 
297 Beresford (200 I, p. 75). 
298 Beresford (200 I, p. 76). 
299 Beresford (200 I , p. 77). 
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These and other ad hoc suggestions that politicians and, possibly through them, other 
lobbyists significantly shaped SFAS 141 and 142, the outcomes of the FASB's business 
combinations project. More systematic evidence can be obtained from the comment let-
ters that the F ASB received from its constituents in various stages of the project. Wyr-
wich (2002) suggests that, while the impairment-only approach was predetermined by 
Congressional pressure, the details were open to debate.300 His analysis of comment let-
ters indicates that financial statement preparers as well as Big Five auditors principally 
influenced the final wording of SF AS 141 and 142.301 
The study by Gore, Taib and Taylor (2000) documents "the positions taken by manage-
ments of UK-listed companies during the heated debate surrounding proposals for a new 
standard on goodwill accounting".302 As discussed above, the authors find that managers 
prefer goodwill-related accounting rules that avoid future charges and are especially in 
favor of an immediate charge of goodwill against equity.303 In his analysis of goodwill 
accounting standard setting in the U. K., Nobes (1992) discusses the influences exercised 
by several interested parties. 304 He concludes standard setting follows a cyclical pattern, 
where perceived variety in accounting practices, economic developments, and interna-
tional regulatory initiatives induce standard setters to act. The ensuing process is shaped 
by competing "downward" and "upward forces", which are in favor of less or more stan-
dardization, respectively. The downward force is usually represented by self-interested 
managers, possibly supported by audit firms, whereas the upward force is frequently con-
stituted by "individual senior members of the profession", backed by government, the 
press and international organizations. 305 
2.4.4 Indirect evidence 
It is interesting to examine whether the beliefs apparently held by some preparers of fi-
nancial statements are corroborated by market data. If market reactions consistently tum 
out contrary to management's beliefs, revisions in these beliefs to reflect actual market 
300 See Wyrwich (2002, p. 48). 
30 1 Wyrwich' s (2002) analysis includes 208 comment letters on the FASB's February 2001 Exposure 
Draft, Business Combinations and Intangible Assets - Accounting for Goodwill, with a combined 
length of 1,002 pages. Methodologically, his approach draws on McLeay, Ordelheide and Young's 
(2000) study. 
302 Gore, Taib and Taylor (2000, p. 213). 
303 See Gore, Taib and Taylor (2000, p. 221). 
304 Refer to Nobes ( 1992, pp. 157-9). 
305 Nobes (1992, p. 158). 
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behavior are likely to occur. Accordingly, in this section a body of research that sheds 
light on investors' perceptions of goodwill accounting and the purchase/pooling choice is 
reviewed. 
2.4.4.1 Experimental evidence 
According to some authors, management's doubts in the EMH, implying that investors 
are unable to fully see through the financial statement effects of goodwill-related ac-
counting decisions, are not entirely far-fetched. For example, Duvall et al. (1992) suggest 
that then current U. S. reporting requirements made it difficult for investors to disentan-
gle the financial statement effects of goodwill accounting. Especially, they report that a 
substantial number of firms, amounting to 76.3% of the sample, 306 do not disclose good-
will amortization, even when it is material. 307 Furthermore, estimation of this charge 
when it is not disclosed can result in material errors.308 
Hopkins, Houston and Peters' (2000) experimental study of financial analysts' informa-
tion processing behavior suggests a similar conclusion: The authors ask 113 buy-side 
equity analysts309 to estimate the price of a company's stock, depending on the method 
chosen to account for a recent stock-for-stock business combination and on the amount of 
time elapsed since the transaction occurred. They hypothesize that application of the pur-
chase method and subsequent amortization of any resulting accounting acquisition pre-
mium310 results in lower estimated stock prices than does either immediately expensing 
the premium or use of the pooling method. The authors also predict that the negative ef-
fects of amortization are stronger in association with business combinations that occurred 
a longer time previously because investors fail to remember that the amortization origi-
nated from a cash-neutral accounting decision. It is further assumed that separate income 
statement presentation of goodwill amortization, combined with a display of pre-
goodwill-amortization income, diminishes the negative effects of this accounting treat-
ment. They report that, with respect to the same business combination, test persons' 
stock-price judgments depend on the method chosen to account for the business combi-
306 See Duvall et al. ( 1992, p. 6). 
307 See Duvall et al . ( 1992, p. 11 ). 
308 See Duvall et al. (1992, pp. 8-10). The estimation procedure is reported in Duvall et al. (1992, pp. 12-
4). 
309 An analyst employed by an entity, such as a mutual fund, that invests on its own accounts. Unlike that 
of the sell-side analysts employed by brokerage firms or other firms that manage client accounts, re-
search produced by buy-side analysts is usually unavailable outside of the firm that hired the analyst. 
310 The difference between the fair value paid for the target and the book value of the target's net assets. 
See Hopkins, Houston and Peters (2000, p. 258). 
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nation and on the time passed since the transaction. Analysts' judgments are lowest when 
a business combination is accounted for using the purchase method and any resulting 
premium is amortized. With respect to the timing issue, they find support for the assump-
tion (e.g. made by AT&T in its acquisition ofNCR311 ) that analysts tend to forget over 
time that income-decreasing financial statement repercussions from past transactions are 
purely cosmetic in nature and not indicative of economic decline. It is important to keep 
in mind not only that Hopkins, Houston and Peters' (2000) experimental setting does not 
realistically simulate actual market behavior,312 but also that "market prices are deter-
mined by an aggregation of the beliefs of a myriad of participants, not a set of isolated 
financial analysts".313 However, the experimental setting has at least one advantage: It 
inherently controls for factors other than the choice of accounting method that are likely 
to influence market perception of a merger. 314 In market-based studies, these factors must 
be controlled for in the research design, which poses problems of model misspecification 
and other errors. In conclusion, Hopkins, Houston and Peters ' (2000) results do challenge 
the EMH in that they document that analysts tend to forget after several reporting periods 
that lower earnings due to goodwill amortization are merely cosmetic and not resultant 
from lower cash flows. 315 
2.4.4.2 Information content of goodwill write-offs 
Ceteris paribus, statistically significant associations between goodwill write-offs and 
stock prices is likely to induce management to influence, within their discretion, the exis-
tence, amount, and timing of these charges in order to either achieve or, if desirable, 
avoid the expected stock price effect associated with them. If the sign and/or extent of 
any association between goodwill write-offs and stock price were documented to vary 
cross-sectionally, different incentives would exist depending on firm characteristics and 
other factors found to be statistical determinants of this association. 
While there is a substantial body of literature on investors' reactions to other discretion-
ary asset write-offs,316 there is little direct evidence on the association of goodwill write-
offs with share prices. At this point, empirical tests of stock market reactions to transi-
311 See Lys and Vincent (1995, p. 370) 
312 See Hopkins, Houston and Peters' (2000, pp. 277-8). 
31 3 Hong, Kaplan and Mandelker (I 978, p. 34). 
314 See Hopkins, Houston and Peters (2000, p. 258). 
315 See also Hong, Kaplan amd Mandelker (1978, pp. 33-4). 
316 Refer to section 3.4 below. 
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tional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs have relied on preliminary data. Segal (2003) ana-
lyzes such market reactions. However, his study includes write-off announcements pub-
lished between October 2001 and June 2002 only. He controls for the expected portion of 
the write-off by estimating these amounts using, first, a "market price drop" estimation 
method and, second, a residual income estimation method.317 Also, any earnings surprise 
as well as other information inherent in the write-off announcement is controlled for. The 
unexpected portion of the write-off is found to be significantly associated with a negative 
stock price response, whereas the expected portion is insignificant. 318 The earnings sur-
prise and "other information" variables are insignificant. A comparison of the market 
reactions under the SF AS 121 regime and under the SF AS 142 regime generates only a 
weak indication that "the market reaction to goodwill write-downs is more negative un-
der the new rule".319 Regarding the timeliness of the write-offs, Segal claims that SFAS 
142 may have caused some "catching up" of write-offs not recognized under the previous 
regime.320 However, under both accounting standards, goodwill write-offs, on average, 
lag the corresponding stock price declines. 321 
Henning and Stock (1998) conduct a value-relevance study of pre-SF AS 142 goodwill 
write-offs. 322 They find that the association of stock prices with write-offs depends on the 
type of goodwill. Write-offs of goodwill related to valuable intangible assets are associ-
ated with both advance and contemporaneous stock price decreases. The anticipation of 
the write-offs by market participants is greater for firms with poor results than for firms 
with strong results. 
In contrast, Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) use an event study design to document an 
insignificantly positive association between two-day abnormal returns and goodwill 
write-off amounts for a sample of 44 goodwill write-off announcements made during the 
317 See Segal (2003, p. 26). The methods are explained in more detail in the appendix to the paper. 
318 See Segal (2003, pp. 27-8). This result relates to the unexpected portion estimated using the residual 
income estimation method. In contrast, the alternative method generates a significantly negative coef-
ficient for the expected portion of the write-off, which is not easily interpreted. 
319 Segal (2003, p. 28). 
320 An alternative explanation would be big bath behavior because transitional goodwill write-offs are 
displayed "below-the-line". 
321 See Segal (2003, p. 28). 
322 Since the Henning and Stock (1998) paper is no longer available for full download on SSRN, the 
published abstract is used. According to an email from contact author Steven L. Henning, the Hen-
ning and Stock (1998) study was continued by Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002). However, unlike the 
former paper, the Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002) analysis does not consider market reactions to 
goodwill write-offs. 
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period 1989-92. 323 They interpret this finding as suggesting that, since "incentives ... play 
a substantial role in explaining goodwill write-offs",324 these write-offs reveal less infor-
mation about any economic value declines than other write-off types ( e.g. inventory 
write-offs) where reporting managers have less discretion over existence, amount, and 
timing. Overall, "investors' response is driven more by write-offs revealing information 
about asset impairments than by write-offs conveying positive signals about future 
performance".325 
Finally, in an event study of 80 pre-SF AS 142 goodwill write-off announcements made 
during the period 1992-96, Hirschey and Richardson (2002) document statistically sig-
nificant negative event-day market reactions. They interpret their findings as suggesting 
that goodwill write-offs are perceived as bad news, signaling a deterioration of the firm's 
future proft-making potential. In a cross-sectional regression analysis, they find no evi-
dence that the size of the write-off influences the strength of the market response. In a 
long-window extension of this study, Hirschey and Richardson (2003) find that investors 
initially underreact to goodwill write-off announcements. They document significant 
negative returns in the one-year pre-announcement period as well as the one-year post-
announcement period, the latter of which are more pronounced for larger write-offs. 
2.4.4.3 Value relevance of goodwill book value and amortization 
Investors' overall assessment of goodwill accounting in general has also been tested in 
several studies of the association of goodwill accounting numbers and either stock prices 
or long-window stock returns.326 Especially, researchers perform regression analyses to 
examine (1) whether the "goodwill asset" has incremental explanatory power for stock 
prices, and/or (2) whether goodwill amortization has incremental explanatory power for 
stock returns. 327 Evidence on these questions is reviewed next. 328 While the relevance of 
these studies for the question at issue here is less direct than the literature presented ear-
323 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, pp. 130, 133). 
324 Francis, Hanna and Vincent (I 996, p. 134). 
325 Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 134). 
326 The methodology used in such studies is briefly introduced in section 3.4.2 below. 
327 These questions are frequently addressed jointly within a single paper. " Incremental" in this context 
means that, while other explanatory variables are frequently included in the regression models, the re-
searchers ' main interest is in the sign and significance of the coefficient on the goodwill-related vari-
able. 
328 For a review of part of the literature, refer to Clinch (1997, pp. 342-4). Most of the evidence presented 
concerns U. S. firms. 
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lier, investors' perception of goodwill-related accounting numbers is a potential source of 
management's beliefs in this matter.329 
2. 4. 4. 3.1 Balance sheet approach 
Chauvin and Hirschey (1994), interpreting accounting goodwill "as a potentially useful, 
albeit imperfect, indicator of intangible assets which give rise to higher rates of profit-
ability", investigate whether accounting goodwill numbers are "a useful proxy or instru-
ment for the size and duration of economic goodwill".330 In a three-equation system of 
simultaneous equations, they test whether goodwill, profitability and the market value of 
the firm are related. They show for a pooled sample of 1,353 firm years (1989-1991) 
from non-manufacturing sectors that the reported goodwill asset is related positively to 
market value, suggesting that this balance sheet item is regarded by investors "as a proxy 
useful for the favorable influence of brand-name recognition, good customer relations, 
and good management, among other factors." They "infer that accounting goodwill data 
offer a useful perspective on the hard-to-measure ongoing concern (reputational) value 
component of the economic value of the firm."331 
McCarthy and Schneider (l 995) analyze whether goodwill book values have incremental 
explanatory power, beyond other assets, liabilities and income, for the market value of 
equity.332 They find, for a sample of 6,216 U. S. firm years in the period 1988-92, that 
goodwill is significant in explaining firm value and that the value attached to it by inves-
tors is at least as high as that of other assets.333 However, the authors indicate several 
econometric issues that potentially limit the validity of their findings .334 
Similar to McCarthy and Schneider (1995), Wang (1993) conducts a study of the ex-
planatory power of goodwill book value for the market value of equity, incremental to 
that of other assets' and total liabilities' book values. Making no specific prediction, he 
tests whether goodwill book value overstates (understates) its market value and whether, 
therefore, goodwill amortization is understated (overstated) due to too long (short) amor-
329 However, it must be noted that a statistical relation between market variables and goodwill-related 
variables does not necessarily imply causality. All it indicates is that some of the information that in-
vestors use to determine share prices is also reflected in the goodwill-related variables. See Clinch 
(I 997, p. 343 fn. 3). 
33° Chauvin and Hirschey (1994, p. 161 [both quotes]). 
331 Chauvin and Hirschey (I 994, p. 178 [both quotes]). 
332 The model is explained in McCarthy and Schneider (1995, pp. 73-4). 
333 See McCarthy and Schneider (1995, pp. 77-9). 
334 See McCarthy and Schneider (I 995, p. 80). 
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tization periods.335 He tests his hypothesis on two samples of firms from the service in-
dustry (1988: 67 firms; 1989: 69 firms) because of the high significance of goodwill 
(amortization) for these firms. He finds positive coefficients on goodwill book value in 
excess of+ l for both the 1988 and the 1989 samples, suggesting that "the security mar-
ket perceived the reported goodwill assets as being understated under the current amorti-
zation requirement".336 A further study by Wang (1995), motivated by the IASB's then 
plans to reconsider goodwill accounting, draws heavily on Wang's (1993) analysis337 and 
yields similar results,338 albeit for a larger sample.339 
2.4.4.3.2 Combined balance sheet and income statement approaches 
Henning, Lewis and Shaw (2000) use a model developed by Bradley, Desai and Kim 
(1988) to partition goodwill into the components suggested by Johnson and Petrone 
(1998).340 They first analyze each component's explanatory power for contemporaneous 
stock prices in the context of a balance sheet model. They find that a disaggregation of 
the goodwill number provides explanatory power incremental to that of goodwill book 
value itself. Especially, the results show that "investors attach positive and negative 
weights to components of goodwill."341 An income statement model reveals "no signifi-
cant relation between returns and the amortization of the going-concern or synergy com-
ponents. "342 This suggests that the amortization procedure used does not capture the ac-
tual value decline, if any, in the underlying goodwill components or that these compo-
nents are perceived by the market to be non-wasting assets altogether. 
Jennings et al. (1996) examine a sample of 259 U. S. firms over the period 1982-88. 
They find a "strong positive cross-sectional association between equity values and re-
335 See Wang (1993, pp. 128-9). 
336 See Wang (1993 , p. 129). The results are robust to several alternative specifications. See Wang (1993, 
pp. 129-32). 
337 The two papers are widely similar, including their recommendations for further research, namely to 
extend his balance sheet approach by an analysis based on an income statement approach. Interest-
ingly, Wang's (1993) study is nowhere referred to in Wang (1995). 
338 See Wang (1995, p. 46). 
339 See Wang (1995, p. 42). 
340 This component approach is introduced in section 2.2 above. 
341 Henning, Lewis and Shaw (2000, p. 385 [emphasis in original]). Both "core" components of goodwill 
exhibit a positive relation to market value. The synergy component is apparently viewed to be even 
more relevant than other assets. Conversely, the residual component, intended to capture any over-
payment, is related negatively to market value. For a detailed description of the components and the 
empirical variables designed to proxy for them, refer to Henning, Lewis and Shaw (2000, pp. 375-8). 
342 Henning, Lewis and Shaw (2000, p. 385). 
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corded goodwill asset amounts, after controlling for other components of net assets" as 
well as "evidence of a negative association between equity values and goodwill amortiza-
tion, after controlling for other components of expected eamings."343 Upon these find-
ings, the authors base the recommendation of "recording purchased goodwill as an asset 
that is reduced in value only when its value is clearly impaired."344 In effect, they advo-
cate a "capitalization and annual review" approach to goodwill accounting that had been 
under consideration by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in the U. K. at the time. 
However, they caution that, for this approach to realize its perceived potential of repre-
sentational faithfulness, "the financial reporting incentives of managers must be aligned 
with those of financial statement users. "345 However, no suggestions are made as to how 
this alignment of interests could be achieved. 
Lindenberg and Ross (1999) find that goodwill book values are unrelated to firm value-
to-EBITDA multiples of 3,633 large public U.S . companies, suggesting that there is no 
"market bias against balance sheet goodwill or against known future amortization 
charges". 346 The authors further examine the association of goodwill amortization and 
PIE ratios when industry effects and other variables are controlled for.347 They find that 
PIE ratios are positively related to goodwill amortization, i.e. PIE ratios adjust upward 
where goodwill amortization is present in earnings, effectively offsetting the income-
decreasing effect goodwill amortization and, on average, leaving stock prices unaffected. 
They interpret this result as supportive of the EMH, stating that "equity analysts who fail 
to see through goodwill amortization may find themselves undervaluing firms with rela-
tively large amounts of goodwill."348 
Vincent (1997) includes both purchase and pooling firms in her study of the value rele-
vance for stock prices of goodwill and goodwill amortization, incremental to that of re-
ported book value of equity and reported net income. She examines data from the five 
years of and following 57 purchase and 35 pooling transactions that occurred during the 
period 1979-86 in the U. S. Since goodwill and goodwill amortization are reported only 
343 Jennings et al. ( 1996, p. 530). Regarding the latter finding, they stress that this association is weak 
and exhibits substantial cross-sectional variation, suggesting that "investors may view purchased 
goodwill as an economic resource that does not decline in value for some firms." 
344 Jennings et al. ( 1996, p. 513 ). 
345 Jennings et al. (I 996, p. 530). 
346 Lindenberg and Ross (1999, p. 40). 
347 See Lindenberg and Ross (1999, pp. 36-9). 
348 Lindenberg and Ross (1999, p. 38 fu. 16). 
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in purchase transactions, she uses the estimated accounting acquisition premium349 and 
its accompanying amortization to approximate the goodwill and goodwill amortization 
that would have been reported had the pooling transactions been accounted for under the 
purchase method. She argues that, if the EMH holds, "investors would similarly value 
implicit acquisition goodwill for pooling firms."350 Under the precondition that both re-
ported equity and net income are value relevant, she expects coefficients to be zero for 
the goodwill and goodwill amortization proxies in the purchase transactions, since both 
should be captured by the other variables, reported equity and net income. If, contrary to 
popular conjectures, "pooling and purchase firms are valued equivalently",351 the author 
expects the goodwill proxy (the goodwill amortization proxy) of pooling firms to be 
positively (negatively) associated with pooling firms' stock prices, because for those 
firms it is not included in reported book value of equity (reported net income). Results 
are not entirely in line with predictions. The coefficient on the goodwill proxy is insig-
nificant for pooling firms, suggesting that investors do not perceive the goodwill proxy as 
an asset for those firms. For purchase firms, it has a positive association with stock price, 
indicating that goodwill is perceived to be undervalued on the books. Also unpredicted, 
the goodwill amortization proxy is positively associated with the stock prices of pooling 
firms in most years, suggesting that it is viewed as positively value relevant, not as an 
expense. In contrast, the goodwill amortization proxy is negatively associated with the 
stock prices of purchase firms in the years most recent to the acquisition. The author 
partly attributes her inconsistent (for example, for purchase firms, goodwill seems to be 
undervalued and at the same time underamortized) results to the research design and fol-
lows up with a ratio analysis in which she compares the purchase and pooling firms' 
MTB and PIE ratios.352 She finds that unadjusted median MTB ratios for pooling and 
purchase firms are equal in the pre-acquisition year but that pooling firms' median MTB 
ratios significantly exceed those of purchase finns in later years. 353 However, when the 
firms' equity values are adjusted to an "as if pooling" or an "as if purchase" basis, the 
difference in MTB ratios disappears. These results are corroborated in an industry com-
parison.354 According to the author, this "analysis confirms that, on average, the market 
adjusts pooling firms to an 'as if purchase' basis, and values purchase and pooling firms 
349 This premium represents goodwill and the asset write-up recognized in the business combination. See 
Vincent (I 997, p. 7). 
350 Vincent (I 997, p. 8). 
351 Vincent(l997,p. JI). 
352 See Vincent (1997, pp. 12-5). 
353 See Vincent (1997, p. 13). 
354 See Vincent (I 997, p. 13). 
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similarly, at least during the first five years following the acquisition."355 However, in an 
analysis of PIE ratios, the author finds that "pooling PIE ratios tend to be higher regard-
less of whether earnings are adjusted for accounting differences, especially in the year of 
and the first year after the acquisition."356 Overall, the author draws the following con-
clusions: "The results overall suggest that concerns about the negative valuation implica-
tions of purchase accounting are not unjustified. Finns that choose ( or that structure 
transactions to achieve) the pooling-of-interests method of accounting for a business 
combination appear to enjoy a valuation premium relative to purchase firms and relative 
to their industry, especially as measured using PIE ratios."357 However, she cautions that, 
since the "evidence also suggests investors adjust accounting numbers for pooling and 
purchase firms to an approximately equivalent basis, .. the accounting method, in and of 
itself, does not explain the valuation differences."358 She points out that the differences in 
market perception of purchase and pooling firms might be due to differences along other 
dimensions between pooling and purchase firms. 359 
The EMH is backed by Deng and Lev (1998), who conduct a comparative value rele-
vance study for a sample of 375 purchase and 186 pooling acquisitions that occurred dur-
ing the period 1985-96.360 They analyze whether "investors [treat] differently acquisi-
tions recorded by the purchase method than those recorded as pooling".361 Based on a 
regression of stock price on assets, liabilities, earnings and the acquisition price, they find 
evidence suggesting that "the reliability of asset and liabilities' values under purchase 
accounting ... is higher than the reliability of assets/liabilities under pooling".362 They 
summarize that "in acquisitions accounted for as pooling investors largely ignore the 
accounting practice used and focus on the economics of the transaction". 363 
Motivated by proposed changes in IAS, Wilkins, Swanson and Loudder (1998) analyze 
the value relevance of book value of goodwill and other intangible assets. For a sample 
355 Vincent (1997, p. 13). 
356 Vincent (l 997, p. 14). 
357 Vincent ( I 997, p. 17). 
358 Vincent (1997, pp. 17-8). 
359 See Vincent (1997, p. 16). This problem of self-selection bias is also stressed in other studies. 
360 See Deng and Lev (1998, pp. 17-20). 
361 Deng and Lev (1998, p. 18). 
362 Deng and Lev (I 998, p. I 8). 
363 Deng and Lev ( 1998, p. 20). 
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of 8,230 finn-years from the period 1988-96, they find that "investors do view the bal-
ance sheet disclosure of goodwill as value-relevant."364 
Petersen (2002) presents evidence from the Danish stock exchange. Using methodology 
following Jennings et al. (1996) and Vincent (1997), he finds a significant positive asso-
ciation between stock prices and goodwill book values,365 suggesting that investors view 
goodwill as an asset. 366 The coefficient on the goodwill variable is considerably higher 
than that on the other assets variable. In addition, an income statement approach yields 
mixed results regarding the explanatory power of levels and change components of 
goodwill amortization for stock returns, depending on alternative specifications of the 
dependent variable. According to the author, this evidence does not substantiate the hy-
pothesis that investors view goodwill as an asset with a limited economic life. 367 He 
notes that his findings might suggest that goodwill amortization per se is viewed as an 
expense, but reported goodwill amortization is based on inappropriately short amortiza-
tion periods. However, the results might also reflect the fact that what little incremental 
explanatory power goodwill amortization might have is difficult to detect due to "noise" 
introduced by the research design. 
Huijgen (1996) adopts a research program similar to those of Jennings et al. (1996), Vin-
cent (1997), and Petersen (2002). 368 He considers 90 large Dutch non-financial firms 
listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in the period 1990-94. The value relevance of 
goodwill book value is assessed using the Ohlson (1995) model that interprets market 
value as a function of reported book value and earnings. Since goodwill is charged di-
rectly to equity by most sample finns, the author had to add back those amounts, gath-
ered from footnote disclosures, to arrive at a book value of equity that would have been 
reported had the goodwill not been charged to equity. He finds that these "as if capital-
ized" goodwill amounts have significant incremental explanatory power for market val-
ues in the sample period. A risk analysis based on finn betas supports the same conclu-
sion: Purchased goodwill, even if not reported on the face of the financial statements but 
only disclosed in footnotes, appears to be viewed as an asset by investors. Also, consis-
tent with results reported by Vincent (1997), Petersen (2002), and Wang (1993), Huijgen 
364 Wilkins, Swanson and Loudder (1998, p. 129). 
365 The sample consists of 307 firm-year observations. The period over which these observations are 
drawn is not reported in the paper. 
366 See Petersen (2002, p. 7). 
367 See Petersen (2002, p. 5). 
368 Refer to Huijgen (1996, ch. 4). Main results are reported in Huijgen (I 996, pp. 111-3). 
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finds higher positive coefficients on goodwill than on other components of reported eq-
uity, suggesting that investors value goodwill higher than other components of reported 
equity. Finally, an analysis of returns does not indicate that goodwill amortization adds 
explanatory power over and above that of other components of net income. 
Empirical evidence on the information content of goodwill accounting in Germany is 
presented by Kramling ( 1998). Adopting an approach similar to that of Huijgen ( 1996), 
he tests the value relevance of the goodwill asset, incremental to that of reported equity 
and earnings, conditional on the methods used to account for this balance sheet item. He 
expects that, if the goodwill asset reflects economic benefits, the value relevance of the 
summary measures equity and earnings will be higher when goodwill is capitalized and 
amortized over a long period, as opposed to charged directly against equity.369 He finds 
that goodwill's incremental explanatory power for market value exceeds that of other 
components of net assets. 37° Further, he documents that equity and earnings are more 
value relevant when goodwill is capitalized and charged against income over time than 
when it is charged against equity directly after the acquisition, bypassing the income 
statement.371 Finally, Kramling (1998) fails to find evidence suggesting that the length of 
amortization period significantly affects value relevance. 372 These findings basically cor-
roborate what has been found in other jurisdictions. 
2.4.4.3.3 Income statement approach 
A number of studies challenge especially the notion that goodwill amortization is value 
relevant.373 Moehrle, Reynolds-Moehrle and Wallace (2001) investigate the explanatory 
power for market-adjusted returns of different earnings and cash flow measures of the 
S&P 1500 firms in the period 1988-98. They conclude from their results that goodwill 
amortization disclosures were not decision-useful during that period. Jennings, LeClere 
and Thompson (200 I) report for a large sample of publicly traded U. S. firms in the pe-
riod 1993-98 that "earnings before goodwill amortization explain significantly more of 
the observed distribution of share prices than earnings after goodwill amortization and 
that when share valuations are based on earnings alone, goodwill amortization simply 
adds noise to the measure."374 The authors interpret this finding as supportive of the 
369 Results are presented in Krlimling (1998, pp. I 84-246). 
370 See Krlimling ( 1998, pp. 185-9). 
371 See Krlimling ( 1998, pp. 190-226). 
372 See Krlimling (1998, pp. 226-37). 
373 See the conclusions in Clinch (1997, p. 345) and Davis ( 1996, p. 57). 
374 Jennings, LeClere and Thompson (2001, p. 20). 
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F ASB' s decision to eliminate goodwill amortization. 375 Brown, Tucker and Pfeiffer' s 
(l 999) study is motivated by the F ASB 's initial I 999 exposure draft on accounting for 
business combinations, in which the F ASB suggested separate income statement report-
ing of goodwill charges. The authors investigate, among other aspects of this topic, 
whether firms that use the purchase method to account for acquisitions are indeed at a 
competitive disadvantage due to the income-decreasing effects of goodwill amortization. 
In a regression of security returns on goodwill amortization and a number of control vari-
ables, they find no evidence that stocks of firms with high goodwill amortization are sys-
tematically undervalued. 376 
2.4.4.3.4 International comparison studies 
In recent years, researchers have turned to comparing the value relevance of outputs of 
different accounting regimes.377 Using form 20-F reconciliations of national GAAP fi-
nancial statements to reflect U.S. GAAP, Amir, Harris and Venuti (1993) and Barth and 
Clinch ( 1996) compare, among other things, the association of goodwill book values and 
market values of equity for firms from different countries. For their sample of 467 firms 
from various countries,378 Amir, Harris and Venuti (1993) find that "capitalizing good-
will is consistent with the way investors price this asset."379 Since most of their firms are 
from the U. K., their analysis bears on the value relevance of the immediate write-off 
approach then available under U. K. GAAP. The authors conclude that some national 
GAAP regimes require goodwill to be accounted for in a manner inconsistent with how 
investors view it. 
In a similar study, Barth and Clinch (1996) investigate whether differences between, on 
the one hand, U. K., Australian, and Canadian GAAP and, on the other hand, U. S. 
GAAP are associated with share prices and returns. With regard to goodwill, the authors 
conclude that "[g]oodwill amortization under U.S., U.K., and Australian GAAP is 'too 
375 See Jennings, LeClere and Thompson (2001, p. 26). However, this conclusion appears to be prema-
ture because the explanatory power of goodwill impairment losses likely to occur under SFAS 142 
has yet to be examined systematically. 
376 See Brown, Tucker and Pfeiffer ( 1999, pp. 13-5). 
m This body of literature has grown considerably over the past decade. Refer to Bonse (2004, ch. III) for 
an overview and to Holthausen and Watts (2001) and Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001) for critical 
perspectives. However, this section focuses on studies that explicitly analyze issues relevant to good-
will accounting. 
m Of these, roughly 42 % are from the U. K., whereas the next largest numbers of firms are registered in 
Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden. The rest is distributed across I 6 other countries, not including 
Germany. See Amir, Harris and Venuti (1993, pp. 233-6). 
379 Amir, Harris and Venuti (1993, p. 259). 
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small' relative to the expense reflected in returns, and a portion of U.S. GAAP goodwill 
is priced as an asset, suggesting that, by electing to write off goodwill, U.K. managers 
reduce the relevance ofreported balance sheet amounts."380 
2.4.4.4 Market reactions to the purchase/pooling decision 
Figure 5 gives an example how different market reactions to the purchase/pooling deci-
sion might be interpreted.381 Some managers apparently consider well spent the costs of 
obtaining what they believe to be a favorable accounting treatment. If investors respond 
positively or neutrally, interpretation of this finding will depend on the researcher's view 
of the EMH: Skeptics would point to the mechanistic hypothesis, claiming that manage-
ment's attempt at "fooling" investors was successful. In contrast, proponents of the EMH 
would assert that the positive (or non-existent) response is due to the fact that investors 
do see through the cosmetic accounting effects but derive other (unobserved) benefits 
from the pooling treatment that (over-) compensate for the costs of obtaining this treat-
ment. Conversely, if the market reacts negatively, this suggests that investors are not en-
tirely fooled: They see through the accounting effects and understand that management 
has incurred costs that are quite real for alleged benefits that, to shareholders, are non-
existent. 
Shareholders respond 
positively or neutrally 
Managers incur extra costs 




benefits from pooling 
equal to or in excess 
of the extra cost 
Shareholders .see through" 
Shareholders respond 1-----.. cosmetic accounting effects 
negatively (information efficiency); 
no benefits from pooling 
• Managers are not only .fooled" by the cosmetically improved financial 
statements, but are also unaware of the extra costs incurred by 
management to secure pooling treatment. 
Figure 5: Market reactions to overpayment in pooling acquisitions 
380 Barth and Clinch (1996, p. 164). 
381 The following discussion is purely conceptual and ignores empirical problems of measuring market 
response. 
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In this section, studies on the market reactions to finns' choices of accounting methods in 
business combinations are reviewed. According to persistent popular conjectures, pooling 
finns enjoy a valuation premium due to the allegedly favorable, but ultimately cosmetic, 
earnings effects of this method.382 In effect, this is a challenge to the EMH.383 
Research findings are largely contrary to this hypothesis in that purchase method acquisi-
tions are generally found to outperfonn pooling mergers. Two relatively early studies, 
Hong, Kaplan and Mandelker ( 1978)384 and its replication by Davis ( 1990), 385 report evi-
dence suggesting that finns using the purchase method to account for acquisitions on 
average outperform those using the pooling method.386 The latter finns essentially stay 
even with the broad market. These findings are documented over various test periods 
surrounding the transactions. 387 
Desai et al. (200 l) find no substantiation for the widely held belief that the pur-
chase/pooling choice is a significant detenninant of the acquirer's post-acquisition stock 
perfonnance. 388 They interpret this finding as corroboration of the EMH, since "the mar-
ket is able to see through this choice in accounting method that has no cash flow implica-
tions. "389 
Lindenberg and Ross's (1999) results of a study of stock market reactions to 1,442 busi-
ness combination announcements also indicate that the market does not seem to penalize 
acquirers that use the purchase method. On the contrary, they find a significant, positive 
announcement effect for purchase business combinations, whereas the average stock 
382 Refer to section 2.3.2.3 above. 
383 See Hong, Kaplan and Mandelker (1978, p. 33 ): "If stock prices were to be affected by the choice of 
an accounting method for a merger, then we might have evidence in conflict with the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis since information on the effects of using either method is generally available." 
384 Hong, Kaplan and Mandelker (1978, p. 33) hypothesize that "the market is efficient and thus able to 
distinguish between higher earnings caused by pooling-of-interests from higher earnings caused by 
real economic events of the firm". 
385 See Davis (I 990, p. 707). 
386 See reviews by Davis (1996, pp. 54-5) and Clinch (1997, p. 347). While Hong, Kaplan and Man-
delker (I 978) use a sample of 205 tax-free pooling and purchase transaction occurring in the pre-APB 
Opinion 16 period 1954-1964, Davis (1990) analyzes 177 tax-free mergers that were completed dur• 
ing the period 1971-1982. 
387 Davis (1990, p. 700) uses a period from 26 weeks before the merger announcement date to 26 weeks 
after the merger effective date. The interim period between those dates varies across mergers. Hong, 
Kaplan and Mandelker (I 978, pp. 37-42) use different time periods, the first centered on the first (an-
nual and/or interim) earnings announcement after the merger, and the second centered on the merger 
date. 
388 See Desai et al. (200 I, p. 5). 
389 Desai et al. (200 I, p. 5). 
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price response to the announcement of pooling acquisitions is significantly negative. The 
authors offer possible interpretations of this result, including pooling acquirers' (I) al-
leged propensity to overpay for an acquisition, (2) inability, due to the restrictive pooling 
criteria, to implement certain value-enhancing activities in the combined entity, and (3) 
apparent preoccupation with accounting cosmetics rather than with value creation. 390 
However, as the authors concede, their results might be influenced by their failure to con-
trol for the effects of different forms of purchase price consideration. The fact that some 
of the purchase business combinations studied were effected by a cash payment might 
drive the market's preference of this type of transaction over pooling business combina-
tions.391 Replication of their study with stock-for-stock purchase transactions confirms 
this assumption: While the stock price effect of cash-only purchase business combina-
tions is significantly positive, the market appears to be indifferent to stock-only purchase 
transactions. 392 
Similar to Lindenberg and Ross (1999), Martinez-Jerez (2001), examining a sample of 
355393 stock-for-stock acquisitions completed in the U. S. during the period 1990-98,394 
finds significant, negative acquirer stock price effects of an average 4% surrounding an-
nouncements of transactions accounted for using the pooling method,395 while "returns 
for purchase transactions are not significantly different from zero"396 He states that this 
statistically significant difference is not attributable to systematic differences, other than 
the choice of accounting method, between the 246 pooling and 89 purchase firms. This 
finding is interpreted as being "inconsistent with [both] the accounting irrelevance and 
earnings fixation hypotheses".397 The negative reaction to pooling acquisitions is found 
to be especially pronounced "in companies with poor corporate governance", presumably 
due to shareholders' increased concerns about the costs associated with pooling account-
ing when corporate control mechanisms are poor. 398 
Based on the notion that management incurs additional costs to obtain the perceived fa-
vorable pooling treatment for acquisitions, Weber (2000) examines whether shareholders 
390 See Lindenberg and Ross (1999, p. 35). 
391 See Lindenberg and Ross (1999, p. 35). 
392 See Lindenberg and Ross (1999, p. 36). 
393 Martinez-Jerez (2001, p. 24): 345. 
394 See Martinez-Jerez (2001, p. 24). 
395 See Martinez-Jerez (200 I, pp. 24-5). 
396 Martinez-Jerez (200 I, p. 14 ). 
397 Martinez-Jerez (2001, p. 24). 
398 See Martinez-Jerez (200 I, p. 24). 
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consider these costs well spent and benefit from managers' use of pooling. Since the SEC 
restricts firms' ability to repurchase shares subsequent to pooling transactions, using the 
pooling method restricts firms ' scope of actions, forcing them to forego what some per-
ceive to be valuable options.399 Weber finds that "shareholders do not consider the favor-
able financial reporting effects of pooling to be beneficial, when they are obtained at the 
cost of firms' share repurchase programs",400 since "the market considers the benefits of 
a firm ' s share repurchase program to exceed the financial reporting advantages of pool-
ing-of-interests."401 This result is arrived at, among other analyses, by an event-study 
analysis of abnormal security returns earned by firms with pending pooling transactions 
following the SEC's adoption of Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) 96.402 Weber (2000) 
argues that SAB 96 reduces the likelihood that (I) pending pooling transactions will be 
completed, (2) the pooling method will be applied, and (3) future share repurchase pro-
grams will occur.403 Based on this assumption, he finds statistically significant negative 
abnormal stock returns associated with firms' decision to go through with pooling trans-
actions at the expense of future options to initiate share repurchase programs. 404 This 
finding sheds light on the issue of whether managers act in the shareholders' best interest 
or, rather, opportunistically when making financial reporting choices: "Managers appear 
to be willing to incur the increased costs associated with the use of pooling-of-interests 
and continue to use pooling even though the results from this study suggest that the cur-
rent shareholders do not derive a benefit from the financial reporting effects of pool-
ing. "405 
The findings of Blackbum Norris and Ayres (2000) are somewhat in contrast with those 
presented previously. The authors examine stock price responses to the first earnings 
announcements subsequent to the completion of acquisitions accounted for by either the 
purchase or the pooling method.406 According to their results, "it appears that a negative 
reaction occurs on the first earnings announcement date in response to the book reduction 
in reported earnings from the goodwill amortization.',4°7 The alternative explanation that 
399 For a discussion of the benefits of share repurchases, refer to Schremper (2002, especially ch. III). 
400 Weber(2000, p. I). 
401 Weber (2000, pp. 28-9). 
402 SAB 96 restricts firms ' ability to engage in share repurchase programs for up to two years subsequent 
to pooling transactions. 
403 See Weber (2000, pp. 19-20). 
404 See Weber (2000, pp. 26-8). 
405 Weber (2000, p. 29). 
406 Their sample includes I 16 acquisitions that occurred in the U.S. during the period 1984-1990. 
407 Blackburn Norris and Ayres (2000, p. 87). 
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the extent of any overpayment drives the negative response is rejected on the grounds 
that it is not necessarily on the date of the first earnings announcement that investors 
would learn of the existence and extent of any overpayment. 408 
While these findings appear to refute the conjecture that, contrary to the EMH, the mar-
ket is "fooled" into responding positively to the favorable financial statement effects of 
the pooling method, it is far from established that this phenomenon is causally related to 
the accounting choice. In most of the studies reviewed in this section, the authors con-
cede that cross-sectional differences, if any, are not necessarily due to the pur-
chase/pooling choice, but might be caused by omitted variables.409 Alternative interpreta-
tions include the following: Clinch (1997) argues that Davis' (1990) results are subject to 
cautious interpretation because much of the stock price response occurs before the acqui-
sitions are consummated and before the respective accounting treatments are made pub-
lic, suggesting explanatory variables other than the accounting treatment.410 Davis (1990) 
examines this possibility and finds that abnormal returns decrease as the acquirer's bar-
gaining strength decreases, consistent with the notion that weak acquirers tend to over-
pay. 411 Since he documents that the purchase method is associated with positive abnor-
mal returns and that acquirers in a strong bargaining position tend towards using the pur-
chase method, the low abnormal returns to pooling mergers might be associated with the 
acquirer's low bargaining power and resulting overpayment, and not with the fact that the 
merger is accounted for as a pooling of interests. This evidence would support the EMH 
in so far as, apparently investors are not mislead by the financial statement effects of the 
pooling method. However, the bargaining strength explanation is not the only convincing 
one: It is possible that investors not only are not fooled by the improved earnings under 
pooling but do in fact detect that managers incur substantial costs to secure these "phan-
tom" benefits. 412 A similar explanation is offered by Lindenberg and Ross (1999): If 
managers believe that the market punishes purchase business combinations, only the 
economically soundest transactions should accounted for using that method, and an effi-
408 See Blackbum Norris and Ayres (2000, p. 87 fu. 15). 
409 Refer also to the individual reviews above. 
410 See Clinch (1997, p. 347). 
411 See Davis (1990, pp. 706-7). 
412 Davis (1996, p. 50) states that "companies that overpay for acquisitions are penalized by financial 
markets". See also Davis (1996, p. 55). Lys and Vincent's (1995) case study evidence shows that 
AT&T's willingness to incur additional costs ofup to $500 million in order to be able to use the pool-
ing method for the acquisition of NCR was apparently not rewarded by the market: An enormous 
stock price decline (between $3 .9 and 6.5 billion) occurred during the time the acquisition was being 
carried into execution. 
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cient market's reaction to them should tend to be positive. 413 Martinez-Jerez (2001) 
summarizes that "the choice of pooling of interests is likely to be a sign that managers' 
interests have dominated those of shareholders, leading stock prices to decline."414 
2.4.4.S Market reactions to mandated changes in accounting rules for business 
combinations 
A final body of literature relevant here is concerned with assessing market reactions to 
mandated changes in accounting rules, as opposed to voluntary accounting decisions, 
related to goodwill. These analyses predominantly take the shape of event studies, where 
abnormal returns to key events preceding the issuance of new accounting standards are 
measured.415 The existence and sign of any market reactions to mandated changes in 
goodwill-related accounting rules allow conclusions about the market perception of 
goodwill accounting, especially if these reactions vary across firms. For example, the 
existence ( or absence) of any response to a cash-neutral accounting change will poten-
tially shape managers' belief in the EMH. 
Day and Hartnett (1999/2000) investigate stock market reactions to distinct milestones 
within the standard-setting process preceding the abolishment of the favorable inverted-
sum-of-years-digits method of goodwill amortization in Australia.416 However, they fail 
to find significant excess returns associated with any of the events or announcements 
investigated, which refutes the assumption that "the market actually perceived a material 
economic consequence in banning the [inverted-sum-of-years-digits] method.',417 
Leftwich (1981), also in an event-study approach, tests abnormal stock performance re-
lated to the deliberations preceding the APB's change in accounting rules for business 
combinations. Hypotheses are derived from contracting theory, predicting that this ap-
parently "cosmetic" rule change will affect firms according to their exposure to restric-
tive covenants in lending agreements.418 While significant abnormal returns are found for 
nine of 21 events considered, these abnormal returns can only partially be attributed to 
effects as predicted by contracting theory.419 Leftwich (1981) reports a strong and unpre-
413 See Lindenberg and Ross (1999, p. 36). 
414 Martinez-Jerez (2001, pp. 6-7). 
415 Refer to section 3.4.3.1 below. 
416 See Day and Hartnett (1999/2000, pp. 208-12). 
417 Day and Hartnett (1999/2000, p. 211). 
418 See Leftwich {I 981, pp. 7-9). 
419 See Leftwich (1981, p. 31 ). 
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dieted indication that larger finns were less negatively affected by the mandated account-
ing rule change, which he interprets as suggestive of omitted variables. Overall, Leftwich 
( 1981) concludes that, while contracting theory cannot fully account for the results, there 
are "few competing theories to explain why apparently cosmetic accounting changes af-
fect the equity value of finns.',420 
2. 5 Summary and implications 
The literature analyzed in section 2.4 provides empirical evidence on the goodwill debate 
presented earlier in this chapter. The first part of the review deals with the question 
whether managers' actual goodwill reporting behavior is consistent with their beliefs 
stated in the discussion. In the second part, financial statement users' goodwill-related 
behavior is analyzed in order to infer whether managers' capital market-related beliefs 
are justified. This dichotomy is appropriately summarized by Day and Hartnett 
(1999/2000) who highlight management's beliefs as important detenninants of manage-
ment's financial reporting behavior: 
"In light of widely accepted efficient market concepts, mandated changes in good-
will amortisation policy may appear to be of little relevance to share price. However, 
in view of such strong and sustained public debate concerning goodwill and its per-
ceived value, it is clear that business communities are divided on this issue. The di-
vergence of opinion is in itself important because it may also suggest the possibility 
of dysfunctional decision-making and a continued need to better understand the 
various perceptions, thought processes and decision criteria of key market partici-
pants.',421 
According to Dunstan (1999), "evidence regarding the detenninants of the accounting 
treatment of goodwill is limited" within existing literature.422 The literature presented in 
section 2.4.3 above contributes direct evidence to suggest that, in most settings and under 
most circumstances, managers prefer income-increasing goodwill-related accounting 
treatments. They are also concerned about the effect of goodwill accounting on their fi-
nancial leverage ratios. These preferences are found to be consistent with contracting-
based incentives as well as the notion that investors are believed to react negatively to 
goodwill-related charges. Finns generally prefer the pooling method over the purchase 
method to account for business combinations, and are frequently willing to incur substan-
tial costs to obtain the perceived accounting benefits associated with this procedure. Fur-
420 Leftwich (1981, p. 33). 
421 Day and Hartnett (1999/2000, p. 212). 
422 Dunstan (1999, p. 2). 
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ther, in the political process managers and their allies lobby for firms' preferred good-
will-related accounting treatments. 
Again, this result suggests in no way that the EMH does not hold. However, it does indi-
cate that managers do not necessarily believe that it does. Apparently, managers do not in 
general trust investors to "see through" goodwill charges to the underlying substance of 
the firm. To them, the downside risk remains that investors might just be "fooled" by 
appearances after all, penalizing the firm for its superficially poor financial status.423 For 
example, the costs of pooling are quite real and a large portion of the expected account-
ing benefits will, in the absence of any direct cash flow effects of the purchase/pooling 
choice, only accrue to management to the extent that investors in fact fail to see through 
the allegedly desirable, albeit cosmetic financial statement effects of the pooling method. 
Since this risk does not seem to preclude managers from "paying to pool", their belief 
that different accounting methods for goodwill "matter" beyond any direct cash flow 
effects must indeed be strong. 
In section 2.4.4, indirect evidence on management's preferences is derived from studies 
of investors' responses to goodwill-related accounting decisions. The experimental re-
sults imply that not all users of financial statement information are at all times able to see 
through goodwill-related accounting effects under an amortization approach with inade-
quate disclosure requirements. Maybe this circumstance can account for managers' ap-
parent doubts in the EMH: Knowing that goodwill-related accounting information is 
sometimes hidden ( or not contained at all) in financial reports, they worry about negative 
stock price effects of goodwill amortization because they do not think investors are able 
to see that sometimes it is cash-neutral goodwill charges that drive weak earnings per-
formance. However, while these findings present a potential challenge to the EMH, simi-
lar deficiencies are much less likely to occur under SF AS 142, where any goodwill write-
offs will be communicated much more clearly to the capital markets through separate-
line disclosure in the income statement. 
Given the scarce and inconclusive evidence on stock market reactions to goodwill write-
offs, it is unclear whether managers have any reason to be concerned about (hopeful of) 
adverse (positive) stock price effects of SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs. Therefore, that 
423 Desai et al. (200 I) note that a "necessary condition for acquirers to pay more in pooling transactions 
is that some parties to the merger believe that market participants cannot see through the differences 
in earnings." 
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particular body of research has little potential, at this point, to inform hypotheses regard-
ing write-off behavior. 
The research findings on the value relevance of goodwill-related accounting amounts 
suggest that, on the whole, goodwill book values are positively and significantly associ-
ated with market values of equity.424 Not in all of the studies reviewed here, however, 
this association is equally strong for goodwill and for other balance sheet items.425 Value 
relevance is found although the goodwill asset is likely to be subject to substantial earn-
ings management. 426 Consequently, one would expect investors to adjust stock prices 
downward, ceteris paribus, when goodwill book values fall. Goodwill write-offs cause 
goodwill book values to fall. If goodwill book values reflect information used by capital 
market participants in determining stock prices, one would likewise expect goodwill 
write-offs, on average, to provide value-relevant information to investors. Then, goodwill 
write-offs would, on average, be associated with downward stock price movements.427 If 
managers believe that investors, for whatever reason,428 respond negatively to changes in 







See Clinch (1997, pp. 342-4) and Davis (1996, p. 57). 
Also, as Clinch (1997, p. 344) notes, there should be cross-sectional differences in the sign and 
strength of the association. For example, different degrees of negotiating power exercised in the take-
over negotiations will influence the extent to which the purchase price reflects the present value of an-
ticipated future economic benefits of the acquisition. Acquirers with high bargaining power will, on 
average, have to pay less than the present value of all expected future economic benefits, whereas ac-
quirers with low bargaining power will, on average, have to remunerate the acquiree's owners for the 
full present value of expected future economic benefits associated with the acquisition. Goodwill 
book values resulting from the former group's acquisitions will tend to understate the true economic 
benefits, whereas goodwill book values from acquisitions made by firms with low bargaining power 
will more accurately reflect or even overstate present value of expected future economic benefits as-
sociated with these acquisitions. These and other factors will contribute to cross-sectional variation in 
the value relevance of goodwill-related accounting numbers. Therefore, goodwill write-offs made by 
some firms should be associated with stronger stock price declines than that would be expected for 
goodwill write-offs recorded by other firms. In tum, managers of firm belonging to the former group 
will be less inclined to record (accelerate/overstate) goodwill write-offs than will be the case with 
managers of firms belonging to the latter group, because the former will expect goodwill write-offs to 
be associated with a more pronounced stock price decline than will the latter. 
See, for example, Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996). 
A separate issue is whether such write-offs occur in a timely manner. A write-off is timely when it 
reflects the economic value decline of the underlying asset in the period in which it occurs. If a write-
off is not recorded in a timely manner, it might be preempted by other information. Refer to Segal 
(2003) for an empirical study of the timeliness of certain SFAS 121 and SFAS 142 goodwill write-
offs. 
Again, a critical point is management' s perspective on the EMH. If managers accept the EMH, earn-
ings management for capital market-related reasons (i.e., to "fool" investors) is pointless since inves-
tors will see through any "cosmetic" (i.e. cash-neutral) accounting decisions. However, incentives 
remain to manage goodwill write-offs for other, primarily contracting reasons. Refer to section 3.3.2.3 
below. 
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stock prices,429 they have incentive to avoid or, depending on the circumstances, to delay 
and/or understate any goodwill write-offs as long as the costs of any expected associated 
stock price decline outweigh any benefits of these write-offs. 
While the goodwill asset does appear to capture information used by investors in setting 
share prices, the goodwill amortization rule prevalent in most accounting systems in the 
past apparently does a poor job at capturing the value decline, if any, of this asset. Ap-
parently, while goodwill is perceived by investors as a valuable asset, its value does not 
appear to develop in the manner suggested by linear amortization over some arbitrarily 
chosen period. Rather. goodwill amortization is apparently viewed as "noise". The 
FASB, in line with the recommendation by Jennings et al. (1996),430 claims that the im-
pairment-only approach in SFAS 142 is more relevant to investors.431 This might be 
taken as prima facie evidence that managers will believe that shareholders' will view 
(unexpected) goodwill write-offs under SFAS 142 as value relevant, which would result 
in negative stock price reactions. In view of extant criticism of the high degree of discre-
tion inherent in the details of SFAS 142,432 this new method represents a considerable 
leap of faith by standard setters. Managers' use of their discretion in this context will 
depend not only on their contracting-related incentives but also in their assumptions as to 
how investors will react to transitional goodwill write-offs under SFAS 142. 
The persistent belief apparently held by managers, that investors respond less favorably 
to purchase acquisitions than they do to pooling acquisitions, amounts to an expression of 
doubt regarding the EMH, specifically in the market's ability to adjust for differences in 
429 Refer to section 3.3.2.4.2 below. 
430 See Jennings et al . (1996, p. 513). Interestingly, this recommendation is subject to the reservation that 
"the financial reporting incentives of managers must be aligned with those of financial statement us-
ers." 
431 See, for example, SFAS 142.B74-8. However, the finding that goodwill amortization apparently does 
not reflect information used by investors does not automatically imply that an impairment-only ap-
proach, despite its conceptual appeal, is superior in that respect. All it suggests is that goodwill amor-
tization does not accurately reflect any decline in the value of goodwill as perceived by investors. 
However, simply omitting goodwill amortization is not what occurs under an impairment-only ap-
proach, at least not when an impairment write-off actually takes place. It is not self-evident that a 
goodwill write-off measured according to SFAS 142 will accurately capture the "real" extent and tim-
ing of any goodwill value decline as perceived by market participants. Especially, the apparent "value 
irrelevance" of goodwill amortization does not necessarily mean that goodwill does not decline in 
value in the market's view at all. However, arguments put forward in favor of the impairment-only 
approach by both the F ASB and members of the academic community might induce management to 
feel justified in avoiding goodwill write-offs because they might think that the market feels that 
goodwill is an asset that does not decline in value. 
432 Refer to chapter 4 below. 
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financial reporting methods that have no accompanying direct cash flow differences.433 
However, the data reviewed here suggests that, on average, purchase business combina-
tions appear to outperform pooling transactions. The apparent lack of positive market 
response to the pooling method suggests that investors do not appear to respond mecha-
nistically to the financial statement effects of a given accounting treatment. 
What little evidence there is on the stock price effects of mandated changes in goodwill-
related accounting rules does not allow a consistent conclusion. While some abnormal 
returns are found, they apparently cannot be fully explained by theory consistent with the 
EMH. On the other hand, where abnormal returns are not observed, the EMH is only 
supported under the assumption that no unanticipated indirect cash flow effects, as as-
sumed to exist under contracting theory, will result from the rule change.434 
As stated earlier, while the research analyzed above contributes valuable information to 
the question at hand, the findings do not fully generalize for various reasons. While, un-
der the pre-SF AS 142 reporting regime, avoiding charges to earnings had to be traded off 
against maintaining leverage, SF AS 142 offers "the best of both worlds". Therefore, the 
evidence presented here suggests that managers are likely to avoid goodwill charges al-
together. However, since the transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-off is disclosed as a 
change in accounting principle, managers might prefer the adoption year over later peri-
ods for recording large write-offs. 
433 Even the F ASB cited as a reason for taking on the business combinations project concerns that a 
competitive advantage were bestowed on firms that qualified for use of the pooling method to account 
for their acquisitions. See SF AS 141.B6. 
434 This mixed evidence can be at least partly attributed to problems with the research design. It is par-
ticularly difficult to identify the key event(s) within a lengthy rule-making process that caused revi-
sions in investors' expectations. Also, since virtually all firms are affected by the change, calculating 
abnormal returns is exceptionally problematic. 
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3 Empirical research on discretionary asset write-offs 
3.1 Chapter overview 
In chapter 2, goodwill write-offs according to SF AS 142 were presented as the latest epi-
sode in the long-standing goodwill debate. It was argued that the relevant theoretical ar-
guments and empirical findings have implications for possible determinants of firms ' 
behavior related to the adoption of SF AS 142. In this chapter, another facet of the transi-
tional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off is analyzed: It has been claimed that the new rules 
make accounting for goodwill even more flexible than it was before - and therefore in-
creasingly susceptible to management's financial reporting incentives.435 In this sense, 
SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs belong to a category of accounting phenomena frequently 
referred to as discretionary asset write-offs, which are interesting objects of study due to 
their economic significance and other specific characteristics. The hypotheses, theoretical 
background, and main findings generated in this well-developed discretionary asset 
write-off literature appear to be largely applicable to the SF AS I 42 setting and might 
help predict managers' financial reporting behavior upon adoption. Therefore, this chap-
ter is devoted to an in-depth analysis and review of this research area, the insights of 
which are taken up in section 5.2 to form specific hypotheses. 
This investigation proceeds as follows: In section 3.2, discretionary asset write-offs are 
introduced and established as an interesting and fruitful area of accounting research. The 
remainder of this chapter is dedicated to analyzing the two facets of the discretionary 
asset write-off literature in tum: In section 3.3, research on the determinants of discre-
tionary asset write-offs is analyzed. Special emphasis is placed on the theoretical origins 
of the main hypotheses, in order to ascertain applicability of predictions and findings to 
the SFAS 142 setting. The literature on financial statement users' perception of these 
charges is the subject of section 3.4. Investors' responses to discretionary asset write-offs 
in general are instructive in predicting managers' transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-
offbehavior. In both of these sections, the literature review occasionally goes beyond the 
limited number of discretionary write-off studies to include instructive research findings 
from neighboring areas, e.g. the earnings management and value relevance literatures.436 
Finally, section 3.5 contains a summary of the evidence and a discussion of possible im-
plications for transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off behavior. 
435 The discretionary nature of SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs is established in chapter 4 below. 
436 However, since the empirical study presented in chapter 5 below contributes to the research reviewed 
in section 3.3 , this section is more detailed and comprehensive than section 3.4. 
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3.2 Discretionary asset write-offs as a subject of accounting research 
A write-off is an "accounting event where a firm recognizes a loss and reduces an asset's 
balance sheet value".437 In theory, it is triggered by an impairment of the underlying as-
set, i.e. a situation in which the carrying amount of that asset on the company's books 
exceeds its fair value or similar benchmark amount. 438 Francis, Hanna and Vincent 
( 1996) refer to write-offs as discretionary when there is "little authoritative guidance" on 
the accounting for them.439 It is debatable to what extent an area of accounting can be 
termed "discretionary" when accounting standards do exist for it. In this study, however, 
it is argued that the existence of accounting standards as such does not necessarily elimi-
nate all discretion. Consequently, a write-off is referred to as discretionary if its exis-
tence, amount, and/or timing either are not regulated explicitly under existing GAAP or 
are governed by rules that allow an unusually high degree of flexibility and discretion.440 
It has been briefly discussed in section 1.2 that discretionary asset write-offs have drawn 
the attention of accounting researchers, policy-makers and other interest groups for a 
number of reasons. 441 First, the write-offs studied are economically significant, having a 
large impact on firms' financial statements item such as accounting earnings and the 
book value of (net) assets.442 Second, long-term assets, especially intangible assets, are 
inherently difficult to value. As has been discussed at length in section 2.3 .2 above, this 
problem is particularly severe where the unidentifiable intangible asset "goodwill" is 
437 Heflin and Warfield (1997, p. 1). Similar definitions are provided by Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks 
(1998, p. 327), Bunsis (1997, p. 1385), Hirschey and Richardson (2002, p.178), and Zucca and Camp-
bell (1992, p. 30). The terms "write-off' and "write-down" are used as synonyms. See Alciatore et al. 
(1998, p. 1). Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks (1998, p. 343) note that "write-off" is "a very general term, 
one that encompasses a wide array of financial events". Elliott and Hanna (1996, p. 139) include in 
their analysis of write-offs all "large negative special items", noting that these potentially comprise 
accruals other than write-offs. 
438 See SFAS 144.7: Impairment "is the condition that exists when the carrying amount of a long-lived 
asset (asset group) exceeds its fair value." See also IAS 36.5: "An impairment loss is the amount by 
which the carrying amount of an asset exceeds its recoverable amount". With respect to the goodwill 
impairment test, refer to SFAS 142.19. According to section 253 par. 2 HGB, "auBerplanm!!Bige Ab-
schreibungen" are recorded to account for the fact that an asset's book value no longer reflects its 
lower fair value as of the balance sheet date. Breidert (1994, pp. 20-7) discusses conceptual differ-
ences between impairment write-offs and changes to the amortization schedule as well as between 
temporary and permanent declines in asset value. See also Coenenberg (2003, pp. 112-6), Schildbach 
(2000, pp. 245-7), and Streim (1988, pp. 102-4). 
439 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 117). 
44° Corresponding to the stance taken here, Segal (2003, p. 5) refers to "discretionary write-offs" as 
441 
"situations in which little authoritative guidance on accounting exists or the discretion afforded to 
managers is large" (emphasis added). 
For an overview, refer to Alciatore et al. (1998, pp. 1-2). 
442 This point is made by Alciatore et al. (1998, p. I) and Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks (1998, p. 327). 
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concerned. This circumstance makes detecting and quantifying any impairment a chal-
lenging task, even in the absence of incentives to manage financial statements.443 Third, 
most GAAP allow firms a high degree of discretion and flexibility in determining the 
existence, magnitude and timing of any write-offs.444 For example, before the issuance of 
SFAS 121, in December of 1994, write-offs of long-lived assets were argued to be dis-
cretionary in nature due to the lack of available authoritative guidance.445 Therefore, such 
write-offs were argued to be well suited for earnings management, especially in the form 
of "big bath" behavior. 446 Fourth, new accounting pronouncements recently issued in 
several jurisdictions around the world, prompted mainly by the reasons stated above, 
have sparked renewed interest in the analysis of write-offs. Apart from SFAS 142, these 
include, for example, SF AS 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-
Lived Assets, issued in 2001, and the IASB's revised IAS 36, Impairment of Assets, dated 
March 2004. Many commentators hold that even these pronouncements have not been 
successful in severely restricting discretion.447 Taken together, these characteristics make 
write-offs of long-lived assets ideal instruments of earnings management and, in turn, 
interesting objects of study. 
Consequently, empirical accounting researchers have mainly focused on two aspects:448 
First, due to the high degree of discretion involved in the relevant accounting pro-
nouncements, the reliability of discretionary asset write-offs is frequently questioned. 
Consequently, academics investigate the determinants of discretionary asset write-offs in 
order to ascertain the extent to which these write-offs are used by managers to achieve 
their own self-interested financial reporting objectives. If asset write-offs are primarily 
explained by earnings management incentives, it can be argued that they do not actually 
represent what they purport to represent, i.e. an economic decline in the value of the un-
derlying assets (impairment). Second, the sheer magnitude and infrequent occurrence of 
these charges raises questions regarding their relevance to users of financial statements. 
Therefore, another area of research deals with the association of discretionary asset write-
offs and the market value of write-off firms. Aspects of this literature are possible stock 
443 See Segal (2003, p. 6). 
444 See Elliott and Shaw (1988, p. 92). See also Schildbach (2001, p. 130). 
445 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, pp. 117-8). 
446 See, for example, Alciatore et al. (1998, p. I). 
447 Riedl (2002, pp. 1-2) argues that, even after the issuance of SF AS 121, write-offs of long-lived asset 
remain a discretionary item, possibly even more so than before. 
448 These two aspects of the research are addressed jointly in many studies. 
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price responses to write-off announcements as well as the value relevance of accounting 
amounts that reflect the write-offs. 
The core of this literature, and consequently the review in this section, focuses on write-
offs of long-lived assets. A number of other accounting items are also touched upon due 
to their structural similarity with asset write-offs in terms of the criteria discussed above. 
First and foremost, restructuring charges are an exemplar of this equivalence, especially 
because they are also potential vehicles of "big bath"-type charges. 449 Equivalently, 
write-offs of acquired in-process R&D share some of the characteristics of other discre-
tionary asset write-offs. 450 Other accounting events, including upward revaluations of 
long-lived assets, special items, write-offs of current assets, severance payments, liability 
accruals, and asset disposals are too structurally dissimilar to be included in the literature 
of interest here. 451 Also, several studies analyze industry-specific accruals (e.g. loss-
reserve accruals in the insurance industry or bank loan loss reserves) that, while similar 
to discretionary asset write-offs in a number of respects, are not considered here due to 
their limited scope. 452 Finally, a number of industry-specific studies analyzing non-
discretionary write-offs in the oil and gas industry are also omitted here. 453 
Inferential research on discretionary asset write-offs 
.,Causes": 
Factors driving the existence, 
amount, and timing of write-offs 
• Do write-offs capture economic 
declines in asset value adequately 
and in a timely manner? 
• To what extent is the discretion 
inherent in the write-off decision 
used to achieve financial reporting 
objectives stemming from 
management's incentives? 
,.Effects": 
Capital market reactions to 
(announcements of) write-offs 
• How do stock prices respond to 
(announcements of) write-offs? 
• What is the long-term 
association of accounting 
amounts including write-offs and 
stock prices? 
Figure 6: Research questions in discretionary write-off studies 
449 See, for example, Chaney, Hogan and Jeter (2000), who consider write-offs as a possible component 
of a larger restructuring effort. See also the literature reviewed in Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks (1998, 
pp. 329-332). 





Empirical investigations of upward asset revaluations include those by Black, Sellers and Manly 
(1998) and Easton, Eddey and Harris (1993). Bartov (1993) analyzes asset sales as an instrument of 
earnings manipulation. 
Refer to McNichols (2000, pp. 316-7, 333-5) for a detailed discussion of part of this literature. 
Refer to Alciatore et al. ( 1998, pp. 22-6) and Alciatore, Easton and Spear (2000). 
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Figure 6 on the previous page summarizes the research agendas pursued in the discre-
tionary write-off literature. 454 
First, researchers are commonly interested in the causes of discretionary asset write-offs. 
Therefore, they analyze the statistical association between write-offs and a range of vari-
ables that proxy for possible determinants of the write-off decision and the amount writ-
ten off. Since available methodology cannot ascertain causality,455 reference is made to 
"determinants" of or "factors" associated with, as opposed to "causes" of write-offs. 
However, researchers try to establish the root causes of write-offs and therefore try to 
present evidence that allows them to decide whether their hypotheses about potential 
causes must be rejected. On the one hand, it is possible that the existence, amount, and 
timing of these accounting events reflect the existence, amount, and timing of economic 
declines in the values of the underlying assets accurately and in a timely manner. On the 
other hand, the discretion inherent in the ( or the complete lack of) rules governing the 
write-off may be used by management to engage in earnings management, motivated by 
any of the earnings management incentives discussed in section 3.3.2 below.456 It is diffi-
cult to disentangle the two factors, a fact that is not always sufficiently accounted for. 457 
Second, researchers are also interested in the effects of discretionary write-offs on the 
market value of the write-off firms' equity. While information content studies mainly 
focus on the short-term stock price effects of write-off announcements, association stud-
ies investigate the association of write-off amounts and longer-term stock returns. The 
theory presented in section 3.4.1 below explains why such associations would be ex-
pected. Again, available methodology cannot determine causality. Rather, levels of statis-
tical significance are established at which a given hypothesis is either refuted of refuta-
tion of a given hypotheses is rejected.458 
454 Another area not separately discussed here concerns descriptive investigations of the characteristics of 
write-offs, especially their magnitude and significance relative to other balance sheet and income 
statement items. See Alciatore et al. ( 1998, pp. 2, 26, 29). 
455 See, for example, Huijgen (1996, p. 9 fn. 5). 
456 Consequently, Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 118) " investigate the extent to which proxies for 
managerial incentives to manipulate earnings and proxies for asset impairment explain write-off deci-
sions". 
457 Riedl (2002, p. 7) argues that "the reporting of asset impairment is conceptually a function of eco-
nomic factors and reporting incentives". Wilson (I 996, p. 172) states that the "credibility of a ma-
nipulation study's research findings depends on the extent to which the experimental design controls 
for .. economic factors". 
458 Bearing this in mind, Francis, Hanna and Vincent's (1996) choice of title ("Causes and Effects of 
Discretionary Asset Write-Offs") raises somewhat false expectations. See also Wilson (1996, p. 177). 
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It should be noted that these two apparently separate and distinct research agendas influ-
ence each other: As discussed above, when trying to grasp the factors driving write-offs, 
consideration must be given to economic developments likely to have caused the under-
lying asset's value decline. Some investigate whether poor performance, as a proxy for 
value declines, is related to subsequent write-offs.459 If a statistically significant relation 
can be shown to exist, it might be interpreted as evidence of the causality outlined above. 
But the relation might as well work the other way round: The fact that an economic de-
cline in (part of) the firm's asset base has occurred might lead investors to adjust down-
wards their expectations regarding the firm ' s future cash flows. Provided that market 
participants learn about these developments through sources other than the firm's finan-
cial reporting disclosures, a stock price drop is bound to occur even before the corre-
sponding write-off is actually recorded, let alone announced.460 
Research on causes and effects is linked in another way: Investors are unlikely to react to 
each write-off in the same, predictable way regardless of its underlying cause. Each in-
vestor's reaction will depend on the information that the write-off is perceived to convey, 
i.e. on the way in which a specific write-off changes her expectations about the firm ' s 
future cash flows. For example, a surprising write-off reflecting an asset's obsolescence 
will probably trigger a response different from the one observed if that same write-off 
were purely motivated by management's desire to signal a strategic change that is 
planned to improve future earnings power. Therefore, market reactions may be different 
for different types of write-offs and in different settings in which write-offs occur. This 
notion is explicitly analyzed in studies testing for cross-sectional differences in market 
reactions to (announcements of) asset write-offs.461 
Occasionally, the question whether or not a write-off is recorded in a timely manner 
(timeliness) is presented as a separate issue.462 A write-off can be characterized as timely 
when it is recorded contemporaneously with the underlying asset becoming economically 
459 For example, as Strong and Meyer (1987, p. 646) point out: "]fan asset writedown is at heart a recog-
nition of valuation declines that occurred in the past, the prior effects are likely to be apparent in past 
financial and operating performance". 
460 See also Comprix (2000, p. 4). 
461 For example, Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 128) maintain that a write-off announcement 
potentially conveys information on three types of underlying facts: Economic value decreases, 
changes in management strategies, and management's inclination and ability to exercise earnings 
management discretion. For each type, they hypothesize different effects. See also Elliott and Shaw 
(1988, pp. 105-107). 
462 See, for example, Alciatore et al. (1998, p. 3), Heflin and Warfield (1997, pp. 3, 9-15), and Riedl 
(2002, pp. 14-9). 
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impaired.463 In analyzing the factors underlying discretionary asset write-offs, researchers 
must address the question whether or not these accounting events are caused by eco-
nomic factors, i.e. declines in the economic values of the assets in question. When ana-
lyzing these economic factors, one will necessarily have to consider timing issues, i.e. 
whether contemporary economic developments underlie the write-off or whether the 
write-off only reflects the related economic decline with a time lag. For example, ex-
planatory variables for the write-off amount might include current as well as lagged stock 
returns. 
In "effects" studies, the timeliness issue is more complicated, which makes drawing in-
ferences is difficult: For example, a stock price decline following a write-off announce-
ment can be interpreted as evidence that the announcement contained information that 
caused investors to revise their expectations regarding firm value. In this respect, the 
write-off would have been timely. However, the fact that no stock price effect is ob-
served is ambiguous: Either the write-off is preempted by other information that influ-
ences stock price before the write-off announcement (then it is not timely), or it is caused 
by the stock performance prior to the write-off announcement (then it might or might not 
be timely).464 
3. 3 Determinants of write-off behavior 
3.3 .1 Earnings management as an explanatory factor 
3.3.1.1 Earnings management defined 
A common issue in this literature is the choice of terminology, and corresponding defini-
tion, regarding its subject. The term earnings management is by far the most common.465 
It is frequently acknowledged that finding an appropriate term and definition is not a triv-
ial task.466 The following quote is representative of the definitions mainly found in the 
literature: 
463 This discussion should not be confused with the descriptive issue of the distribution of write-offs 
among fiscal quarters, which is more a matter of disclosure. See, for example, Alciatore et al. (I 998, 
p. 29). 
464 The latter explanation would suggest a relevance of stock prices for accounting earnings. See Brown 
(2001 , ch. 9). See also White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 687). 
465 For example, refer to the titles of the articles by Beneish (1998, 2001), Dechow and Skinner (2000), 
Healy and Wahlen (1999), McNichols (2000), and Schipper (1989). 
466 See Beneish (200 I, p. 2), Dechow and Skinner (2000, pp. 238-40). 
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Earnings management is "the process of taking deliberate steps within the con-
straints of generally accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired level of 
reported earnings. "467 
This definition suggests a very limited focus on earnings versus other financial statement 
items and components that can be used to achieve managerial financial reporting objec-
tives. Interestingly, the most common German term, "Bilanzpolitik", suggests a similarly 
narrow focus, albeit on the balance sheet.468 Schipper (1989) suggests the broader term 
"disclosure management" to clarify that the actual focus is not exclusively on eamings.469 
The same objective is achieved by Fields, Lys and Vincent's (2001) similarly broad term 
"accounting choice". 470 In Germany, the term "Jahresabschlusspolitik" has been sug-
gested to indicate this boader focus.471 
It should also be noted that the above definition implies some form of "prejudice", as it 
were, regarding a certain managerial intent to self-interestedly manipulate the financial 
statements.472 As discussed above, it is impossible to ascertain empirically the causality 
of managerial intentions for a given financial reporting decisions. While researchers may 
have some idealized sort of intentional management behavior in mind when studying 
specific accounting phenomena, statistical methodology can only document, not posi-
467 Sidney Davidson, Clyde P. Stickney and Roman L. Weil, Accounting: The language of business, 7th 
ed. 1987, as cited in Schipper (1989, p. 92). 
468 See, for example, Baetge and Ballwieser (1977, p. 200) and Schmidt (1977, pp. 2-5). Heintges (1997, 
pp. 5-7) provides an in-depth discussion of different aspects of this definition. The fact that the Ger-
man term is centered on the balance sheet as opposed to the income statement documents different 
emphases that are deeply rooted in dissimilar concepts of accounting theory. Brecht (2002, pp. 152-3, 
esp. fu . 13) explores the relation between "Bilanzpolitik" and "earnings management", concluding 
that earnings management is the wider concept. 
469 "By ' earnings management' I really mean 'disclosure management' in the sense ofa purposeful inter-
vention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as 
opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process)." See Schipper (1989, p. 92). 
470 "An accounting choice is any decision whose primary purpose is to influence (either in form or sub-
stance) the output of the accounting system in a particular way, including not only financial state-
ments published in accordance with GAAP, but also tax returns and regulatory filings" . See Fields, 
Lys and Vincent (2001, p. 256). Arguably, this definition is too broad: It should be every manager's 
objective to influence reported earnings upwards, primarily by making sound operating, investment, 
and financing decisions. Such non-accounting decisions would be comprised by "accounting choice". 
471 See, for example, the literature cited in Veit (2002, p. 3). 
472 This is also true of Schipper's (1989) definition. Refer to fu . 469. In contrast to that, Kilting and 
Dawo' s (2002a, p. 1157) definition implies that "Bilanzpolitik" is motivated a desire to obtain the 
firm ' s, not management's own, objectives: "Die willentliche und hinsichtlich der Unternehmensziele 
zweckorientierte Einflussnahme auf Form, Inhalt und Berichterstattung des handelsrechtlichen Jahre-
sabschlusses wird allgemein als Bilanzpolitik bezeichnet" (emphasis added). Possibly, the concept of 
methodological individualism has not profoundly taken root in German accounting scholarship. For 
an introduction to that concept, refer to Furubotn and Richter (2000, pp. 2-3). 
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tively prove, empirical regularities suggestive of certain causal relations. 473 Although 
some managerial purpose or intent is an integral element of a meaningful definition,474 
presuming self-interested, opportunistic intentions,475 as is the standard assumption in 
new institutional economics,476 might be beside the point in some cases. Advocates of a 
"signaling" view argue that earnings management can serve to align managers' and 
stakeholders' interests, when managers use their financial reporting discretion to reduce 
infonnation asymmetries regarding the finn's future prospects.477 Most definitions ap-
pear to exclude signaling as an explanation of financial reporting decisions, suggesting 
that earnings management is always opportunistic. 
Another issue has to do with the concrete actions potentially taken by management when 
pursuing its financial reporting objectives. The following definition by Healy and 
Wahlen ( 1999) explicitly considers this point: 
"Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stake-
holders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.',478 
Schipper (1989) also acknowledges that financial reports can be influenced by "real" 
investment, financing, and operating decisions, as well as pure financial reporting steps 
473 To mitigate this potential problem, Dechow and Skinner (2000, p. 241) propose to focus on manage-
rial incentives in order to infer indirectly whether earnings management has been engaged in. 
474 For example, according to Merchant and Rockness (1994, p. 79), "[e]amings management can be 
defined as any action on the part of management which affects reported income and which provides 
no true economic advantage to the organization and may, in fact, in the long-term, be detrimental". 
This definition is too broad in that includes just any income-affecting management action that, regard-
less of original intent, turns out to be detrimental in the long term. It centers on the outcome, not the a 
priori intent. Other broad definitions do include a wide range of actions as well, but they rely on 
managerial intent to qualify those decisions as earnings management. 
475 According to Christie and Zimmerman (1994, p. 541), "[o]pportunism occurs when a manager's deci-
sion increases the manager's wealth, but does not create a net increase in aggregate wealth. Since 
claim holders are price protected, opportunism is the excess opportunism over that expected" (empha-
sis in original). 
476 Refer to Furubotn and Richter (2000, pp. 2-8, esp. 4). 
471 See, for example, Beneish (2001, p. 3) and Rees, Gill and Gore (1996, p. 157). This signaling or in-
formation perspective dates back to Holthausen and Leftwich (I 983). 
478 Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368). This definition is also wide in that it does not focus on earnings 
alone, but on "financial reports" in a more general sense. 
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to account for a given "real" decision. 479 Furthennore, it should be noted at this point that 
the purpose of earnings management can be either to shift income across periods (in-
tertemporal earnings management) or to achieve a certain financial statement presenta-
tion (classificatory earnings management).480 
Healy and Wahlen's (1999) use of the tenn "judgment" highlights another point common 
to much of the terminology: Earnings management, achieved by taking advantage of sub-
jective and discretionary GAAP guidance, is strictly distinct from fraudulent accounting, 
which implies clear violations of GAAP.481 Where a self-interested management is as-
sumed, possible types of financial reporting behavior can be thought of as a continuum 
ranging from neutral, unbiased financial reporting, via earnings management within 
GAAP, to earnings manipulation violating GAAP. Motivations might or might not be 
similar. 
Considering the aspects discussed above, the more neutral term "financial reporting deci-
sions" is defined here to comprise any purposeful management behavior intended to 
achieve management's financial reporting objectives, whatever these objectives might be. 
This behavior, while keeping within the borders set by GAAP, involves all aspects of the 
financial reporting process, and could therefore also be referred to as "financial state-
ments management".482 
479 See Schipper (1989, p. 92). The German terms "Sachverhaltsgestaltungen" and "Sachverhaltsab-
bildungen", respectively, represent these actions. See, for example, Veit (2002, pp. 10-1). See also 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999, pp. 2-3) who similarly distinguish "direct" earnings manage-
ment from "misreporting", both constituting earnings management. Beneish (2001, p. 3) argues that 
excluding all "real" decisions is problematic because it neglects at least two types of such decisions 
that earnings management researchers are interested in. These involve the structuring of transactions 
(solely) to obtain a desired accounting treatment (e.g. the pooling method) and the timing of transac-
tions during the short time span around the closing date of the accounting period in order to achieve 
certain financial relations or ratios (window-dressing) . 
480 This distinction is discussed in more detail in section 3.3.2.4.4 below. 
481 See Dechow and Skinner (2000, pp. 238-40). This notion is consistent with the definition used by 
Davidson, Stickney and Weil (see fn . 467), who specifically stress the "within the constraints of 
GAAP" aspect. On the other hand, Brecht (2002, p. 153) argues that earnings management does in-
clude fraudulent conduct. 
482 However, since the term "earnings management" is by far more common and essentially comprises 
the same aspects, it will be used synonymously throughout the text. 
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3.3.1.2 Overview of the earnings management literature 
Several authors have compiled overviews of the wide array of research questions and, 
mainly empirical, methodological approaches spanned by this extensive topic area. 483 
Typically, these summary articles are structured around different types of earnings man-
agement incentives. Perhaps the most comprehensive synopsis of the more recent re-
search in this area is provided by Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001),484 who organize their 
review around three market imperfections that managers seek to exploit with their finan-
cial reporting decisions. 485 These imperfections, including agency costs, information 
asymmetries, and extemalities,486 give rise to financial reporting behavior motivated by 
contracting considerations (management compensation, debt covenants), stock price con-
siderations, and a potential impact on third parties.487 Concluding that the research in the 
1990s has generated relatively little progress, they recommend that researchers widen the 
scope of accounting issues addressed, improve their empirical research designs, increas-
ingly incorporate theoretical guidance from analytical models, and examine more closely 
the consequences of different aspects of financial reporting behavior, including its costs 
and benefits. 488 Beneish (200 I) also discusses earnings management incentives. How-
ever, in contrast to Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001), he chooses to distinguish between 
income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management as resulting from differ-
ent incentives.489 He acknowledges that this distinction is somewhat simplistic because, 
depending on the situation, one type of incentives may lead to both income-increasing 
and income-decreasing earnings management.490 Dechow and Skinner's (2000) review 
483 A list of 55 articles on earnings management, published during the 1993-99 period in The Accounting 
Review, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Ac-
counting, Auditing and Finance, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Journal of Accounting Re-
search, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, and Review of Accounting Studies, has been 
compiled by McNichols (2000, p. 316). 
484 The authors focus on studies published in the "three top accounting journals" in the 1990s. These 
journals are the Journal of Accounting and Economics, the Journal of Accounting Research, and The 
Accounting Review. They suggest that "roughly 10 percent of papers" in these periodicals deal with 
accounting choice. See Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, p. 256 (both quotes]). 
485 That article is reviewed by Francis (2001). 
486 Refer to Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, pp. 261-3). 
487 Refer to Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, pp. 265-88). These categories are presented in more detail in 
section 3.3.2 below. 
488 Refer to Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, pp. 288-99). 
489 Refer to Beneish (2001, pp. 7-11). 
490 See Beneish (2001, p. 11 ). 
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focuses on capital market-related incentives for earnings management and market par-
ticipants' responses to such behavior.491 
Beneish (2001) further examines different methodological approaches used in the litera-
ture to detect whether earnings management is present. 492 This approach is also adopted 
by McNichols (2000), who explicitly focuses on research design issues in earnings man-
agement studies. She distinguishes between three main methodological approaches, in-
cluding studies based on aggregate (total or discretionary) accruals, on specific accruals 
(such as discretionary asset write-offs), and on the distributional patterns of "managed" 
earnings.493 McNichols (2000) concludes that future progress in earnings management 
research is unlikely to be made in aggregate accruals studies because the empirical meth-
odology employed in this research is not powerful and reliable enough to assess earnings 
management behavior in many interesting contexts. She encourages tests of specific ac-
cruals, which make use of detailed institutional knowledge, as well as of earnings distri-
butions. Specifically, she highlights studies that focus on particular industries or eco-
nomic setting in which a certain earnings management incentive is especially strong.494 
For example, banks and insurance companies have specific discretionary accruals avail-
able in which earnings management should manifest itself. Also, income-decreasing 
earnings management might be observed most frequently where firms are in wage nego-
tiations with labor unions or are preparing a management buy-out, whereas income-
increasing behavior is mostly likely in firms preparing for an initial public offering 
(IPO). Schipper's (1989) seminal commentary on earnings management is also preoccu-
pied with research design issues. However, the author also reviews analytical work on 
conditions giving rise to earnings management.495 
Healy and Wahlen's (1999) overview represents an attempt to extract implications for 
financial accounting standard setting from the research findings concerning earnings 
management. Focusing on the research questions most likely of interest to regulators, 
they document the specific accruals used to manage earnings and the pervasiveness in 
times of frequency and magnitude of earnings management behavior. Furthermore, they 
assess whether earnings management is "successful" in that it actually influences investor 
491 Refer to Dechow and Skinner (2000, pp. 242-7). 
492 Refer to Beneish (200 I, pp. 4-7). See also Beneish (1999b, 1998, I 997). 
493 Refer to McNichols (2000, pp. 316-9). Bernard and Skinner's (1996) review of papers by Subra-
manyam (1996) and Kasanen, Kinnunen and Niskanen (1996) is focused on discretionary accruals 
studies. 
494 See McNichols (2000, p. 334). 
495 Refer to Schipper (1989, pp. 93-8). 
90 
Thorsten Sellhorn - 978-3-631-75498-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:09:55AM
via free access
behavior. However, Healy and Wahlen's (1999) paper also considers different types of 
incentives and methodological approaches. They conclude that the earnings management 
literature to date has had only limited success in clarifying the questions of main interest 
to standard setters. 496 
Finally, the earnings management literature is reviewed in some of the more comprehen-
sive review articles, where it is considered as a specific facet of accounting research in 
general.497 Earnings management research is generally regarded under the aspect of the 
informativeness or "quality" of "managed" earnings, from which inferences are drawn 
regarding, among other things, capital market efficiency. Also, where "managed" earn-
ings turn out to be informative, it might not be desirable that standard setters eliminate all 
discretion from financial reporting standards.498 
In this dissertation, much of the earnings management research beyond the discretionary 
asset write-off literature is reviewed in the appropriate sections below. 
3.3.1.3 Discretionary asset write-offs and earnings management 
While accounting rules pertaining to asset write-offs are intended to capture asset im-
pairment, the discretionary nature of most of this guidance makes such write-offs a po-
tential instrument used by managers to achieve their financial reporting objectives. In this 
context, researchers interested in managers' financial reporting behavior and its underly-
ing motives have turned to examining the determinants of discretionary asset write-offs 
in order to ascertain the extent to which these write-offs actually reflected impairment 
versus financial reporting incentives. In this sense, research on the determinants of dis-
cretionary asset write-offs is a distinct subset of the earnings management literature, a 
larger body of research into managers' incentives and behavior pertaining to accounting 
method choice and other, more subtle financial reporting decisions. 
This "earnings management literature attempts to understand why managers manipulate 
earnings, how they do so and the consequences of this behavior".499 Within the categories 
suggested by McNichols (2000), discretionary asset write-off studies represent tests of 
496 See Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 380). 
497 These articles include, among others, Beaver (2002, pp. 466-8), Beaver (I 998, pp. 98·9), Beaver 
(1996, pp. 116, 119), Lev and Ohlson (1982, pp. 266-275), Kothari (2001, pp. 161-7, 196-204), Ber-
nard (I 989, pp. 85-6). 
498 See, for example, Schipper ( 1989, p. 91). 
499 McN ichols (2000, p. 3 I 3). In this section, the focus is on the former part, while the consequences of 
managers' financial reporting decisions are the subject of section 3.4 below. 
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financial reporting incentives using specific accruals. The specific characteristics of dis-
cretionary asset write-offs, including transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs, have 
important implications for their suitability as earnings management instruments. This fact 
must be taken into consideration when forming hypotheses about management's behavior 
regarding these charges. For example, the effects of write-offs on the financial statements 
are usually considerable and must in most cases be disclosed separately. For this reason, 
it is not plausible to assume that managers use discretionary asset write-offs to achieve 
some subtle financial statement effect, which they hope will go undetected by capital 
market participants. soo Rather, it is likely that managers use discretionary asset write-offs 
strategically as a one-off effect. "Advertised" to investors as a change in accounting 
method or a "cash-neutral" restructuring charge, managers hope that write-offs are 
viewed neutrally, or even favorably, at the time they occur. For this reason, write-off 
effects are frequently and backed out of "pro forma" earnings numbers that allegedly 
represent firm performance much more accurately than GAAP figures can. The true 
benefits of this effect, then, accrue to management in later periods, when financial state-
ment ratios appear more favorable as a result of the prior write-off. This notion that in-
vestors view such transitory items differently from other earnings components is an im-
portant aspect of the discretionary write-off literature. It is a reason why not all of the 
hypotheses used in the broader earnings management literature can be applied in an un-
modified way to discretionary write-off settings. In section 3.3.2.4.8, this issue is elabo-
rated upon. 
3.3.2 Theory, hypotheses, and main findings 
3.3.2.1 Overview 
As has been noted in section 3.2 above, applicable accounting guidance requires a write-
off to be recorded upon impairment of the underlying asset. However, the assets of inter-
est to the discretionary asset write-off literature share the common characteristic that 
their fair values ( or similar benchmark amounts compared to book values in an impair-
ment test) cannot be measured without recourse to management's subjective judgment. 
Consequently, researchers interested in ascertaining the determinants of discretionary 
asset write-offs face the challenge of discriminating between, on the one hand, economic 
factors and, on the other hand, management' s financial reporting incentives as potential 
causes of discretionary asset write-offs. 
500 See also Moses ( 1987, p. 366 fn. 11 ). 
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In section 3.3.2.2 below, the concept of economic impainnent and researchers' ap-
proaches to ascertaining the extent to which actual impainnent is behind discretionary 
asset write-offs are discussed. In a manner of speaking, where a discretionary asset write-
off reflects management's incentives rather than the asset's actual economic obsoles-
cence, the applicable accounting guidance introduces measurement error into the write-
off amount, which might harm financial statement relevance and reliability. 
Management's financial reporting objectives stem from the multiple functions of finan-
cial accounting infonnation.501 As will be discussed in more detail below, financial ac-
counting infonnation provided by finns, voluntarily or due to legal or contractual obliga-
tions, potentially serves numerous purposes.502 In several countries, financial statements 
established according to local GAAP are used to bring about legal consequences. For 
example, taxable income of German firms is to a large extent detennined by the same 
rules that also govern the establishment of accounts for financial reporting purposes. In 
addition, according to corporation law, the amount of accounting earnings calculated 
under German GAAP influences the level of dividends that can or must be distributed to 
stockholders of German stock corporations. However, since most of the research dis-
cussed here, as well as the empirical study presented in chapter 5, focuses on jurisdic-
tions where such close links between discretionary asset write-offs, taxation, and divi-
dend policy do not exist,503 financial reporting incentives stemming from possible conse-
quences for taxes and dividend payouts are not at the center of attention in this section. 
Rather, two types of financial reporting incentives that are most frequently discussed in 
the discretionary write-off research and in the broader earnings management literature are 
focused on here. As depicted in Figure 7, financial reporting incentives potentially result 
when the outcome of finns' explicit and implicit contracts with outside parties depends 
on reported accounting numbers. Such contracts include management compensation 
plans as well as restrictive clauses in debt covenants and, where the concept of "contract" 
is interpreted broadly, political and regulatory costs that depend on a finn's financial 
statements. Furthennore, financial reporting incentives also ensue because financial 
501 Refer to Heintges (I 997) for a detailed discussion of financial reporting incentives depending on 
differing capital market and legal conditions in Germany and the U.S. See also Sieben and Coenen-
berg (I 997, pp. I 045-7). 
502 The purposes of financial accounting information are discussed in most accounting textbooks and 
countless academic articles. Examples include Kieso, Weygandt and Warfield (2001, pp. 2-6), Pellens 
(2001, pp. 9-21), Schildbach (2001, pp. 39-47), Schildbach (2000, pp. 23-73), Streim (1988, pp. 8-
26), Schneider (1997, pp. 27-66), and White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, pp. 2-5). 
503 For example, the tax linkage is regulated in the U.S. only with respect to the LIFO method. See Watts 
and Zimmerman (I 986, p. 233). 
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statement information is believed by managers to be an important factor in the decision-
making processes of capital market participants, including investors and rating agencies. 
Sections 3.3.2.3 and 3.3.2.4 below provide background on each of these categories and 
contain discussions of the relevant literature. 504 
Management's financial reporting incentives 
Economic-consequences Incentives 
Influence contractual outcomes and 
(potential) regulation to directly affect 
management's utility 
• Accounting-based compensation 
plans 
Accounting-based covenants in 
debt contracts 
Accounting-based regulation 
Capital market-related incentives 
Influence market perceptions to 
directly or indirectly affect 
management's utility 
• Benevolent view (signaling): 
Convey privately held 
information about timing, 
magnitude and risk of future 
cash-flows through exercise of 
accounting discretion 
• Malevolent view (manipulation): 
Influence earnings for self-
interested reasons, chiefly in 
order to increase stock price 
Figure 7: Management's financial reporting incentives 
3.3.2.2 Economic factors 
As indicated in section 3.2 above, an asset write-off is supposed to reflect an economic 
value decline (impairment) that causes the carrying amount of the asset in question to fall 
below its fair value (or other relevant benchmark amount).505 Therefore, researchers in-
terested in identifying the factors underlying asset write-offs are required to expose the 
extent to which write-offs can be explained by indicators of economic developments that 
affect negatively the values of the assets under scrutiny. In the attempt to distinguish em-
pirically between economic and incentive causes behind discretionary asset write-offs, 
researchers model write-off behavior under the assumption that it is made "true to the 
spirit" of the applicable guidance. Under that assumption, a write-off would be unaf-
fected by management's incentives, but would purely reflect the underlying asset's eco-
nomic value decline. Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998) argue that incentives might also be 
so4 A similar classification is used by Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001). Beneish (2001, pp.7-11) chooses a 
different categorization when he discusses earnings management incentives based on whether earn-
ings are likely to be increased or decreased because of them. 
sos 
94 
See, for example, SFAS 121.7, SFAS 144.7. The tenn "fair value" is most common under U.S. 
GAAP, whereas the relevant IAS 36.5 refers to "recoverable amount", "the higher of an asset's net 
selling price and its value in use." For ease of exposition, the tenn "fair value" will be used through-
out. Francis, Hanna and Vincent {I 996, p. 122) refer to "economic value" instead. 
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behind the extent to which managers actually report any economic value declines in as-
sets. They point out that managers have "economic and legal liability incentives and re-
sponsibilities to recognise writedowns."506 Similarly, Healy and Palepu (1993) argue that 
reflecting asset value declines in the financial statements enhances managers' reputation 
for credible reporting. If economic factors behind discretionary asset write-offs are not 
controlled for, researchers are vulnerable to jumping to the conclusion that managers 
manipulate earnings when in fact they only account for asset obsolescence as required by 
financial reporting standards. 507 
Most accounting standards on asset write-offs specify impairment indicators as well as 
more or less detailed impairment testing procedures.508 Where the underlying asset's fair 
value can be objectively measured, most frequently due to the existence of an active 
market, the researcher can readily model the amount of impairment, if any. Such market-
able assets do not offer much room for discretionary financial reporting behavior, since 
objective benchmarks for impairment testing are usually available. Wilson (1996) sug-
gests that accounting numbers be decomposed into three components, distinguishing be-
tween a fictitious "true" measurement construct, a measurement error ( due to difficulties 
in observing the "true" value) absent earnings management, and an intentionally "man-
aged" component. 509 He notes that, for marketable assets, the measurement error compo-
nent will, on average, be much smaller than for firm-specific assets such as goodwill that 
are difficult to value. 
The discretionary write-off literature is primarily interested in the latter type of assets, for 
which active markets do not exist. The fact that management has significant discretion in 
making the write-off decision and in determining the amount, if any, to write off (i.e., 
Wilson's (l 996) second and third components are potentially large) directly implies that 
researchers have little hope in developing reasonably correct predictive models of that 
decision. Stated differently, if researchers were able to ascertain the extent of economic 
impairment (i.e., Wilson's (1996) first component) in a given asset with sufficient cer-
tainty, auditors as well as capital market participants could use these models to verify 
managers' write-off behavior, limiting management's financial reporting discretion. Con-
sistent with this notion, Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) report that incentives play a 
506 Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998, p. 160). 
507 See, for example, Wilson (1996, p. 172). 
sos Impairment indicators relevant to SFAS 142 goodwill write-off behavior are analyzed in section 4.3.2 
below. For an investigation of the testing procedure itself, refer to sections 4.5 and 4.6 below. See 
also SFAS 144.7-22 for assets other than goodwill and indefinite-lived intangibles. 
509 Refer to Wilson ( 1996, p. 173). 
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substantial role in explaining discretionary financial reporting decisions such as goodwill 
write-offs or restructuring charges, whereas write-offs of inventory and PP&E appear to 
be significantly less "managed".510 Due to this difficulty in modeling the "unmanaged" 
portion of a discretionary asset write-off, conclusions from extant modeling on the extent 
to which a given set of write-offs correctly reflects economic obsolescence should be 
drawn with caution. Similarly, researchers focusing on write-off firms alone are likely to 
waste information, since the decision not to record but to avoid a write-off potentially has 
an economic and an incentive portion as well. 
Most researchers include in their models proxy variables designed to capture the firm's 
economic development surrounding the write-off. For example, Francis, Hanna and Vin-
cent (1996) use indicators of the firm's as well as the industry's financial and accounting 
performance as "variables indicating the likelihood that the firm has impaired assets and 
the extent of any impairment", assuming that "impairment is associated with both poor 
historical firm performance and declining industry trends. ,,m They find that most types 
of write-offs examined are significantly associated with past stock price declines. Good-
will write-offs in particular are additionally found to be related changes in both to firm 
and industry MTB ratio and ROA. However, not all of these associations have the pre-
dicted sign.512 
While adopting a similar approach, Riedl (2002) focuses on change in firm sales and 
change in industry ROA as economic factors behind asset write-offs under SFAS 121 
compared with the pre-SF AS 121 regime.513 These variables are found to be highly sig-
nificant, in both Tobit and ordinary least squares (OLS) specifications, 514 in the pre-
SF AS 121 regime, but not under SF AS 121. In a related study of goodwill write-offs un-
der SFAS 121 versus SFAS 142, Segal (2003) uses the same proxies for economic fac-
tors that are employed by Riedl (2002).515 In addition, he includes the change in firm 
market value (.1MV). In both regimes, only .1MV is found to be significant. 516 Cotter, 
510 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 125). 
SIi Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 122 [both quotes)). Proxy variables used include several lagged 
stock returns, the book-to-market ratio and its change over time, the change in return on assets (ROA) 
and sales, as well as the corresponding 4-digit SIC industry values. 
512 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 125). 
513 See Riedl (2002, pp. 9-10). 
514 For a discussion of methodological details peculiar to discretionary asset write-off studies, refer to 
section 5.4.1 below. 
515 See Segal (2003, p. 17). 
516 In contrast to Riedl (2002) and Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996), Segal (2003, pp. 40-1) exclusively 
relies on an OLS specification. 
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Stokes and Wyatt ( 1998) also document that write-offs are associated with economic 
value declines.517 Heflin and Warfield (1997), Rees, Gill and Gore (1996), Elliott and 
Shaw (1988), as well as Strong and Meyer (I 987) report largely similar results for uni-
variate comparisons between write-off firms and their industries, concluding that write-
off firms significantly underperform their industry peers on a variety of performance 
measures.518 Loh and Tan (2002) find that macroeconomic factors such as GDP growth, 
change in interest rate, property vacancy rate, and change in unemployment rate are asso-
ciated with the frequency and magnitude of fixed-asset and investment write-offs re-
corded by firms in Singapore.519 Overall, "the evidence seems to indicate that finns write 
down assets during periods of poor perfonnance."520 
Commentators on the discretionary asset write-off literature (and the more general earn-
ings management research) suggest that researchers should make more explicit use of 
their institutional knowledge of accounting standards and financial reporting practice.521 
For example, the studies discussed above rely on proxy variables that capture some gen-
eral notion of economic finn and industry decline. In most cases, these variables are not 
specifically modeled to emulate the method according to which the relevant accounting 
guidance requires asset impairment to be measured.522 For example, SFAS 142 goodwill 
write-offs should be observed whenever the MTB ratio of a finn's reporting unit falls 
below one.523 In a recent working paper, Beatty and Weber (2004) adopt a different ap-
proach to controlling for economic developments in the context of an SF AS 142 write-off 
causes study. They model the expected portion of the transitional goodwill write-off as 
"the amount by which the tangible book value of equity exceeds the market value of eq-
uity"_ 524 
517 See Coner, Stokes and Wyatt (1998, pp. 170-4). 
518 See Heflin and Warfield (1997, p. 25), Rees, Gill and Gore (1996, pp. 160-2), Elliott and Shaw (1988, 
pp. 98-103), and Strong and Meyer (1987, pp. 646-8). 
519 See Loh and Tan (2002, pp. 138-40, 150). The importance of controlling for the state of the economy 
at the time of the write-off is also stressed by Alciatore et al. (I 998, p. 32). 
520 White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 279). 
52 1 See, for example, Wilson (1996, pp. 171-3), McNichols (2000, pp. 337-8), Fields, Lys and Vincent 
(2001, p. 301). 
522 See Wilson (1996, p. 173). 
523 Refer to section 5.2.2 below for a more detailed discussion of the use of the MTB ratio as a proxy for 
economic impairment in the SFAS 142 setting. The SFAS 142 impairment testing procedure is de-
scribed in SFAS 142.19-22. For a detailed discussion, refer to sections 4.5 and 4.6 below. 
524 Beatty and Weber (2004, p. 14). According to the authors, this method is outlined in Tergesen (2002). 
97 
Thorsten Sellhorn - 978-3-631-75498-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:09:55AM
via free access
Determining the "unmanaged" portion of a financial reporting decision is highly relevant 
to another aspect of the discretionary write-off literature. When modeling the expected 
portion of a discretionary asset write-off in the context of a write-off effects study,525 
researchers must make assumptions regarding the amount of write-off, if any, expected 
by capital market participants, based on the information available at the time of the write-
off. Usually, the extent to which a write-off is assumed to be expected depends on eco-
nomic developments preceding the write-off. In other words, capital market participants 
are not, on average, assumed by researchers to be able to anticipate earnings manage-
ment. 
As noted above, discretionary asset write-off studies can be characterized as tests of spe-
cific accruals. 526 However, a substantial segment of the broader earnings management 
literature is interested in ascertaining the extent to which financial reporting incentives 
are reflected in earnings, the aggregate of the entirety of a firm's financial reporting deci-
sions. Such studies rely, perhaps to a larger extent than studies of individual financial 
reporting decisions, on the researcher's ability to correctly specify the amount of earnings 
that would be observed in the absence of earnings management.527 However, early re-
search such as Healy (1985) relied on unadjusted total accruals, represented by the dif-
ference between reported earnings and operating cash flow,528 as a proxy for the "man-
aged" portion of a firm's earnings.529 This approach has been widely criticized because 
total accruals can be disaggregated into a discretionary and a non-discretionary compo-
nent and total accruals are thought to be a noisy measure of the discretionary compo-
nent. s30 
In order to better predict the expected amount of"unmanaged" accruals, researchers have 
developed models to isolate from total accruals the discretionary portion, i.e. the amount 
52l Such studies are discussed in section 3.4 below. 
526 See, for example, McNichols (2000, p. 316). 
527 In the former context, the "earnings management potential" available to management is restricted to a 
single balance sheet or income statement item, perhaps made fairly predictable by accounting guid-
ance and/or industry practice, whereas aggregate accruals studies deal with a much wider array of fi. 
nancial reporting decisions. 
528 See, for example, Healy (1985, p. 94) and DeAngelo (1986, p. 408). 
529 See Healy (1985, p. 94). Another proxy used by Healy (1985) is "the effect of voluntary changes in 
accounting procedures on earnings". 
53° For example, refer to Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995). Healy (1985, p. 94) and DeAngelo (1986, 
p. 408) acknowledge this potential weakness of total accruals. DeAngelo ( I 986, p. 409) uses prior-
period total accruals as "a benchmark for what the current accrual would be, absent income manipula-
tion", assuming that nondiscretionary accruals follow a random walk pattern. However, this method 
assumes that prior-period total accruals were "unmanaged". 
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of potentially "managed" accruals. One of the earliest studies to propose such a discre-
tionary accruals model is Jones (1991 ), who developed what became known as the 
"Jones model". Discretionary accruals models attempt to estimate the discretionary por-
tion of total accruals under the assumption that nondiscretionary accruals are a function 
of the firm's operating characteristics. More technically, total accruals are regressed on 
firm size, the change in revenues, and the level of property, plant and equipment (PP&E) 
over some estimation period. The resulting regression coefficients are then used to esti-
mate, for the period under consideration, the expected level of non-discretionary accru-
als. The difference between this estimate and total accruals is then interpreted as the 
amount of discretionary accruals. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) provide an over-
view of these models.531 Recently, discretionary accruals model have been widely criti-
cized on the grounds that they produce potentially noisy estimates of the "managed" por-
tion of earnings, and that they therefore lack power to actually detect earnings manage-
ment. 532 
3.3.2.3 Economic-consequences incentives 
Since financial reporting rules provide discretion to management, financial reporting de-
cisions such as asset write-offs are likely to be influenced by factors other than economic 
value declines. The determinants of these financial reporting decisions can be further 
explained by investigating management's incentives. An approach introduced in this sec-
tion analyzes any direct cash flow consequences of these decisions. These economic con-
sequences are theorized to result from specific contracts (explicit or implicit) that the 
firm is a party to. 533 For this reason, this category of incentives has also come to be 
termed contracting incentives,534 as opposed to incentives derived from an information 
perspective: 
5)1 
"[T]he contracting and information perspectives agree that there is an association be-
tween accounting methods and cash flows, but they disagree on the causality. The 
contracting perspectives (either efficient contracting or opportunistic behavior) sug-
gest that the accounting methods chosen affect the firm 's cash flows (choose the 
most efficient methods to maximize finn value or behave opportunistically to trans-
See Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995 , pp. 197-200). Identifying certain weaknesses, they suggest a 
"modified Jones model". See also Beaver (2002, pp. 466-8), Bernard and Skinner (I 996), and Kothari 
(2001, pp. 161-7). 
532 Wilson (1996, p. 173) suggests that researchers "stop decomposing accounting numbers into discre-
tionary and nondiscretionary components". See also McNichols (2000, pp. 337-8). 
533 In the spirit of Lev and Ohlson (I 982, p. 250), a "broader view'' is adopted here that includes all di-
rect cash flow consequences of financial reporting decisions. 
534 See White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 173). See also Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, pp. 265-75). 
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fer wealth), while the information perspective suggests the methods chosen provide 
information about the future cash flows of the firm, but do not affect them di-
rectly ."535 
Economic-consequences incentives have been derived from a literature most frequently 
referred to as positive accounting theory, which is introduced next. This research devel-
oped into three main branches, each of which is discussed in turn subsequently. As the 
previous quote indicates, financial reporting decisions made to influence cash flows from 
contracts may be made by management for either efficiency or opportunistic reasons. 
This distinction, including the problems it creates for empirical analyses of the motiva-
tions of financial reporting decisions, is discussed further in section 3.3 .2.3.6. 
3.3.2.3.1 Intellectual roots: Positive accounting theory 
Prior to the 1960s, accounting research was largely concerned with prescribing how firms 
should report. It was attempted to normatively recommend accounting procedures that 
fulfill some theoretical ideal or principle. Under this normative approach, alternative ac-
counting procedures were evaluated based on the extent to which they align net income 
with this perceived ideal. 536 Positive accounting theory evolved in the 1970s and was 
originally intended by its initiators, Watts and Zimmerman, to form a counter-proposal to 
that normative approach. 537 Inspired by contemporary developments in economics and 
finance, a positive approach was adopted, shifting the focus to explaining and predicting 
current observable accounting practice.538 Watts and Zimmerman looked to the contract-
ing and political processes, in which the firm and its constituents are embedded, for ex-
planatory factors of observable accounting practice.539 Under the assumption of nonzero 
contracting and information costs, accounting methods have the potential to affect the 
cash flows accruing to the firm and its managers. 
535 Holthausen ( 1990, pp. 208-9). In the words of White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 173), "accounting 
data do not merely describe reality- they in effect define reality, as real economic consequences flow 
from the reported numbers" (emphasis in original). 
536 See Beaver (1998, pp. 2-3). 
537 The evolution of positive accounting theory is outlined in Watts and Zimmerman (1990, pp. 132-140). 
Haller (1994) provides an introduction to this theory (pp. 597-601) and a review of related research 
findings (pp. 601-3) from a German perspective. See also Kelly (1983). Critical appraisals are pro-
vided, among others, by Ballwieser (1993 , pp. 125-8), Tinker and Puxty (1994), and Wagenhofer 
(1988). 
538 The seminal paper is Watts and Zimmerman (I 979). See also Watts and Zimmerman (1978). 
539 The original idea of positive accounting theory has been widely criticized. The proponents reply to 
this criticism in Watts and Zimmerman (1990, pp. 140-9). See also their views on the terminology (p. 
148). 
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This contracting role of accounting is based on an economic theory of the finn that 
draws on the property rights literature.540 This literature views a finn as a nexus of (for-
mal and infonnal, explicit and implicit) contracts that govern the agency relationships 
between, essentially, owners, debtholders (the principals), and managers (the agents).541 
The assumption that the costs to establish and maintain these contracts are non-zero pro-
vides a link between accounting procedures and the cash flows accruing to the finns 
and/or their managers: Accounting is an integral part of the finn's contracts in that ac-
counting numbers are used to detennine the outcomes of these contracts. Relevant con-
tracts include management's compensation schemes and private lending agreements with 
creditors. 
Since the agent's utility is assumed to increase in the amount of money and non-
pecuniary benefits she receives or consumes on the job, the agent has incentive to engage 
in opportunistic behavior, i.e. behavior that increases the agent's wealth but reduces finn 
value.542 However, under the assumption of rational expectations,543 the principal will 
anticipate these actions and adjust the prices she is willing to pay for stock or debt ac-
cordingly (price protection), causing the agent to bear agency costs.544 Therefore, as an 
owner-manager with a relatively large stake in the finn's equity, she has incentive to in-
cur costs for bonding and monitoring actions to reduce agency costs. However, as is 
common in today's large, public corporations, when the agent is a professional manager 
with a relatively small stake in the finn's equity, she bears only a small fraction of the 
agency costs, which reduces her incentive to act in the principal's best interest. In this 
scenario it is the principal who has incentive to align the agent's interests with her own 
(maximization offinn value) in order to reduce agency costs.545 
Two concrete instruments to minimize agency costs have been the focal points of the 
contracting literature: Incentive compensation plans that align managers' and sharehold-
540 See Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 133). For much the following, refer to Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986, ch. 8). For references see FUlbier (1998, pp. 121-34). 
541 The role of managers differs depending on whether they are owner-managers or professional manag-
ers who own no more than a small percentage of the firm's equity. 
542 See Watts and Zimmerman (I 986, p. 192). The concept of opportunism is discussed in Williamson 
(1975, pp. 26-30). See also FUlbier (1998, pp. 128-9). 
543 See, for example, Furubotn and Richter (2000, pp. 3-4). 
544 The costs of conflicts of interest between agent and principal, which result in value-reducing actions 
taken by the agent. See Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 196, 198). 
545 The manager is additionally disciplined by the labor market. Refer to Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 
pp. 191-3). 
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ers' interests and debt covenants that align managers' and debtholders' interests.546 These 
contracts are often defined in terms of accounting numbers. 547 For example, lending 
agreements between firms' managers and their creditors often specify certain covenants, 
defined in terms of accounting ratios such as interest coverage548 or DTE549, the violation 
of which triggers default on the loan. 550 Therefore, incentives exist for managers to influ-
ence the accounting numbers that are used in these contracts and also in corporate char-
ters and bylaws.551 
3.3.2.3.2 Application to financial reporting decisions 
Early capital markets-based accounting research assumed that, at any point in time, the 
publicly available information set was instantaneously impounded in security prices.552 
Stated differently, researchers relied on the EMH in its semi-strong form.553 Under this 
assumption, "cosmetic" (i.e., cash-neutral) accounting decisions were not expected to 
have any influence on the market value of the firm. More specifically, announcements of 
mandated or voluntary changes in accounting methods were not expected to affect stock 
prices in the absence of tax consequences or any other "direct" cash-flow effects.554 Nor 
were firms that followed different accounting methods expected to be priced differently 
by the market because of their different accounting procedures. However, when early 
research found some evidence that cosmetic accounting decisions did actually appear to 
have stock price effects, 555 a debate ensued concerning possible explanations of these 
findings which apparently contradicted the semi-strong-form EMH. 556 Suggested inter-
pretations range from functional fixation, investors punishing income-increasing manipu-
546 Watts and Zimmerman ( 1986, p. 200) point out that these types of contracts are most frequently stud-
ied because "data are available on those contracts", whereas data "are not readily available for many 
other formal and informal firm contracts". Other such contracts include sales and other contracts. Re-
fer to Watts and Zimmerman (1990, pp. 134 [especially fn. 5), 145, 151). 
547 Refer to sections 3.3 .2.3.3 and 3.3.2.3.4 below for empirical evidence on the actual extent to which 
accounting numbers are used in contractual relations. 
548 EBIT divided by interest expense. 
549 Debt divided by shareholders' equity. 






See Watts and Zimmerman (I 986, p. 196). 
See, for example, Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, p. 264), Holthausen and Leftwich (1983, pp. 80-2). 
According to Beneish (200 I, p. 9), informational efficiency is "a central hypothesis in capital market 
research". Refer also to the discussion section 2.3.3 above. 
See, for example, the review of early research in this area by Lev and Ohlson (I 982, pp. 266-75). 
For concrete examples, refer to Lev and Ohlson (1982, pp. 267-9). 
556 See, for example, Lev and Ohlson (I 982, pp. 273-5) and Bernard (1989). 
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lation, signaling, and cosmetic accounting choices as proxies for firms' economic charac-
teristics. 
As explicitly encouraged by Lev and Ohlson (1982),557 the types of contracts discussed 
above have been considered by the "Rochester school" as an explanation for (1) such 
seemingly "cosmetic", i.e. cash-neutral, financial reporting decisions (mainly mandatory 
and voluntary accounting choices) and for (2) market movements observed in association 
with these decisions, which could not be readily explained when the EMH was assumed 
to hold (so-called "anomalies"558). The existence of contracts that relied on accounting 
numbers to generate "real" economic, cash-relevant consequences has been viewed as 
presenting a theoretically sound explanation consistent with the EMH not only for, at 
first sight, "cosmetic" financial reporting decisions, but also for firms' lobbying behavior 
in the standard-setting process and, ultimately, standard setters' regulatory decisions. 
According to positive accounting theory, these financial reporting decisions have cash-
flow and resulting stock price effects through the use of accounting numbers in contracts. 
However, early empirical tests of these hypotheses generated inconclusive results, possi-
bly because research methods at that time were insufficient to detect the minuscule stock 
price movements associated with the contracting-induced cash-flow consequences of 
financial reporting decisions. 559 White, Sondhi and Fried (1997), summarizing the evi-
dence on the economic-consequences incentives hypotheses, state that "research results 
are consistent, albeit weakly, with the predicted relationships for mandated accounting 
changes but not for voluntary ones."560 
Besides the use of accounting information in the firm's contracts, positive accounting 
theory also considered the role of accounting in the political and regulatory environ-
ment.561 The political process was viewed as a medium through which constituents com-
peted for wealth transfers, with accounting information serving as an indicator of wealth. 
For example, it was assumed that large reported earnings were used as evidence of a mo-
nopoly from which wealth had to be transferred away by regulation. This provided man-
557 See Lev and Ohlson (I 982, pp. 274-5). 
558 Brown (2001, p. 85) paraphrases Kuhn's (1970) definition ofan anomaly as "systematic evidence that 
appears scientifically precise but is inconsistent with the tenets of basic theory". Lev and Ohlson 
(1982, p. 274) prefer the term "surprises", wondering why "some still insist on referring to them as 
anomalies." 
559 See, for example, Zmijewski and Hagerman (I 981 ). Literature reviews by, for example, Bernard 
(1989, p. 80), Christie (1990), Haller (1994), Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), and Leftwich (1990) 
report a growing disenchantment with this line ofresearch. 
560 White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 242). 
561 Refer to Watts and Zimmerman (1986, ch. IO). 
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agers with an incentive to influence accounting numbers in order to minimize the likeli-
hood of exposure to adverse regulation. 
Since Watts and Zimmerman, focusing on explaining and predicting accounting deci-
sions, primarily identified explanatory factors that stemmed from the role of accounting 
numbers in contracts and regulation,562 this line of reasoning has also become known as 
contracting theory. However, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) defend the term positive 
accounting theory, which they prefer over contracting theory and other terms that have 
been suggested, e.g. economic-consequences literature. 563 According to them, it was 
originally chosen to "distinguish research aimed at explanation and prediction from re-
search whose objective was prescription",564 of which contracting theory is only a small 
fraction. 565 
In this dissertation, financial reporting incentives derived from assumed "real" cash-flow 
consequences of accounting numbers are referred to as economic-consequences incen-
tives, because ( 1) the term contracting theory falls intuitively short of including political 
and regulatory considerations, and (2) the term positive accounting theory is too broad: 
The incentives discussed in this section are distinct from the capital markets-related mo-
tivations discussed in section 3.3.2.4.566 However, all financial reporting incentives are 
part of positive accounting theory, while not all are considered to stem from assumed 
"real" cash-flow consequences of accounting numbers. 567 Three branches of the eco-
nomic-consequences literature are discussed in some detail below: Accounting-based 
compensation schemes, accounting-based debt covenants, and accounting-based political 
and other regulatory costs. 568 Problems stemming from the fact that accounting-based 
contracts are possibly endogenous are the subject of section 3.3.2.3.6. 
562 Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 150): "The [positive accounting] literature ... emphasizes the central 
role of contracting costs in accounting theory". 
563 See Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 148). 
564 Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 148). 
565 In that sense, all research interested in the determinants of actual financial reporting decisions is 
"positive". Tinker and Puxty (1994, p. 8) argue that positive accounting theory denotes the whole 
paradigm that replaced normative accounting research: "This contracting research is still ' positive' in 
that it explores the factors influencing management's choice of one accounting policy over others." 
566 These latter incentives are studied, according to Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 132 fn . I), from an 
"information perspective". 
567 The term positive accounting theory does not only include that contracting role of accounting but 
also, as Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 148 fn. 14) explicitly state, " noncontractual variables ... 
[such as] taxes or information for the capital markets". Most generally, according to Watts and Zim-
merman (1990, p. 150), "[accounting choices] are made in terms of individual objectives and the ef-
fects of accounting methods on the achievement of those objectives." 
568 These categories are described fundamentally in Watts and Zimmerman (1986, chapters 9 and 10). 
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3.3.2.3.3 Accounting earnings-based compensation schemes 
The fact that the principal is interested in motivating the agent to increase firm value ex-
plains the existence of management incentive compensation schemes as such.569 How-
ever, it is less straightforward why the principal, especially in a publicly traded firm, 
should reward the agent not on the basis of her impact on firm value but on the basis of 
accounting earnings. 570 Watts and Zimmerman (I 986) argue that the proliferation and 
long history of accounting earnings-based compensation plans indicate that these are ef-
ficient contracts. They point to several factors that possibly motivate the use of these 
schemes:571 First, much of a firm's (debt) capital might not be publicly traded. Earnings 
before interest, then, could be a useful indicator of the firm's performance, i.e. of changes 
in the total value of the firm, since it may be reasonable to assume that overall firm value 
varies with earnings before interest like stock price varies with earnings.572 Second, even 
where (a large portion of) total firm value is observable, it need not be the adequate basis 
for compensating managers that are not responsible for the whole firm. Subunit managers 
should be rewarded based on divisional performance. For most divisions, market values 
are not observable, but divisional accounting earnings that are indicators of those sub-
units' market value can be calculated.573 Third, since performance and bonus plans defer 
compensation for one or more years, a tax benefit is realized by the manager if the firm's 
corporate tax rate exceeds the manager's personal tax rate. However, an offsetting effect 
is the plan's influence on the manager's risk. Compared to the present value of a fixed 
salary, the present value of accounting earnings-based bonus compensation adds more 
risk to the manager's overall portfolio. Risk-averse managers will require greater com-
pensation when they are subject to a bonus plan. The fact that such plans nonetheless do 
exist suggests that other (incentive) benefits are derived from their use.574 Finally, com-
569 Hypotheses that explain the existence and composition of management compensation schemes are 
presented by Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 201). See also Smith and Watts (1992). 
570 Shareholders may be interested in high accounting earnings as such, because accounting earnings are 
a determining factor of the amount of dividends that can be paid. A bonus plan that ties (part of) 
management's compensation to the accounting earnings reported in a given period, then, should help 
align management's interests with those of shareholders. In a related paper, Lewellen. Loderer and 
Martin (1987) investigate the composition of executive compensation packages in terms of current 
versus deferred and stock-related versus cash-based elements. 
571 Refer to Watts and Zimmerman (I 986, pp. 202-3). 
572 According to Healy (1985, p. 93), 33 .5% of bonus contracts examined included an earnings definition 
that involved adding back interest. 
573 Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999, p. 121) explicitly investigate business-unit managers' earnings-based 
bonus plans that are based on business-unit earnings, arguing that the signal-to-noise ratio of aggre-
gate firm-level earnings is likely to be low in a decentralized firm. 
574 Hypotheses why compensation contracts include accounting performance (in addition to stock price 
performance) are also discussed by Boschen et al. (2003, pp. 146-7). 
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pensating a manager based on stock performance alone would involve rewarding and, as 
the case might be, penalizing her for market fluctuations that might not be under her in-
fluence . 
Compensation schemes that rely on accounting earnings are widespread. Management 
compensation usually consists of base salary and incentive compensation. Two types of 
the latter are distinguished:575 (1) Performance plans tie management's reward to three-
or five-year targets, frequently defined in terms of stock performance, while (2) bonus 
plans specify annual goals based on accounting measures such as net income, ROA, and 
ROE. 576 Healy (1985) cites evidence documenting that, in 1980, 90% of the 1,000 largest 
U.S. manufacturing firms used an accounting earnings-based bonus plan to remunerate 
managers, and that bonus plans accounted for a larger proportion of managers' overall 
compensation than did performance plans. 577 
If compensation is based on accounting measures generated by management, it is not 
intuitively clear, why discretion should be allowed in determining these measures. 578 
However, some discretion appears to be economically efficient since it can be used by 
managers to signal the firm's future performance. Also, it is simply too costly to elimi-
nate all discretion. Possibly, management's manipulation accounting earnings upward to 
increase their bonus payments might even be in the shareholders' best interest, since 
higher earnings are also likely to result in higher stock price and/or a lower likelihood of 
debt covenant violation. Furthermore, discretion in accounting-based contracts allows 
managers to use their superior knowledge about the accounting methods that best moti-
vate subordinates. Ultimately, investors' assumed rational expectations provide that man-
agement's overall compensation package anticipates opportunistic financial reporting 
decisions. One cost of more rather than less discretion is the increased likelihood of ex 
post opportunism due to unanticipated redistribution. 579 
575 See Healy (1985, p. 87). 
576 See Fields, Lys and Vincent (200 I, p. 266). 
577 See Healy (I 985, pp. 85, 87). For more recent evidence, especially on the determinants of CEO com-
pensation, refer to Boschen et al. (2003, pp. 147-9). 
578 In the words of Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 204 [both quotes]), "[i]f managers controlled the 
calculation of earnings to the extent that they could report any number they wished, earnings-based 
bonus plans would not exist for incentive purposes". "If earnings-based plans are used to reward 
managers for incentive reasons, there must be some restriction of the methods managers use to 
calculate earnings". 
579 See Watts and Zimmerman (1990, pp. 135-6) and Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, p. 266). For more 
detail on this issue, refer to section 3.3.2.3.6 below. 
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In practice, compensation committees are frequently responsible for administering ac-
counting-based compensation schemes. It has been investigated whether compensation 
committees undo certain transactions/accounting entries to adjust accounting earnings, or 
other accounting data relevant for compensation purposes, in order to generate enhanced 
incentive effects.580 Generally speaking, opportunistic earnings management to maximize 
bonus payments could be precluded by adjusting for bonus-increasing earnings manage-
ment. Conversely, managers could be shielded from bonus-decreasing events that either 
are outside their responsibility or benefit shareholders by enhancing finn value. Healy, 
Kang and Palepu ( 1987) examine the effect of two distinct accounting procedure changes 
on CEOs' cash compensation. They find no evidence that changes between inventory 
valuation methods and depreciation procedures are adjusted in order to compute CEO 
compensation. The authors are surprised by this finding since correcting earnings num-
bers to pre-change levels would have been low-cost for compensation committees, since 
the accounting changes studied are well visible and apparent from publicly available fi-
nancial data. 581 In a related study, Abdel-khalik (1985) finds opposite results. Dechow, 
Huson and Sloan (1994) report evidence on a specific aspect of this issue. They argue 
that restructuring charges are of specific interest in this context because they usually pro-
duce reverse short-term earnings versus long-tenn shareholder value effects. Their em-
pirical evidence suggests that restructuring charges are backed out of CEO cash compen-
sation. Interestingly, the fact that restructuring charges are backed out is not necessarily 
stated explicitly in the plans. Therefore, managers might still engage in bonus-related 
earnings management and only learn later on that avoiding, understating, or delaying 
restructuring charges was unnecessary. 582 Gaver and Gaver ( 1998) examine the extent to 
which different components of earnings influence CEO cash compensation. They distin-
guish above-the-line earnings from below-the-line earnings, i.e. the results of discontin-
ued operations and extraordinary items. Their regression results suggest that positive 
components flow through to affect compensation while negative components do not. This 
result holds even for other unusual, non-recurring gains and losses that do not qualify for 
below-the-line treatment. The authors suggest several explanations for this interesting 
finding: 583 First, they argue that executives have high bargaining power in negotiations 
580 See, for example, Dechow, Huson and Sloan (1994, p. 138). Healy (1985, p. 85) declares that earn-
ings "are often defined so that certain accounting decisions do not affect bonuses". Pertaining to the 
financial reporting decisions of interest here, Francis, Hanna and Vincent ( 1996, p. 123 fn. 7) note 
that "manipulations will affect management compensation if bonus calculations are not adjusted for 
write-offs and restructuring charges." 
581 See Healy, Kang and Palepu (1987, p. 32). 
582 See Dechow, Huson and Sloan (1994, p. 155). 
583 See Gaver and Gaver ( 1998, p. 252). 
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with compensation committees since replacement is not easily found for their specialized 
knowledge and shareholders have incentive to avoid potential decreases in firm value 
caused by the departure of the CEO. Second, managers are rewarded for the value-
increasing decisions that are behind the non-recurring items. This explanation corre-
sponds to the frequent assertion that goodwill write-offs and other charges, e.g. restruc-
turing charges, 584 are part of a strategic review that leads to enhanced future prospects. 
Finally, executives are shielded from exogenous losses for which they are not responsi-
ble. 585 Finally, Boschen et al. (2003) document that CEO compensation initially responds 
positively to unexpected accounting performance, but falls below prior levels in later 
periods. However, they point that economic interpretation of this finding is open to de-
bate: Performance standards might be raised for periods following unexpected earnings, 
making them more difficult to attain. Alternatively, unexpected earnings due to earnings 
management might reverse in later periods because future earnings had been accelerated 
to achieve them.586 Taken together, the evidence presented in these studies suggests that 
the extent to which earnings management decisions affect compensation is not a priori 
known to management. Therefore, bonus-related earnings management cannot be ruled 
out in most situations, especially where unprecedented financial reporting decisions are 
made due to mandatory changes in GAAP such as the initial application of SF AS 142. 
The bonus plan hypothesis has originally been formulated by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) as follows : 
"Ceteris paribus, managers of firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose ac-
counting frocedures that shift reported earnings from future periods to the current 
period."58 
Healy (1985) expands this simple relation by explicitly taking into account that bonus 
plans frequently have upper and lower bounds and that bonus payments are an increasing 
function of reported accounting earnings only when earnings are within the corridor de-
fined by these thresholds. When managers make financial reporting decisions so as to 
maximize multi-period compensation, they have incentive to manage earnings upward 
only when unmanaged earnings are expected to fall within the corridor or when they are 
584 For example, Dechow, Huson and Sloan (1994) report that CEO cash compensation does not decrease 
as a result ofrestructuring charges taken. 
585 Lambert (200 I) documents that incentive constructs have a discouraging effect when they are based 
on measures that are highly volatile and not under the manager's influence. See also Hitz and Kuhner 
(2002, p. 284) and Kahle (2002b, pp. 903-4). 
586 See Boschen et al. (2003, p. 164). 
587 Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 208). 
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sufficiently close to the lower end that income-increasing earnings management can level 
out the remaining difference. When W11Danaged earnings are either above the upper 
bound or (far) below the lower bound, managers will have incentive to manage earnings 
downward instead, a fact not recognized by the simple bonus plan hypothesis as stated 
originally by Watts and Zimmerman. While Healy (1985) finds evidence supporting his 
hypotheses, his study has been criticized, not least on methodological grounds and with 
respect to competing hypotheses. 588 Several papers, including Gaver, Gaver and Austin 
(1995), Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995), and Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999) ex-
pand upon Healy (I 985) and partly challenge his conclusions. 
Another reason why the Watts and Zimmerman (1986) hypothesis may be overly sim-
plistic is the fact that bonus plans frequently exhibit a "ratchet effect". This means that 
the target earnings numbers are not fixed from one period to the next, but next period's 
target earnings are a function of the current period's actual earnings. In this setting, the 
incentive to manage earnings upward is dampened because future targets are escalated, 
and therefore more difficult to meet, when the current target is overachieved.589 Finally, 
bonus considerations must be viewed in the context of other, potentially conflicting earn-
ings management incentives, some of which may suggest different predictions regarding 
management's financial reporting behavior.590 
Several asset write-off studies invoke the bonus plan hypothesis to explain the determi-
nants of write-off behavior. These studies assume, implicitly or explicitly, that manage-
ment's accounting-based compensation reflects the effect of the write-off.591 Heflin and 
Warfield (1997) posit that managers delay write-offs to maximize bonus payments.592 
Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) argue that earnings-based compensation plans present 
an incentive to accelerate write-offs in bad years, in order to shelter future bonus pay-
ments, suggesting a negative association between pre-write-off earnings and write-off 
588 For example, refer to Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, pp. 267-9), Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999, pp. 
116-21). 
ss9 See Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999, p. I 16). The opposite effect, i.e. a downward adjustment of the 
target after a shortfall in the current year, is much less pronounced. 
590 For example, income smoothing has been suggested as an alternative explanation of Healy's (1985) 
findings. See Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999, p. 117). 
s9t For example, Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 123) explicitly state that acceleration ofa write-
offwhere pre-write-off earnings are already short of a target "will affect management compensation if 
bonus calculations are not adjusted for write-offs". For financial reporting incentives relative to earn-
ings targets, refer to section 3.3.2.4 .5 below. 
sn See Heflin and Warfield (I 997, p. 9). However, more interested in the stock price effect of write-off 
announcements, they do not explicitly test this notion. 
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amounts. However, they note that the opposite association might also be observed, con-
sistent with income smoothing behavior. In order to empirically discriminate between 
these two settings, they develop proxy variables of unexpectedly high versus low operat-
ing ROA.593 However, throughout their regression analysis, these variables were either 
insignificant or significant with the wrong sign. 594 Riedl (2002) follows Francis, Hanna 
and Vincent's (1996) choice of variables, finding that unexpectedly low earnings have a 
significantly negative relation to write-off amounts in both the pre-SF AS 121 and post-
SFAS 121 regimes.595 Using the same variables as the two previous studies, Segal (2003) 
reports a significantly positive relation of unexpectedly high earnings and write-off 
amounts in both the SFAS 121 and SFAS 142 regimes,596 suggesting the use of write-
offs as an income-smoothing device. 597 Beatty and Weber (2004) find that finns with 
earnings-based bonus plans, on average, are less likely to record SF AS 142 write-offs 
and record lower write-offs. Loh and Tan (2002) also allude to the management compen-
sation hypothesis; however, they end up using generic variables of finn profitability and 
a change in top management that bear no explicit relation to the existence and/or specifi-
cation of accounting-based bonus plans.598 Overall, the evidence from the discretionary 
asset write-off literature seems to suggest that these charges are not particularly suited to 
influence management's accounting based compensation, but might be used to either 
smooth earnings or accelerate expenses in an attempt to shelter future earnings levels. 
3.3.2.3.4 Accounting-based debt covenants in lending agreements 
Creditors are interested in ensuring that management has enough funds available to pay 
interest and repay existing debt. Debt covenants are designed to restrict the amount of 
additional debt capital that management can raise to finance operations and/or additional 
investments. They are also intended to limit management's ability to increase the finn's 
(financial and operating) risk and take value-reducing investment and financing actions, 
such as liquidating dividends.599 For this purpose, debt covenants frequently define ac-
counting-based heuristics, the violation of which often constitutes an "event of default". 
s93 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, pp. 123-4). 
S94 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 125). They note that this result sharply contrasts with Zucca 
and Campbell's (1992) findings. 
s9s See Riedl (2002, p. 39). This finding is robust to both OLS and Tobit specifications. 
596 See Segal (2003, p. 40). In contrast to that, the proxy variable for unexpectedly low earnings is insig-
nificant. 
597 See Segal (2003, p. 25). 
s9s See Loh and Tan (2002, pp. 136-8). 
s99 See Smith and Warner (1979, p. 117) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 186-91, 210-7). 
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If a finn is in technical default, its debt is due to be repaid immediately. Recent debt con-
tracts increasingly include perfonnance pricing features, which tie the interest rate on the 
debt to some set of measures of the borrower's creditworthiness.600 In some cases, how-
ever, the violations are simply waived, especially where the borrower is not in immediate 
danger of bankruptcy.601 Beneish and Press ( 1993) document empirically the different 
cost components associated with technical covenant violations for 91 finns in the period 
1983-87. They estimate that refinancing costs, resulting from interest rate increases, 
range from 0.84 to 1.63% of the market value of the borrower's equity. Restructuring 
costs, stemming from the lender's demand for accelerated repayment, are approximately 
0.37% of the market value of equity. In addition, other consequences, such as forced 
changes in operations and increased lender control, are found to be associated with tech-
nical default.602 As Beneish and Press (1995) document, these costs also translate into 
decreases in shareholder wealth when technical default is publicly announced.603 How-
ever, Frost and Bernard (1989) find that no observable adverse consequences related to 
loan covenant violations for a sample of oil and gas finns that recorded write-downs 
mandated by the SEC. 604 
Standard covenants frequently require that management uphold sufficient levels of work-
ing capital and similar financial variables and ratios. 605 A variety of accounting-based 
ratios used in debt covenants exists.606 These are often based on debt ratios (also referred 
to as leverage ratios), which measure the portion of debt within a finn's overall capital 
structure. A common example is the DTE ratio. 607 Furthennore, direct measures of a 
finn's ability to make current debt-related payments are used, for example interest cover-
age ratios such as times-interest-earned or capital expenditure ratios,608 which take into 
600 See Beatty and Weber (2003, p. 120) and Dichev (2002). 
601 See Dichev and Skinner (2002, p. 1122). 
602 See Beneish and Press (1993, pp. 233-4). However, the extent to which these consequences actually 
impose costs on the borrower is not sure. See Beneish and Press ( 1995, p. 338). 
603 EI-Gazzar (1993) documents that the anticipation of a mandated accounting change that is likely to 
increase the tightness of covenant restrictions results in negative stock returns for the affected firms. 
The debt covenant effects of mandated accounting changes are also analyzed by Collins, Rozeff and 
Dhaliwal (1981), Espahbodi, Espahbodi and Tehranian (1995), Leftwich (1981), and Lys (1984). 
604 See Frost and Bernard (1989, p. 807). 
605 See White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 174). Also, refer to Smith and Warner (1979). 
606 Refer to Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 211-3) and White, Sondhi and Fried (2003 , pp. 130-2). For 
recent evidence, refer to Dichev and Skinner (2002, pp. 1101-1104 ). 
607 Total debt divided by total equity. 
608 Cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures. 
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consideration capital expenditures in excess of interest charges. 609 Smith ( 1993) struc-
tures the wide array of observable covenants by distinguishing affirmative and negative 
covenants.610 
Accounting-based restrictions in debt covenants are calculated on the basis of original 
GAAP or rely on accounting methods that either represent modified GAAP or are en-
tirely outside GAAP.611 Where GAAP is the relevant basis, the applicable accounting 
rules can either be "frozen" at the time of the debt issuance or be allowed to "roll". In the 
latter case, the calculation is based on GAAP effective at the date of the calculation. De-
partures from GAAP are common; however, they occur most frequently in private rather 
than public lending agreements.612 Watts and Zimmerman (1986) assume that most debt 
covenants observed in large, publicly traded firms rely on reported and audited account-
ing numbers that are based on promulgated GAAP.613 Beatty, Ramesh and Weber (2002) 
find that the interest rate charged on the debt is lower where the covenant is based on 
"frozen" GAAP, which prohibits voluntary as well as mandatory accounting changes. 
Their interpretation is that managers incur costs to retain accounting flexibility that en-
ables them to avoid covenant violations.614 
In its most general and theoretically correct form, the debt covenant hypothesis has been 
formulated as follows: 
"The debt covenant hypothesis states that managers are motivated to choose ac-
counting methods that minimize the likelihood that covenants would be violated."615 
Since the actual restrictions imposed by lending agreements are not necessarily known to 
the researcher, empirical tests of the debt covenant hypothesis frequently rely on vari-
ables that capture the proximity to the restrictions imposed by actual debt covenants. The 
most frequently used indicator is the DTE ratio.616 Early research adopting this approach 
609 EBIT (or operating cash flow) divided by interest expense. 
610 See Smith (1993, p. 290). 
611 El-Gazzar and Pastena (1990) investigate to what extent such "tailoring" of GAAP depends on the 
contracting parties' characteristics. 
612 See Leftwich (1983, p. 36). Refer to section 5.2.3 .1.2 below for discussion of the assumption that 
firms' transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off behavior will have effects on accounting-based debt 
covenants. 
613 See Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 213). 
614 See Beatty, Ramesh and Weber (2002, p. 222). 
615 White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 174). 
616 See Duke and Hunt (1990, p. 48). Other ratios, used less frequently, are listed in fn. 4 of that article. 
See also Press and Weintrop (1990, pp. 65-6) and Smith (1993, p. 290). 
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includes Collins, Rozeff and Dhaliwal (1981), Daley and Vigeland (1983), Leftwich 
(1981), and Lys (1984). However, researchers seem to increasingly rely on actual cove-
nant data to test the debt covenant hypothesis. Among these studies are Beneish and 
Press (1993), El-Gazzar (1993), Healy and Palepu (1990), Mohrman (1993), Press and 
Weintrop ( 1990), Smith ( 1993), and Sweeney ( 1994 ). 
The DTE hypothesis has been operationalized as follows: 
"Ceteris paribus, the larger a firm's debt/equity ratio, the more likely the firm's 
manager is to select accountin~ procedures that shift reported earnings from future 
periods to the current period.',61 
Watts and Zimmerman ( 1986) argue that the DTE ratio is a reasonable approximation of 
most actual debt covenant restrictions because the likelihood of these other restrictions 
being violated can be shown to increase when the DTE ratio increases. Nonetheless, they 
encourage researchers to increasingly rely on actual debt covenant details.618 Duke and 
Hunt ( 1990) examine empirically the accounting-based debt covenant proxies used in 
prior research and their association with actual debt covenant restrictions.619 Based on 
their finding that different variations of the DTE ratio capture the most common account-
ing-based restrictions used in actual debt covenants, they conclude that researchers are 
comparatively safe in using this proxy.620 Beneish and Press (1993) also show that lever-
age is a suitable proxy for the magnitude of debt covenant violation costs, with similar 
findings being reported by Press and Weintrop (1990).621 However, recent large-sample 
evidence reported by Dichev and Skinner (2002) suggests that leverage is only to a small 
extent correlated with firms' actual closeness to covenant restrictions.622 
617 Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 216). 
618 See Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 216). 
619 Data was obtained from the American Bar Foundation's 1971 publication "Commentaries on Inden-
tures" and from a random 20-firm sample retrieved from "Moody's Industrial Manual" of 1985. See 
Duke and Hunt (1990, p. 52). White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, pp. 350-4) caution that these data are 
general in nature and may provide only an incomplete understanding of what actual covenant con-
straints look like. Like Press and Weintrop (1990), they recommend the use of original bond inden-
tures filed with the SEC upon issuance of the bond. 
620 See Duke and Hunt ( 1990, p. 61 ). Earlier analyses of actual covenants used in debt contracts were 
carried out by Smith and Warner (1979, especially pp. 125-146) and Leftwich (1983, especially pp. 
31-41), who, like Duke and Hunt (1990), rely on data published in 1971 in the American Bar Founda-
tion's "Commentaries on Indentures". See Smith and Warner (1979, p. 118). 
621 However, Beneish and Press (1995, p. 338) caution that leverage is not associated with abnormal 
returns around announcements of technical default. They conclude that the debt covenant hypothesis 
is better specified when actual covenant data is used instead of a proxy variable. See Beneish and 
Press (1995, p. 352). 
622 See Dichev and Skinner (2002, p. 1122). 
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The debt covenant hypothesis is frequently included in empirical tests of the detenni-
nants of discretionary asset write-offs and of the market reactions to those write-offs. 
Despite the mixed evidence on the DTE ratio's suitability as a proxy for imminence of 
covenant violation, this variable is widely relied upon in the discretionary asset write-off 
literature. Heflin and Warfield (1997) speculate that managers may defer write-offs in 
order to minimize debt covenant violation costs.623 However, the scope of their paper 
does not include an empirical test of this assertion. Riedl (2002) invokes contracting the-
ory to hypothesize that finns "take income-increasing accounting decisions to avoid 
costly violations of debt covenants."624 Referring to Bartov's (1993) study of discretion-
ary timing of asset sales, he uses the DTE ratio as a proxy variable of nearness to cove-
nant restrictions. Since write-offs are never an income-increasing accounting decision, 
Riedl's prediction of"a negative association between write-offs and this variable" appar-
ently implies that he expects to observe no write-offs where debt covenant violation is at 
hand.625 However, this hypothesis is not corroborated in Riedl's empirical analyses of 
pre-SFAS 121 and SFAS 121 write-offs.626 Similarly, Segal (2003) finds only marginal 
significance for the DTE ratio as an explanatory variable of SF AS 121 write-offs, and no 
association of this variable with SFAS 142 write-offs.627 Beatty and Weber (2004) find 
that finns delay SF AS 142 write-offs where their covenants, e.g. net worth covenants, are 
affected by the write-off. Finally, Loh and Tan (2002) also adopt the DTE hypothesis.628 
Their analysis of asset write-offs in Singapore suggests that the debt-to-asset ratio is not a 
significant explanatory factor of write-off behavior. 
3.3.2.3.5 Political costs 
Another earnings management incentive stems from the fact that accounting numbers 
may influence the degree to which finns are subjected to (potentially adverse) regulation 
that imposes "political costs" on them.629 In economic theory of regulation, the political 
623 See Heflin and Warfield (1997, p. 9). 
624 Riedl (2002, p. 11 ). 
625 Riedl (2002, p. 12). 
626 See Riedl (2002, pp. 22, 39-40). 
627 See Segal (2003, p. 40). 
628 See Loh and Tan (2002, p. 138). 
629 The seminal paper, Watts and Zimmerman (1978, p. 115) distinguishes regulatory from other political 
costs. However, both terms are used synonymously here. Likewise, the term "regulation" is com-
monly meant to include legislation and other political or regulatory actions. For example, according to 
Gowland (1990), "(r]egulation means the laying down of rules". 
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process is viewed as a competition for wealth transfers between different constituents.630 
In this process, accounting numbers are frequently used to determine the direction and 
amount of wealth transfers. First, the amount of allowable profit in certain industries is 
restricted ex ante by regulation based on reported accounting numbers. Second, adverse 
economic consequences for "politically visible" firms are assumed to arise ex post from 
their reported income numbers.631 These different aspects are summarized in Figure 8. 





industries (oil and gas) 
Figure 8: Firms' exposure to potential costs from adverse regulation 
Several regulated industries, predominantly the utilities industry,632 have been the subject 
of political cost-based studies.633 In these industries, firms' profits are restricted to some 
"fair rate of return" on assets, estimated as a weighted-average cost of debt and equity 
capital.634 Allowable earnings are calculated on the basis of GAAP,635 with occasional 
adjustments where certain costs are considered abnormal. 636 Based on this relation, sev-
eral researchers have studied (l) the effects of (the standard-setting process preceding) 
new accounting standards on the market value of regulated and non-regulated firms as 
well as (2) the question whether firms engage in earnings management to increase regu-
lated allowable profit. Khurana and Loudder (1994) and Espahbodi, Strock and Tehra-
63° For an overview of the role of accounting in the political process and related literature, refer to Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 222-43) and Watts and Zimmerman (1990, pp. 115-6). 
631 See Watts and Zimmerman (1978, p. 115). 
632 Watts and Zimmerman (1978, pp. 115-6) focus on rate-regulation in the public utilities industry. 
However, other industries (including banking, insurance, and oil) are also mentioned. 
633 For the very reason that researchers interested in the political cost hypothesis find regulated firms a 
promising object of study, these firms are often excluded from general earnings management studies. 
For example, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p. 101 fu. 3) exclude from their analysis firms from the 
utilities industry, because "conflicting incentives to report lower earnings or decreases in earnings 
arise whenever there are economic benefits from reporting lower earnings to regulators." 
634 The mechanics of a typical rate-regulation formula are explained in Watts and Zimmerman ( 1986, pp. 
231 -233). 
635 See Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 232). 
636 For example, SFAS 71 , Accounting for the Effects of Certain Types of Regulation, explicitly consid-
ers the accounting by regulated firms. Certain expenses ordinarily charged to income in non-regulated 
firms are capitalized as "regulatory assets", which increases allowable profit in the future. See 
Khurana and Loudder (1994, p. 366). 
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nian (1991) examine the effect of pronouncements related to SF AS l 06, Employers' Ac-
counting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions, on regulated and non-
regulated firms' stock price. While the former study finds a positive reaction stemming 
from regulated firms' increased cash flows due to the standard's effect on rate-setting, 
the latter study documents that this positive effect is compensated by negative debt cove-
nant repercussions. Cahan (1993) refutes the political cost hypothesis in his analysis of 
nuclear power plant operators' accounting responses to a nuclear breakdown and the sub-
sequent threat of adverse regulation. 
Besides rate-regulated industries, where allowable firm profits are directly calculated in 
terms of accounting numbers, accounting data is also hypothesized to determine a firm's 
"political visibility", i.e. the likelihood of adverse regulation and, consequently, the ex-
pected value of political costs.637 Certain industries, e.g. the oil industry, have been a 
particular object of political exposure. Hall (1993b) states that the oil industry has "his-
torically been tied to the political process."638 Han and Wang (1998) show that oil firms 
expected to benefit from the rapid oil price upsurge following the 1990 Persian Gulf cri-
sis have responded with income-decreasing earnings management to that event. The al-
leged reason for this behavior was that higher profits resulting from these "unjustified" 
product price increases were likely to trigger adverse regulation, such as antitrust investi-
gations or a special "profits tax" for oil firms.639 In a more general setting, Hall (1993b) 
finds similar behavioral patterns, suggesting that oil firms manage earnings in response 
to the development of gasoline prices and, consequently, oil firm earnings. Although not 
exactly related to political costs, Hall and Stammerjohan (1997) document that oil firms 
threatened with potentially large damage awards, e.g. from environmental litigation, re-
spond by income-decreasing earnings management. 
Irrespective of industry, however, "obscenely" high accounting earnings are more gener-
ally assumed to indicate monopoly or "windfall" profits. 640 Such earnings, as well as 
large fluctuations in earnings,641 increase the likelihood of adverse legislation or other 
637 For the following, refer to the right branch of Figure 8. 
638 Hall (1993b, p. 325). 
639 See Han and Wang (1998, p. 104). As a side result, firms were found to have reversed their previous 
tendency to disclose "good" earnings news early. 
640 Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 223) argue that it is irrational for voters to become informed about 
the real reasons behind high profits. Knowing this, politicians try to gain media exposure and improve 
their (re-) election chances by responding with regulation to the perceived "crisis". 
641 See Moses (1987, p. 363). 
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regulation.642 Because it is costly for firms to lobby for favorable (or the absence of ad-
verse) regulation, managers have incentive to exercise discretion to reduce reported earn-
ings. 643 Cahan (1992) reports that firms under monopoly-related antitrust investigation 
adopted more income-decreasing accounting methods while being investigated than in 
periods of non-investigation. 644 Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that high profits due 
to price increases in consumer products are more likely to trigger adverse regulation 
since they are more visible and of concern to voters.645 
Researchers have attempted to increase the power of empirical tests by focusing on spe-
cific settings in which firms' political cost-related incentives were assumed to be particu-
larly strong. Such situations, regularly signaled by high earnings reported by certain 
firms, are perceived in the political process as (potential) "crises" that must be overcome 
by additional regulation.646 An example is oil companies' high profits following oil em-
bargoes or other rapid oil price increases,647 which spurred political scrutiny directed at 
imposing price controls or even breaking up individual firms. Affected firms are ex-
pected to manage earnings downward in order to escape such political repercussions.648 
Several papers focusing on such narrow settings have been cited elsewhere in this sec-
tion, e.g. Cahan (1992), Cahan (1993), and Han and Wang (1998). Jones (1991) focuses 
on firms hoping to benefit from potential import relief, and finds that these firms practice 
income-decreasing earnings management during import relief investigations. Key ( 1997) 
analyzes cable television firms' earnings management behavior during periods of Con-
gressional scrutiny, arguing that this setting "provides an opportunity to investigate po-
litical costs theory directly."649 Consistent with expectations, she finds that firms ex-
pected to be especially exposed to political costs manage earnings downwards during 
those periods. 
642 Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 133) state that "[p]olitical costs are a function of reported profits." 
See also Watts and Zimmerman (1978, p. 115), Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 223), Beatty and 
Verrecchia (I 989, pp. 473-4). For example, the pharmaceutical industry is constantly under the suspi-
cion of extracting monopoly rents from proprietary, patented drugs. 
643 See Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 231), Watts and Zimmerman (1978, p. I 15). 
644 See Cahan ( 1992, pp. 84-90). 
645 See Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 361-2). 
646 Refer to Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 230-1). An overview of"crisis theory", a branch of the 
positive theory of regulation, and the related literature, is provided by FUlbier (I 999, p. 472). 
647 Refer to the discussion above. 
648 This assumes that it is costly for outsiders to undo such earnings management. See Watts and Zim-
merman (1986, p. 231). 
649 Key(l997, p. 311). 
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The likelihood of adverse regulation has frequently, especially in earlier research, been 
asswned to increase in the absolute size of the firm since "[s]ize is a proxy variable for 
political attention. "650 Therefore, larger firms are predicted to tend towards using income-
decreasing accounting methods. This "size hypothesis" has been formulated by Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986) as follows:651 
"Ceteris paribus, the larger the finn, the more likely the manager is to choose ac-
counting procedures that defer reported earnings from current to future periods.',652 
However, the size proxy has been criticized as crude, since it is not explicitly linked to 
political costs.653 According to Ball and Foster (1982), size might proxy for a variety of 
other aspects of firm, including industry membership.654 Also, the original suggestion by 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) that political costs are positively associated with firm size 
might be based on superficial and partially misunderstood evidence.655 On the contrary, 
where compliance with regulation causes fixed costs, relative regulatory costs actually 
decrease in firm size.656 However, despite these criticisms, Watts and Zimmerman con-
clude that, at the time, there were no alternative theories available to explain the empiri-
cal regularity that large firms tend to use income-decreasing accounting methods.657 
Since the suspicion that a firm earns monopoly rents has been argued to be associated 
with political costs,658 the extent of a firm's market power, approximated by market 
650 Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 139). See also Gagnon (1967), White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 
175), and Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 287,295). 
651 For an early empirical test of the size hypothesis, refer to Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981 ). 




Refer to Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), Ball and Foster (1982, pp. 182-4). Watts and Zimmerman 
(1990, pp. 139-40) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 234-40) provide overviews of this debate 
and respond to some of the criticisms. 
See Ball and Foster (1982, pp. 190-1) and also Christie (1990, p. 15). It has been shown that political 
exposure is driven by industry membership, and especially by oil and gas firms. This point is con-
ceded by Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 239). See Gupta (1995, p. 493). Also, the size hypothesis 
appears to be confined to only the very largest firms. See Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981). 
See Ball and Foster (1982, p. 183) allege that Watts and Zimmerman (1978) misunderstood the con-
clusions reached in Siegfried's (1975) study on the determinants of antitrust activity. 
656 See Ball and Foster (1982, pp. 182-4). However, it must be noted that the expected value of political 
costs depends on both the absolute amount of these costs and the likelihood of their being imposed 
through regulatory action. If this likelihood is extremely high (only) for very large firms, the expected 
value of political costs might increase in firm size nonetheless. 
657 See Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 140) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 239-40). 
658 See Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), Watts and Zimmerman (1978, p. 115), and Zmijewski and 
Hagerman (1981). 
118 
Thorsten Sellhorn - 978-3-631-75498-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:09:55AM
via free access
share, has been used along with, or instead of, the size variable.659 Gupta (1995) uses a 
measure of industry concentration to identify industries in which monopolistic conditions 
are most likely to be present.660 
Political costs hypotheses are not popular in the discretionary asset write-off literature. 
Among the studies in that category, Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) include firm size, 
measured as the log of sales, as an explanatory variable.661 However, that variable is in-
tended to "control for any disclosure and publication biases",662 not to pick up any politi-
cal cost incentives. This variable turns out to be significantly positively related with 
goodwill write-offs and write-offs in general.663 This finding might be interpreted in the 
sense of positive accounting theory, suggesting that "politically visible" firms minimize 
earnings by taking write-offs.664 
3.3.2.3.6 Discriminating between competing hypotheses 
The theory introduced in section 3.3.2.3 so far predicts that managers use financial re-
porting decisions to influence the outcomes of contracts based on accounting numbers. 
Empirical support for these predictions has commonly been interpreted as evidence that 
managers act opportunistically, i.e. transfer wealth from other stakeholders to themselves 
by exploiting the discretion inherent in applicable financial reporting rules in a self-
interested way.665 However, an analysis of the whole contracting process shows that this 
interpretation is not necessarily correct and might be premature in some cases.666 
659 See, for example, Moses (1987, p. 363), who defines market share as firm sales by total industry 
sales, where the industry is comprised of all firms with identical four-digit SIC codes. 
660 See Gupta (1995, p. 499). Further, Gupta (1995) and EI-Gazzar, Lilien and Pastena (1986) use the 
effective tax rate to surrogate for political costs. However, Zimmerman (1983) cautions that the qual-
ity of the effective tax rate as a proxy for political costs potentially varies intertemporally as well as 
cross-sectionally. See also Watts and Zimmerman (I 986, pp. 235-8). 
661 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (I 996, p. 126). 
662 Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 124). 
663 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 125). 
664 This explanation is only briefly alluded to by the authors. See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 
124 fn . 10). 
665 According to Holthausen (1990, p. 208), the opportunistic behavior perspective implies that "a man-
ager's utility is affected by the firm's stock price and the manager's compensation." When the firm's 
contracts are taken as given, the opportunistic behavior perspective predicts that "the accounting 
method a manager would choose is driven by how the choice affects the existing contracts without 
considering how future contracts might be written." To Holthausen, this interpretation clearly under-
estimates the level of sophistication of the contracting parties. 
666 See, for example, Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, p. 271), Skinner (1993, p. 411), and Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990, pp. 134-7). 
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It has been argued that two major factors influence financial reporting decisions in a 
contracting setting. First, the existence of accounting-based contracts and the accepted set 
of accounting rules employed to administer these contracts are not necessarily 
exogenous, but more likely to stem from economic efficiency reasons: For some firms, 
accounting-based contracts apparently present an effective way to resolve agency 
problems. 667 The accepted set of accounting rules, or GAAP, referred to in these 
contracts evolves over time and represents some form of best practice to minimize 
agency costs.668 Therefore, observable financial reporting decisions are (pre-) determined 
ex ante (i.e. before the contracts are in place) by the fact that some firms use accounting-
based contracts at all and by the accepted set of GAAP that is deemed to be efficient for 
these firms.669 This notion that accounting-based contractual provisions and the resulting 
financial reporting behavior might be in the best interest of all contracting parties has 
been referred to as the efficient contracting perspective.610 
Second, if the accepted set of GAAP were to restrict managers' discretion completely, 
(opportunistic) ex post (i.e. after the contracts are concluded) earnings management 
would not arise. Therefore, researchers have addressed the question why the accepted set 
leaves room for discretion at all.671 The decision (to be made by those administering the 
667 For example, Bushman and Smith (2001, pp. 248-9) criticize that earnings management studies using 
the bonus plan hypothesis treat managerial incentive plans as exogenous and earnings management 
behavior motivated by these plans as dysfunctional. They argue that rational investors should be able 
to predict the incentives provided by these plans and thus the earnings management behavior likely to 
result from them. Consequently, the empirical earnings management research following the "exoge-
nous contract approach" is likely to lead to misguided conclusions because earnings management be-
havior interpreted as opportunistic might well be in the investors' best interest. 
668 According to Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 136), the set of accounting procedures within which 
managers have discretion is called the "accepted set". Since managers have incentive to act opportu-
nistically, the accepted set includes "conservative" and "objective" procedures. The accepted set of 
GAAP is a component of the "firm's implicit and explicit contracts including the firm's capital struc-
ture, compensation plans, and ownership structure" (p. 137). However, it is difficult to predict exactly 
which accepted set of GAAP is efficient in a given contracting situation. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986, pp. 246-7) note that "[e]xplaining the choice of accounting procedures to use in contracts (the 
choice of accepted procedures) requires a theory explaining the detailed structure of contracts. Con-
tracting theory is not yet developed to that point" ( emphasis in original). 
669 Leftwich (I 983, p. 31) argues that the accounting choices that have evolved as "best practice" in debt 
contracts (and that are specified in "boiler-plate" type models) represent procedures that have turned 
out over time to minimize the agency costs between the firm and its creditors. 
670 As stated by Holthausen (1990, p. 207), "[t]he efficient contracting perspective ... implies that ac-
counting methods, like the form of organization chosen or the form of contracts written, will be se-
lected to minimize agency costs amongst the various parties to the firm." See also Watts (1977), 
Skinner ( 1993, pp. 410-2). 
671 
120 
In the words of Dunstan (1999, p. 6), this question can be interpreted as the search for ex ante expla-
nations for financial reporting decisions. In contrast to that, ex post explanations deal with the ques-
tion how managers use their discretion within a given accepted set ofGAAP. 
Thorsten Sellhorn - 978-3-631-75498-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:09:55AM
via free access
contract) to what degree discretion should be allowed involves a tradeoff.672 On the one 
hand, if managers are completely free to choose among financial reporting alternatives, 
accounting-based contracts are unsuited to control their actions, i.e. restrict their behav-
ior. 673 On the other hand, stakeholders incur different costs when restricting managers' 
discretion completely: (l) It might be cost-effective to allow managers discretion when 
managers have specific knowledge about which financial reporting procedures maximize 
firm value. For example, managers might know best which methods minimize political 
costs or which procedures are most suitable to motivate subordinates. Therefore, there is 
a potential that managers use their discretion in a way that is optimal from the perspec-
tive of all stakeholders. (2) Non-trivial costs are involved in monitoring and enforcing 
restrictions on management's financial reporting discretion. (3) Finally, there is potential 
that managers exercise their discretion within the accepted set to signal private informa-
tion about the firm's future prospects to stakeholders.674 Foregoing this potentially valu-
able information also represents costs. Despite these potential benefits of leaving some 
room for discretion, the risk remains that managers exploit this leeway to make them-
selves better off at the expense of the other contracting parties, i.e. act opportunistically. 
However, where researchers jump to the conclusion that observed financial reporting 
behavior is motivated by opportunism alone, other, potentially more appropriate explana-
tions are often overlooked.675 
In order to discriminate empirically between efficient contracting and opportunism rea-
sons behind observed financial reporting behavior, theories have been developed to pre-
dict the accepted set of GAAP by examining firms' economic characteristics.676 Specifi-
672 Refer to Skinner (1993, p. 411). 
673 For example, if a manager's annual bonus was 10% of accounting earnings, little motivational effect 
would result from this scheme if the manager were completely free to choose from alternative proce-
dures to calculate accounting earnings. See Skinner (1993, p. 411). 
674 Holthausen ( 1990, p. 208) states that "the information perspective suggests that accounting methods 
are chosen to reveal managers' expectations about the future cash flows of the firm." Managers are 
assumed to have private information about the firm and their hypothesized incentive to reveal this in-
formation through choice of accounting techniques stems from the assumption that they are "compen-
sated in part on the basis of their ability to provide information about the future cash flows of the 
firm." 
675 As discussed in section 3.3.2.3.1, stakeholders are price-protected from any anticipated opportunistic 
behavior. Opportunism can only arise where (I) stakeholders had no way of anticipating certain ac-
tions on the part of management and where (2) there is no ex post adjustment of contractual outcomes 
to adjust for these actions due to prohibitive search and monitoring costs. According to Watts and 
Zimmmerman' s (I 990, p. 135) wording: "If managers elect to exercise discretion to their advantage 
ex post, and the discretion has wealth redistributive effects among the contracting parties, then we say 
managers acted 'opportunistically."' 
676 Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 136) stress that it is difficult to distinguish empirically between 
opportunistic, efficient contracting, and signaling explanations. 
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cally, it has been argued that the relative costs and benefits of restricting managers' ex 
post discretion vary across finns, depending on finns' investment opportunities. 677 
Therefore, the cost-effective accepted sets of GAAP, specified ex ante, are likely to vary 
with firms' investment opportunity sets (IOS).678 Consequently, since observed financial 
reporting behavior is likely to vary with finns' accepted sets of GAAP, there should be 
an association between firms' financial reporting behavior and their IOSs. However, it is 
difficult to predict exactly how the 10S is likely to affect the accepted set of GAAP and, 
thus, management's financial reporting behavior. For example, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) posit that managers of growth finns have more accounting flexibility because the 
assets of these firms are more difficult to value than those of established firms with a 
large portion of assets-in-place. 679 Managers from firms with different IOSs are likely to 
have made their financial reporting decisions with respect to different accepted sets of 
GAAP. 
This discussion has certain implications for researchers interested in the determinants of 
financial reporting decisions. The existence of accounting-based contracts is frequently 
taken as given. If researchers rely on proxy variables to surrogate for contract-based in-
centives (e.g. the DTE ratio as a proxy for the incentive to manage earnings upward in 
order to avoid debt covenant violation) without knowing whether these contracts are ac-
tually present in the firm analyzed, conclusions may be inappropriate. The same problem 
occurs when accounting-based contracts are in place, but the financial reporting decision 
of interest does not influence their outcomes because it is adjusted by one of the contract-
ing parties.680 
Also, even if the hypothesized contracts exist in a given finn, the risk of a type II error is 
present, i.e. the contract-based hypothesis might be upheld although the assumed causal-
ity is not present. Where the predicted relation is found in the data, a type II error occurs 
when management's behavior, while consistent with the prediction (e.g. firms with high 
DTE ratios tend to make income-increasing financial reporting decisions), is not caused 
by contracting motivations but by correlated variables omitted from the predictive 
677 See Skinner (1993, p. 411) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 360-1). 
678 According to Smith and Watts (1992, p. 264), a firm's IOS is defined by its "prospective investment 
opportunities and associated payoff distributions". 
679 See Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 360-1). 
68° For a discussion of possible adjustments to reported GAAP figures by compensation committees or in 
debt contracts, refer to sections 3.3.2.3.3 and 3.3.2.3.4 above. 
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model. 681 However, Skinner (1993) concludes that, "while I find that firms' investment 
opportunities do affect the nature of their contracts, I also find that the 'traditional' ex-
planations for accounting choice are important after controlling for the effects of the in-
vestment opportunity set. "682 
For the reasons discussed here, it is important to consider the factors that determine, first, 
which firms are likely to have accounting-based contracts at all and, second, which ac-
cepted set of accounting rules these contracts are likely to specify. Especially the latter 
question is difficult to solve in the context of newly promulgated accounting standards 
such as SF AS 142. In section 5.2 below, it is discussed at length how transitional SF AS 
142 goodwill write-off behavior is expected to affect the outcomes of accounting-based 
contracts of adopting firms, and the implications for management' s expected financial 
reporting behavior. 
3.3.2.4 Capital market-related incentives 
3. 3. 2. 4.1 Theoretical fundamentals 
In contrast to the economic-consequences incentives discussed above, the capital market-
related incentives presented in this section rest on the notion that, under certain circum-
stances, management will engage in earnings management for reasons other than generat-
ing (contract-related) direct cash flow effects. Stated generally, management's financial 
reporting decisions may be intended to influence favorably capital market participants' 
perceptions of the firm ' s future prospects. In the words of Heflin and Warfield (1997), 
one earnings management objective may be "influencing perceptions of managerial per-
formance", 683 partly because of "the need to raise external financing".684 Here, manage-
ment's utility is not affected directly, but only via the market reaction expected to be 
triggered by the financial reporting decision at issue. Capital market-related earnings 
management can only be expected when information asymmetries exist between man-
agement and capital market participants.685 Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) stress this 
681 See Skinner (1993, p. 409. In this example, an alternative explanation might be that firms with rela-
tively low growth options, which rely on debt financing and thus have high DTE ratios, also have 
high levels of accounting earnings. See Gaver and Gaver (I 993). 
682 Skinner (I 993 , p. 408). In the context of goodwill amortization periods, Bradbury, Godfrey and Koh 
(2003) report that IOS-related variables have greater explanatory power than traditional contracting 
variables. 
683 Heflin and Warfield (I 997, p. 9). 
684 Beneish (2001, p. 2). 
685 See Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001 , pp. 257,262, 275-81). 
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point, referring to the incentives described here as asset pricing motivations, i.e. attempts 
to influence asset prices that are driven by information asymmetries. It is only when such 
information asymmetries exist that management can send informative or manipulative 
"signals" that constitute information to the market and cause revisions in expectations. 
Although alleged capital market-related financial reporting strategies take different 
forms,686 they are assumed to share a common ultimate objective: Management's finan-
cial reporting decisions are motivated by the desire to, in the current and/or future 
periods, fulfill or exceed investors' expectations and thus bring about an increase in share 
price.687 This motivation need not be opportunistic; management might as well strive to 
foster shareholders' interests along with their own. Stated differently, "firms with a 
greater capacity to absorb the financial statement effects of the writedowns (those with 
greater financial slack) are more likely to disclose greater writedowns."688 
While conceptually different, capital market-related incentives may lead to the same pre-
dicted behavior as economic-consequences incentives. Income-increasing earnings man-
agement might be motivated by contracting considerations and/or the desire to increase 
stock price. For example, while Healy's (1985) evidence suggests that managers manipu-
late accruals to maximize bonus payments, Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995) find that the 
income smoothing hypothesis better explains management behavior.689 This makes em-
pirical findings difficult to attribute to a specific set of motivations.69° Conversely, since 
contradictory capital market-related and economic-consequences incentives might be 
present in a given situation, empirical investigations might return inconclusive evidence 
because conflicting effects compensate each other. 
Although discussed in sections 2.3.3 and 3.3.2.3.2 above, the importance of manage-
ment's beliefs regarding the way the capital markets process information is reiterated 
here: Since management's intention is to influence market perceptions, predictions about 
management behavior must take into consideration how management expects the market 
to respond to management's actions. In other words, it is not primarily important whether 
686 See Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, p. 275). 
687 This is also true for signaling, at least in the long run, even when management signals that difficult 
times lie ahead: When managers signal private information to shareholders, their objective is to cor-
rect shareholders' (upward or downward) biased expectations. Once the bias is removed, management 
will continue trying to fulfill expectations. 
688 See Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt ( 1998, p. 163). 
689 The financial reporting strategy of income smoothing is explained in more detail in section 3.3.2.4.4 
below. 
690 See Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, p. 277). 
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the EMH actually holds.691 Rather, predicting management's capital market-related fi-
nancial reporting behavior requires assumptions about management's beliefs regarding 
the EMH. For example, Mayer-Sommer (1979) reports survey evidence indicating low 
levels of understanding and even lower levels of acceptance of the EMH and its account-
ing implications. 692 Cosmetic financial reporting decisions are meaningful when the 
EMH is not assumed to hold.693 If managers do not believe in the EMH, one might ob-
serve financial reporting decisions that could not otherwise be explained.694 For example, 
Moses ( 1987) refers to income smoothing as a financial reporting strategy that "may be 
practiced to directly reduce market risk", although "in an efficient market the relationship 
between accounting numbers and market parameters should not be mechanistic and use 
of visible accounting techniques to affect risk should be ineffective."695 
Although "[ e ]arnings management to influence stock values . . . is taken as a given in 
capital markets",696 its existence is difficult to justify theoretically, especially when it is 
assumed that management successfully tries to "fool" or "mislead" investors. 697 This 
notion does not sit well with proponents of the semi-strong form EMH, who claim that 
investors are not misled by cosmetic earnings management but "see through" manage-
ment's misrepresentations, using public information - available to them at low cost - to 
691 The EMH has frequently been cast in doubt with respect to the effects of financial reporting decisions. 
For example, Lev and Ohlson (1982, p. 250) conclude from their comprehensive evaluation of the 
relevant literature that "the existence of some investor irrationality ( often termed ' functional fixation' 
cannot be precluded." This phenomenon is often explained with reference to the behavioral finance 
literature; see for example Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). 
692 See Mayer-Sommer (1979, pp. 97-103) and, with a similar conclusion, Wyatt (1983, p. 56). 
693 Cosmetic financial reporting decisions are also likely to be successful when capital markets are effi-
cient but participants ' information processing costs to adjust for these decisions exceed the perceived 
benefits. See Moses ( 1987, p. 366 fu. 11 ). 
694 See Wyatt (I 983, pp. 57-62), who cites financial reporting decisions that dispute the validity of the 
EMH. It is not essential that all managers share the same beliefs. If only a subgroup of managers be-
lieved that capital markets are informationally inefficient, certain financial reporting decisions would 
be made in order to favorably influence ("fool") investors. Managers belonging to a second subgroup 
of EMH proponents would be forced to behave similarly, if only in order to be comparable. If, how-
ever, the former subgroup's behavior were found to be successful, the EMH proponents would have 
to start "playing the same game" or suffer a competitive disadvantage. The financial press frequently 
alludes to financial reporting strategies that are not meaningful from an EMH standpoint, but are 
nonetheless observed in practice because "everybody's doing it" . 
695 See Moses (1987, p. 366 fn . 11). 
696 Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000, p. 5). 
697 A frequently cited example is a speech entitled "The Numbers Game", given in 1998 by Arthur Levitt 
who was chairman of the SEC at the time: "In the zeal to satisfy consensus earnings estimates and 
project a smooth earnings path, wishful thinking may be winning the day over faithful representa-
tion." See Levitt ( 1998). 
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estimate the firm's "true" future prospects.698 Consequently, they dismiss an information 
hypothesis, according to which managers' financial reporting decisions are driven by the 
assumption that financial statements are investors' main, if not only, source of informa-
tion for valuing firms and making investment decisions.699 As Watts and Zimmerman 
( 1986), the main advocates of the contracting hypothesis, point out: 
"Researchers have been able to generate links between accounting procedures and 
the firm's or manager's cash flows under the contracting hypothesis, links that are 
consistent with the EMH. Based on these links, they can generate predictions about 
the accounting procedures used by firms. Under the information hy~othesis re-
searchers have not been able to generate links consistent with the EMH." 00 
As a consequence, the fact that they should not exist "if investors are rational may ex-
plain why academics have been slow to examine capital market incentives for earnings 
management."701 Increasingly, anecdotal as well as systematic evidence calls into ques-
tion the empirical descriptiveness of the semi-strong form EMH.702 However, even the 
empirical validity of this theory would not necessarily rule out that those managers who 
happen not to believe in the EMH may still attempt to influence market participants' per-
ceptions, albeit probably with little success. Because of this, a considerable body of lit-
erature now examines "whether managers act as if they believe users of financial report-
ing data can be misled into interpreting reported accounting earnings as equivalent to 
economic profitability."703 
A more benign interpretation of capital market-related financial reporting behavior is 
compatible with the theory: Management may use financial reporting, from an informa-
tion perspective, as a means of signaling private information to investors.704 Since the 
semi-strong form EMH assumes that private information is not reflected in stock prices at 
any given point in time, timely financial reporting disclosures containing such informa-
tion have the potential to affect stock prices: 
"[R]esearchers have generally not considered the premise that the market could re-
act, either positively or negatively, to a write-down if it provides any new informa-
698 See Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000, p. 6). 
699 Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001 , p. 275) refer to this phenomenon as investor irrationality. 
700 Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. I 98). 
70 1 Dechow and Skinner (2000, p. 245). 
702 Refer to Brown's (2001, p. 14, ch. 8) review of the literature on stock market anomalies that contra-
dict the EMH. Further discussion and references are provided, for example, by Coenenberg et al. 
(1978), F0lbier (1998, pp. 157-9) and M<iller and H0fner (2002). 
703 Fields, Lys and Vincent (200 I, p. 279 [ emphasis added]). 
704 See, for example, Zarowin (2002). 
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tion that would cause investors to revise their estimates of expected future cash 
flows from that asset".705 
This information perspective is compatible with the EMH, because it assumes that man-
agers signal new, private information that, according to the semi-strong form EMH, has 
not previously been included into investors' beliefs and therefore has the potential to alter 
stock price. 706 With respect to discretionary asset write-offs, positive market reactions 
have frequently been observed upon write-off announcements. 707 Such positive stock 
price effects can be expected where management successfully passes off write-offs as 
"good news", e.g. as part of a larger restructuring effort,708 or where investors expected a 
larger "bad news" write-off. As will be discussed in greater detail below, it is difficult in 
practice to distinguish between the manipulation and signaling explanations for an ob-
served financial reporting decision. 709 For example, a write-off might reflect both of 
management's intent to signal that prospects are improving ("clear the decks") or wors-
ening ("show how bad the situation really is"). 
3.3.2.4.2 Management's interest in the firm 's stock price 
The above-mentioned incentives rest on the assumption that management has a stake in 
the firm's stock price, i.e. when a manager's utility is a function of her firm's stock 
price.710 In today's publicly owned corporations, managers do not necessarily have sub-
stantial ownership. Therefore, they will only to a small extent derive capital gains from 
stock price increases that result from their financial reporting decisions. 
Regardless, it is a common conjecture that management utility increases with the level 
and growth rate of stock price and decreases with its variability.711 In recent years, it has 
been widely argued that the main reason for management's preoccupation with stock 
price is the growing importance of employee stock options as a component of corporate 
decision makers' incentive plans.712 In fact, much of the earnings management activities 
705 Alciatore et al. (I 998, p. 31 [ emphasis in original]). 
706 See also Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, p. 275). 
707 White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, pp. 278-9) discuss this signaling view of write-offs. This branch of 
the literature is presented in section 3.4 below. 
708 See, for example, White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 59). 
709 See Fields, Lys and Vincent (200 I, p. 259). 
710 See propositions I and 2 in Gordon (1964, p. 261). 
711 See, for example, proposition 2 in Gordon (1964, p. 261). 
712 According to Levitt (I 998), "companies try to meet or beat Wall Street earnings projections in order 
to .. . increase the value of stock options." See also Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, p. 259). 
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alleged by the financial press have been attributed to management's attempts to increase 
stock prices and, consequently, their income from this specific component of their 
remuneration.713 
Additional links between management utility and stock price include the following: From 
the perspective of the market for managers, executives of growing firms are likely to en-
joy better reputations, enhancing their current income as well as their prospects for future 
employment.714 These firms are also less likely to be targets of hostile takeovers that 
jeopardize management's job security. Managers are also likely to derive a sense of 
status and prestige from their firm's size and growth.715 Further, to the extent that man-
agement participates in earnings, increasing stock prices and thereby reducing cost of 
capital is in its best interest. 
These considerations suggest that management is interested in a (steady) growth in stock 
price,716 which they attempt to achieve through a number of capital market-related finan-
cial reporting strategies discussed in the subsequent sections. 
3.3.2.4.3 Maximizing earnings 
The most intuitive strategy is for management to maximize earnings in a given period.717 
Early research on this hypothesis is reviewed by Robinson and Shane (1990).718 As will 
be discussed at length below, this strategy has several drawbacks because it neglects 
intertemporal effects. Maximum earnings are not an end in itself because capital market 
participants and managers alike are usually concerned with the time series of earnings. 
713 Bernstein (1993, p. 757) stresses the importance of management's greed as the primary driver of 
earnings management behavior. 
714 
715 
See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), and Weisbach 
(1988). 
See, for example, DeFond and Park (1997, p. 117). 
716 Unique situations might occur when it is in management's interest to decrease stock price. For exam-
ple, managers planning to initiate a management buyout can be expected to understate earnings in an 
attempt to reduce share price. However, this specific setting is fundamentally similar to other capital 
market-related situations in that management is assumed to ( 1) have a stake in the firm's stock price, 
(2) attempt to self-interestedly influence stock price, and (3) bring about future increases in stock 
price. The interest in decreasing stock price is temporary at best. Perry and Williams (1994) find evi-
dence consistent with this prediction, whereas DeAngelo (1986) does not. This is possibly due to 
management's conflicting incentive to impress potential creditors through high earnings, since these 
717 
transactions are often highly leveraged. See Fields, Lys and Vincent (200 I, p. 276). 
See Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001, p. 275). Early evidence on this hypothesis is reported by Gagnon 
(1971, 1967). 
718 Robinson and Shane (1990, pp. 26-8). For a discussion of income-maximization incentives in the 
context of the purchase/pooling decision, refer to 2.4.3.4.1 above. 
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However, in situations where the Iong-tenn development of earnings is of little concern 
to management, maximizing earnings might be an effective strategy. Erickson and Wang 
(l 999) argue that managers planning a stock-for-stock acquisition have incentive to man-
age earnings upwards in order to increase share price and thus decrease acquisition costs. 
They find evidence consistent with this prediction, especially where transactions are 
large. For managers planning to initiate a management buyout (MBO), diametrically op-
posed incentives are reported.719 
3.3.2.4.4 Income smoothing 
"The variance of a finn' s earnings is a direct measure of the uncertainty (risk) of its earn-
ings stream. A smooth earnings stream is assumed to be desirable by finns, their credi-
tors, and the financial markets. To the extent that accounting earnings mirror a finn's 
economic well-being, the variance in that measure would be expected to measure a firm's 
risk."720 Stated differently, investors may equate steady earnings with low risk, which 
will, ceteris paribus, increase stock price721 and, as a side effect, managers' job secu-
rity 722 and income. 723 In addition, political cost considerations may support income 
smoothing: 724 While regulatory sanctions might be imposed on finns with rapid profit 
increases, 725 large downward fluctuations may signal crisis, prompting regulators to 
act.726 
For these reasons, income maximization might in some circumstances be an inferior 
strategy. Rather, these considerations imply an incentive to engage in what has been 
called earnings smoothing or income smoothing: 727 
"Income smoothing describes an earnings pattern in which management aspires to 
maintain a steady and predictable rate of earnings growth".728 
719 See, for example, DeAngelo (1986), Perry and Williams (1994), and Wu (1997). Also, see fu. 716. 
720 White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 647). 
721 See Barth, Elliott and Finn (1999), Copeland (1968, pp. 101-2), Fischer and Haller (1993, p. 37), 
Gordon (1964), Ronen and Sadan (1981), Shank and Burnell (1974), and Trueman and Titman 
(1988). 
722 Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) develop the theory that managers smooth income to enhance their repu-
tation and, consequently, job security. Empirical support for this hypothesis has been reported by De-
Fond and Park (1997). See also Lambert (1984, p. 604) and Weisbach (1988). 
723 Moses (1987) explores the linkage between income smoothing behavior and economic-consequences 
incentives. See also Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995, p. 6). 
724 Refer to section 3.3.2.3 .5 for a discussion of political cost incentives for earnings management. 
725 See Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 234). 
726 See Ronen and Sadan (1981). 
727 A review of the income smoothing literature is provided by Fischer and Haller (1993). 
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Managers might attempt to attain a smooth earnings stream by using the discretion inher-
ent in existing GAAP to dampen earnings fluctuations as well as by lobbying with stan-
dard setters for regulations that increase the extent of this discretion.729 
Two types of smoothing behavior are usually distinguished: 730 lntertempora/ smoothing 
involves shifting gains and losses between reporting periods so as to reduce earnings in 
good periods and inflate earnings in bad periods. This objective can be achieved either by 
timing real business decisions, such as expenditures or disposals, or by choosing account-
ing methods that allocate earnings over time in the desired manner.731 German corpora-
tion law links earnings to dividends. 732 Therefore much emphasis is placed there on the 
concept of an intertemporally smooth dividend stream. 733 In contrast, classificatory 
smoothing deals with the presentation of reported income.734 Under the assumption that 
investors concentrate on income from continuing operations, income components that are 
incompatible with the smoothing strategy currently pursued (e.g., losses) are classified as 
non-recurring or otherwise extraordinary, "below-the-line" income. These "undesired" 
components, it is hoped, are then ignored by investors. Arguably, this distinction is 
blurred since classificatory smoothing deals with the object of intertemporal smoothing 
by making assumptions about which earnings figure is smoothed over time. 
The literature on income smoothing dates back to the 1950s. 735 Hepworth (1953) states 
that "the owners and creditors of an enterprise will feel more confident toward a corpo-
rate management which is able to report stable earnings than if considerable fluctuations 
of reported earnings exist." 736 Originally, researchers were primarily interested in 
728 Zucca and Campbell (1992, p. 35). To Beidleman (1973, p. 653), income smoothing is the "inten-
tional dampening of fluctuations about some level of earnings that is currently considered to be nor-
mal for a firm". See also Beidleman (1975), Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995, p. 6), and lmhoff(l975). 
729 For example, the income smoothing devices ofSFAS 87, Employers ' Accounting/or Pensions, have 
often been cited as evidence that a smoothed time series of earnings is desired by management. See 
Kieso, Weygandt and Warfield (2001, p. 1125) and Schildbach (1999, pp. 968,973). Evidence on 
earnings management under pension accounting standards is reported by Ali and Kumar (1993). 
730 Refer to Ronen and Sadan (1981) and Lambert (I 984, p. 605). 
731 See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (I 995, p. 76). A narrower definition is employed by Bern-
stein (1993, p. 755), according to whom income smoothing excludes the influencing of"real" transac-
tions. 
732 Refer to sections 58 and 150 of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, AktG). 
733 For example, refer to SUchting (1995, pp. 548-51). 
734 See, for example, Barnea, Ronen and Sadan (I 976, I 975) and Ronen and Sadan (1975a, 1975b). 
735 Summaries of the literature are provided by White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, pp. 59-61) and, more 
extensively, by Schmidt (I 977). See also the references in Ronen and Sadan (1975a, p. 133). A re-
view of more recent theory and evidence is given by DeFond and Park (1997, pp. 117-9). 
736 Hepworth (1953, p. 33). 
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whether smoothing actually occurred at all, 737 which involved the problem of devising a 
financial model that could detect the existence of smoothing by distinguishing a 
"smoothed" from an expected, "natural" time series of earnings. A simple approach sug-
gested by Gordon (1964) considers the accounting choices made and their relation to the 
trend in (pre-managed) earnings.738 Later, the attention shifted to the question whether 
the commonness of smoothing behavior was influenced by the degree to which a firm's 
ownership and (management) control are separated.739 Results indicated that manager-
controlled firms engaged in income smoothing more frequently than did owner-
controlled firms. 740 
It was not until approximately the 1980s that researchers accounted more explicitly in 
their empirical research designs for the determinants of smoothing behavior.741 In the 
early literature, a negative connotation was most frequently associated with income 
smoothing.742 Later, it became more accepted that income smoothing could be used as 
both a manipulative and a signaling device. 743 In the latter event, management uses its 
discretion to indicate the future prospects of the firm, thereby increasing the predictive 
ability of earnings. Lambert (1984) shows analytically that smoothing can possibly arise 
as rational equilibrium behavior. The potentially value-enhancing effects of income 
smoothing are also shown by Trueman and Titman ( 1988). Barnea, Ronen and Sadan 
( 1976) specifically highlight the conceivable signaling use of classificatory smoothing. 744 
The literature providing theoretical and empirical evidence on income smoothing further 
fanned out in the 1990s. For example, DeFond and Park (1997) find support for Fuden-
berg and Tirole's (1995) theory that managers smooth income and dividends for job se-
curity reasons under the assumption that their current performance is considered more 
important than their past performance (information decay).745 Kirschenheiter and Melu-
mad (2002) provide theory to suggest that income smoothing and "big bath" can co-exist 
737 Gagnon (1967) examined whether firms used the purchase/pooling choice to smooth their income. 
See also the reviews by Sapienza (1967) and Wyatt (I 967). 
738 See Gordon ( 1964, p. 262). See also Copeland and Licastro ( 1968). 
739 While not tested empirically until a substantially later time, this notion was already brought up in the 
1960s. Refer to Gordon (1964) and Monsen and Downs (1965). 
740 See Kamin and Ronen (1978) and Smith (1976). 
741 See the criticism in Ball and Foster ( 1982, pp. 214-5). 
742 Refer to the discussion in Lambert (I 984, p. 604). See also Ball and Foster (1982, p. 214). 
743 See, for example, Moses (1987). 
744 See Bamea, Ronen and Sadan (1976, p. 110). 
745 A critical reassessment of this paper is provided by Elgers, Pfeiffer and Porter (2003). 
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as equilibrium financial reporting strategies, depending on the extent and direction of any 
earnings surprise. 746 According to Zarowin (2002), managers reveal private information 
about the firm's future profitability by smoothing income. 
Discretionary asset write-off studies testing the income smoothing hypothesis include 
those conducted by Riedl (2002), Zucca and Campbell (1992), Francis, Hanna and Vin-
cent (1996), and Segal (2003). 747 The results found in these papers are mixed. While 
Zucca and Campbell (1992) conclude that some write-off firms appear to be smoothing 
earnings, Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) find a significantly negative association of 
write-off amounts and unexpectedly high earnings, suggesting that managers do not, on 
average, use write-offs to bring down excess earnings to a "smoothed" level. Riedl 
(2002) reports no significant association of the smoothing proxy with the write-off 
amount. However, in Segal's (2003) data, the smoothing variable is highly significant in 
the SFAS 121 regime, while it is the only significant explanatory variable ofSFAS 142 
goodwill write-offs. 
3.3.2.4.5 Target accounting 
A financial reporting strategy that makes immediate intuitive sense when the EMH is not 
believed to hold is the attempt to meet or exceed certain one-period thresholds regarding 
reported income numbers (target accounting).748 To the extent that actual earnings repre-
sent a positive (negative) surprise, investors are assumed to revise their expectations re-
garding the firm's prospects upward ( downward), which results in an immediate stock 
price increase (decrease). 
This "numbers game", heavily criticized by regulators,749 has only recently received ex-
tensive attention from the academic community.750 Researchers analyze, first, whether 
earnings are indeed managed with respect to certain thresholds, second, why these 
thresholds appear to be important, third, whether threshold-based earnings management 
746 The financial reporting strategy referred to as "big bath" is explained in section 3.3 .2.4.6 below. 
747 For the following, refer to Francis, Hanna and Vincent (I 996, pp. 123-8), Heflin and Warfield (I 997, 
p. 16), Riedl (2002, pp. 10-2, 39-40), Segal (2003, p. 16 fn. 17, p. 40), and Zucca and Campbell 
(1992, pp. 35, 40-1). 
748 In contrast, income smoothing deals with earnings management to achieve a multi-period benchmark. 
A brief literature review is provided by Dechow and Skinner (2000, pp. 242-5). See also Moehrle 
(2002, pp. 400-1). The terms "threshold", "target" and "benchmark" are used synonymously here, as 
is the custom in the literature. 
749 See Levitt (I 998). 
750 See Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002, pp. 176-7) for a brief literature review. See also White, Sondhi 
and Fried (2003, p. 60). 
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incentives vary between firms, and, fourth, whether "making the nwnbers" (failing to 
"make the numbers") is rewarded (punished) by investors. So far, target accounting has 
not been explicitly tested as a determinant of discretionary write-offbehavior.751 
3.3.2.4.5.1 Prevalence of target accounting 
Anecdotal as well as systematic evidence suggests that firms do manage earnings to meet 
or beat different types of targets (see Figure 9).752 
Approximations of investor expectations as 
benchmarks for earnings management 
Forecasted numbers 




• Last year's annual 
earnings 
• Last quarter's 
earnings 
• Last year's quarterly 
earnings 
Figure 9: Targets for earnings management 
Absolute numbers 
• Zero 
• .Round" numbers 
and other heuristics 
While some of these thresholds, such as published forecasts by analysts or management 
itself, are direct proxies for the expectations of (sophisticated) investors, 753 others include 
prior-period earnings figures754 and certain absolute nwnbers, e.g. zero. Degeorge, Patel 
and Zeckhauser (1999) argue in favor of a hierarchy of behavioral thresholds for earnings 
management: It "is most important first to make positive profits, second to report quar-
terly profits at least equal to profits of 4 quarters ago, and third to meet analysts' expecta-
tions".755 According to Brown and Caylor (2003), these priorities have apparently shifted 
over time, with avoiding negative earnings surprises becoming the most important moti-
751 Moehrle (2002) considers restructuring charge reversals as a means to meet or beat earnings targets. 
752 For example, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, pp. 99-100) cite several firms' explicitly stated inten-
tions to present a consistently increasing earnings stream. 
75) See Schipper (1991 , p. 105). 
754 The former can be subdivided to include previous year's annual earnings in the case of an annual 
earnings announcement as well as, in the event of a quarterly earnings announcement, the preceding 
quarter's earnings and previous year's quarterly earnings, i.e. the earnings reported in the same quar-
ter of the previous year. 
755 Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser ( 1999, p. I). 
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vation in recent years. 756 It should be noted that intertemporal income smoothing, dis-
cussed above, is actually a special case of meet-or-beat behavior, where the relevant 
benchmark is prior period's earnings. 
In this literature, the presence of earnings management is usually not detected by analyz-
ing a subset of accruals or by using a discretionary accruals model. Instead, time series 
and/or cross sections of reported earnings numbers are analyzed and "unusual" distribu-
tional patterns are interpreted as evidence of earnings management. 757 In a pioneering 
study, Hayn's (1995) findings of an unexpected concentration of small above-zero earn-
ings suggest that earnings are managed to avoid losses. 758 Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), for annual earnings, and Burgstahler (1997) and Skinner and Myers (1999), for 
quarterly earnings, report similar evidence and conclude that earnings management is 
used to avoid earnings decreases and losses. 759 Earlier research undertaken by Carslaw 
(1988) and Thomas ( 1989) indicates that round numbers, not necessarily zero, are impor-
tant benchmarks that managers attempt to meet by exercising financial reporting discre-
tion. 760 Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) document that managers engage in earn-
ings management to avoid losses, sustain earnings from four quarters ago, and meet ana-
lysts' expectations. Moehrle (2002) finds that restructuring charge reversals are used to 
meet or beat these three thresholds. Libby and Kinney's (2000) experiments imply that 
managers - with auditor approval - are likely to not correct immaterial earnings over-
statements if consensus earnings forecasts would be missed as_ a result. Brown (2001) 
documents that median earnings surprise has shifted from small negative to zero to small 
positive over the period 1984-99. 
756 Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser's (I 999) results cover the I 974-96 time period, while Brown and 
Caylor's (2003) data is taken from the 1986-2001 period. During 1994-2001, meeting analysts' fore-
casts seems to be management's overriding goal. 
757 See the discussion in McNichols (2000, pp. 316-7, 335-7). 
758 Burgstahler, Elliott and Hanlon (2003) provide further evidence that this is in part achieved by use of 
deferred taxes. 
759 Burgstahler and Dichev ( I 997) estimate that about I 0% of firms with small decreases in unmanaged 
earnings use their discretion to achieve an earnings increase, and that 30-44% of firms with small pre-
managed losses manipulate earnings to report earnings above zero. Marquardt and Wiedman (2002) 
argue that earnings are managed using different items, depending on the context. In order to avoid re-
porting an earnings decrease, they find that transitory items are used, e.g. special items. 
760 Carslaw (I 988) finds that earnings numbers ending with zero, such as $2.00, appear with unexpect-
edly high frequency in the earnings reports of New Zealand firms, while those ending with nine, such 
as $1 .99, occur unexpectedly seldom. Thomas (1989) reports similar findings for U.S. firms. 
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Research considering analyst forecasts761 as the best proxy for investors' expectations 
and, therefore, as the relevant earnings target must deal with the fact that there are two 
components to an earnings surprise: the benchmark number and the actual number. Con-
sequently, earnings management intended to meet or exceed analysts' forecasts need not 
be limited to manipulating the actual earnings number, but might include attempts to in-
fluence analysts' expectations as well. While this latter phenomenon, frequently referred 
to as expectations management, 762 does not strictly fall under the term "earnings man-
agement" as defined in section 3.3.1.1, it is nevertheless considered here.763 
It has been shown by Brown (l 998), Burgstahler and Eames (200 l ), Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser (1999), Payne and Robb (2000), and Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (1999) 
that analysts' forecast errors (i.e., the differences between consensus forecasts and actual 
earnings numbers) also exhibit unusual properties: They are unusually often zero or just 
positive and unusually seldom just negative. 764 While unusual earnings patterns relative 
to fixed, "natural" benchmarks (zero, prior-period numbers) suggest earnings manage-
ment, the evidence on forecast errors calls into question the process by which these fore-
casts are generated.765 For example, a small positive earnings surprise might be caused by 
management manipulating earnings upward, analysts "walking down" their estimates, or, 
most likely, a combination of both. Burgstahler and Eames (2001) find in this context 
that managers not only manage reported earnings upwards but also give guidance to ana-
lysts that influences their forecasts downward.766 In a similar vein, Schrand and Walther 
(2000) demonstrate that prior-period benchmarks reported in earnings announcements are 
selected strategically to compare favorably with current figures. This is achieved by high-
lighting non-recurring prior-period gains. 
One possible alternative set of simple targets that management tries to attain by earnings 
management is its own voluntarily disclosed forecasts .767 Kasznik (1999) finds that man-
761 Frequently, individual forecasts are aggregated to a summary measure referred to as "consensus" 
forecasts . See Schipper (1991 , pp. 106-7). 
762 See, for example, Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) and Kasznik and Lev (1995). 
763 In contrast to the contracting-based earnings targets discussed in section 3.3.2.3, capital market-based 
targets derived from investors' expectations change over time because they are revised to include new 
information as it becomes available during the reporting period. See Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000, p. 
5). Apparently, management actively influences these revisions. 
764 Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000) use analyst forecasts to predict the direction of earnings management. 
765 Since the focus here is on earnings management, research on the characteristics of analysts' forecasts 
and forecast errors is not reviewed in detail. 
766 Matsumoto (2002, p. 484) refers to this behavior as "forecast guidance". 
767 For an overview of the literature on certain aspects of voluntary disclosure, refer to Healy and Palepu 
(200 I, p. 425). 
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agers whose forecasts would otherwise turn out to be overly optimistic use discretionary 
accruals to manage earnings upward. He argues that managers avoid the costs of falling 
short of their own forecasts, which include potential shareholder litigation and reputation 
loss. 768 In a related paper, Dutta and Gigler (2002) theorize that asking managers to issue 
earnings forecasts will limit their future earnings management potential. For several rea-
sons, earnings management studies based on management's own forecasts are relatively 
rare and are not further considered here. 769 
3.3.2.4.5.2 Importance of earnings targets 
Where thresholds proxy for market participants' expectations, earnings management to 
meet or exceed them makes intuitive sense. When, due to assumed high information 
costs, investors are expected to rely on simple earnings-based heuristics, such as ana-
lysts' consensus estimates, to evaluate firm performance, managers will fear that a failure 
to live up to these expectations is likely to be penalized. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that "making the numbers" is important to managers. 
However, it is much less clear why the net benefits of earnings management should be 
especially high around simple thresholds such as zero, prior-period earnings, or round 
numbers. Essentially, managers "focus on thresholds for earnings because the parties 
concerned with the firm's performance do."770 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) invoke 
transaction cost theory to argue that managers assume stakeholders' decisions to be 
"based on heuristic cutoffs at zero levels or zero changes in earnings",771 making transac-
tions with them disproportionately more costly when these targets are not met. 772 Alter-
natively, prospect theory suggests that "decision-makers derive value from gains and 
losses with respect to a reference point, rather than from absolute levels of wealth", im-
plying that changes in investors' utility are greatest around these cutoff points.773 Using 
768 If managers fail to meet their own forecasts, this could signal to investors that the firm operates in a 
volatile, high-risk environment, causing share price to fall . See Kasznik (I 999, p. 61). 
769 First, only few firms issue quantitative forecasts, possibly due to substantial costs associated with 
forecasts that turn out to be inaccurate. Second, firms that do issue voluntary management forecasts 
self-select into the group studied. The causal relation between the fact that forecasts are issued and the 
fact that earnings management is practiced is not clear, causing complex methodological problems. 
Third, a long research tradition in this area has been further precluded by the fact that the SEC did not 
always allow managers to disclose forecast information. For a review of the management forecast lit-
erature, refer to Cameron (1986). 
770 Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999, p. 5). 
771 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p. 122). 
772 This reliance on simplifying heuristics amounts to a challenge of the EMH. 
773 Burgstahler and Dichev (I 997, p. 123). 
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similar theoretical reasoning, Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) conclude that 
stakeholders exhibit a "threshold mentality".774 With respect to round numbers, e.g. the 
avoidance of the figure nine in favor of the figure zero in earnings numbers, Carslaw 
(1988) cites psychological evidence on the role of key numbers, especially factors often, 
as cognitive reference points. Das and Zhang (2003) document that finns engage in earn-
ings management in order to be able to round up reported EPS figures. Finally, Matsu-
naga and Park (2001) document that missing quarterly earnings benchmarks has negative 
repercussions on CEOs' annual bonus payments. 
3.3.2.4.5.3 Cross-sectional differences in target-accounting behavior 
After early studies established that target accounting indeed occurred, researchers' atten-
tion shifted to cross-sectional differences in this behavior. Several finn characteristics 
were assumed to explain why some finns were more likely to engage in threshold-based 
earnings management than others. For example, Beatty, Ke and Petroni (2002) single out 
differences in ownership structure as one of these factors. They argue that publicly held 
firms have different incentives to engage in earnings management than those held pri-
vately, because the fonner's shareholders are more likely to focus on simple earnings 
thresholds. Consistent with this prediction, they find that public bank holding companies 
appear to manage earnings more frequently than do their privately held counterparts.775 
Matsumoto (2002) explores a number of other finn characteristics associated with par-
ticularly strong incentives to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. She hypothesizes and 
finds that high institutional ownership, high dependence on a positive image with stake-
holders other than investors, and low value relevance of earnings are positively associ-
ated with the frequency to which finns achieve simple earnings benchmarks. 
3.3.2.4.5.4 Market reactions to target accounting 
Given the mounting evidence that meeting or exceeding benchmarks induces earnings 
management, researchers ask whether this purely "cosmetic" financial reporting behavior 
is actually rewarded by capital market participants. 
Barth, Elliott and Finn (1999) demonstrate that finns with a history of earnings increases 
have higher price-earnings multiples than other finns, and that these premiums are higher 
774 Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999, p. 6). 
m Most frequently, the loan loss provision is used to achieve the desired earnings effect. 
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for longer sequences. 776 This incentive to maintain a time series of increasing earnings 
for as long as possible is further strengthened by the finding that price-earnings multiples 
decrease substantially once that pattern is broken. Similarly, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner (l 996) find that breaking a string of increasing annual earnings triggers a signifi-
cantly negative abnormal stock return. With respect to the benchmark "zero", Burgstahler 
( 1997) predicts and finds that the marginal benefits of earnings management are espe-
cially high around zero. 
Focusing on analyst forecasts as the benchmark, several authors find favorable market 
reactions to positive earnings surprises, as well as stock price declines associated ( espe-
cially in the case of "growth" stocks) with negative earnings surprises. Bartov, Givoly 
and Hayn (2002) document that positive quarterly forecast errors are associated with 
higher returns, even when the earnings surprise has apparently been achieved by either 
earnings or expectations management. 777 Significant negative responses to even small 
earnings disappointments are found by Kinney, Burgstahler and Martin (2002) and Skin-
ner and Sloan (200 l ). Lopez and Rees (2002) document an interesting dichotomy: The 
market reward for beating forecasts is significantly smaller than the penalty associated 
with missing them. 
3.3.2.4.6 Big bath 
The so-called "big bath" strategy, frequently alluded to in the financial press and criti-
cized by regulators, 778 has been widely investigated by researchers. A phenomenon espe-
cially associated with discretionary asset write-offs and therefore of particular relevance 
here,779 "the big bath hypothesis suggests that management will report additional losses 
in bad years in the hope that, by taking all available losses at one time, they will 'clear 
the decks' once and for all. The implicit assumption is that future profits will in-
crease."780 
This hypothesis assumes that investors do not mechanistically fix on a reported earnings 
number but carefully evaluate the implications of current financial reporting announce-
776 These differences are not due to differences in growth or risk. See Barth, Elliott and Finn (1999, p. 
410). 
777 Similar results are reported by Kasznik and McNichols (2002) and Lopez and Rees (2002). 
778 Levitt (1998) disapproves, among other things, of"'big bath' restructuring charges". 
779 See White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 279). 
780 White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 60). See also Moehrle (2002, p. 399) in the context of restructuring 
charges. 
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ments for the firm's future cash flows, even if that implies ignoring large one-time 
charges.781 Under this assumption, management can "sell" a large and possibly overstated 
write-off as "good news". This phenomenon is frequently said to follow changes in top 
management.782 Incoming executives allegedly have inventive to engage in house clean-
ing to signal that "the worst is over", a strategic reorientation has occurred and, generally, 
problems left behind by the predecessor management are being dealt with.783 
"Big bath" is not strictly a financial reporting incentive in itself, but a financial reporting 
behavior that might be observed as a result of several motivations, not all of which nec-
essarily stem from capital market-related considerations: Healy (1985) argues, and pro-
vides evidence that, managers "take a bath" when earnings fall below a threshold in their 
bonus plan. In general, "big bath" behavior is assumed to occur when earnings are ex-
pected to fall short of any threshold that management considers important to achieve. In 
that sense, it can be considered the fallback option to be exercised when the attempt to 
meet or exceed earnings thresholds, discussed at length above, fails. In the context of 
SFAS 142, the "big bath" strategy would allow management to store up reserves for fu-
ture periods through accelerated and/or overstated goodwill impairment losses in the 
transition year.784 
marginal costs 
amount of earnings disappointment 
Figure 10: The marginal costs associated with missing a threshold 
781 See, for example, Levitt ( 1998). 
782 This assertion has been documented and investigated as early as the 1970s. See Moore (I 973, p. I 00). 
See also Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998, pp. 163-4), Strong and Meyer (1987), Pourciau (1993), and 
Segal (2003 , p. 7). 
783 See White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 278). 
784 See Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000, p. 7). 
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Given that the marginal costs associated with falling short of earnings expectations or 
other thresholds have been found to decline in the amount of the deficit (see Figure 10), 
the costs of taking a "big bath" (i.e., reporting an "overstated" loss) are only slightly 
higher than the costs of disappointing investors by a narrow margin. Therefore, to ensure 
that future thresholds are attained, it might be rational for managers in some circum-
stances to "save" earnings for future periods by accelerating losses.785 
Despite this convincing rationale as well as frequent reports in the financial press, em-
pirical evidence concerning big bath hypothesis is mixed.786 Several researchers, includ-
ing Elliott and Shaw (1988),787 have found that most asset write-offs do not appear to be 
considered good news by investors, as would be expected under the big bath hypothe-
sis. 788 Based upon the claim that write-off announcements might convey different types 
of information, Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks (1998) report that "restructurings" meet with 
positive market reactions, while purely accounting write-offs generate negative re-
sponses. Riedl (2002) finds a significantly negative relation between unexpectedly nega-
tive earnings and the amount of SFAS 121 and pre-SF AS 121 write-offs, suggesting a 
"big bath" explanation.789 However, in Segal's (2003) analysis of SFAS 121 and SFAS 
142 goodwill write-offs, no such relation is found. Fried, Schiff and Sondhi (1989), Elli-
ott and Hanna (1996), and Francis, Hanna and Vincent ( 1996) document that a write-off 
is rarely a one-time event, but is often followed by another one soon after, suggesting that 
write-offs are underestimated rather than overstated as implied by the big bath hypothe-
sis. 790 However, while write-offs frequently coincide with poor performance and negative 
785 Abarbanell and Lehavy's finding (2003) that firms rated by analysts as "sell" tend to engage in big 
bath behavior. See also Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999, p. 30). Kirschenheiter and Melumad 
(2002) develop a model suggesting that the big bath strategy is appropriate when investors do not 
know the precision of reported earnings and pre-managed earnings are already below expectations. 
By additionally understating earnings, i.e. engaging in big bath behavior, management introduces 
"noise" into the earnings figure, which reduces the inferred precision of the earnings report. Investors 
are led to believe that the "true" earnings figure is in fact higher than the reported one. 
786 White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, pp. 60, 278-9) review the discretionary asset write-off literature for 
evidence on the big bath hypothesis. 
787 Elliott and Shaw ( 1988, p. 110) report that analyst forecasts of year-ahead earnings are adjusted 
downward upon write-offs. Also, write-off announcements trigger negative market reactions. 
788 Similar findings are documented by Bunsis (1997). Analyzing restructurings, Brickley and Van 
Drunen (1990) and Kross, Park and Ro (1996) report that the announcements of such activities and 
the related charges generate positive abnormal returns. 
789 See Riedl (2002, pp. 22-3, 39-40). 
790 Anecdotal evidence exemplified by AOL Time Warner's repeated revisions of its estimated goodwill 
write-off amount corroborate this notion. See Taub (2003). 
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discretionary accruals,791 write-off firms are not necessarily the worst performing firms 
within their industries.792 Evidence reported by Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998), DeAn-
gelo (1988), Elliott and Shaw (1988), Godfrey, Mather and Ramsay (2003), Moore 
(1973), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), Pourciau (1993), and Strong and Meyer (1987) 
suggests that big bath behavior follows management changes. 793 Beatty and Weber 
(2004) argue similarly when they predict that a recently appointed CEO has incentive to 
accelerate goodwill write-offs, whereas the CEO who made the original acquisition deci-
sion does not.794 Finally, big bath behavior has also been suggested to explain certain 
restructuring charges. 795 
In summary, the big bath hypothesis does not explain the majority of observed write-
offs,796 and even where it does appear to do so, it is not clear whether earnings manage-
ment is really at the heart of the empirical findings. 
A financial reporting strategy closely related to target accounting and "big bath" behavior 
is suggested where a firm exceeds an earnings target by a substantial amount. In order to 
establish earnings reserves for future earnings management use, firms engage in "cookie 
jar reserving", i.e. decreasing earnings just enough to bring them just above the target. 797 
3.3.2.4. 7 Rating 
In recent years, the dominance of credit of rating agencies has increased in the global 
capital markets. Basically, four firms (Standard & Poor' s,798 Moody' s Investors Service, 
Inc., Fitch, Inc., and Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited) share the market for bond 
791 See, for example, Elliott and Shaw (1988), Fried, Schiff and Sondhi (1989), Rees, Gill and Gore 
(1996), and Heflin and Warfield (1997). 
792 Refer to Strong and Meyer (1987). 
793 DeAngelo's (1988, pp. 30-4) findings pertain to newly elected dissident managers following proxy 
contests, while Pourciau (1993) focuses on "non-routine" executive changes. Both authors caution 
that their findings are compatible not only with an earnings management hypothesis but might also be 
caused by economically sound decisions. Furthermore, both the management change and the apparent 
"big bath" could be caused by a third variable such as poor performance. See DeAngelo (I 988, p. 32) 
and Pourciau (1993, p. 334). In Smith's (1993) review of the two papers, these issues are expanded 
upon. 
794 See Beatty and Weber (2004, p. 11). 
795 See for example Brickley and Van Drunen (1990) and John, Lang and Netter (1992). 
796 According to Fried, Schiff and Sondhi (1989, p. 109), write-offs are determined by economy- and 
industry-wide developments rather than by firm-specific factors such as financial reporting decisions. 
797 See, for example, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000, p. 7). 
798 Standard and Poor's is a division of the publishing company McGraw-Hill. 
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ratings. 799 These organizations operate independently, disseminating their ratings to the 
public, and relying on investors' willingness to accept their judgments. Like financial 
analysts, they are not strictly capital market participants themselves; rather, they function 
as information intermediaries between firms and investors. 800 
Firms are concerned about possible downgrades in their rating status, because of the in-
creased cost of capital such downgrades often bring about. In the event of a downgrad-
ing, a firm's costs of debt capital usually rise due to worsening terms with its creditors. 
Indirectly, the costs of equity capital frequently rise also, because such events are often 
accompanied by severe declines in stock price. 801 Anecdotal evidence suggests that these 
concerns have the potential to influence managers ' financial reporting decisions. For ex-
ample, Gore, Taib and Taylor's (2000) survey evidence indicates UK managers' con-
cerns that the income-decreasing effect of goodwill amortization might impair their 
firms ' rating status.802 Similarly, Nelson, Elliott and Tarpley (2002) report that concern 
over bond ratings is among the reasons behind earnings management attempts observed 
by auditors. 803 
In fact, the procedures employed by the agencies to arrive at their appraisals rely at least 
in part on financial ratios derived from GAAP financial statements. For example, Stan-
dard & Poor's "Corporate Ratings Criteria" publication contains the methodologies em-
ployed to arrive at the agency's rating decisions.804 While S&P emphasizes that "[t]he 
rating process is not limited to an examination of various financial measures", 805 it does 
799 These four agencies are recognized by the staff of the SEC as "nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations". Their bond ratings today are "widely used as benchmarks in federal and state legisla-
tion, rules issued by financial and other regulators, foreign regulatory schemes, and private financial 
contracts." See SEC Concept Release "Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings under the Fed-
eral Securities Laws". 
800 By way of example, S&P's role in the financial markets is outlined in S&P (2003, pp. 3-6). For a 
more general description of the bond rating process, refer to Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2001, pp. 50-
55) and Ederington and Yawitz (1987). 
801 On February 21, 2003, the German heavy industry group ThyssenKrupp was downgraded by Standard 
& Poor's, whereupon market capitalization dropped by roughly 20% or about three quarters of a bil-
lion Euro. See Hennes (2003). Interestingly, while Standard & Poor's downgraded ThyssenKrupp by 
two notches to junk bond status (BB+), the Moody's rating remained unchanged at Baal . 
802 See Gore, Taib and Taylor (2000, p. 221). 
803 See Nelson, Elliott and Tarpley (2002, p. 190). 
804 While Moody's and Fitch's approaches vary from that of S&P's in some minor details, S&P's meth-
odology is considered here to be representative of the way that rating organizations process account-
ing information. This simplifying assumption seems reasonable given S&P's superior market posi-
tion. For a summary of Moody's approach, refer to Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2001 , pp. 50-55). 
805 S&P (2003, p. 5). 
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state that "[f]inancial risk is portrayed largely through quantitative means, particularly by 
using financial ratios. "806 In computing these ratios, S&P relies on audited data, although 
specific accounting issues are reviewed and certain adjustments to reported GAAP fig-
ures are made in order to improve comparability and "to better portray reality."807 When 
assessing the degree ofleverage, different ratios are employed.808 A firm's asset mix and 
business risk are considered when assessing appropriate levels for these leverage meas-
ures. 809 Key ratios to measure leverage are, among others, long-term debt to capital and 
total debt to capital. 810 
Managers might be inclined to believe that financial ratios play a dominant role in the 
rating process. For example, Standard & Poor' s downgrading of Thyssen-Krupp was 
justified by the firm's high provisions for future pension obligations.811 These provisions, 
until then regarded as similar to equity-type financing, were for the first time considered 
to be debt in nature, which caused a marked increase in ThyssenKrupp' s financial lever-
age.812 In contrast, U. S. firms frequently use external funding agencies, therefore report-
ing on the balance sheet not the entire future pension obligation, but, under SFAS 87, 
Employers· Accounting for Pensions, only a portion of any deficit not covered by the 
plan assets held by the funding agency. ThyssenKrupp officials disputed Standard & 
Poor's decision on the grounds that it did not reflect any worsening of ThyssenKrupp's 
financial condition but exclusively resulted from a change in Standard & Poor's 
methodology. Other European firms chimed in, hinting at managers' belief that rating 
agencies might take financial statement information at face value instead of 
autonomously considering the economic substance of the pension obligations. This belief 
might have further implications for management behavior: To the extent that rating 
agencies are believed to rely mechanistically on certain financial ratios, managers' 
concerns about possible downgrades might be justified, even where the deterioration of 
financial ratios is brought about by a mandatory accounting change. Therefore, managers 
806 S&P (2003, p. 22). 
807 S&P (2003, p. 22). 
808 While the traditional measure of debt to capital has recently lost some its former significance, it does 
remain in the focus of rating organizations. See S&P (2003, pp. 30-1). 
809 Refer to S&P (2003 , pp. 24, 56). Specific adjustments with regard to the accounting for business 
combinations and goodwill are discussed in section 5.2.3.2. 
810 See S&P (2003, p. 55). Long-term debt to capital is long term debt divided by long-term debt plus 
shareholders' equity (including preferred stock) plus minority interest. In the total debt to capital ra-
tio, long-term debt is supplemented by current maturities, commercial paper, and other short-term 
borrowings. These ratios are adjusted for the amount to which operating leases are in fact debt equiva-
lents. 
811 See, for example, o. V. (2003). 
812 S&P's treatment of pension and similar obligations is explained in S&P (2003, pp. 107-24). 
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about by a mandatory accounting change. Therefore, managers have incentive to influ-
ence the relevant financial ratios.813 
3.3.2.4.8 Specific considerations regarding accounting changes and other transitory 
earnings components 
Transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs, possibly even more than other discretionary 
asset write-offs, are distinct from other components of earnings, which might influence 
the extent to which they are suitable as instruments to achieve capital market-related fi-
nancial reporting incentives. It is commonly assumed that (the time series of) a firm's 
earnings are relevant to investors' assessment of the firm's future prospects.814 Therefore, 
investors are interested in certain properties of this earnings stream, frequently referred to 
as the quality of earnings.815 High-quality earnings contain a high proportion of perma-
nent, sustainable components, which have predictive ability for future earnings. In con-
trast to that, earnings have low quality when they are affected by one-off effects and 
other transitory or non-recurring components, which complicate the forecasting of future 
earnings. 816 Therefore, one of financial statement users' primary tasks is to remove tran-
sitory components from reported earnings in an attempt to "normalize" reported income 
and assess a firm's underlying earnings power. 817 
Such transitory components, or non-recurring items, are comprised of unusual or infre-
quent items, extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and accounting changes. 818 
While the first category, also referred to as "special" items,819 are reported "above the 
line" as income from continuing operations, the other three components are presented net 
of tax as "below-the-line" items. Extraordinary items are unusual in nature, infrequent in 
813 Although finns pay fees to be rated, potential costs arising from adverse rating changes are not con-
sidered here to be "contracting costs" (refer to section 3.3.2.3.1 ), since they are imposed on firms not 
by the rating agencies directly but by investors relying on the agencies' judgments. Therefore, earn-
ings management incentives stemming from a desire to influence rating status are capital market-
related as opposed to economic consequences-type incentives. 
814 Hirst and Hopkins (I 998) state that "equity analysts typically use earnings-based valuation models". 
BIS 
See also Barker (1999), Block (1999), and Brown, Finn and Hope (2000, p. 1235) for evidence on 
valuation models used by analysts. 
See, for example, White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 637), to whom earnings quality is represented by 
"the degree of conservatism in a firm's reported earnings." 
816 See, for example, Beaver (1998, pp. 92-6). Early research on the value relevance of permanent versus 
transitory earnings components includes Beaver and Morse (1978) and Lipe (1986). 
817 See Hopkins, Houston and Peters (2000, p. 263) and White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, pp.631-6). 
818 For much of the following, refer to White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, pp. 52-56). 
819 These entries are either unusual in nature or infrequent in occurrence but not both. 
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occurrence and material in amount. 820 APB Opinion 30 states explicitly that write-offs of 
intangible assets do not belong in this category.821 Income from discontinued operations, 
governed by SFAS 144, is segregated in the income statement because these activities 
will not contribute to future earnings or cash flows. The treatment of accounting changes 
is regulated in APB Opinion 20, Accounting Changes. Usually, the cumulative effect on 
prior period earnings is reported net of tax below the line. This treatment is required by 
SFAS 142.56 for transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs.822 White, Sondhi and Fried 
(2003) note that "accounting changes also affect future operating results. That impact is 
rarely disclosed but can sometimes be estimated."823 
The fact that a transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off is presented separately as a 
cumulative effect-type accounting change makes it an extremely visible item, which 
might not lend itself to subtle earnings manipulation.824 Therefore, it is unreasonable to 
assume that managers use transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs in the context of a 
financial reporting strategy that hinges on the notion that the earnings manipulation goes 
unnoticed by financial statement users. Furthermore, transitional SFAS 142 goodwill 
write-offs reduce net income while having no influence on operating income or other 
earnings measures such as EBITDA. Subsequent to the transitional impairment test, 
however, SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs will represent a separate line item in the income 
statement before the subtotal "income from continuing operations".825 
These considerations suggest a strategic use of transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-
offs. Financial reporting incentives related to the adoption of SF AS 142 are likely to dif-
fer from those regarding "regular" goodwill write-offs. Consistent with the classificatory 
smoothing literature, Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002) expect "transition period firms 
[to] announce large goodwill impairments based on a belief that, as ' below-the-line' 
items, the market would view such impairments as relating to a past problem and having 
820 Refer to APB Opinion 30, Reporting the Results of Operations--Reporting the Effects of Disposal of a 
Segment of a Business, and Extraordinary, Unusual and Infrequently Occurring Events and Transac-
tions, par. 19-24. 
821 See APB Opinion 30.23 lit. a. Kieso, Weygandt and Warfield (2001, p. 563) also argue that impair-
ment losses do not have the characteristics of extraordinary items and should therefore be reported as 
part of income from continuing operations. 
822 Refer to section 4.7.3 below. 
823 White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 55). 
824 Beneish (2001, p. 6) states that managers intent on managing earnings "are likely to do so in a way 
that is difficult to detect". 
825 See SFAS 142, par. 43 . Such "regular" SFAS 142 write-offs represent "special" items like most other 
impairment write-offs. See White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 53). 
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no impact on current firm vaJue."826 If that assumption holds, firms with present write-off 
potential and firms anticipating such potential in the near future will have incentive to 
engage in "big bath" behavior, accelerating future write-offs into the adoption period.827 
In that sense, Beneish's (1998) assertion that "accounting changes [are] a rather blunt 
instrument for earnings management because it is not plausible to assume that the effects 
of the accounting change on earnings are difficult to unravel" is not entirely correct. 828 It 
assumes that earnings management works best where it cannot be detected by financial 
statement users in the period in which it is occurs. Quite on the contrary, precisely be-
cause accounting changes are visible and therefore likely to be ignored due to its transi-
tory nature in the period of the change, users frequently overlook the strategic implica-
tions of these changes for earnings and other financial statement items in future peri-
ods. 829 Therefore, transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs are suitable for strategic 
earnings management. 830 With respect to capital market-related financial reporting incen-
tives, 831 it appears reasonable to assume that managers will expect investors to largely 
ignore transitional, but not regular SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs.832 Transitional SFAS 
142 goodwill write-offs, then, will be used strategically. As will be discussed in more 
826 Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002, p. 8). 
827 See also Osterland (2002), who quotes a Lehman Brothers associate with the statement that an initial 
goodwill write-off, reported as an accounting change is likely to be ignored or discounted by inves-
tors. That associate advises firms to record a transitional SFAS I 42 goodwill write-off as early and as 
high as possible, in order to avoid regular write-offs in the near future. 
828 Beneish (I 998, p. 85). 
829 Elliott and Philbrick's (1990) evidence suggests that analysts are unable to predict the earnings effect 
of a mandatory accounting change. It is reasonable to assume that analysts will assign less importance 
to earnings components that, to them, represent pure accounting events, the effect of which on future 
prospects cannot be estimated. Burgstahler, Jiambalvo and Shevlin (2002), Elliott and Hanna (1996) 
and Moffitt and Rai (2002) report that the presence of special items impairs investors' ability to form 
accurate earnings expectations. Similar evidence is reported by Chen, Danielson and Schoderbek 
(2003). 
830 In the context ofSFAS 87, Langer and Lev (1993) demonstrate that the adoption ofa new standard is 
used by firms to engage in earnings management. Elliott and Philbrick (I 990) find that managers 
make income-increasing (income-decreasing) voluntary accounting changes in response to analysts' 
downward (upward) earnings forecast revisions, suggesting an income-smoothing explanation of vol-
untary accounting changes. Evidence consistent with this finding is reported by Kinney and Trezevant 
831 
(1997) in the context of special items. 
The role of transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs and other transitory items in accounting-based 
contracts is another issue. Refer to section 3.3.2.3 above and section 5.2.3.1 below. 
832 This - alleged - opinion of the capital markets is portrayed in Osterland's (2002) article, suggesting 
that investors will ignore any transitional goodwill write-offs, while goodwill write-offs that occur af-
ter the transition period "will likely have a lot more negative impact in the market". Similarly, Riedl 
(2002, p. 2) argues that "asset impairments directly affect net income, suggesting incentives may exist 
for managers to manipulate write-off amounts". 
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detail in section 5.2.3.2 below, firms that anticipate future earnings to be above earnings 
targets will have incentive to avoid transitional write-offs, storing up write-off potential 
for future periods. Conversely, firms that anticipate future earnings to be below earnings 
targets will accelerate transitional write-offs in order to shelter future earnings. 
A number of studies on target accounting833 present evidence on whether the assumption 
that investors will ignore transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs is representative of 
extant research approaches. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) use both net income and 
earnings before extraordinary items as the earnings numbers relevant to analysts. They 
find that "the results are generally consistent for the two alternative measures of earn-
ings. "834 Moehrle (2002) uses EPS based on net income, except where 1/B/E/S backs out 
unusual items from reported earnings. 835 Burgstahler and Eames (200 I) use the proprie-
tary definition of Zacks Investment Research database for an "operating EPS before ex-
traordinary and non-recurring items". 836 Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) use 
quarterly EPS before extraordinary items for the pre- I 985 period. Post-I 984, they use 
1/B/E/S forecasted and actual EPS, which, according to 1/B/E/S, exclude unusual or non-
recurring charges.837 Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) use "actual earnings" (not defined 
any further) and forecasts from I/B/E/S.838 Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000) report difficul-
ties in comparing EPS figures across databases. Marquardt and Wiedman (2002) use net 
income before extraordinary items. 839 Kasznik ( 1999), consistent with Jaggi and Sannella 
(1995), excludes changes in accounting principle and extraordinary items, because the 
management forecasts studied relate to earnings from continuing operations. 840 Hayn 
( 1995) uses "income (loss) from continuing operations, before extraordinary items, dis-
continued operations, and the cumulative effect of accounting changes."841 Finally, Phil-
833 Refer to section 3.3 .2.4.5. 
834 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, pp. 101-2). 
835 1/B/E/S is the Institutional Brokers Estimate System. 
836 Burgstahler and Eames (2001, p. 5 fu. 10). The authors note that Zacks' actual (and forecast) EPS are 
not directly comparable to 1/B/E/S actual EPS and that differences are sometimes substantial. 
837 Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (I 999, pp. I 5-6). 
838 They delete observations where 1/B/E/S earnings and COMPUST AT earnings (not defined any fur-
ther) differ substantially (> 50%) and the difference cannot be explained by a special item. They 
stress that 1/B/E/S reports an "adjusted" earnings figure. 
839 See Marquardt and Wiedman (2002, pp. 19, 38). 
840 See Kasznik (1999, p. 63 fu . 10). 
841 Hayn (1995, p. 129). 
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brick and Ricks (1991) report that extraordinary items are excluded from 1/B/E/S fore-
casts. 842 
3.3.2.5 Factors restricting management discretion 
The above discussion of different earnings management incentives does not imply that 
there are no limitations to management's discretion in managing earnings. Stated gener-
ally, the benefits managers associate with achieving their financial reporting objectives 
must be traded off with the costs of earnings manipulation. 843 Pertaining to the focus of 
this dissertation, managers will also trade off the particular costs and benefits of earnings 
manipulation associated with discretionary asset write-offs with those related to other 
discretionary financial reporting decisions. 844 For example, since write-offs are high-
profile accounting events, using them for subtle earnings management is not feasible. 845 
Several factors detennine the costs of earnings manipulation and thereby the extent to 
which management can achieve their financial reporting objectives by engaging in earn-
ings management. First, the degree of rigidity, i.e. the absence of flexibility and discre-
tion, in applicable financial reporting rules (GAAP) predefines the extent to which man-
agement can influence the reported numbers and accompanying disclosures. While a 
rules-based accounting system tends to be relatively rigid, a principles-based approach to 
standard setting necessarily introduces considerable discretion of application into the 
rules. 846 As has been discussed above, discretionary asset write-offs are characterized by 
the comparatively high degree of judgment and subjectivity involved in applying the 
relevant guidance, where any exists. This is argued to be especially true for transitional 
SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs.847 
Second, the guiding principles of most accounting rules contain principles intended to 
limit randomness and enhance the decision usefulness of financial statements. Under 
842 See Philbrick and Ricks (1991 , p. 401). 
843 For example, refer to Waymire (I 988, pp. 123-5). 
844 See Waymire (I 998, pp. 125-6). A discussion of the relative costs and benefits of using different 
accounting items as earnings management instruments is provided by Marquardt and Wiedman (2002, 
pp. 8-18). They partition the relevant costs into costs of detected versus costs of undetected earnings 
management. 
845 Refer to section 3.3 .2.4.8. 
846 In the theoretical extreme, a rules-based accounting system leaves no discretion. Earnings manage-
ment, then, cannot occur in a strictly rules-based accounting system. However, such a system would 
be associated with prohibitive costs. 
847 Refer to chapter 4 below. 
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U.S. GAAP, "[c]onsistency in applying accounting methods over a span of time has al-
ways been regarded as an important quality that makes accounting numbers more use-
ful. "848 According to SFAC 2, consistency is defined as "[c]onformity from period to 
period with unchanging policies and procedures."849 Due to this principle, the exercise in 
one period of what discretion exists usually limits the degree of discretion available in 
later periods.850 This implies that discretion will be exercised strategically, taking into 
consideration the implications of current financial reporting decisions for the degree of 
discretion available in future periods. Applied to the SFAS 142 setting, the methods and 
basic assumptions used by management in the transitional goodwill impairment test will, 
at least to some extent, have to be carried over into future periods. At least, significant 
deviations will have to be justified by management to auditors and, possibly, SEC offi-
cials. 
Third, management's financial reporting decision making is monitored by auditors in 
order to ensure compliance with GAAP and to prevent manipulation. Since earnings 
management is here defined to be strictly within the limits ofGAAP, the role of the audi-
tor with respect to earnings management is to prevent management from crossing the fine 
line to GAAP violation. 851 Stakeholders rely on auditors to limit earnings manage-
ment.852 For example, managers potentially face adverse consequences from auditors' 
decisions to raise audit fees, render qualified audit opinions or, in severe cases, terminate 
the audit engagement. 853 Since GAAP on discretionary asset write-offs rely heavily on 
management's judgment, the extent to which auditors limit management's discretion in 
this context is an open issue.854 Some argue that it is precisely this discretionary nature 
848 SF AC 2.120. With regard to financial statement measurement, presentation, and consolidation issues, 
this concept is also important in Germany ("Stetigkeit"). See Pellens (200 I, p. I 41) and Sieben and 
Coenenberg (1997, p. 1146-7). 
849 Sf AC 2 (Glossary of terms). 
850 This relation is referred to by Marquardt and Wiedman (2002, p. 13) as the "reversal" of earnings 
851 
management. 
In addition, managers' incentives to abstain from manipulative or even fraudulent GAAP violations 
stems from the potential threat of litigation under applicable securities laws. See, for example, 
Waymire (1988, pp. 124-5). However, since the definition of earnings management given in section 
3 .3. I.I above does not include GAAP violations, this aspect is not further pursued here. 
852 See, for example, Heninger (2001, p. 112). 
853 See, for example, Waymire (I 988, p. 124). 
854 Defond and Subramanyam ( 1998, p. 40) stress that, "because the interpretation of GAAP requires 
professional judgment, management and auditors ... can hold legitimate divergent beliefs regarding 
its application". 
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that ensures close monitoring of asset write-offs and prevents potential abuse. 855 The role 
of auditors with respect to earnings management has been the subject of extensive re-
search. For example, Krishnan's (2003b) analysis suggests that auditors with industry 
expertise limit the amount of discretionary accruals reported by client firms. Nelson, 
Elliott and Tarpley (2002) document survey evidence on clients' earnings management 
attempts and auditors' responses. Heninger (2001) finds that auditors' litigation risk in-
creases in the extent of their clients' income-increasing earnings management. DeFond 
and Subramanyam ' s (1998) evidence suggests that auditor changes can frequently be 
explained by auditors' preference of conservative accounting due to litigation concerns, 
which conflict with managers' financial reporting incentives. Francis, Maydew and 
Sparks (1999) conclude from their evidence that Big Six auditors constrain aggressive 
and potentially opportunistic earnings management. 856 
Fourth, extensive disclosure requirements also help to ensure that managers make public 
their assumptions underlying write-offs and other discretionary financial reporting deci-
sions. Where assumptions must be explicitly stated and are therefore made open to scru-
tiny, management's incentive to manipulate financial statements will tend to be further 
restricted. Such disclosures assist financial statement users in "seeing through" the possi-
bly manipulative motivations behind managers' financial reporting decisions.857 
Finally, assuming that managers maximize their own utility does not necessarily imply 
that financial reporting decisions are exclusively motivated by considerations such as 
income or job security, which ultimately have financial repercussions. To the extent that 
character traits such as honesty, decency, or, less solemn, a simple distaste for lying, are 
part of a manager's personality, making financial reporting decisions that faithfully rep-
resent economic reality will increase her utility.858 
855 See Elliott and Hanna (1996, p. 137): "Management must use judgment to determine the size of a 
write-off. Because these large accounting write-offs are discrete and relatively infrequent, this mana-
gerial judgment may be more subject to investor and regulator scrutiny than similar recurring judg-
ments by management regarding receivables collectability and other accruals." 
856 Also, refer to Elder and Zhou's (2003, 2002) evidence on the association between audit quality and 
earnings management in the context of seasoned and initial equity offerings, respectively. 
857 See also Baetge and Ballwieser (I 977, p. 2003). 
858 Evans et al. (2001 , pp. 552-5) use an experimental design to analyze managers' preferences for wealth 
and honesty and their effect on managerial reporting. They show that subjects gave up a substantial 
portion of the available payoff by reporting (partially) honestly. These results challenge existing 
agency models that predict at most a weak role of honesty. Subjects were (partially) honest although 
they faced none of the negative consequences normally associated with lying due to the absence of 
monitoring, auditing, and reputation effects. 
150 
Thorsten Sellhorn - 978-3-631-75498-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:09:55AM
via free access
To summarize, factors restricting management's discretion can be interpreted as costs of 
manipulation. Due to the specific characteristics of discretionary asset write-offs, the 
costs resulting from their use of as earnings management instruments differ from those 
associated with other financial reporting decisions. 
3.4 Financial statement users' view of discretionary asset write-offs 
In this section, research on the relation between discretionary asset write-offs and mar-
ket-based metrics such as stock prices or stock returns is reviewed. In contrast to the ap-
proach introduced in section 3.3.2.2 above, the focus of this research is not on whether 
the firm's market performance causes the write-off. Rather, investors' responses to dis-
cretionary asset write-offs are studied, where the write-off itself is interpreted as the 
cause. 859 The findings of this research area are of interest to both managers and research-
ers: Managers might want to pre-estimate the stock price effects of avoiding or recording 
discretionary asset-write-offs. Researchers are interested in learning about investors' 
perception of these charges. 
3.4.1 Information perspective of financial reporting 
The literature discussed here is primarily interested in the implications of discretionary 
asset write-offs for investors' assessment of the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of the 
write-off firms' future cash flows. These implications, if any, are expected to influence 
security prices in the instance they are disclosed to the market as well as over longer time 
periods. Therefore, researchers interested in financial statement users' perception of dis-
cretionary asset write-offs investigate empirically the relation between a write-off firm's 
accounting numbers and the market value of its stock. 
Such relation is expected to exist because financial statements and other elements of fi-
nancial reporting are commonly viewed from an information perspective, i.e. they are 
primarily intended to provide decision-useful information to present and potential users, 
primarily shareholders. 860 This information perspective has also been adopted by finan-
cial reporting standard setters. It is stipulated in the FASB's conceptual framework as 
follows: 
859 Since this aspect of the discretionary asset write-off literature is not taken up in the empirical analysis 
in chapter 5, the discussion in this section is less detailed and comprehensive than that in section 3.3 
above. 
860 For example, refer to Beaver (1998, pp. 4-5) and Christensen and Demski (2003, ch. I). See also 
Francis and Schipper (1999, p. 319). 
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"Financial reporting should provide information that is useful to present and poten-
tial investors and creditors and other users in making rational investment, credit, and 
similar decisions ... Financial reporting should provide information to help present 
and potential investors and creditors and other users in assessing the amount, timing, 
and uncertainty of prospective cash receipts ... financial reporting should provide in-
formation to help investors, creditors, and others assess the amounts, timing, and un-
certainty of prospective net cash inflows to the .. enterprise."86 1 
In the IASB' s framework for the preparation and presentation of financial statements,862 
the objective of financial statements is stated in this fashion: 
"The objective of financial statements is to provide information about the financial 
position, performance and changes in financial position of an enterprise that is useful 
to wide range of users in making economic decisions. "863 
Investors, especially shareholders, are identified in the Framework as the primary user 
group. 864 Their information needs are thought to be representative of those of most other 
users. 865 Shareholders are assumed to be "interested in information which enables them 
to assess the ability of the enterprise to pay dividends."866 
Since a firm's dividend-paying ability is determined by its cash flows, financial reporting 
data is intended to help the firm's stakeholders in assessing the amount, timing, and risk 
of the firm's prospective cash flows. Information based on accrual accounting, which is 
primarily earnings-oriented, is useful for the assessment of future cash flows because 
accruals have normalizing properties that reduce the raw cash flows' inherent volatility. 
Therefore, they have predictive value over and above that of raw cash flows. 867 Since an 
accrual-based accounting system produces information incremental to that included in 
cash flows (e.g. management' s expectations about an asset's future earnings power that 
86 1 Sf AC 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises, par. 34, 37. Also, refer to Pellens 
(2001, pp. 132-7). 
862 Hereafter referred to as "Framework". 
863 Framework, par. 12. Also, refer to Pellens (2001, pp. 437-8), and Pellens, Boose and FUlbier (1996, 
pp. 271-6). 
864 See Framework, par. 9. 
865 See Framework, par. 10. 
866 Framework, par. 9 (a). 
867 For an in-depth discussion of this issue, refer to Dechow (I 994, pp. 4-7, 35-6). She documents that, 
over short periods, earnings are more closely associated with stock returns than are realized cash 
flows, especially where forms operate in a "steady state". Where firms experience changes in their 
operating environment, cash flows suffer from timing and matching problems. 
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might get reflected in that asset being written off), earnings are viewed to be more infor-
mative and indicative of future cash flows than are past cash flows alone. 868 
3.4.2 Research approaches 
To ascertain the informational properties of discretionary asset write-offs, two distinct 
approaches are adopted in the research, depending on whether short-term or long-term 
effects of (the announcements of) write-offs are studied.869 In information content stud-
ies, a causal, short-term relation is assumed to exist between (announcements of) discre-
tionary asset write-offs and security prices. 870 If such relation is found to exist, the discre-
tionary asset write-off is said to have information content,871 implying that it "conveys 
new information to market participants as reflected in changes in the level ... of security 
prices .. . over a short time period around the event".872 The maintained hypothesis in 
these studies is that the EMH holds, i.e. security prices reflect the new information in the 
instant it is made public.873 Generally speaking, the information content of an earnings 
figure is "measured by market reaction to the announced earnings and its deviation from 
expected earnings. "874 Likewise, the information content of a discretionary asset write-
off would be measured by the market reaction to the write-off announcement. To the ex-
tent that the write-off was unexpected, any market reaction can be interpreted as reflect-
ing investors' assessment of the information conveyed by the write-off. Since the market 
reaction is most frequently measured in terms of the write-off firm's stock return over a 
short interval centered on the write-off announcement, this approach has also been la-
beled return analysis. 875 Because this type of analysis methodologically represents an 
868 See, for example, Beaver (I 998, p. 6). 
869 See, for example, Alciatore et al. (I 998, pp. 3-4). 
870 In the words of Vincent (1997, p. 7), researchers are interested in "the information content (or 'news') 
of an event", i.e. of the write-off announcement. 
871 Holthausen and Watts (2001, p. 6) label such research "marginal information content studies". 
872 Kothari (2001, p. 116). See also Watts and Zimmerman (1986, ch. 3) and Brown (2001, pp. 14-6). 
873 
874 
According to Alciatore et al. (1998, p. 3), the "question implicit in these studies is: Do asset write-
downs convey information to investors at the time they are announcecf!" (Emphasis in original.) 
This, of course, assumes that the information is actually new and has not been previously conveyed to 
investors through mechanisms other than the write-off announcement. With respect to asset write-
offs, Heflin and Warfield (1997, p. 9) argue that investors may obtain information about asset value 
declines through financial intermediaries and reported accounting data in the period before the write-
off. 
White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 169). 
875 Atiase and Tse (I 986, p. 2) refer to the "returns approach". See also Alciatore et al. ( 1998, p. 3). 
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event study,876 this branch of capital market-based accounting research has also become 
known under that label. 877 The archetypal event study, conducted by Fama, Fisher, Jen-
sen and Roll (1969), was initiated even before, although published later than, the influen-
tial article by Ball and Brown (1968) that made the event study approach popular in ac-
counting research. 878 
Association studies represent another approach found in the discretionary asset write-off 
literature. Here, researchers are interested in the correlation between write-off amounts 
and stock prices or returns measured over longer time periods, e.g. the fiscal period.879 
The hypothesized relation can be framed as the following research question: "Does the 
inclusion of the amount of the write-down in earnings result in an income number which 
provides a better summary of the information that investors have used in setting security 
prices over the fiscal period?"880 Since write-offs affect earnings numbers, not cash 
flows, association studies primarily analyze the relation between stock returns and earn-
ings. If such a relation is found to be significant and positive, this result can be inter-
preted as evidence that the write-off reflects some of the same information that has 
caused investors to lower their expectations regarding the write-off firms' future cash 
flows. However, no direct causal connection is hypothesized. 881 Because association 
studies examine whether accounting numbers capture information relevant to investors in 
their estimation of firm value, they are also referred to as value relevance studies. 882 
876 Synonyms include "residual analysis" and "abnormal performance index test". See Bowman (1983, p. 
561). 
877 See, for example, Kothari (2001, p. 116). For an introduction into the methodology employed in an 
event study, refer to Binder (1998), Bowman (1983), MacKinlay (1997), Peterson (1998), Peterson 
(1989), Schremper (2002, pp. 121-30), and Thompson (1995). 
878 See Brown (2001, p. 14, 23). Another seminal, albeit methodologically somewhat different study is 
Beaver (1968). Reviews of this literature include those by Beaver (2002), Brown (2001), Coenenberg 
(1974), Coenenberg et al. (1978), Kothari (2001), Lev (1989), Lev and Ohlson (1982), and Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986, ch. 3). 
879 See Kothari (2001, p. 116). Following Vincent (1997, p. 7), "the degree of association between re-
ported accounting numbers and either stock prices or long window (twelve to fifteen months) security 
returns" is investigated. 
880 Alciatore et al. (1998, p. 3 [emphasis in original]). 
881 See Kothari (200 I, p. 116). 
882 Excellent reviews of this literature include Barth, Beaver and Landsman (200 I), Bonse (2004 ), 
Coenenberg (1974), Coenenberg et al. (1978), Holthausen and Watts (2001), Lev (1989), and Lev and 
Ohlson (1982). Francis and Schipper (I 999, p. 320) refer to this line of research as the "explanatory 
power approach" because the value relevance of financial statement information can be measured by 
the "explanatory power of accounting information for measures of market value". 
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3 .4 .3 Main findings 
3.4.3.1 Information content studies 
Strong and Meyer (1987) study 120 write-offs announced during the period 1981-85. 
Their results indicate that infonnation about an impending write-off was available to the 
market before the write-off was actually made. Positive pre-write-off stock perfonnance 
suggests that investors responded positively to the anticipated write-off, possibly because 
it was perceived as part of a larger restructuring plan. However, stock perfonnance dur-
ing the write-off announcement period was mostly negative, which might indicate that 
investors perceived the actual restructuring plan disclosed in the write-off announcement 
to be disappointing. 883 However, during the period subsequent to the write-off an-
nouncement, the negative announcement reaction was largely reversed. 
Focusing on the same time period as Strong and Meyer's (1987) analysis, Elliott and 
Shaw (1988) examine 240 finns reporting discretionary asset write-offs during the period 
1982-85. The write-off announcements are found to be associated with significantly 
negative industry-adjusted retums.884 Cross-sectional variation in the returns is found to 
be associated with write-off size, the information signal conveyed ("good" or "bad" 
news), and concurrent stock repurchase announcements. 885 During the subsequent six 
months, write-off finns continued to experience negative industry-adjusted stock per-
fonnance. The write-offs also appeared to trigger downward revisions in analysts' expec-
tations regarding the write-off finns. Overall, Elliott and Shaw ( 1988) find no evidence to 
suggest that write-offs are either expected or perceived as "good news" by investors; 
rather, they "occur during a period of sustained economic difficulty". 886 
In their analysis of 77 write-offs taken during the period 1981-83, Zucca and Campbell 
(l 992) find no significant stock price response to the write-off announcements. 887 An 
examination of several perfonnance measures during the six years centered on the write-
off leads the authors to conclude that write-offs are not "a precursor of improved finan-
cial health" due to "big bath"-type improvement projects with which write-off finns in-
883 See Strong and Meyer (1987, p. 660). 
884 See Elliott and Shaw (I 988, pp. 104-5). 
885 See Elliott and Shaw (I 988, pp. 105-7). 
886 Elliott and Shaw (1988, p. 114). 
887 See Zucca and Campbell (1992, p. 36). This finding might be associated with the fact that the 
announcement period was very long (120 days). 
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tend to strengthen their future prospects; instead, they appear to indicate economic prob-
lems. 888 
Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) analyze 507 write-off announcements disclosed dur-
ing the period 1989-92. 889 On average, they find negative market reactions to these 
events. 890 However, reactions vary with the type of write-off under scrutiny. Non-
discretionary write-offs of inventory are viewed negatively, while restructuring-type 
charges trigger a positive response. Write-offs of goodwill and PP&E, in contrast, are 
perceived neutrally. 891 The authors conclude that, "on average, investors' response is 
driven more by write-offs revealing information about asset impairments than by write-
offs conveying positive signals about future performance. "892 
Buns is' ( 1997) study is designed as an explicit test of the above notion that investors' 
reactions to write-off announcements depend on the signal conveyed. Examining 207 
write-offs made during the period 1983-89, he finds that write-offs suggesting increases 
(decreases) in future cash flows are associated with positive (negative) market-adjusted 
stock returns. The extent of these responses also increases in the amount written off. The 
author concludes that "the stock price reaction to write-off announcements is associated 
with the expected cash flow implications of the events surrounding the write-off."893 
In their study of 373 write-off announcements disclosed during the period 1984-85, Bar-
tov, Lindahl and Ricks (1998) make a similar distinction between pure accounting events 
and write-offs suggestive of changes in firm operations. 894 They report that the first cate-
gory of write-offs trigger a marginally significant negative response in terms of risk-
adjusted returns, while the second group is associated with significantly positive reac-
tions. 895 Furthermore, they provide evidence that market participants either expect part of 
the write-offs or postpone their reaction until more detailed information about the reasons 
behind the write-offs is available. 
888 Zucca and Campbell (1992, p. 41). 
889 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (I 996, p. 128). 
890 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, pp. 129-31). 
891 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (I 996, pp. 131-3). 
892 Francis, Hanna and Vincent (I 996, p. 134). 
893 Bunsis (1997, p. 1398). 
894 See Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks (1998, pp. 335-7). 
R95 See Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks (1998, p. 328). 
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In a similar vein, Chaney, Hogan and Jeter (2000) analyze market responses to 128 re-
structuring charges taken in the period 1990-92. These charges represent either asset 
write-offs or severance payments and other cash outflows. 896 The authors find that asset 
write-offs do not, on average, result in significant stock price reactions. The market reac-
tion to severance and other cash charges depends on whether the firm had experienced 
prior losses or changes in management. A combination of the two components does not 
result in significant stock price responses. The authors conclude that, "on average, the 
nature and context of restructuring charges are important to ... users in formulating their 
responses to the charges. "897 
In a recent comparative study of SF AS 142 versus SF AS 121 goodwill write-offs, Segal 
(2003) examines stock price reactions to the unexpected portion of 177 write-offs an-
nounced during the period October 2001 through June 2002.898 He expects markets reac-
tions to be more negative for SFAS 142 write-offs, since these are expected to be more 
strongly associated with economic factors as opposed to earnings management incen-
tives. 899 Regarding both types of write-offs, Segal (2003) finds negative reactions that are 
only marginally significant, with no significant differences discernable between the re-
gimes. 900 
Overall, the evidence presented here appears to be consistent with the notion that inves-
tors ' reactions to write-off announcements depend on the information conveyed and on 
the extent to which these events were anticipated at the time they are announced. This 
finding implies an interesting new aspect of management's financial reporting discretion: 
Regardless of the "true" reasons behind a write-off, management might be able to control 
the market response to this event by voluntarily disclosing the write-off and carefully 
phrasing the accompanying announcement. In that way, asset impairments might be 
passed off as good news to an investing public suffering from information asymmetries. 
3.4.3.2 Association studies 
Elliott and Hanna (1996) investigate the valuation implications of repeated asset write-
offs. They analyze 6,073 write-offs recorded by 2,761 firms in the period 1975-94, where 
896 See Chaney, Hogan and Jeter (2000, pp. 7-8). 
897 Chaney, Hogan and Jeter (2000, p. 22). 
898 Segal (2003, p. 23) estimates the expected write-off amount by applying market-based and residual-
income valuation models, which might introduce measurement error into that variable. 
899 See Segal (2003, p. 19). 
900 See Segal (2003, pp. 27-8). 
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write-offs are defined as negative special items in excess of l % of total assets. The au-
thors document that the association of earnings (before special items) and special items 
with stock returns becomes less significant when several write-offs occur in sequence. 
Apparently, a series of write-offs impairs investors' ability to discern permanent and 
transitory components of firms' earnings.901 Similarly, Burgstahler, Jiambalvo and Shev-
lin (2002) report that stock prices do not fully reflect the implications of special items for 
future earnings. 902 
Heflin and Warfield (1997) investigate 845 write-offs taken in the period 1985-91 in or-
der to assess whether asset write-offs occur in a timely manner and whether they are in-
tentionally overstated to improve earnings subsequent to the write-off. 903 Their examina-
tion of stock price and accounting performance during seven years centered on the write-
off suggests that firms delay write-offs until a year where earnings are poor irrespective 
of the write-off. They report that write-offs, on average, lag downward developments in 
stock performance as well as accounting performance by several periods. Also, write-offs 
appear to be overstated. 
In the context of their information content study summarized above, Bartov, Lindahl and 
Ricks (1998) also analyze the longer-term association of write-offs and stock prices. 
Since short-term reactions to large write-offs are found to be unexpectedly small, the 
authors are interested whether the write-offs are preempted by other information or 
whether investors initially under-react to them, adjusting their expectations in the post-
announcement period as more background information becomes available.904 They find 
that write-offs are generally preceded by significant stock price declines as long as two 
years before the announcement. This development continues during the post-write-off 
year. Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks (1998) conclude that, "while the market might partially 
anticipate the write-off announcements, it fails to fully incorporate all the value-relevant 
information into stock prices on a timely basis."905 
Based on the notion that asset write-offs should realign the book value of assets with the 
future economic benefits associated with those assets, Comprix (2000) analyzes the 
valuation of assets surrounding write-offs. He argues that, if asset write-offs are eco-
901 See Elliott and Hanna(l996, p. 154). 
902 Also, refer to section 3.3.2.4.8 above. 
903 See Heflin and Warfield (1997, p. I). 
904 See Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks (1998, p. 328). 
905 Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks (1998, p. 329). 
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nomically meaningful, they are equal to the difference between the book value of an im-
paired asset and its fair value. Consequently, if an asset write-off aligns the asset's book 
value closer with its fair value, the resulting new book value should be more useful to 
investors than before. Accordingly, Comprix (2000) predicts that the value relevance to 
investors of non-impaired assets is different from that of the pre-write-off amounts of 
impaired assets.906 From this assumption, he derives his main hypothesis that the book 
value and value relevance of impaired and non-impaired asset should converge subse-
quent to a write-off announcement.907 In this association study, the author finds that the 
pre-write-off book values of impaired assets had a significantly weaker association with 
stock prices than did the book values of non-impaired assets. This difference in coeffi-
cients is largely removed subsequent to the write-off, which the author interprets as evi-
dence that write-offs align book values and fair values, making financial statement data 
more relevant to investors.908 
Deng and Lev (1998) investigate acquiring firms' practice to immediately write off to 
earnings the fair values of in-process R&D costs acquired in a business combination.909 
Finding that investors reverse the immediate write-off of in-process R&D when pricing 
both earnings and asset values, they conclude that such R&D activities are value relevant 
to investors. 910 
Riedl (2002) compares the timeliness of asset write-offs under the pre-SFAS 121 versus 
SFAS 121 financial reporting regimes. However, write-offs do not appear to be related to 
contemporaneous or lagged stock retums.911 In that sense, Riedl's (2002) results do not 
unambiguously show whether write-offs are taken in a timely manner or whether the 
timeliness of write-offs differs between the two regimes.912 
906 See Comprix (2000, pp. 2-3). 
907 See Comprix (2000, pp. 2-3). Comprix further investigates whether and to what extent investors an-
ticipate write-offs. Consistent with economic factors causing the write-off (refer to section 3.3.2.2 
above), he argues that it will to some extent lag the economic event( s) that caused the impairment. 
See Comprix (2000, p. 3). 
908 See Comprix (2000, pp. 23, 26). 
909 This procedure is required by FASB Interpretation (FIN) 4, Applicability of FASB Statement No. 2 to 
Business Combinations Accounted for by the Purchase Method -An interpretation of FASB Statement 
No. 2. 
910 See Deng and Lev (I 998, p. 5). 
911 See Riedl (2002, p. 28). 
912 See Riedl (2002, p. 3). 
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The study of asset revaluations conducted by Easton, Eddey and Harris (1993) is not ex-
plicitly considered here because, while the authors do include downward revaluations, 
i.e. write-offs, in their analysis, the incidence of such write-offs is very infrequent.913 
3.5 Summary and implications 
The research reviewed in this chapter has documented that asset write-offs represent ac-
counting events that have substantial effects on companies' financial statements. Fre-
quently, they relate to assets for which market values are not readily observed and appli-
cable accounting guidance, if available, involves considerable judgment and subjectivity. 
These characteristics make discretionary asset write-offs interesting earnings manage-
ment instruments as well as promising objects of empirical research.914 
Empirical research regarding the determinants of discretionary asset write-offs suggests 
that such charges frequently coincide with declining stock performance of the write-off 
firm and, occasionally, its industry. To a lesser extent, accounting performance and mac-
roeconomic factors appear to be related to write-offs. These relations are comparatively 
stable across different accounting regimes and time periods. Despite assertions that dis-
cretionary asset write-offs are primarily used to manipulate the financial statements, the 
evidence strongly suggests that firms record such charges during periods of poor per-
formance. However, extant research has been criticized with respect to the validity of the 
variables used to capture economic developments behind write-offs. Where such vari-
ables are not modeled after the actual impairment test prescribed in the relevant account-
ing guidance, the interpretation of reported findings is open to debate. Consequently, 
emphasis will be placed in chapter 5 on selecting economic-factors variables that ade-
quately depict, to the extent possible, the impairment testing procedure set down in SF AS 
142.915 
Financial reporting incentives also seem to play an important role in the write-off deci-
sion and the amount written off. Among the economic-consequences incentives, compen-
sation considerations appear to be consistent with both accelerated write-offs in order to 
shelter future bonuses as well as delayed write-offs, aimed at smoothing the income 
913 For a review of this paper, refer to Alciatore et al. (1998, p. 16). 
9 14 For example, Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 127) predict and find that "the importance of 
incentives in explaining write-offs depends on the existence of both independent sources of informa-
tion for measuring impairment and authoritative guidance on when such impairment must be recog-
nized." 
915 Refer to section 5.2.2 below. 
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stream. In most cases, the variables used are not derived from actual compensation 
agreements; a fact that makes their interpretation difficult. The same is true for evidence 
on the debt covenant hypothesis, where the DTE ratio is largely relied upon as a proxy 
for the restrictiveness of actual covenants. Overall, evidence on the association of discre-
tionary asset write-offs and economic-consequences incentives is inconsistent at best.916 
This result is not surprising: Applying economic-consequences hypotheses to discretion-
ary asset write-off behavior is especially difficult because the extent to which such non-
recurring charges are allowed to affect the outcomes of accounting-based contracts is 
largely unclear, a priori, not only to the researcher, but possibly also to investors and 
even management. This caveat applies particularly to the SFAS 142 setting investigated 
here. Therefore, formulating hypotheses regarding managements' contracting-induced 
behavior must rely on prior research findings as well as economic reasoning regarding 
the strategic implications of transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offbehavior.917 
Capital market-related financial reporting incentives have long been ignored since they 
are not easily derived when the EMH is assumed to hold. However, such incentives have 
recently been found to account for financial reporting behavior that economic-
consequences incentives have failed to explain. Thereby, recent research has increasingly 
acknowledged that theoretically and empirically irrelevant financial reporting decisions 
might nonetheless be made as long as decisions-making managers believe that they will 
have an effect.918 Anecdotal evidence suggests that managers pursue a number of finan-
cial reporting strategies aimed at influencing capital market participants' perceptions. 
Some of these strategies have been found to be behind discretionary asset write-offs. For 
example, such charges have sporadically been related to income-smoothing behavior. 
Although the broader earnings management literature documented overwhelming evi-
dence that firms manage earnings to achieve certain targets, this notion has not played 
much of a role in the discretionary asset write-off research to date. However, the strategic 
implications (for future earnings) of such charges as well as the fact that investors might 
view them differently from other, more permanent earnings components suggests a vi-
916 In addition, even where such associations are found, inferences that manipulative earnings manage-
ment is behind the findings might be misguided. Refer to section 3.3.2.3.6 above. A notable excep-
tion, the political costs hypothesis is not usually tested in the discretionary asset write-off research. 
917 Refer to section 5.2.3.1 below. 
918 See Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001 , p. 260). In tum, these beliefs held by management might be influ-
enced by theories about how capital markets work as well as by, for example, the financial press. Ul-
timately, the existence of financial reporting decisions aimed at "manipulating" capital market percep-
tions rests on the joint hypothesis that (I) management has a stake in firm value, and (2) believes that 
financial reporting decisions will affect firm value. 
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able avenue to be explored in this dissertation. In section 5.2.3.2.1 below, it is argued that 
the transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off behavior is influenced by management's 
interest in achieving future earnings targets. Due to their income-decreasing nature and 
their possible association with profit-enhancing corporate restructurings, discretionary 
asset write-offs uniquely lend themselves to being taken in the context of a "big bath"-
type financial reporting strategy. Perhaps the most persistent finding in extant research is 
that write-offs are taken subsequent to changes in top management positions. While this 
result might be explained by new executives doing their job of tenninating unprofitable 
lines of business, it is equally consistent with "big bath" behavior to signal an impending 
turnaround to investors. 
Interested in the way investors actually perceive discretionary asset write-offs, extant 
research has documented convincingly that investors' reactions to write-off announce-
ments depend on the infonnation conveyed in the write-off announcement. Write-offs 
were frequently anticipated by investors and contributed to the alignment of book values 
and fair values. If they occurred unexpectedly, the market regularly punished write-off 
firms, except where the charges appeared to be part of an overall restructuring. 
Although the research findings discussed in this chapter allow inferences to be drawn 
regarding managers' transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off behavior, the particular 
circumstances of this setting imply that these prior hypotheses cannot be adopted without 
modification. As noted by Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) and discussed in chapter 2 
above, the goodwill asset has specific characteristics that distinguish it from other assets. 
Furthennore, the fact that transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs are presented "be-
low the line" as an accounting change might alter the way managers expect those charges 
to influence contractual outcomes and investors' perceptions. Furthennore, the specific 
discretionary parameters inherent in SF AS 142 must be taken into consideration in order 
to model adequately this financial reporting decision.919 In section 5.2 below, testable 
predictions incorporating these aspects are derived. 
919 A detailed analysis of these parameters is provided in chapter 4 below. 
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4 Discretionary properties of the impairment-only approach 
4.1 Chapter overview 
Detecting earnings management behavior is most likely to be successful when focusing 
on accounting items involving a high degree of discretion. In this sort of setting, earnings 
management behavior is relatively low-cost and therefore more likely to be observed. 
Such behavior is unlikely to be penalized, since management can argue that a given fi-
nancial reporting decision is within the bounds of the authoritative literature. 920 For that 
reason, it can be expected that accounts with a high discretionary component will be most 
frequently used to achieve managers' financial reporting objectives. In a review of re-
search design issues related to earnings management studies, McNichols (2000) suggests 
that future progress in this area is likely to come from studies of specific accruals, rather 
than from studies using aggregate accruals models.921 Elliott and Shaw (1988) perceive 
that material, separately disclosed asset write-offs involve "greater discretion as to their 
magnitude and timing" than other types of accruals.922 Consequently, they examine the 
relations between material write-offs, underlying economic events, and the goals of man-
agement regarding financial disclosures. For the same reason, Riedl (2002) argues that 
SF AS 142 write-offs are an adequate setting for an earnings management study. 923 
Contrary to the FASB's reasoning, critics ofSFAS 142 argue that-especially due to the 
replacement of goodwill amortization by an impairment-only approach - this standard 
affords management unprecedented discretionary freedom regarding the accounting for 
goodwill.924 Empirical research has addressed the question whether discretion increased 
or decreased as a result of the new standard. Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002) argue in 
920 Refer to section 3.3 .2.5 above. 
921 See McNichols (2000, pp. 337-9). 
922 Elliott and Shaw (1988, p. 92). See also Marquardt and Wiedman (2002). 
923 See Riedl (2002, p. 4). See also Moehrle (2002, p. 399), who cites similar reasons for his conjecture 
that restructuring charges and subsequent reversals of such charges are a likely object of earnings 
management. 
924 See Brecht (2002, pp. 212-8), Busse von Colbe (2001a), Busse von Colbe et al. (2003, p. 248), Gentz 
and Kauffmann (2003, pp. 81-93), Hitz and Kuhner (2002, p. 286), Hommel (2001 a, p. 809), Hommel 
(200 I b, p. 1948), Hutten and Lorson (2002, pp. 31-2), IDW (200 I), Janschek (2002, pp. 15-6), Kahle 
(2002b, p. 902), Kilting, Weber and Wirth (2002, pp. 65-6), Kilting, Weber and Wirth (2001, pp. 196-
8), Kilting and Koch (2003, p. 54), Lilckmann (2001), Pejic and BuschhUter (2001, pp. 111-2), Pellens 
and Sellhorn (2002a, p. 114), Pellens and Sellhorn (2002b), Pellens and Sellhorn (2001a, pp. 1685-6), 
Pellens and Sellhorn (2001b, p. 720), Pfeil and Vater (2002a, pp. 78-9), Pfeil and Vater (2002b, p. 
588), Richter (2004), and Stauber and Ketterle (2001, p. 961). For the notion that this substantial dis-
cretion makes these rules difficult to audit, refer to Ruhnke (2003) and Schurbohm and Ganssauge 
(2003). Articles focusing explicitly on the discretionary elements inherent in SFAS 142 include Har-
ing (2002) and Pfeil and Vater (2002c). 
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favor of a decrease in discretion compared to the pre-SF AS 142 regime.925 Similar find-
ings are reported by Segal (2003).926 In the empirical study presented in chapter 5, the 
focus is placed on one specific accrual: Transitional goodwill write-offs under SFAS 142. 
This choice of research object is based on the notion that this is an exemplar of a discre-
tionary accrual, particularly in the period of transition. Much of this chapter is dedicated 
to substantiating the notion that the subjective elements inherent in the new standards 
afford management a high degree of discretion with regard to goodwill write-off behav-
ior. 
While measuring the degree of discretion associated with a given account is a difficult 
task, a detailed understanding of the applicable accounting guidance and the financial 
reporting process allows an assessment of the managerial flexibility involved.927 There-
fore, this chapter provides a detailed analysis of the provisions in SFAS 142 and other 
relevant standards as they relate to the transitional goodwill impairment test.928 Subse-
quent to a brief introduction of the new standards' main provisions (section 4.2), it seems 
appropriate to organize the following detailed analysis of discretionary elements around 
these issues:929 
1. Frequency - How frequently is goodwill tested for impairment and what are the oc-
casions that trigger a goodwill impairment test (section 4.3)? 
2. Level of aggregation - What is the level of aggregation at which goodwill is allocated 
to sub units of the reporting entity for impairment testing (section 4.4)? 
3. Existence - How is the existence of impairment determined (section 4.5)? 
925 See Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002, p. I). 
926 See Segal (2003, pp. 8-9). 
927 See Schipper ( I 989, p. 100). 
928 For a brief overview of SFAS 142, see also Jennings, LeClere and Thompson (2001 , pp. 21-2), Segal 
(2003, pp. 9-11), and most of the articles cited in fn. 924 above. 
929 Riedl (2002, p. 5) uses a similar approach in his analysis of SF AS 121. This chapter is not intended to 
provide a detailed discussion of all the provisions in SFAS 142, let alone SFAS 141. A thorough 
analysis of a given rule is conditional on the extent to which that rule is relevant to goodwill write-off 
behavior, i.e. the existence, amount, and timing of any goodwill impairment loss. See SF AS 141.61. 
Equity method goodwill is also not considered here since it is not subject to the SFAS 142 goodwill 
impairment test. Instead, starting with the firm's adoption of SFAS 142 it is no longer amortized 
(SFAS 142.59), and reviewed for impairment in accordance with APB Opinion 18, The Equity 
Method of Accounting for Investments in Common Stock. See SFAS 142.40, which refers to APB 
Opinion 18.19 lit. h. Further, issues of initial recognition and measurement of goodwill under SFAS 
141, including those related to determining the cost of the acquired entity (SFAS 141.20-34) and to 
allocating the cost of the acquired entity to assets acquired and liabilities assumed (SFAS 141.35-46) 
are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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4. Measurement - How is the amount of an impairment loss measured, if any (section 
4.6)? 
5. Transition - How is the transition from an amortization approach to an impairment-
only approach organized (section 4.7)?930 
A summary of implications of this analysis and a discussion of factors that potentially 
limit management's financial reporting discretion in the adoption year conclude this 
chapter in section 4.8. 
4.2 MainprovisionsofSFAS 141 and 142 
SFAS 142 took effect for fiscal years beginning on or after December 15, 2001.931 The 
beginning of the fiscal year was designated to be the date of initial application. Given 
that most public U.S. firms are calendar-year firms, 932 most entities initially applied 
SFAS 142 as of January 1, 2002. In other words, these firms had to use the information 
available to them as of January 1, 2002, to make the transitional SFAS 142 goodwill 
write-off decision and determine the amount, if any, to write off. The provisions that deal 
with the accounting for goodwill are codified in SFAS 142.18-40. 
Goodwill amortization is eliminated in favor of what has come to be called an impair-
ment-only or non-amortization933 approach.934 That is, goodwill is to be tested for im-
pairment at least annually at a level of reporting referred to as a reporting unit.935 The 
F ASB was reluctant to abandon goodwill amortization although it agreed that "straight-
line amortization of goodwill over an arbitrary period does not reflect economic reality 
and thus does not provide useful information".936 However, board members' willingness 
to consider a non-amortization approach was contingent on the possibility of developing 
930 The discussion of transition provisions includes issues of financial statement presentation that are 
argued here to be specifically influential on goodwill write-off behavior in the year of transition. 
931 SFAS 142.48a. Early adoption was permitted for firms with fiscal years beginning after March 15, 
2001, except when the first interim financial statements for the fiscal years had already been issued. 
With that provision, the FASB intended to ensure that early adopters would not switch to SFAS 142 
half-way through an annual financial reporting period. Retroactive application was not permitted. 
932 Out of I 1,764 public firms included in the COMPUSTAT industrial annual database, 7,776 (66%) 
were calendar-year firms as of June 2002. 
933 See Busse von Colbe (2001c). 
934 Regardless of whether acquired before or after adoption of SF AS 142, amortization is prohibited for 
all of goodwill, starting with the date ofadoption (SF AS 142.50). 
9ll See SFAS 142.18. 
936 SFAS 142.879. 
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a conceptually sound impainnent test that would be rigorous enough to detect a decline 
in value. The two-step impainnent testing procedure laid down in SFAS 142.19-25 is 
considered by the FASB to possess these qualities.937 Its mechanics are summarized in 
Figure 11 :938 
Step 1: Is goodwill impaired? 
~-R~ep_o_rt_in~g _un_it_fa_ir_v_a_lu_e ~I < Reporting unij net assets at carrying value 
(including goodwill) 
Step 2: Amount of goodwill impairment loss 
Carrying value of goodwill I _ I Implied fair value of goodwill 
~
•If.no•. no further steps are required. 
Reporting unit 
fair value 
Figure 11: Goodwill impairment test procedure 
Reporting unit net 
assets at fair value 
(w/o goodwill) 
The first step deals with the issue of recognition. It is used to identify a potential impair-
ment by comparing the fair value of a reporting unit with its carrying amount, including 
goodwill.939 The second step measures the amount of any goodwill impainnent loss. It is 
"triggered" only when the first step indicates that reporting unit fair value is lower than 
its carrying amount, indicating that the goodwill assigned to the reporting unit under 
scrutiny might be impaired. The amount of any impairment loss is measured by weighing 
the implied fair value of goodwill against its carrying amount.940 
The implied fair value of goodwill is a construct that accounts for the fact that goodwill 
cannot be measured separately since it does not exist apart from other assets. It is meas-
ured under the fiction that the reporting unit to which goodwill has been allocated is pur-
chased at the date of the impainnent test, with the purchase price being the reporting 
unit's fair value.941 Allocating that notional purchase price to the fair value of the report-
ing unit's net assets (excluding goodwill) yields the implied fair value of goodwill, the 
937 See SFAS 142.B95-100. 
938 For details, refer to sections 4.5 and 4.6 below. 
939 See SFAS 142.19. 
940 See SFAS 142.20. 
941 See SFAS 142.21. 
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residual. The goodwill impairment loss, if any, is the amount by which the carrying 
amount of goodwill exceeds its implied fair value. Consistent with other U.S. GAAP 
pronouncements, any impairment loss, once its measurement is completed, cannot be 
reversed. 942 
Any impairment loss resulting from initial application of SF AS 142 as of the transition 
date is to be presented in the financial statements as the effect of a change in accounting 
principle. 943 In contrast, regular impairment losses incurred after the initial impairment 
test has been completed are to be presented as a separate line item in the income state-
ment as a component of income from continuing operations.944 
4. 3 Frequency 
"Goodwill of reporting unit shall be tested for impairment on an annual basis and be-
tween annual tests in certain circumstances".945 In this section, the discretionary parame-
ters associated with the choice of annual test date and with the interpretation of impair-
ment indicators are discussed. 
4.3.1 Annual testing 
4.3.1.1 Rule 
The requirement of an annual test is rather straightforward and does not at first sight 
seem to give management any discretionary freedom. However, the annual impairment 
test may be conducted at any time during the fiscal year, and a different test date may be 
chosen for each reporting unit.946 The transition provisions, discussed at length in section 
4.7.2 below, require the transitional impairment test to be conducted as of the first of the 
year of initial application. Consequently, the first regular annual test must also be carried 
out within this first year, implying that two goodwill impairment tests must be conducted 
for each reporting unit within the transition year. This obligation to perform two parallel 
942 See SFAS 142.20. This principle applies to most assets accounted for under U. S. GAAP. See Kieso, 
Weygandt and Warfield (2001, p. 564). 
943 See SFAS 142.56. 
944 See SFAS 142.43 . Exempt from this rule are impairment losses associated with discontinued opera-
tions. 
945 SFAS 142.26. The FASB had originally proposed a so-called "events-and-circumstances approach" 
that did not require annual testing but relied on triggering events alone. See SF AS 142.B 137. 
946 See SFAS 142.26. However, once chosen, the test dates for the different reporting units must remain 
fixed for each reporting unit in subsequent periods. 
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tests is only waived if the designated annual testing date for a reporting unit is the first of 
the year.947 
Since firms are free to define arbitrary test dates for each reporting unit, management has 
the opportunity to strategically choose impairment test dates consistent with their finan-
cial reporting objectives. Assume that management's financial reporting strategy is to 
shift income from future periods to the present by avoiding/delaying/understating good-
will impairment losses. In this case, goodwill associated with reporting units that operate 
in seasonal industries are likely to be tested during a time of year when reporting unit fair 
value is highest, e.g. at the beginning of a cyclical high.948 Conversely, if management 
intends to shift income from the present into future periods by re-
cording/accelerating/overstating goodwill impairment losses, impairment test dates will 
be chosen to minimize reporting unit fair values. However, to the extent that financial 
reporting strategies change over time, the requirement to hold test dates constant in sub-
sequent periods in effect limits management's discretion.949 
4.3.1.2 Exception 
SFAS 142 provides one exception to the annual testing rule: According to SFAS 142.27, 
the determination of reporting unit fair value can be carried forward from the previous 
goodwill impairment test under certain circumstances: First, the assets and liabilities that 
comprise the reporting unit "have not changed significantly" since reporting unit fair 
value was last determined. 950 Recent significant acquisitions or reorganizations of the 
segment reporting structure are given as examples of events that might lead to such a 
significant change. However, since only these two examples are given, management will 
possibly be justified in arguing that this first criterion is met whenever major acquisitions 
or reorganizations have not recently occurred. Further, the Board let it suffice to state that 
these events "might" significantly change a reporting unit's composition. This implies 
that there is elbowroom for management to argue that, under specific circumstances, a 
reporting unit has remained unchanged although a major acquisition and/or reorganiza-
947 See SFAS 142.58. 
948 It could be argued that, given an infinite forecasting period, the date at which reporting unit fair vale 
is measured does not make a difference. However, in practice forecasting periods are usually shorter 
and terminal value is not necessarily defined as a perpetuity. Also, where reporting unit fair value is 
not measured as the present value of future cash flows, the timing of the measurement is likely to be 
relevant. 
949 Refer to section 3.3.2.5 above. 
950 See SF AS 142.27 lit a. 
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tion has recently taken place. Aided by such reasoning, management might be able to 
sidestep the testing requirement altogether in some years. 
Second, when reporting unit fair value was determined in detail last time, it exceeded the 
reporting unit's carrying amount (including the carrying amount of the reporting unit's 
goodwill) "by a substantial margin".951 It is not at all clear what constitutes a substantial 
margin. Given the potential sensitivity of reporting unit fair value, determined based on 
either quoted market price or some valuation method,952 to changes in circumstances or 
valuation assumptions, it is likely that even a relatively large difference between report-
ing unit fair value and reporting unit carrying value may erode within a year's time. 
Therefore, the third criterion requires that an analysis of events and changes in circum-
stances since the last determination of reporting unit fair value be conducted. Based on 
this analysis, the likelihood that the current reporting unit fair value is less than the carry-
ing amount must be remote. According to SFAS 5, Accounting for Contingencies, the 
term "remote" implies that the "chance of the future event or events occurring is 
slight." 953 Application of this criterion inherently calls for management's subjective 
judgment regarding the occurrence probability of some event.954 
In summary, SFAS 142.27 gives management the option to avoid the annual goodwill 
impairment test. The condition is that management successfully argues that there is no 
evidence to suggest that reporting unit fair value has declined below carrying amount 
since the last time both were determined and compared with each other. If so inclined, 
management can assert a certain minimum reporting unit fair value without actually 
measuring it, provided that three criteria are met. These criteria rely heavily on ill-
specified terms such as "significant", "substantial", and "remote". While remote is ar-
guably the most clear-cut of these terms, a great deal of discretion remains when man-
agement is required to apply it to real-life circumstances in order to make a likelihood 
assessment. This is even truer for the other two expressions, as is discussed in more detail 
below. 
951 SFAS 142.27 lit b. 
952 Refer to section 4.5.1. 
953 SFAS 5.3 lit. c. See also SFAS 90, Regulated Enterprises-Accounting for Abandonments and Disal-
/owances of Plant Costs-an amendment of F ASB Statement No. 7 I, par. 9 lit. a, SF AS 114, Account-
ing by Creditors/or Impairment of a Loan, par. 10, and SFAS 133.464. 
954 For a fundamental discussion of the use of probability assessments in financial reporting, albeit in an 
!AS context, refer to LUdenbach and Hoffmann (2003). 
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4.3.2 Unscheduled testing when circumstances warrant 
Since a fixed test date each reporting period might preclude timely reporting when eco-
nomic circumstances change, SF AS 142.28 provides a non-exhaustive list of impairment 
indicators:955 These events and changes in circumstances that would more likely than not 
reduce reporting unit fair value below its carrying amount trigger additional impairment 
tests.956 As shown below, most of these indicators are inherently subjective, in effect 
providing management with the opportunity to either actively seek or avoid additional, 
unscheduled impairment tests, depending on the financial reporting strategy pursued. 
The first indicator is a "significant adverse change in legal factors or in the business cli-
mate". 957 The term "significant" is not defined in the context of SF AS 142. Thus, various 
perceptions are likely to exist regarding exactly what constitutes that type of event.958 
The term "significant", in contrast to the admittedly vague but well-understood financial 
accounting concept of materiality, 959 is used throughout the F ASB' s statements in a 
rather casual and not strictly defined manner. Two examples will demonstrate this: A 
reference to the term "significant" under U. S. GAAP is found in APB Opinion 18.17. 
The equity method of accounting is to be applied to an investment that gives the investor 
"the ability to exercise significant influence over operating and financial policies of an 
investee". The Board recognized that "determining the ability of an investor to exercise 
such influence is not always clear and applying judgment is necessary". Therefore, it 
established the rebuttable presumption that significant influence can be exercised when 
the investor controls between 20 and 50% of the investee's voting stock. Another refer-
ence to the term "significant" is found in SFAS 95, Statement of Cash Flows, where cer-
tain "significant noncash transactions" are to be omitted from the body of the statement 
and instead disclosed in the notes. 960 Existing does not provide sufficient guidance to 
strip the term "significant" of excessive subjectivity. 961 
955 See SFAS 142.B138. 
956 Unscheduled impairment tests are also required in the period of initial application (SF AS 142.57). 
957 SF AS 142.28 lit a. 
958 Likewise, it is not clear how large a "portion of a reporting unit" or an "asset group within a reporting 
unit" must be in order to be deemed significant in the context of SF AS 142.28 lit. e and f, and by what 
criteria the size of a reporting unit is to be measured. 
959 Refer to SFAC 2.123-132. See also Pe liens (200 I, p. 142). 
960 See SFAS 95.32 and Kieso, Weygandt and Warfield (2001, pp. 1336-7). 
961 
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According to SF AS 142.28 lit. e, a "more-likely-than-not expectation" that a (significant 
portion of a) reporting unit will be disposed of triggers an unscheduled impairment test. 
According to SFAS 109, Accounting for Income Taxes, the term more likely than not 
implies "a likelihood of more than 50 percent". 962 Although this definition seems, at first 
sight, to imply a relatively fixed cut-off point, the criterion is very open to management 
preferences since the likelihood of disposal is primarily determined by management's 
intent. Furthermore, deciding whether some future event is more likely than not to occur 
is much vaguer than applying criteria such as "remote"963 that lean towards one end of 
the likelihood range. A clear judgment is only possible where the likelihood is either very 
small or very large, and a gray area exists in the center of the range. 
Equally subjective are the following questions, to name but a few: When is competition 
"unexpected"?964 What constitutes "key" personnel?965 These questions cannot be an-
swered without intimate knowledge of a company's business, and decisions based on 
them are therefore inherently difficult to verify. They demonstrate that management has 
the opportunity to exploit the information asymmetry that exists in its favor in judging 
whether or not an unscheduled impairment test is called for. 
The two secondary criteria in SFAS 142.28 lit. f and g require an unscheduled impair-
ment test under the condition that other financial reporting events have occurred else-
where within the reporting entity. These criteria shift the discretion to the decision mak-
ers responsible for determining whether or not a significant asset group within a reporting 
unit is tested for impairment under SF AS 144966 or a goodwill impairment loss is recog-
nized in the separate financial statements of a subsidiary that is a component of a report-
ing unit. SF AS 144 contains a high degree of management flexibility in its own right, 
which, by this mechanism, is perpetuated for the purpose of applying SF AS 142.28 lit. f. 
An unscheduled impairment test is only required when it is more likely than not that re-
porting unit fair value is reduced below its carrying amount because of the presence of 
one or more impairment indicators. The wording in SFAS 142.28 is somewhat ambigu-
962 SFAS 109.17 lit. e, 97. 
963 SFAS 5.3 lit. c: "Remote. The chance of the future event or events occurring is slight." (Emphasis in 
original.) 
964 SFAS 142.28 lit. c. 
965 SFAS 142.28 lit. d. 
966 SFAS 144 superseded SFAS 121 for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2001. 
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ous,967 and allows different interpretations: First, one alternative is that the presence of 
any one of these indicators in itself is sufficient to assume that reporting unit fair value is 
more likely than not reduced below its carrying amount. Stated differently, under the first 
interpretation, the tenn "impainnent indicator" means an event or change in circum-
stances that more likely than not reduces reporting unit fair value below its carrying 
amount. In that case, discretion does not go beyond that already described above. Im-
pairment indicators would trigger an unscheduled impairment test regardless of how high 
reporting unit fair value was before the impairment indicator occurred. 
Second, another reading would imply that management is not only required to determine 
whether these indicators are present, but also to judge the extent to which their presence 
is likely to influence reporting unit fair value. This interpretation suggests that an "im-
pairment indicator" is an event or change in circumstances that might or might not be 
more likely than not to reduce reporting unit fair value below its carrying amount. The 
discretion inherent in the "more-likely-than-not" condition, which is invoked again here, 
has been discussed above. Determining the likelihood of a reduction of reporting unit fair 
value below its carrying amount also requires some preconception regarding how high 
reporting unit fair value was before the event or change in circumstances occurred. The 
obligation to conduct unscheduled impairment tests would mainly hinge on manage-
ment's estimate of reporting unit fair value before that value had actually been meas-
ured.968 This "second-guessing" about the likelihood of impairment has been a powerful 
argument against an "events-and-circumstances approach" to goodwill impairment test-
ing, under which impairment tests would not have been required annually but only in the 
presence of impainnent indicators. 969 
Since the list contained in SFAS 142.28 is non-exhaustive, management is free to find 
additional impairment indicators that it thinks are more likely than not to have reduced 
reporting unit fair value below its carrying amount. To the extent that timely/accelerated 
recognition of goodwill impairment losses is consistent with management's financial 
reporting strategy, management has incentive to adduce events and circumstances other 
than those listed as impairment indicators. Overall, while some discretion exists in the 
context of impairment indicators, the effect of this discretion on goodwill write-off be-
967 SFAS 142.28: "Goodwill ofa reporting unit shall be tested for impairment between annual tests ifan 
event occurs or circumstances change that would more likely than not reduce the fair value of a re-
porting unit below its carrying amount. Examples of such events or circumstances include .. . " (em-
phasis added). 
968 The problem is similar to that discussed in section 4.3.1 .2. 
969 See SFAS 142.8140. 
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havior is not very severe since SFAS 142.26 ensures that impairment tests are conducted 
annually, regardless of the presence of impairment indicators. The discretion inherent in 
the frequency provisions can mainly be exploited to accelerate goodwill impairment 
losses, if desired. The notable exception is the provision in SFAS 142.27, which enables 
management to avoid the goodwill impairment test altogether when certain criteria are 
met. 
4. 4 Level of aggregation 
The level of aggregation on which goodwill impairment tests are conducted allows 
management to influence the likelihood that any goodwill impairment will be detected in 
step one of the impairment test. According to SFAS 142.18, goodwill shall be tested for 
impairment at a level of reporting referred to as a reporting unit. As shown in Figure 12 
and explained in more detail below, a reporting unit is either an operating segment 
according to par. IO of SF AS 131, Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and 
Related Information, or a component, i.e. one level below an operating segment.970 
Operating Segment 1 
............ ............................... , 
! Component Component ! 
! 1.1 1.2 ! 
l similar economic characteristics i 
Reporting Unit 
Figure 12: Defining reporting units 
Reporting Entity 
Operating Segment 2 
l:~11~:I 
Reporting Unit Reporting Unit 
SF AS 131 .10 defines an operating segment as a component of an enterprise that engages 
in business activities from which it may earn revenues and incur expenses, whose operat-
ing results are regularly reviewed by the enterprise's chief operating decision maker to 
decide about resource allocation and performance assessment, and for which separate 
financial information is available. 971 Under this so-called "management approach", 972 
970 See SFAS 142.30. See also Hitz and Kuhner (2002, pp. 275-6), Kilting, Weber and Wirth (2001, p. 
186), and LUdenbach and Frowein (2003, pp. 218-9). 
971 For an analysis of SF AS 131, refer to Williams (2002, ch. 43). 
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firms rely for external financial reporting purposes on data generated and used in the con-
text of their internal control and reporting structures.973 A firm's organizational and fi-
nancial reporting decisions are likely to be jointly determined and influenced by man-
agement's incentives as well as considerations of organizational efficiency.974 Therefore, 
while the management approach to defining operating segments (and, therefore, reporting 
units) gives management considerable discretion, it is unlikely that earnings management 
incentives will be the only or even the most influential determinant of a firm's organiza-
tional set-up. Stated differently, management will establish and maintain an organiza-
tional set-up that maximizes the utility derived from earnings management, efficiency, 
and other incentives. 
Under certain circumstances, firms are required to use components, i.e. organizational 
units below the operating segment level, as reporting units. "A component of an operat-
ing segment is a reporting unit if the component constitutes a business for which discrete 
financial information is available and segment management regularly reviews the operat-
ing results of that component. "975 The definition of "business" is contained in EITF Issue 
98-03, Determining Whether a Nonmonetary Transaction Involves Receipt of Productive 
Assets or of a Business: "A business is a self-sustaining integrated set of activities and 
assets conducted and managed for the purpose of providing a return to investors. A busi-
ness consists of(a) inputs, (b) processes applied to those inputs, and (c) resulting outputs 
that are used to generate revenues. "976 As a result, whenever an operating segment con-
sists of several distinct smaller units that amount to separate businesses and are reviewed 
on a regular basis by one or more segment managers,977 these components are to be used 
as reporting units for the purpose of applying SFS 142. 
972 This term was coined by the FASB in SFAS 13 I. According to par. 4, the "management approach is 
based on the way that management organizes the segments within the enterprise for making operating 
decisions and assessing perfonnance." In contrast to prescribing the exact nature and extent of disclo-
sures, the Board gives management what it intends to be a cost-effective and timely opportunity to 
disclose the "information that an enterprise's decision makers use to make decisions about the enter-
973 
prise's operating matters" (SFAS 131.5). 
For a discussion in the context of SF AS 142, see also Hitz and Kuhner (2002, p. 276), LUdenbach and 
Frowein (2003, pp. 218-9), and Nestler and Thuy (2002, pp. 170-1 ). 
974 Refer to section 3.3 .2.3.6 above. 
975 SFAS 142.30 (emphasis added). 
976 EITF Issue 98-03 .6. Further guidance is provided on the definitions of inputs, processes, and outputs. 
977 According to SF AS 131.14, a segment manager is "directly accountable to and maintains regular 
contact with the chief operating decision maker to discuss operating activities, financial results, fore-
casts, or plans for the segment. The term segment manager identifies a function, not necessarily a 
manager with a specific title." 
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This guidance is another example of a rigorous management approach, because it implies 
that firms are not required to allocate goodwill to components below the operating seg-
ment level when either no discrete financial information is available for them or their 
operating results are not reviewed on a regular basis by senior executives who fit the 
definition of "segment management". In other words, the guidance suggests that firms 
with inappropriate internal reporting systems and/or neglectful management are spared 
the potentially costly requirement of breaking down their operating segments into com-
ponents. They are apparently not required to generate and review component data for 
application of SF AS 142 unless they are already doing so for internal control purposes. 
SFAS 142.30 states an exception to the above rule: Two or more components are to be 
aggregated to a single reporting unit if they have similar economic characteristics. In 
detennining whether several components have similar economic characteristics, firms are 
referred to the "aggregation criteria" given in SF AS 131.17 for defining reportable seg-
ments. However, this guidance is rather unclear about what constitutes similar economic 
characteristics. The criteria listed in SF AS 131 .17978 cannot be meant as indicators of 
economic similarity since their presence is required over and above the similar economic 
characteristics of the reporting segments. 979 Also, similar performance and margin meas-
ures across segments are not necessarily indicators, but may or may not be results of sev-
eral segments' similar economic characteristics.980 Overall, since the guidance on similar 
economic characteristics provided in SF AS 142.30 and, by reference, in SF AS 131.17, is 
rather vague, it is at management's discretion whether components of operating segments 
are aggregated to form a larger reporting unit. 
This subjectivity has fundamental implications for the likelihood of impairment being 
found. The higher the level of aggregation at which reporting units are formed, the larger 
is the probability that a goodwill value decrease in one sub-set of a reporting unit is com-
978 The list includes criteria such as the nature of the products, services, and of the production process, 
customer types, and distribution methods. 
979 SF AS 131.17: "Two or more operating segments may be aggregated into a single operating segment 
if aggregation is consistent with the objective and basic principles of this Statement, if the segments 
have similar economic characteristics, and if the segments are similar in each of the following areas: 
[ ... ]" ( emphasis added). 
980 SF AS 131.17: "For example, similar long-term average gross margins for two operating segments 
would be expected if their economic characteristics were similar." 
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pensated by an increase in the value of (internally generated) goodwill in another.981 
Therefore, the level at which an entity initially defines its reporting units detennines to a 
large extent the likelihood of goodwill write-offs occurring in later periods. 982 This con-
clusion is also reached by Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002), who state that "a narrower 
unit of analysis is likely to reduce managerial discretion, resulting in more impair-
ment. "983 Depending on management's financial reporting strategy, incentives might ex-
ist to avoid/delay/understate any transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs. In this case, 
management would have incentive to argue, for example, that any components existing 
below the reporting segment level either do not constitute businesses or have similar eco-
nomic characteristics. Overall, the guidance on defining reporting units is very discre-
tionary, owing in part to the rigorous implementation of the management approach. 
4. 5 Existence 
The first step of the goodwill impainnent test is designed to detennine whether impair-
ment is present at all. According to SFAS 142.19, the fair value of a reporting unit is 
compared with its carrying amount, including goodwill. It is only when the carrying 
amount exceeds the fair value that the second test step is to be perfonned because, in that 
event, impainnent is assumed to exist. Consequently, the main discretionary elements 
inherent in the testing procedure itself relate, first, to detennining reporting unit fair value 
and, second, to assigning the carrying amounts of assets, liabilities, and goodwill to re-
porting units.984 
981 SFAS 142.B86 states that "the higher the level of review, the more difficult it would be to develop a 
robust impairment test". Osterland (2002) points out that "large companies with multiple business 
units and little existing (purchased] goodwill have an advantage over smaller companies in the acqui-
sition market." The impact of aggregation on measuring impairment is also discussed in Braun, Ro-
han and Yospe's (1991) article on the FASB's standard-setting process preceding SFAS 121. See also 
Kahle (2002b, p. 902), Kilting, Weber and Wirth (2001, p. 192), Pfeil and Yater (2002c, p. 262), and 
Pfeil and Yater (2002a, p. 71). 
982 SFAS 142.B84-7. For a numerical example, refer to Pellens and Sellhorn (2001a, pp. 1685-6). Braun, 
Rohan and Yospe ( 1991 , p. 68) conclude that "the manner in which assets are grouped can have a 
dramatic impact on the writeoffamount ofan asset impairment." 
983 Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002, p. 7). 
984 Special problems arise where portions of reporting units are disposed of and where reporting units 
include subsidiaries that are not wholly owned by the reporting entity. These latter problems of im-
pairment testing in the presence of non-controlling (minority) interests are not discussed in detail. In-
stead, refer to SFAS 142.38, Pellens and Sellhorn (2003), Kilting, Weber and Wirth (2001 , p. 192), 
and Ltidenbach and Frowein (2003, pp. 221-2). 
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4.5.1 Reporting unit fair value 
According to SFAS 142.19, the guidance in SFAS 142.23-25 is relevant in determining 
reporting unit fair value.985 The concept of fair value is applied in SFAS 142.23 to report-
ing units using a quote from the glossary of SFAC 7, Using Cash Flow Information and 
Present Value in Accounting Measurements, which defines fair value of an asset or liabil-
ity as the "amount at which that asset (or liability) could be bought (or incurred) or sold 
( or settled) in a current transaction between willing parties, that is, other than in a forced 
or liquidation sale."986 
SFAS 142.23-25 establish a fair value hierarchy applicable to reporting units: 
I . Quoted market prices in active markets are the best evidence of fair value and shall 
be used as the basis for the measurement, if available. "987 
2. "If quoted market prices are not available, the estimate of fair value shall be based on 
the best information available, including prices for similar assets and liabilities and 
the results of using other valuation techniques. A present value technique is often the 
best available technique with which to estimate the fair value of a group of net assets 
(such as a reporting unit)."988 
3. "In estimating the fair value of a reporting unit, a valuation technique based on multi-
ples of earnings or revenue or a similar performance measure may be used if that 
technique is consistent with the objective of measuring fair value."989 
Subjective elements inherent in these fair value measurements are discussed in the fol-
lowing sections. 
985 As has been discussed at length in section 4.3.1.2 above, reporting unit fair value can be carried over 
from the previous goodwill impairment test when certain criteria are met (SF AS 142.27). 
986 Stated differently, fair value can be characterized as a present value measurement that attempts to 
"capture the elements that taken together would comprise a market price if one existed" (SFAC 7.25). 
In German terms, the concept of fair value is closest to the measurement construct of "beizulegender 
Zeitwert". See, for example, German Accounting Standard (GAS) 4.7: "Betrag, zu dem im Bewer-
tungszeitpunkt zwischen geschliftsbereiten und sachverstlindigen Geschliftspartnem ein VermOgen-
swert ausgetauscht oder eine Schuld beglichen werden kann." 
987 SFAS 142.23 (emphasis added). 
988 SFAS 142.24 (emphasis added). 
989 SFAS 142.25 (emphasis added). 
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4.5.1.1 Quoted market prices 
Where equity securities of a reporting unit are publicly traded, quoted market prices are 
the preferable measure of reporting unit fair value.990 However, since in most cases only 
a relatively small portion of a given reporting unit' s equity is publicly traded,991 propor-
tionally extrapolating the reporting unit's market capitalization may not be a good indica-
tor of the reporting unit's overall fair value.992 The Board acknowledges that this notion 
seems to contradict SF AS 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity 
Securities, and SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, 
according to which fair value is the product of the number of trading units times market 
price per trading unit. 993 
However, the Board argues that due to the existence of a control premium,994 the quoted 
market price of, for example, 30% of a reporting unit's stock may be significantly less 
than 30% of its fair value as a whole.995 An acquirer of a controlling 70% stake in a re-
porting unit may be willing to pay more than 70% of the reporting unit's overall fair 
value, since the ability to exercise control996 over the operations of the reporting unit may 
be of substantial value to the acquirer,997 for example because it could give rise to syner-
gies between the acquirer's and the reporting unit's operations.998 
By allowing finns to deviate from quoted market prices when detennining reporting unit 
fair value even where those prices are available, the FASB prefers (allegedly) relevant 
measures of fair value over reliable, verifiable ones.999 This decision results in consider-
990 For a discussion of the role of quoted market prices in company valuation, refer to Bocking and 
Nowak (2000). 
991 A reporting unit, as defined in SFAS 142 (refer to section 4.4 above), does not necessarily constitute a 
separate legal entity. 
992 See SFAS 142.23. 
993 See SFAS 142.B154. Refer also to SFAS 133.540 (glossary), 534 lit j . (amendment of SFAS 
115.137). 
994 See, for example, KUting and Leinen (2002, p. 1203). For an empirical approach to estimating such 
premiums, refer to Henning, Lewis and Shaw (2000). 
99s See also Hitz and Kuhner (2002, p. 278). 
996 See SFAS 94, Consolidation of All Majority-owned Subsidiaries, par. 13. 
997 See, for example, von Wysocki and Wohlgemuth (I 996, p. 124). 
998 See SFAS 142.23 fn. 16. 
999 See SFAC 7.17, 73 . Even where quoted market prices for reporting unit are available and deemed to 
be relevant, it is unclear whether valuation should be based on stock price at some point in time or on 
an average price measured over a certain period. See, for example, Nestler and Thuy (2002, p. 173) 
with further references. 
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able room for management judgment and argumentation. As will be discussed next, the 
following stages in the fair value hierarchy are increasingly subjective. 1000 
4.5.1.2 Present value techniques 
4.5.1.2.J Measuring/air value as the objective 
Where quoted market prices are either unavailable or deemed inappropriate for measur-
ing reporting unit fair value, SFAS 142.24 requires firms to revert to valuation meth-
ods. 1001 Preference is given to present value techniques, as long as the cash flow esti-
mates used are consistent with the objective of measuring fair value. 1002 SF AS 142.24 
includes structural guidance from SF AC 7 for measuring present values. 1003 It is required 
that a present value measurement consistent with determining fair value incorporates the 
following elements: 
1. An estimate of the future cash flow, or in more complex cases, series of future cash 
flows at different times. 
2. Expectations about possible variations in the amount or timing of those cash flows. 
3. The time value of money, represented by the risk-free rate of interest. 
4. The price for bearing the uncertainty inherent in the asset or liability. 
5. Other, sometimes unidentifiable, factors including illiquidity and market imperfec-
tions.1004 
In order to be consistent with the objective of measuring fair value and thereby achieve 
some degree of objectivity and verifiability, cash flow estimates are to include assump-
1000 This circumstance was deplored by some of the respondents to the FASB 's revised exposure draft 
Business Combinations and Intangible Assets - Accounting/or Goodwill. See SF AS 142.B 151. 
1001 The terms measurement technique and valuation method are considered to be synonymous. The ap-
plication of methods of company valuation to the SFAS 142 impairment-only approach is discussed at 
length in AAA's Financial Accounting Standards Committee (2001), Frowein and LUdenbach (2003), 
L0denbach and Schulz (2002), Mard et al. (2002), Mercer Capital (2001), Nestler and Thuy (2002), 
Richter (2004, ch. 6) and Schultze (2003). 
1002 See also SFAC 7.25 . 
1001 See, for example, Hitz and Kuhner (2000) and Starbatty (2001). Also, refer to the FASB's four-article 
"Understanding the Issues" series on SFAC 7, available at www.fasb.org. /articles&reports. 
1004 See SFAC 7.23, 39. See also Hitz and Kuhner (2002, p. 278). 
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tions that marketplace participants would use in their estimates of fair value. 1005 This 
requirement to use third-party assumptions represents an attempt to limit management's 
financial reporting discretion by enhancing the degree of both reliability and relevance of 
the fair value measures generated. It has the effect that synergies among different report-
ing units are not part of the fair value measurements. 1006 
However, where these assumptions are not available without undue cost and effort, man-
agement may use its own assumptions, as long as they are "reasonable and supportable" 
and "all available evidence" is considered. 1007 The conditions under which costs and ef-
forts of obtaining information on market participants' assumptions can be regarded as 
"undue" are somewhat vague. In effect, managers may use their own estimates, as long 
as there is no information indicating that marketplace participants would use different 
assumptions. If such information exists, management must adjust its assumptions to in-
corporate that market information. 1008 According to SF AC 7 .38, the objective of measur-
ing fair value is not violated under these circumstances. Interestingly, SFAC 7 24 lit. b 
indicates that a measurement based on management's own estimates, expectations and 
other assumptions, as opposed to those of market-place participants, is not strictly a fair 
value measurement. It is in fact referred to as a value-in-use or entity-specific value. 
This discussion indicates that the borders between different types of measurements, each 
having different measurement objectives, 1009 are fairly indistinct. It is doubtful that the 
guidance given in SFAS 142.24 will ensure that market-based assumptions are consis-
tently used in measuring reporting unit fair value and, thereby, that the resulting meas-
ures can be characterized as fair values in the sense of SFAC 7. In summary, whereas the 
F ASB, via SF AC 7, prescribes the elements and variables to be considered when using 
present value techniques for measuring fair value, it is left entirely up to management 
1005 SFAC 7.24 lit. a explicitly states that a fair value measurement captures all of the five elements listed 
in SFAC 7.23, using the estimates and expectations of marketplace participants rather than those of 
management. 
1006 See Hitz and Kuhner (2002, pp. 280-1), Hommel (2001 b, p. 1946), Kahle (2002a, p. 854), KUting, 
Weber and Wirth (2001, p. 189), and Nestler and Thuy (2002, p. 177). 
1007 SFAS 142.24 (both quotes). 
1008 See SFAS 142.B155. 
1009 As noted in SFAC 7.24 lit. b fn. 4, the "entity-specific value ... can be characterized as the amount at 
which independent willing parties that share the same information and ability to generate the entity's 
estimated cash flows would agree to a transaction that exchanges the estimated future cash flows for a 
current amount." This definition is quite different from that of fair value, which is given in the glos-
sary to SFAC 7 (see quote above). 
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exactly what parameter values it chooses to assign to those variables. 1010 Projecting un-
certain future cash flows, earnings, or other input data and choosing appropriate discount 
rates is a difficult task even for those attempting to generate unbiased results. In effect, 
management is safe in using business plans based almost entirely on its own assumption 
regarding the five elements listed above. 
4.5.1.2.2 Measurement techniques 
SFAS 142.24 gives firms considerable discretion regarding their choice of valuation 
method, as long as the approach used is consistent with the objective of measuring fair 
value. Two different approaches to computing present value are explicitly referred to in 
SF AC 7.40: When the preferred expected cash flow approach is used, the discount rate is 
intended to capture only the time value of money. Therefore, a risk-free interest rate is 
applied and cash flows are included at their expected values to incorporate uncertainty 
and risk. Under the traditional approach, the discount rate captures all uncertainty sur-
rounding future cash flows, including a risk premium, whereas cash flows are not ad-
justed for any of these elements.'°11 While the guidance in SF AS 142 implies that the 
equity variant of the discounted-cash-flow (DCF) method be used, 1012 it is argued that 
both the entity and equity approaches can accommodate the standard's requirements. 1013 
However, applicable techniques are not limited to DCF methods. During the standard-
setting deliberations, the Board also considered approaches based on market capitaliza-
tion, residual income, and performance measures such as cash-flow return on investment 
1010 See SFAS 142.Bl53 . A different approach is pursued in the British FRS 11, Impairment of Fixed 
Assets and Goodwill, which provides concrete guidance on estimating cash flows, e.g. growth rate as-
sumptions. The F ASB decided against this approach based on the argument that such guidance could 
interfere with the objective of measuring fair value, since cash flows used to measure fair value 
should be estimated according to the management approach, i.e. based on "the most recent budgets 
and plans approved by management". However, the Board did indicate that "some consideration 
should be given to industry trends" (SFAS 142.Bl52 [both quotes]). 
1011 Under German terminology, the first approach is referred to as the "Sicherheitsllquivalenzmethode", 
whereas the second method corresponds to the German "Risikozuschlagsmethode". For an introduc-
tion to these concepts, refer to Mandi and Rabel (1997, pp. 218-22, 226-35, respectively) and the cited 
literature. See also Starbatty (200 I, p. 545). 
1012 The equity and entity variants of the DCF method are discussed in Hachmeister (2000, pp. 118-23), 
Hachmeister (1996) and Mandi and Rabel (1997, pp. 37-43). For a brief overview of valuation meth-
ods that are potentially consistent with the requirements of SF AS 142, refer to Nestler and Thuy 
(2002, pp. 172-9). 
1013 See, for example, Lildenbach and Frowein (2003, p. 222). 
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(CFROI) and economic value added (EVA),1014 all of which were deemed to be consis-
tent with the objective of measuring reporting unit fair value. According to the Board's 
credo, "entities should be permitted to use a valuation method with which they are famil-
iar, providing that the result is consistent with the objective of fair value", 1015 and SFAS 
142 was intended to "allow preparers latitude in applying that objective to their specific 
circumstances based on the guidance in Concepts Statement 7."1016 It appears clear that 
encouraging firms to apply virtually any present value-based valuation technique imagin-
able to their own estimates, expectations, and assumptions, guided only by the sketchy 
catch-all reference in SF AC 7 to the objective of fair value measurement, is likely to 
make "reporting unit fair value" an extremely discretionary variable. 
The AAA's Financial Accounting Standards Committee (2001) concludes that most tech-
niques permitted under SFAS 142.24 are compromised by incorrect forecasts of future 
cash flows and are susceptible to other weaknesses like the inappropriate specification of 
discount rates and terminal values. Regardless of the concrete model used, the valuation 
process relies heavily on management's expectations about future developments and 
events. Detailed specification of acceptable methodology and abstract valuation model 
structure cannot constrain management from exercising substantial discretion when de-
termining what values to assign to the prescribed parameters. Furthermore, even where 
management acts in all conscience, attempting to estimate reporting unit fair value to the 
best of its knowledge, the problems associated with estimating uncertain future cash 
flows and cost of capital are, in itself, severe. This abundance of subjectivity, combined 
with uncertainty, makes the resulting estimates open to criticism with regard to both rele-
vance and reliability. The F ASB is aware of these caveats but deliberately decided 
against providing more guidance. 1017 
It is doubtful that the requirement to incorporate marketplace participants' assumptions is 
sufficient eliminate much of the inherent judgment. For reporting unit fair value to repre-
sent "the amount at which the unit as a whole could be bought or sold in a current trans-
action between willing parties", 1018 the only relevant assumptions would be those of 
management and potential buyers. For reporting units whose disposal is not imminent, 
1014 For a description of some of these methods and their appropriateness in the context of goodwill im-
pairment testing, refer to AAA's Financial Accounting Standards Committee (2001) and Nestler and 
Thuy (2002, pp. 172-9). 
1015 SFAS 142.8150. 
1016 SFAS 142.8153. 
1011 See SFAS 142.8151. 
1018 SFAS 142.23. 
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only management's assumptions will be readily available. Also, in a transaction between 
willing parties, synergies are likely to play a major role in the purchase price negotia-
tions. Since the amount of synergies depends heavily on the identity of the potential 
buyer, incorporating the assumptions of marketplace participants will only be meaningful 
in the rare event that the potential buyer is known. 
4.5.1.3 Multiples 
SF AS 142.25 permits the use of valuation techniques based on "multiples of earnings or 
revenue or a similar performance measure". Again, the methods applied must be consis-
tent with the objective of measuring fair value. The F ASB restricts the use of these tech-
niques to circumstances where "the fair value of an entity that has comparable operations 
and economic characteristics is observable and the relevant multiples of the comparable 
entity are known." 1019 However, SFAS 142.24 does not indicate whether these known 
multiples must in all cases be derived from stock price or other market data. For example, 
the popular PIE multiple is the ratio of stock price divided by earnings. This would 
strictly imply that the PIE multiple can only be used where stock price and earnings data 
of publicly traded comparable firms are observable.1020 
A wide range of these valuation models is available and used in practice. 1021 All of these 
methods are based on the "law of one price", an economic rule which states that in an 
efficient market, a security must have a single price, no matter how that security is cre-
ated. Applied to firm valuation, it implies that two identical or at least closely compara-
ble firms cannot have widely different prices, or otherwise arbitrage opportunities would 
arise. 1022 Based on this assumption, it is argued that comparable firms are priced at fixed 
multiples of their earnings, cash flows or other performance measures.1023 
1019 SFAS 142.25. 
1020 As the common term "market multiples" suggests, valuation based on these methods usually relies on 
data derived from stock prices or other market transactions. See, for example, Coenenberg and 
Schultze (2002a, p. 697) and Mandi and Rabel (1997, p. 265). 
1021 See, for example, Aders, Galli and Wiedemann (2000), Bausch (2000), Bocking and Nowak (1999), 
Hillebrandt (2001), Mandi and Rabel (1997, pp. 265-74), and Seppelfricke (1999). Also, refer to Da-
modaran (1996). 
1022 See Coenenberg and Schultze (2002a, p. 697). 
1023 Instead of a performance measure or similar flow figure, the book value of equity or other accounting-
based stock figures are sometimes used. However, since SFAS 142.25 explicitly refers to multiples 
based on performance measures, these variants are not discussed here. 
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The multiple approach comprises three basic steps: 1024 First, a comparative company or 
transaction 1025 is identified. Several dimensions, along which comparability can be 
judged, are conceivable, e.g. same industry, size, or market position. Due to the multitude 
of attributes by which firms and transactions can be distinguished, finding a truly compa-
rable finn or transaction is especially problematic. 1026 Second, the relevant perfonnance 
measure is ascertained and the multiple calculated. Perfonnance measures mainly used 
besides earnings include income statement sub-totals such as revenues, earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), and earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT), or cash flow figures such as free cash flow (FCF) and flow to equity 
(FTE). Frequently, several comparable companies or transactions are considered and 
averaged. Finally, the value figure is computed by applying the multiple to the perfonn-
ance measure. 1027 
Valuation techniques based on multiples might at first sight appear to generate relatively 
objective and verifiable results, since they resort to market-based measures such as stock 
prices or prices generated in other market transactions. However, the appropriateness of 
multiples for valuation purposes critically hinges not only on management's ability to 
identify comparable companies or transactions, but also on data availability. Where no 
data is available for the first-best comparison finn, management might be tempted to use 
sub-optimal benchmarks. Also, since the reporting unit to be valued and the comparable 
finn from which the multiple is observed are usually not equally sized, the accurateness 
of the valuation depends on whether the relation between the finn value measure and the 
perfonnance measure is proportional. 1028 Special problems arise when transaction prices 
are used. These may be distorted due to transaction-specific circumstances, such as con-
trol premiums paid in acquisitions or the value of synergies that is (partly) reimbursed in 
the purchase consideration, 1029 which might not be applicable to the reporting unit at is-
1024 See, for example, Hillebrandt (2001, p. 618). 
1025 Transactions include recent mergers, acquisitions or (initial) public offerings. 
1026 See Coenenberg and Schultze (2002a, p. 698). Nestler and Thuy (2002, pp. 174-5) note that unlisted 
reporting units should be valued at a discount compared with their publicly traded comparatives. 
1027 It is important to assure that the value figure is consistent with the performance measure. For exam-
ple, a performance measure to which only shareholders are entitled, e.g. net income, will generate a 
measure of the firm's equity value. Conversely, if a perfonnance measure such as FCF is used, the 
firm value generated will represent the market values of both equity and liabilities (so-called enter-
prise value). 
1028 See Bausch (2000, p. 451). 
1029 See Coenenberg and Schultze (2002a, p. 698). 
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sue. For these reasons, reporting unit fair values arrived at by using multiples will have a 
distinct discretionary component. 1030 
4.5.1.4 Preliminary conclusion 
Since the majority of reporting units of SFAS 142 adopters are not publicly traded,1031 
firms will largely apply present value methods and/or market multiples to determine re-
porting unit fair value in the context of step one of the impairment test. The range of 
available methods is depicted in Figure 13. Having extensive control over the determi-
nants of present value as well as over the parameters used in the market multiple ap-
proach, management will be able to justify a wide range of reporting unit fair values. 1032 
This is especially true since the results are very sensitive to ( changes in) underlying as-
sumptions regarding growth and other determinants of terminal value, interest rates, and 
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Figure 13: Hierarchy of reporting unit fair value measurements 
Reporting unit fair value determines to a large extent the outcome of the first test step, 
i.e. whether the second test step is "triggered" because a potential goodwill impairment 
loss is assumed to exist. For that reason, management has a strong incentive to influence 
reporting unit fair value to conform to its financial reporting strategy. If management's 
incentive is to avoid/delay/understate a goodwill impairment loss, it will use assumptions 
1030 Due to the shortcomings of this concept, the use of market multiples in practice is usually limited to 
providing plausibility checks for values generated using more elaborate techniques, and making quick 
"back-of-the-envelope" calculations. See Coenenberg and Schultze (2002b, pp. 602-3), who are there-
fore critical of firms using multiples as the only measure in applying SFAS 142. Also, refer to L0den-
bach and Schulz (2002, pp. 494-5) and Nestler and Thuy (2002, p. 175). 
1031 Even where a reporting unit is publicly traded, stock price need not be the relevant fair value measure. 
Refer to section 4.5.1.1 above. 
1032 See also Busse von Colbe (2001a) and Hitz and Kuhner (2002, p. 283). In a more general context, 
Ordelheide (1997, p. 584) and Moxter (2001) arrive at the same conclusion. 
1033 See also Kilting, Weber and Wirth (200 I, p. 189). 
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and data to maximize reporting unit fair value. Conversely, management will rely on pes-
simistic scenarios when it intends to recognize/accelerate/overstate a goodwill impair-
ment loss. 
4.5.2 Carrying value of reporting unit net assets 
The second variable required to complete the first test step is the carrying value of the 
reporting unit's net assets, including goodwill. This value is derived from the carrying 
values of the reporting entity's assets, liabilities, and goodwill as a whole. The require-
ment of allocating these items to the reporting unit level creates significant elbowroom 
for management, as will be discussed below. 
4.5.2.1 Allocating assets and liabilities 
The guidance provided in SF AS 142.32-3 focuses on the case of assigning the assets ac-
quired and liabilities assumed in a recent acquisition to the firm's reporting units. 1034 
Two conditions must be met for an asset (liability) to be allocated to a reporting unit: 1035 
First, the asset (liability) will be employed in (relates to) the operations of a reporting 
unit. Second, the asset or liability will be considered in determining the fair value of the 
reporting unit. 
In some cases, it should be relatively clear to which reporting unit the assets and liabili-
ties from a recent acquisition relate. For example, if an acquired entity is not integrated 
into the acquirer's operations but operated as a stand-alone reporting unit, the assets and 
liabilities originally acquired will naturally be assigned to that unit. The same is true 
when an acquired entity is grouped with a pre-existing reporting unit to form a part of it. 
However, if an acquired entity is integrated across several reporting units, complex allo-
cation problems arise that are not likely to be solved by the criteria described above. For 
these instances, SFAS I 42.33 requires that assets (liabilities) that are employed in (relate 
to) the operations of multiple reporting units be assigned to those reporting units accord-
ing to a methodology that is "reasonable and supportable" and consistently applied. This 
requirement is rather vague and gives management considerable discretion in determin-
ing a reporting unit's net asset base and, thereby, the outcome of the first test step. For 
example, if an acquired brand name is expected to benefit several of a firm's geographi-
1034 The allocation of the entity's pre-existing assets and liabilities to reporting units upon initial applica-
tion of SFAS 142 is specifically governed by SFAS 142.54, which refers to the guidance in SFAS 
142.32-3. 
1035 See SFAS 142.32. 
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cally divided reporting units, allocation will be have to be based on some measure of 
future benefits that each of the reporting units is likely to derive from that brand name. 
Present value techniques are likely to be employed here, with all the discretionary com-
ponents inherent in these procedures. 1036 In general, all assets that are expected to gener-
ate synergies for several reporting units are difficult to allocate. 1037 Likewise, liabilities 
are equally problematic to assign. 1038 
In the special case of corporate items, i.e. assets or liabilities that are used at the reporting 
unit's top organizational level and are not easily broken down to the reporting unit level, 
SF AS 142.32 requires allocation to a reporting unit if both of the above criteria are met. 
Examples where the criteria are considered to be met are "environmental liabilities that 
relate to an existing operating facility of the reporting unit and a pension obligation that 
would be included in the detennination of the fair value of the reporting unit."1039 How-
ever, due to the unique characteristics of corporate items, i.e. their inherent relation to the 
entity level and not to some lower level, it is doubtful whether the above criteria ever 
apply to true corporate times or, stated differently, whether assets and liabilities that meet 
the above criteria are corporate items at all. 1040 Assigning corporate items to reporting 
units is by definition an extremely arbitrary process. 1041 
The "management approach" plays an important role in the process of allocating assets 
and liabilities to reporting units. A finn' s allocation decisions are likely to be in part 
driven by its existing internal organization and reporting structure. The manner in which 
a finn allocates its assets and liabilities to reporting units is likely to be in part predeter-
mined by its decisions relating to the reporting unit definition itself. 1042 
1036 Refer to section 4.5.1.2. 
1037 Another possibility suggested in SFAS 142.33 is an allocation procedure based on the relative fair 
values of the different reporting units. 
1038 SF AS 142.33 suggests that pension liabilities be allocated pro rata to multiple reporting units, based 
on relative payroll expense. For other liabilities, allocation formulas might not be so obvious. 
1039 SFAS 142.32. 
1040 See also Liidenbach and Frowein (2003, p. 218). 
1041 Respondents to the FASB's 2001 exposure draft expressed the same concerns. See SFAS 142.B115. 
Furthermore, in some cases it can lead to results that are inconsistent with the requirements in State-
ment 131 since, for purposes of segment reporting, firms are required to allocate to reported segments 
only those assets that are included in the chief operating decision maker's measure of segment assets. 
Therefore, goodwill and other (corporate) assets and liabilities may not be included in reported seg-
ment assets. See SFAS 142.B121. 
1042 Refer to section 4.4. 
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4.5.2.2 Allocating goodwill 
As with other assets and liabilities, the guidance provided in SF AS 142.34-5 on allocat-
ing goodwill to reporting units focuses on the case of a recent acquisition. 1043 However, 
in contrast to assets and liabilities, which are only to be allocated to reporting units when 
certain criteria are met, 1044 all of a firm's acquired goodwill must be assigned in its en-
tirety.1045 The allocation procedure considers which reporting unit, or several reporting 
units, of the acquirer are expected to benefit from the synergies of the business combina-
tion.1046 Here again, the allocation method is required to be "reasonable and supportable 
and ... applied in a consistent manner." 1047 SFAS 142.35 provides additional guidance, 
depending on whether a reporting unit that goodwill is going to be allocated to has also 
been assigned assets and liabilities from the same acquisition. 
"In concept, the amount of goodwill assigned to a reporting unit would be determined in 
a manner similar to how the amount of goodwill recognized in a business combination is 
determined."1048 For each reporting unit expected to benefit from the acquisition, a fair 
value as a surrogate for purchase price would be determined and allocated to the net as-
sets of that unit as would be the case if the reporting unit had been acquired in a business 
combination. Consider the following simple example in which entity A is acquired and 
the acquirer's reporting units RU; are expected to benefit from the synergies of the acqui-
sition of A: 1049 
Purchase price of A; fair values ofRUi 
Net assets 














These arbitrary numbers show that only by coincidence is the sum of the reporting units' 
internally generated goodwills (here: 150 MU) equal to the acquired goodwill of A that is 
to be allocated (here: 40 MU). Therefore, the guidance in SFAS 142.35 does not repre-
sent a viable method of allocating A's goodwill. A "reasonable and supportable" method 
1043 The allocation of the entity's pre-existing goodwill to reporting units upon initial application of SF AS 
142 is governed by SFAS 142.54. 
1044 Refer to section 4.5.2.1 . 
1045 See SFAS 142.34, 54. See also Hitz and Kuhner (2002, p. 276). 
1046 It is not necessary that goodwill be allocated solely to reporting units that have also been allocated 
assets and/or liabilities from the same business combination. 
1047 SFAS 142.34. 
1048 SFAS 142.35. 
1049 All amounts are expressed in monetary units (MU). For a similar example, refer to Pellens, Crasselt 
and Schremper (2002). 
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could be to allocate A' s goodwill based on the three reporting units' relative internally 
generated goodwills: 
Goodwill 
Relative proportion of RU; goodwills 
Portion of A's goodwill allocated to RU; 
A 
40 120 
120 / 150 = 0.8 
0.8 X 40 = 32 
RU2 
0 30 
0 30 I 150 = 0.2 




Alternatively, another "reasonable and supportable" method could be to distribute A's 
goodwill in proportion to the three reporting units' relative size as measured by net as-
sets:1oso 
A RU 1 RU2 RU3 :ERU; 
Goodwill 40 120 0 30 150 
Net assets 80 500 20 600 
Relative proportion of RU; total assets 80 / 600 = 0.13 500 I 600 20 / 600 
= 0.83 =O.Q3 1.0 
Portion of A's goodwill allocated to RU; 0.13 X 40 = 5.3 0.83 x40 0.03 X 40 
= 33.3 = 1.3 40 
It is doubtful whether these or other, similar procedures are consistent with the objective 
of assigning goodwill to reporting units proportionally to the benefits expected to arise 
from the acquisition, '°51 since all they achieve is an allocation of acquired goodwill pro-
portional to some arbitrarily chosen apportionment formula. 
The procedure described above is deemed to be inappropriate if goodwill is to a reporting 
unit to which none of the assets acquired or liabilities assumed in that specific acquisition 
were allocated. Goodwill might be allocated to such a reporting unit based on a "with and 
without" computation. "That is, the difference between the fair value of that reporting 
unit before the acquisition and its fair value after the acquisition represents the amount of 
goodwill to be assigned to that reporting unit."1052 This with and without computation is 
intended to capture the incremental increase, resulting from a recent business combina-
tion, in the reporting unit's internally generated goodwill. 1053 This increment will in most 
cases be due to synergies that are expected to arise from combining the acquired entity 
with the acquirer's operations, and from which benefits are expected to accrue to the re-
porting unit in question. For example, assume that entity A in the above example pro-
1050 A third alternative would be an allocation based on reporting unit fair value; see SFAS 142.33 . Also, 
refer to LUdenbach and Frowein (2003, p. 218). 
1051 See SFAS 142.34. 
1052 SFAS 142.35 (both quotes). 
1053 See also KUting, Weber and Wirth (200 I, p. 188). 
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vides distribution channels to all three RUi, albeit being operated as a stand-alone report-
ing unit. It might be feasible to asswne that the future cash flows, and therefore the fair 
values, of RUi will increase to the extent that the distribution channels provided by A 
result in a reduction of distribution expenses and/or an increase in revenues, although no 
assets or liabilities are assigned to them: 
Fair values of RU; before acquisition of A 
Fair values of RU; after acquisition of A 













However, as the example shows, the total amount of goodwill that, according to the "with 
and without" computation, can be potentially assigned to RUi (70 MU) will only by coin-
cidence be equal to the amount that is to be distributed to these reporting units ( 40 
MU).1054 
While the guidance on allocating acquisition-specific goodwill, given in SFAS 142.34-5, 
already involves considerable discretion, this is even truer in the event that the firm's 
entire existing goodwill must be allocated to reporting units upon initial application of 
SF AS 142. 1055 As in SF AS 142.34, no more is required in SF AS 142.54 than that the 
method used to allocate goodwill to reporting units at transition be "reasonable and sup-
portable". Firms are encouraged to consider the original sources of pre-existing goodwill 
and give special attention to those reporting units to which the related assets and liabili-
ties were assigned. The guidance applicable to allocating acquisition-specific goodwill is 
also recommended for allocating pre-existing goodwill upon initial application of SF AS 
142. However, for goodwill components resulting from business combinations that have 
been completed a relatively long time before, the allocation will tend to be even more 
subjective. 
1054 Taken literally, the guidance in SFAS 142.35 suggests that the total amount of 70 MU ("the differ-
ence between the fair value of that reporting unit before the acquisition and its fair value after the ac-
quisition") can be recognized in the acquirer's financial statements. This would imply that not only 
the purchased goodwill of 40 is recognized but, as the case might be, part of the internally generated 
goodwills of reporting units expected to benefit from the acquisition might end up being recognized 
as well. This result would be in contrast to SFAS 142.Fl, which defines goodwill as the "excess of the 
cost of an acquired entity over the net of the amounts assigned to assets acquired and liabilities as-
sumed." In this example, not only this excess value of 40 MU, but an additional 30 MU, would be 
recognized. 
1055 SFAS 142.54 explicitly requires that all recognized goodwill be assigned to reporting units. 
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4.5 .3 Disposal 
When a component ( constituting a business) of a reporting unit is to be disposed of, man-
agement must determine how much of the reporting unit's goodwill to include in the car-
rying value of that component, in order to determine the gain or loss on disposal. 1056 Ac-
cording to SFAS 142.39, the portion ofreporting unit goodwill that enters into that calcu-
lation depends on whether or not the business to be disposed of was integrated into the 
reporting unit after its acquisition. If it was, the portion of the reporting unit's goodwill 
that relates to the business to be disposed of is not readily apparent. In that event, some 
allocation key must be devised. According to SFAS 142.39, that allocation is to be based 
on the relative fair values of, first, the business to be disposed of and, second, the portion 
of the reporting unit to be retained. The fair value of the business to be disposed of will 
usually be derived from the purchase price realized. The discretion inherent in determin-
ing the fair value of the retained portion is identical to that involved in valuing reporting 
units per se.1057 Subsequent to the disposal, any goodwill remaining in the reporting unit 
must be tested for impairment. 1058 
The guidance in SF AS 142.30 implies that a "business" as defined in EITF Issue No. 98-
03 is a separate reporting unit whenever it is situated directly below the operating seg-
ment level. 1059 In contrast, SF AS 142.39 suggests that businesses might exist even further 
down in the organizational hierarchy. Since reporting units are either segments or com-
ponents immediately below the segment level, such businesses would not be viewed as 
reporting units. Conversely, if the reporting unit level is identical to the operating seg-
ment level, and no economically dissimilar businesses exist below that level, it will not 
be possible to allocate the goodwill portion to be disposed of in the manner required in 
SFAS 142.39. In that case, the disposed portion of the reporting unit would not have con-
stituted a business, and no goodwill would have to be allocated to it. Therefore, manage-
ment's argument that the disposed portion did not constitute a business would enable 
management to record a higher gain (or lower loss) on disposal. However, the FASB 
maintains that goodwill cannot relate to a group of assets that does not constitute a busi-
ness. 1060 
1056 The discretion related to detennining what constitutes a " business" is discussed in section 4.4. 
1057 Refer to section 4 .5. I above. 
1058 See SFAS 142.39. 
1059 Refer to section 4.4 above. 
1060 See SFAS 142.B164. 
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4.6 Measurement 
The second test step compares the carrying value of reporting unit goodwill with its im-
plied fair value. The implied fair value of goodwill is measured by comparing reporting 
unit fair value (representing a fictitious purchase price) to reporting unit net assets (with-
out goodwill) at fair value. The F ASB coined the term ,,implied" fair value of goodwill 
because, conceptually, it is difficult to measure the fair value of this residual directly. 1061 
4.6.1 Fair value of reporting unit net assets 
4.6.1.1 Fictitious purchase price allocation 
Determining the fair value of reporting unit net assets requires management to measure 
reporting unit assets and liabilities "as if'' the reporting unit under scrutiny had been ac-
quired as of the impairment test date. 1062 This fictitious "purchase price allocation" proc-
ess1063 or "fair value adjustment"1064 is governed by the provisions in SF AS 142.21.1065 It 
involves discretionary parameters similar to those encountered during actual purchase 
price allocations subsequent to acquisitions. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to discuss all the details and discretionary elements of the purchase price allocation proc-
ess, 1066 it appears necessary to discuss the application of the relevant guidance in SF AS 
141 to the second step of the goodwill impairment test and indicate the subjectivity in-
volved in measuring the fair value of reporting unit net assets. 1067 Assets and liabilities 
are to be measured at "their estimated fair values at date of acquisition".1068 Most of the 
discretionary parameters involved in estimating fair value measurements for entire re-
1061 See SFAS 142.18 fu . 13. 
1062 See SFAS 142.21. 
1063 Ltidenbach and Frowein (2003, pp. 217-8) coin the term "Quasi-Kaufpreisallokation". See also 
Frowein and LUdenbach (2003, p. 65). 
1064 See Kilting, Weber and Winh (2001, p. 187). 
1065 SFAS 142.21 refers to SF AS I 41.35-8. SF AS I 41.35 in turn refers to SF AS 141.26-46 for guidance 
on the process of purchase price allocation. 
1066 For example, refer to Beams, Brozovsky and Shoulders (2000, pp. 76-82), Jeter and Chaney (200 I, 
ch. 5), Larsen (1997, pp. 189-91), and Pellens (2001, pp. 294-5). 
1067 The extent to which the methods and procedures applied in the original purchase price allocation are 
binding for the "fictitious" purchase price allocation is an open issue. L0denbach and Frowein (2003, 
p. 218) maintain that consistency should be applied in this process in order to avoid distonion of the 
implied fair value of goodwill due to measurement anifacts. The authors also argue that, in order to 
correctly account for deferred taxes, the "fictitious" purchase price allocation must include an as-
sumption about the legal form, which the "fictitious" purchase has taken. 
1068 SFAS 141.35. 
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porting units, discussed in section 4.5.1, also apply to measuring the fair values of indi-
vidual assets and liabilities for which fair values are not readily observable. 
The FASB attempted to limit subjectivity by requiring in SFAS 141.35 that, first, the 
valuation of any non-cash purchase consideration be reviewed. By analogy, this trans-
lates into a requirement to review the detennination of reporting unit fair value when 
performing the second step of the goodwill impairment test according to SF AS 142.21. 
Second, all of the assets acquired and liabilities assumed must be identified. This re-
quirement includes intangible assets that meet the recognition criteria in SF AS 141.39 
(see discussion below) as well as all other assets and liabilities of the acquired entity, 
regardless of whether or not were previously recorded in the financial statements of the 
acquired entity. Applying this provision to the second step of the goodwill impainnent 
test implies that not only must the reporting unit's assets and liabilities be measured at 
fair value, but any assets or liabilities that do not qualify for recognition when generated 
internally must be recognized if they do meet the recognition criteria when acquired. The 
remainder of this section first discusses recognition issues, followed by measurement 
issues. 1069 
4.6.1.2 Recognition 
Special recognition provisions exist for previously recorded goodwill (SF AS 141.38), 
deferred taxes (SFAS 141.38), intangible assets (SPAS 141.39), preacquisition contin-
gencies (SFAS 141.40-1), and research and development assets (SFAS 141.42). Accord-
ing to SF AS 141.38, goodwill recognized by the acquired entity from its own previous 
acquisitions cannot be carried over to the consolidated balance sheet of the acquirer. In 
the context of the goodwill impairment test, this requirement implies that, as stated in 
SF AS 142.21, the carrying amounts of any goodwill recognized as part of reporting unit 
net assets must be excluded when calculating the implied fair value of reporting unit 
goodwill. Furthermore, no internally generated goodwill is included in the fair value of 
reporting unit net assets. 
Likewise, deferred income taxes recorded by the acquiree cannot be carried over into the 
acquirer's books but must be reassessed. 107° Consistent with SFAS l 09.30, deferred tax 
liabilities (assets) are recognized based on any differences between the amounts assigned 
to assets acquired (liabilities assumed) in a business combination and the accordant tax 
1069 See also Lildenbach and Frowein (2003, pp. 219-22) and Frowein and Lildenbach (2003, pp. 67-72). 
1070 See SFAS 141.38 and Ltldenbach and Frowein (DB 2003, p. 221). 
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bases. No deferred taxes are recorded in association with goodwill for which amortiza-
tion is not tax-deductible. 1071 The general rules for recognition and measurement of de-
ferred taxes are contained in SFAS I 09.17. 1072 For the measurement of deferred tax as-
sets, a valuation allowance must be established if "it is more likely than not ( a likelihood 
of more than 50 percent) that some portion or all of the deferred tax assets will not be 
realized."1073 This term requires management's estimates of the likelihood of a future 
event occurring. To the extent that deferred tax assets are deemed to be more likely than 
not to be realized, the implied fair value of goodwill is reduced, and vice versa. 
Subjectivity plays an especially pronounced role where intangible assets generated inter-
nally by the reporting unit must be identified. According to SFAS 141.39, intangible as-
sets must be recognized separately from goodwill if they satisfy one of two recognition 
criteria: 1074 The contractual-legal criterion requires that the intangible asset arise from 
contractual or other legal rights. According to the separability criterion, the intangible 
asset in question must be capable of being sold, transferred, licensed, rented, or otherwise 
exchanged either separately or in combination with a related contract, asset, or liabil-
ity . 1075 These renewed recognition criteria for acquired intangible assets were intended by 
the Board to take some of the subjectivity out of the process of purchase price allocation, 
since it observed that many firms chose not to recognize previously unrecognized intan-
gible assets acquired in a business combination, but to include them within goodwill. 1076 
Relying on contractual/legal rights and separate usability will tend to limit management's 
discretion in two ways: On the one hand, it will be more difficult for firms interested in 
avoiding/delaying/understating goodwill impairment losses to maximize the implied fair 
value of goodwill by recognizing as few previously unrecognized intangible assets as 
possible, because relatively objective criteria now exist that, if met, require an intangible 
asset to be recognized as part of the fair value of reporting unit net assets. On the other 
hand, firms that have incentive to recognize/accelerate/overstate a goodwill impairment 
loss will face difficulties in minimizing the implied fair value of goodwill by recognizing 
1071 See also Pellens (2001, pp. 261-2). 
1072 Refer to Pellens (2001, pp. 260-9). 
1073 SFAS 109.17 lit. e (emphasis in original). 
1074 See, for example, Alvarez and Biberacher (2002, pp. 347-8). 
1075 An assembled workforce cannot be recognized as a separate intangible asset. Appendix A to SF AS 
141 provides additional guidance, including a list of intangible assets that meet the recognition crite-
ria. 
1076 See SFAS 141.8148. Such behavior was usually explained by management's desire to minimize 
annual future amortization expense, considering that goodwill was usually amortized over longer pe-
riods (or, in some jurisdictions, deducted from equity) than were separately identifiable intangible as-
sets. Refer to section 2.3 .2 above. 
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as many previously unrecognized intangible assets as possible, because such intangible 
assets cannot be recognized apart from goodwill unless relatively objective criteria are 
met.1011 
Preacquisition contingencies, previously governed by SF AS 38, Accounting for Preac-
quisition Contingencies of Purchased Enterprises, are contingencies of an enterprise ac-
quired in a purchase-method business combination that exist before the combination is 
consummated. 1078 Without regard to details of the sources of contingencies in general, 1079 
it is important to note that preacquisition contingencies, usually measured at fair value 
determined during the allocation period, 1080 are recognized at reasonably estimated val-
ues when fair value cannot be determined by the end of the allocation period. 1081 Apply-
ing these provisions to the second step of the goodwill impairment test is not straightfor-
ward since preacquisition contingencies are an acquisition-specific accounting issue. In 
the context of SFAS 142, they would have to be recognized and measured at fair value 
when in existence before the impairment test date. 1082 In analogy to SFAS 142.22, it 
could be argued that reasonably estimated values must be used when fair value cannot be 
determined before the issuance of the financial statements. 1083 Under this condition, man-
agement would be able to use estimated values of preacquisition contingencies to either 
1077 However, significant discretion still exists with regard to measurement issues. SFAS 141.37 lit. e 
requires intangible assets to be measured at estimated fair values. Where quoted market prices are un-
available or deemed inappropriate, valuation techniques will be applied. The discretion inherent in 
these methods is discussed extensively in section 4.5.1 above. 
1078 This definition in SFAS 38.4 lit. a is carried forward unchanged in SFAS 141.FI. See SFAS 
141.B175. Preacquisition contingencies can be contingent assets, contingent liabilities, or contingent 
impairments of assets. 
1079 Refer to SFAS 5. See also Pellens (2001, pp. 227-35) and Kieso, Weygandt and Warfield (2001, pp. 
670-9). 
1080 According to SF AS 141.F I, the allocation period is the "period that is required to identify and meas-
ure the fair value of the assets acquired and the liabilities assumed in a business combination." It ends 
when the acquirer has incorporated all information known to be available or obtainable. The alloca-
tion period should usually not exceed one year from the consummation of a business combination 
(SFAS 38.4 lit. b). 
1081 See SFAS 141.40 lit. a, b. Previous adjustments are recorded in earnings in the period in which the 
adjustment is determined. See SFAS 141.41. 
1082 LUdenbach and Frowein (2003, p. 220) argue that, for the sake of consistency, such contingencies 
would be recognized or not recognized depending on whether or not their expected impact was also 
factored into the fair value of the reporting unit. 
1083 This would also correspond with the general rules in SFAS 5. 
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over- or understate the implied fair value of goodwill when conducting the initial im-
painnent test. 1084 
Finally, in-process research and development assets that would have to be written off to 
earnings when acquired in a business combination1085 are included in the allocation proc-
ess for purposes of goodwill impairment testing. 1086 
4.6.1.3 Measurement 
Regarding measurement issues, detailed guidance is given in SFAS 141.37 for the meas-
urement of assets acquired and liabilities assumed, excluding goodwill. The recommen-
dations include several variants of fair value measurements, most of which require esti-
mates. 
In a purchase price allocation that follows an actual acquisition, the sum of the amounts 
assigned to assets acquired and liabilities assumed is in effect limited to some extent by 
the cost of the acquired entity. According to SF AS 141.44, the amounts assigned to as-
sets acquired and liabilities assumed are reduced pro rata when their sum exceeds the 
cost of the acquired entity. 1087 No such limit exists when the fair value of reporting unit 
net assets is detennined for purposes of the second test step. If management has incentive 
to overstate any goodwill impainnent loss, it will assess the fair value of reporting unit 
net assets at the highest possible amount, without being restricted by the cost of the ac-
quired entity. 
4.6.2 Inclusion of estimates 
SF AS l 42.22 requires that the best estimate of a goodwill impainnent loss be recognized 
in the financial statements in those cases where the second test step is not completed be-
fore the financial statements are issued, a goodwill impainnent loss is probable, and can 
be reasonably estimated. This implies that "slow" finns can include or exclude an esti-
1084 However, it is not fully clear that preacquisition contingencies in the goodwill impairment test pro-
vide discretion over and above that already involved in accounting for contingencies under Sf AS 5. 
1085 According to FIN 4.5, the amounts assigned to tangible and intangible assets to be used in a particular 
research and development project that have no alternative future use shall be charged to expense at 
the acquisition date. This requirement is carried over unchanged in SFAS 141.42. However, the 
FASB recently announced its intention to revoke FIN 4 in order to achieve convergence with IFRS. 
1086 See SFAS 142.21 fit . 14. 
1087 Exempt from this rule are financial assets other than equity-method investments, assets to be disposed 
of by sale, deferred tax assets, prepaid assets relating to pension or other postretirement benefit plans, 
and any other current assets. 
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mated goodwill impainnent loss based on their financial reporting incentives. The criteria 
"probable" and "reasonably estimable", originally defined in SF AS 5, 1088 are sufficiently 
discretionary to allow management to argue either way. However, finns are required to 
disclose that the measurement of the impainnent loss is an estimate. 1089 After completion 
of the second test step, any necessary adjustments to the estimated losses are recognized. 
This provision will not play a major role in the transition period. SFAS 142.55 specifi-
cally states that the transitional goodwill impainnent test "must be completed ... no later 
than the end of the year of initial application." Therefore, a situation where a finn relies 
on estimated goodwill impainnent losses because the second test step has not been com-
pleted before issuance of the financial statements is not provided for under SFAS 142. 
4. 7 Transition 
The provisions in SFAS 142 are written from the perspective of how goodwill arising 
from a recent acquisition is to be accounted for. For example, SFAS 142.32 requires that 
assets acquired and liabilities assumed "be assigned to a reporting unit as of the acquisi-
tion date". However, special problems arise when finns are required to apply SFAS 142 
for the first time in the year of transition. For purposes of initial application, transition 
provisions are given in SF AS 142.48-6 l. This section discusses transition-specific issues 
and the effects of these issues on the degree of discretion available to management when 
making the goodwill write-off decision and detennining the amount, if any, to write 
off_ 1090 
4. 7.1 Effective date and initial application 
SFAS 142 takes effect in fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2001, with early 
application pennitted for finns that have fiscal years beginning after March 15, 2001. 1091 
To ensure consistent application, early application is only pennitted if the first interim 
1088 SFAS 5.3 lit a: "Probable. The future event or events are likely to occur." (Emphasis in original.) See 
also SFAS 5.8 lit. b. 
1089 See SFAS 142.22, 47 lit. c. 
1090 Some of these issues have already been touched upon within the relevant sections of this chapter. 
1091 See SFAS 142.48 lit. a. 
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statements of the fiscal year have not been issued previously. 1092 Retroactive application 
is not permitted. 1093 
Some of the rules in SFAS 142 become effective before initial application. Goodwill 
acquired in a business combination for which the acquisition date is between June 30, 
2001, and the firm's initial application of SF AS 142, is no longer amortized but tested for 
impairment in accordance with APB Opinion 17 or SF AS 12 I. 1094 However, goodwill 
acquired in a business combination completed before July 1, 2001, continues to be amor-
tized until initial application of SF AS 142. 1095 If firms were interested in avoiding good-
will amortization, they had incentive to consider postponing any pending acquisitions 
until after June 30, 2001 . Conversely, had firms preferred to amortize the greatest possi-
ble amount of their existing goodwill until amortization ceased upon initial application of 
SFAS 142, they would have tended to accelerate any pending acquisitions in order to 
complete them before the cut-off date on July 1, 2001. 1096 
4.7.2 Transitional impairment test 
The prescription in SFAS 142.55 was intended to ease the transition:!097 Firms were 
given six months' time to complete the first step of the goodwill impairment test in each 
reporting unit and another six months for the second step. 1098 Initial application took 
place as of the beginning of the fiscal year. 1099 Therefore, a calendar-year applied SF AS 
142 as of January 1, 2002, completed the first test step by June 30, 2002, and carried out 
1092 This implies that firms with a March 31 year-end can only apply SF AS 142 in their fiscal year ending 
on March 31, 2002, if no first-quarter interim reports, prepared under the SF AS 142 predecessor rules, 
were published. Since SFAS 142 was issued on June 29, 2001, firms only had one and a half months 
to change their reporting to SFAS 142. SEC filing requirements allow firms 45 days to issue their 
quarterly reports. 
1093 See SFAS 142.48 lit. a. 
1094 See SFAS 142.50-1. 
1095 See SFAS 142.50. 
1096 Such behavior would represent earnings management by "real" decisions ("Sachverhaltsgestaltun-
gen") as discussed in section 3.3.1.1 above. 
1097 See SFAS 142.B210-1. 
1098 More precisely, "the second step of the transitional goodwill impairment test must be completed as 
soon as possible, but no later than the end of the year of initial application" (SF AS 142.55 [ emphasis 
added]). 
1099 See SFAS 142.55. 
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the second test step by December 31 , 2002. 1100 As has been discussed briefly above, 
SFAS 142.58 required that firms conduct the first annual impairment tests in the transi-
tion year also. 1101 Besides, the existence of impairment indicators at some time during the 
transition year would have triggered additional impairment tests. 1102 Therefore, work on 
up to three parallel goodwill impairment tests was possibly carried out within each re-
porting unit during the transition year. 
The transition provisions gave firms considerable flexibility regarding the timing of any 
goodwill impairment loss, enabling management to delay or accelerate it according to 
their financial reporting incentives, since the impairment test could be completed any 
time during the first twelve months. Likewise, a firm's announcement that no goodwill 
impairment loss has occurred can also be delayed or accelerated almost at will. Prior re-
search has shown that management prefers to disclose "bad news" in later, rather than 
earlier quarters .1103 It must be stressed that the information used in the transitional good-
will impairment test was based on the situation at the beginning of the year of initial ap-
plication. The Board intended that the initial impairment test capture any goodwill im-
pairment losses that result from a change in methodology, 1104 rather than primarily from 
economic events. Consequently, these transitional goodwill impairment losses were re-
ported as a change in accounting principle. 1105 
In conclusion, while the transition provision did allow management discretion regarding 
the timing of disclosure of goodwill write-off behavior, it should not, in theory, have en-
abled management to exercise discretion with regard to the substance of that decision. 
However, in practice it is doubtful that management actually did use (possibly outdated) 
information and assumptions based on what it knew on January I, 2002, when conduct-
1100 SFAS 142.22 allowed firms to use the ,,best estimate" (as defined in SFAS 5) of any goodwill im-
pairment loss when any required second test steps were not completed by fiscal year-end. As dis-
cussed briefly above, it is not entirely clear whether this rule applies to the transitional impairment 
test. At any rate, SFAS 142.55 does not refer to SFAS 142.22, which suggests that the twelve-month 
period is binding. So does the formulation in Sf AS 142.55 ("must"). See fn . I 098 above. 
1101 Refer to section 4. 3. I. I above. 
1102 See SFAS 142.57. For a discussion of impairment indicators that induce unscheduled impairment 
tests, refer to section 4.3 .2 above. 
1103 See, for example, Elliott and Shaw (1988, p. 97) and Mendenhall and Nichols (1988). 
1104 More precisely, the transitional SF AS 142 goodwill impairment test was meant to capture impairment 
not detected by the goodwill impairment test prescribed by the predecessor standard, SFAS 121 . For a 
brief description of that procedure, refer to section 2.3.2 .2.1 above. 
1101 See SFAS 142.8209. Economic value declines that had occurred until the end of the previous year 
should have been captured by impairment tests carried out according to the predecessor standard(s), 
SF AS 121 and/or APB Opinion 17. 
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ing the second step of the goodwill impainnent test some time during, say, the fourth 
quarter of 2002. 
4.7.3 Transitional presentation and disclosures 
Presentation issues are argued here to be especially relevant for goodwill write-off be-
havior in the transition year. A goodwill impainnent loss resulting from the transitional 
goodwill impainnent test is reported as the effect of a change in accounting principle. 1106 
It is presented in the income statement between the subtotals "extraordinary items" and 
"net income", along with any related income tax effects. 1107 
Since the transitional goodwill impairment test is based on the situation as of the first of 
the transition year, any transitional goodwill impainnent loss is recognized in the first 
interim period, irrespective of when the test is completed. Consistent with SF AS 3, Re-
porting Accounting Changes in Interim Financial Statements, the first-quarter report and 
all other quarterly reports preceding the period in which the transitional goodwill im-
painnent loss is measured, are restated to reflect the accounting change. 1108 The effect is 
included in the first-quarter report as well as any cumulative year-to-date or last-twelve-
months-to-date financial reports that comprise that first quarter. For example, if the tran-
sitional goodwill impairment loss in a calendar-year firm is measured in November, the 
resulting effect is reported by restating net income in the first-quarter report and net in-
come figures reported in the second-quarter report ("year-to-date June 30") and third-
quarter report ("year-to-date September 30"). In contrast, any "regular" goodwill im-
pairment loss that does not result from the transitional test must be presented as a sepa-
rate line item in the income statement, above "income from continuing operations" or a 
similar subtotal. 1109 
Prior research suggests that not all components of net income are viewed equally by fi-
nancial statement users, since some are judged to be more relevant to forecasting future 
cash flows than others. 1110 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that financial statement 
users' perceptions of a goodwill impairment loss differed depending on whether this loss 
was reported as the effect of a change in accounting principle (and disclosed as a re-
1106 If not stated explicitly otherwise, refer to SFAS 142.56 for the provisions discussed in this chapter. 
1107 Per-share information must also be presented for the accounting change. 
1108 See SFAS 142.56. Refer to SFAS 3.10. 
1109 An exception applies to a goodwill impairment loss that is associated with a discontinued operation, 
which must be included within the results of discontinued operations. See SFAS 142.43. 
1110 Refer to section 3.3.2.4.8 above. 
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statement of the first-quarter report) or as a component of the current period's income 
from continuing operations. Possibly, a transitional goodwill impairment loss was viewed 
as a relatively transitory and therefore less value-relevant earnings component, since it 
presumably reflects a change in accounting methodology rather than an economic value 
decline. Under that assumption, management might have had incentive to report the 
highest possible amount as a transitional goodwill impairment loss, thereby decreasing 
the likelihood of further, regular goodwill impairment losses in the near future. In order 
to achieve that goal, management might have chosen to diverge from the requirement to 
base the transitional impairment test on the first of the transition year. 1111 The date on 
which management based the transitional impairment test depends on whether a punish-
ment was expected to result from deviating from the first of the fiscal year and on 
whether the situation that existed as of the first of the fiscal year was more or less suited 
to achieve management's financial reporting incentives.1112 
Another required disclosure in the transition period relates to the results of the first test 
step. Upon completion of the first step of the initial goodwill impairment test, firms had 
to disclose in their interim financial information any reportable segment(s) in which a 
transitional goodwill impairment loss was expected. 1113 Depending on their financial re-
porting incentives, management might have used this disclosure obligation to "warn" 
financial statement users of an impending goodwill impairment loss in one or more of its 
reporting segments, before this loss was finally measured. Although not explicitly re-
quired, management might have had incentive to voluntarily disclose a numerical esti-
mate of the anticipated loss in order to "guide" financial statement users' expecta-
tions.1114 
4.7.4 Reclassification of goodwill and intangible assets 
It has been discussed above that SF AS 141 defines new recognition criteria for intangible 
assets acquired in a business combination.1115 SFAS 142.49, parallel to SFAS 141.61, 
requires that these criteria be applied retroactively to intangibles assets and goodwill pre-
viously recognized in a business combination for which the acquisition date was before 
1111 See also the preceding section 4.7.2. 
1112 For example, if management intended to record the highest possible transitional goodwill impairment 
loss, it would have based the transitional test on a date at which the economic situation justified an 
exceptionally large goodwill impairment loss. 
1113 See SFAS 142.60. 
1114 For this type of"expectations management", refer to section 3.3.2.4.5.1 above. 
1113 Refer to section 4.6.1. 
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July l, 200 l . 1116 Due to this requirement, the carrying amounts of previously acquired 
intangible assets that did not fulfill the recognition criteria now contained in SF AS 
141.39 had to be reclassified as goodwill as of the date of initial application of SFAS 
142. 1117 Conversely, carrying amounts of items previously recognized within goodwill 
(or within similar balance sheet items such as goodwill and other intangible assets) had to 
be reclassified and recognized as separate intangible assets if these items met the above 
criteria. This would presume that accounting records had been maintained for all of these 
items. 1118 
These reclassification provisions gave management the opportunity to use the inherent 
discretion to either increase or decrease the total carrying amount of goodwill, condi-
tional on their financial reporting incentives. Reclassifying intangible assets to goodwill 
would have resulted in an increased carrying value of goodwill. Since intangible assets 
are frequently amortized under SFAS 142.12, unless they have indefinite useful lives, 
reducing the carrying amount of intangible assets in favor of the carrying amount of 
goodwill would have resulted in less amortization expense in future periods. However, 
the likelihood of goodwill impairment losses would have increased correspondingly. 
Therefore, it is not entirely clear which incentive dominated when management increased 
goodwill by reclassifying amounts previously recognized as separate intangible assets (or 
by avoiding to reclassify amounts previously recognized as goodwill in favor of separate 
intangible assets). 1119 
4.8 Intermediate results 
In this chapter, it is demonstrated by a detailed analysis of SFAS 142 that the goodwill 
impairment test in most of its facets is a highly discretionary procedure that allows man-
agement to coordinate goodwill write-off behavior with their financial reporting objec-
1116 The acquisition date ordinarily is the date assets are received and other assets are given, liabilities are 
assumed or incurred, or equity interests are issued (SFAS 141 .48). 
1117 See SF AS 141.61 lit. a. This requirement includes any related deferred tax liabilities. 
1118 See SFAS 142.49 lit b. fn. 25. 
1119 Reclassifying goodwill to intangible assets would have had the reverse effect. Amortization expense 
was likely to increase, unless most of the reclassified intangible assets were determined to have in-
definite useful lives. The likelihood of future goodwill impairment losses decreased correspondingly. 
Here again, a trade-off of different financial reporting incentives would have been involved. 
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tives. In this respect, SF AS 142 does not appear to differ to a great extent from the prede-
cessor standard, SFAS 121.1120 
Management estimates and other subjective elements are required at all stages. 1121 The 
relevant rules refer to other vague terms and subjective provisions that are scattered 
throughout a wide range of GAAP pronouncements. Recognition rules that invoke vague 
terms such as "significant", "probable", or "substantial" provide extensive elbowroom 
for management. 1122 So do measurement provisions that call for estimated values or fair 
value measurements that, in the absence of quoted market prices, rely on valuation tech-
niques. In addition to being subjective, the difficulties associated with estimating uncer-
tain future cash flows contributes to the fact that these procedures generate potentially 
unreliable results. In other words, SF AS 142 creates verifiability problems due to both 
measurer bias and measurement bias. 1123 
However, several factors restrict management's ability to use these discretionary ele-
ments in a short-sighted manner to influence goodwill write-off behavior in the year of 
transition. 1124 For example, Liidenbach and Frowein (2003) stress that the "fictitious" 
purchase price allocation in step two of the impairment test is largely guided by the pro-
cedures applied to prior actual purchase price allocations in acquisitions. 1125 Further, 
auditors are required to review management's assumptions and expectations,1126 and the 
threat of SEC enforcement and potential shareholder litigation might discipline manage-
ment even further. 1127 With regard to the use of valuation techniques to measure report-
ing unit fair value, the use of marketplace participants' assumptions, where available, 
also limits subjectivity. Further, timing flexibility might be limited by the fact that annual 
1120 See also Segal (2003, p. 29). According to Osterland (2002), "the new rules aren't likely to hold .. 
management any more accountable for the success or failure of [a] merger than the pooling method 
did." 
1121 See also Hitz and Kuhner (2002, p. 283). 
1122 For example, Aharony and Dotan (2001) show that different groups (financial analysts, managers, and 
external auditors) ascribe different interpretations to the SFAS 5 criteria "remote" and "probable". 
Analysts are found to be more conservative regarding numerical interpretations than are managers and 
auditors, who assign similar percentages to these verbal criteria. Further, they refer to earlier research 
that found the threshold "remote" and "reasonably possible" ranging from 15% to 25% and that be-
tween "reasonably possible" and "probable" at 67% to 70%. See Aharony and Dotan (2001, p. 5). 
1123 See Holthausen and Watts (2001, p. 28). 
1124 For a general discussion of constraints to earnings management, refer to section 3.3.2.5 above. 
1125 See LUdenbach and Frowein (2003, p. 220). 
1126 Hitz and Kuhner (2002, p. 285) are concerned about auditors' ability to fulfill this role in the context 
ofSFAS 142. 
1127 See Kahle (2002b, p. 903) and Kilting, Weber and Wirth (2001, p. 198). 
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tests must be conducted at fixed dates every year. The discretion related to goodwill from 
future acquisitions will be limited by the fact that management must document its as-
sumptions and expectations related to these transactions and is therefore likely to be held 
accountable by them. 1128 
The above analysis indicates that, with the impairment-only approach set down in SF AS 
142, the F ASB chose to prescribe a highly discretionary method of accounting for good-
will subsequent to its initial recognition and measurement. 1129 While it is difficult to as-
certain if SFAS 142 is more or Jess discretionary than the predecessor rules, 1130 it proba-
bly did not fundamentally change the fact that accounting for goodwill remains one of 
the most subjective areas in financial reporting. 1131 According to Wilson (1996), "unre-
lated measurement experts would have a difficult time assessing changes in the value of 
goodwill, even if they were fully aware of management's private information about re-
lated economic activity". 1132 Especially with respect to the transitional SF AS 142 good-
will write-off, it is argued that it is almost completely at management's discretion 
whether, at what amount, and when such charges are recorded.1133 
1128 See SFAS 141.50-1. See also Hitz and Kuhner (2002, p. 276). However, this requirement does not 
apply to goodwill existing upon adoption. 
1129 Given this result, it is somewhat surprising to learn that the Board originally discussed a different 
approach, which it eventually rejected because it involved "numerous subjective judgments", afforded 
"opportunities for manipulation of reported amounts in financial statements" and led to "concerns 
about its operationality". See SFAS 142.873 (all quotes). Under this "discernible-elements approach" 
(SFAS 142.871-873), the reasons for paying a premium over the fair value of the acquired net assets 
would have been documented, and the recorded amount of goodwill would have been allocated to 
these discernible elements. All of these elements would then have been either amortized or carried 
forward without amortization, based on their respective useful lives. This approach would have re-
sulted in part of goodwill being amortized over some weighted-average useful life, with the remaining 
portion being accounted for under an impairment-only approach. It could be argued that this account-
ing treatment could not logically have resulted in more accounting discretion than the procedure ulti-
mately chosen: In the one extreme, all of goodwill would have been classified as indefinite-lived and 
not amortized. This would have corresponded with the current accounting treatment. In the other ex-
treme, all of goodwill would have been classified as finite-lived and amortized over the weighted av-
erage of the useful lives of the discernible elements. The recorded goodwill amount would have been 
reduced by amortization charges annually, which tends to limit management's discretion over both 
the recorded goodwill amount and annual goodwill-related charges. A small annual charge can also be 
achieved under the current treatment, when firms use their discretion to generate moderate goodwill 
impairment losses each year. Possibly, reasons other than concerns over subjectivity and discretion in-
1130 
fluenced the FASB's decision in favor of the impairment-only approach ultimately codified. 
Segal (2003, p. 11) claims that "SFAS No. 142 may very well not enhance the reporting for goodwill 
impairment in either the short or the long run. The [inherent] discretion ... may lead to amounts that 
do not reflect the economic reality of the firm." 
1131 See, for example, Dunstan (1999, p. 2). From a German perspective, see Kilting (1997). 
1 m See also Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002), Jennings et al. (1996, p. 530), 
11 n See also Elliott and Hanna (1996, p. 150 fu . 10). 
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5 Empirical investigation of write-off determinants 
5. I Chapter overview 
In this chapter, a cross-sectional research design is adopted to investigate the detenni-
nants of publicly listed U.S. industrial finns' decision to write off (or not write-off) 
goodwill upon transition to SFAS 142 and of the amount written off, if any. The tenn 
"goodwill write-off' is used to refer collectively to these aspects. A cross-sectional ap-
proach mitigates the potential effects of changing macroeconomic circumstances and 
financial reporting rules on write-off activity. So far, Segal's (2003) and Henning, Shaw 
and Stock's (2002) analyses appear to be the only empirical studies on aspects of SFAS 
142 goodwill write-offs. 1134 
The analysis in this chapter proceeds as follows: In section 5.2, testable hypotheses about 
the detenninants of management's financial reporting behavior pertaining to transitional 
SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs are developed. Section 5.3 contains the definition of vari-
ables derived from the hypotheses, an outline of the sample selection procedure, as well 
as descriptive information and frequency analyses on sample firms. In section 5.4, appli-
cable regression methodology is discussed, followed by Probit tests of the write-off deci-
sion and Tobit tests of the write-off amount. Model specification and robustness are in-
vestigated in both cases in order to assess the validity of inferences. In section 5.5, the 
empirical findings are summarized and potential limitations to the conclusions are dis-
cussed. 
5.2 Hypothesis development 
5.2.1 Overview 
In this section, explicit hypotheses about the determinants of the goodwill write-off in the 
year of initial application of SF AS 142 are derived. 1135 These hypotheses are based on the 
theory, presented in chapter 3, on possible determinants of (and market reactions to) dis-
cretionary asset write-offs in general. However, the specific motivations pertaining to the 
issue of goodwill accounting (discussed in section 2.4) and the unique discretionary pa-
rameters available to management upon adoption of SF AS 142 (subject of chapter 4) are 
1134 However, Segal (2003) does not differentiate between transitional and regular write-offs, but focuses 
on a comparison of write-offs under SF AS 121 versus SF AS 142. The question addressed in Henning, 
Shaw and Stock's (2002) paper is whether certain valuation models can predict the amount and timing 
of transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs. 
1135 For calendar-year firms, this year was January 1 to December 31, 2002. 
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also considered in order to customize the predictions to the SF AS 142 setting analyzed 
here_ 1136 
Two general types of hypotheses are considered with respect to the transitional SF AS 
142 goodwill write-off: First, predictions are made regarding the outcome of a firm's 
write-off decision, i.e. the likelihood that a write-off is expected at all, regardless of any 
concrete amount. These hypotheses are later tested using Probit regression methodology, 
in an attempt to discriminate between write-off and non-write-off firms. Second, to the 
extent that these or other determinants are expected to additionally influence the write-off 
amount, i.e. a "the more the larger" or comparable relation is predicted, this group of 
hypotheses is subjected to Tobit regression analysis. Viewed in conjunction with the two 
general types of write-off determinants introduced in section 3.3.2.1 above, Table 4 
represents a matrix of hypothesis categories, which are elaborated upon below. All hy-












Hypotheses about economic factors deter-
minint? the write-off decision 
H~ 
Hypotheses about economic factors influ-
encing the write-off amount, given the 
write-off decision 
Considered up to the end of fiscal 2001 




Hypotheses about financial reporting in-
centives controlling the write-off decision 
H: 
Hypotheses about financial reporting in-
centives influencing the write-off amount, 
e:iven the write-off decision 
Considered up to the end offiscal 2002 
SFAS 142.55 requires that the transitional impairment test be based upon the information 
and circumstances prevalent at the transition date. Therefore, economic developments 
taking place subsequent to that date cannot affect the write-off as long as goodwill im-
pairment is measured true to the spirit of the rule. Consequently, all economic-factors 
variables (see Table 6) represent time periods ending on or before the end of fiscal 2001. 
In contrast to this, considering management's financial reporting incentives implies that 
information is likely to be lost where data are restricted to the pre-fiscal 2002 period. 
Although strictly required to base impairment testing on the situation as of the transition 
date, management is given up to one year's time to complete the transitional impairment 
1136 With these hypotheses, ex ante motivations that predict earnings management are presented, in con-
trast to relying on ex post realizations of actual earnings that are indicative of some earnings 
management pattern. See Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000, p. 4). 
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test. 1137 Financial reporting incentives prevailing subsequent to the transition date, i.e. 
during fiscal 2002, are likely to have dominated write-off decision and amount. Conse-
quently, incentive variables represent time periods ending on or before the end of fiscal 
2002. 
5 .2.2 Economic factors 
If, as the FASB suggests, the SFAS 142 procedure measures goodwill impairment relia-
bly, transitional goodwill write-offs reported by the sample firms can be expected to re-
sult (in part) from economic value declines that caused (some ot) firms' reporting unit 
fair values to fall below their respective book values, including goodwill (first test step), 
and, consequently, led to (some ot) the book values of firms' reporting unit goodwills 
exceeding their respective implied fair values (second test step). 1138 These two test steps 
mirror the distinction made above, between the write-off decision and the write-off 
amount: Goodwill impairment will, first, trigger test step one and, second, determine the 
amount to be written off on test step two. To the extent that accurate measures for the 
(unobservable) goodwill impairment can be devised, these proxy variables are expected 
to be associated with both the write-off decision and the amount written off. 
Ideally, the individual "true" fair values of firms' reporting units, in combination with 
these reporting units' respective book values, should be used to detect the existence and 
extent of impairment. If these values were observable, management would be required by 
SF AS 142.23 to use them in the actual impairment test. 1139 Based on the spirit of the 
standard, an ideal-type measure of goodwill impairment is a reporting unit-level "fair 
value-to-book ratio" or MTB ratio. Where this measure is smaller than one, the book 
value of any reporting unit goodwill is no longer justified by the reporting unit's fair 
value. 1140 Since most reporting units are not publicly traded and firms are not required to 
disclose reporting unit data at this fine level of detail, a second-best solution would imply 
using operating segment fair values in combination with operating segment book values, 
i.e. operating segment-level MTB ratios.1141 However, operating segment fair values are 
1137 SeeSFAS 142.55 . 
11 38 Refer to sections 4.5 and 4.6 for a detailed description of the goodwill impairment testing procedure. 
1139 As discussed in section 4.5.1, SFAS 142.23-25 describes a fair value hierarchy that firms are expected 
to adhere to, in order to obtain the best possible estimate of the unobservable "true" reporting unit fair 
value. Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002) use different valuation models to estimate the write-off 
amount. 
1140 See SFAS 142.19. 
114 1 Refer to section 4.4 for the level of aggregation at which sub-units of the firm are tested for goodwill 
impairment, and for the relation of reporting units and operating segments. 
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also not disclosed. 1142 Also, even where such sub-entity-level fair value measures were 
available, the extent to which such accounting numbers measure "true" fair value is open 
to debate. 
These constraints make it necessary to use entity-level data in this study. This problem is 
also acknowledged by Segal (2003), who uses enterprise-level estimates of expected 
goodwill impairment. 1143 The entity-level MTB ratio is a crude proxy for the reporting 
unit-level MTB ratio because, at the entity level, goodwill impairment in one reporting 
unit can be offset by internally generated goodwill in another. 1144 However, whenever the 
entity-level MTB ratio is smaller than one at the transition date, impaired goodwill is 
likely to be found in at least one of the reporting units. 1145 
H~c 1: 
Ceteris paribus, a negative relation exists 
between the write-off decision and the 
firm's MTB ratio. 
H!c 1: 
Ceteris paribus, a negative relation exists 
between the write-off amount and the 
firm 's MTB ratio. 
As discussed in section 3.3.2.2 above, extant literature documents that "firms write down 
assets during periods of poor performance." 1146 In most studies of write-off determinants, 
variables representing the recent developments in market-based performance measures as 
well as accounting-based performance measures are included to capture the extent to 
which goodwill write-offs are determined by economic factors.1147 Declining stock prices 
and decreasing accounting-based performance measures, such as return on assets (ROA), 
1142 SFAS 142 requires some segment-level disclosures. However, these do not include segment fair val-
ues. 
1143 See Segal (2003, p. 23). A similar procedure is adopted by Riedl (2002, p. 3), who analyzes SFAS 
121 write-offs. This approach is supported by Strong and Meyer's (I 987, p. 650) finding that 
"[w]ritedown firms exhibit subpar performance [relative to a control group] on .. . market-to-book ra-
tio". 
1144 Refer to section 4.4 above. This problem will tend to occur more frequently in firms with multiple 
reporting units that are economically dissimilar. 
1145 The only exception to this rule occurs when the fair values of all reporting units with goodwill allo-
cated to them are higher than the respective book values. The low entity-level MTB ratio, then, is 
"caused" exclusively by reporting units that have no goodwill allocated to them. 
1146 White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, p. 279). 
1147 See Segal (2003, p. 16), Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, pp. 122-3), and Riedl (2002, pp. 9-10). 
Here again, firm-level data are used as proxy variables for reporting unit performance. 
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may signal that the future prospects of a firm have deteriorated. 1148 Again, (unavailable) 
reporting unit performance data should ideally be used because reporting unit underper-
formance could require a goodwill write-off even where the entity as a whole appears 
unaffected. The costs of procuring the second-best segment data seem to be out of pro-
portion compared to the expected improvement in proxy variable accuracy. 
u~c 2a: 
Ceteris paribus, a negative relation exists 
between the write-off decision and the 
firm 's stock return. 
H~c 2b: 
Ceteris paribus, a negative relation exists 
between the write-off decision and the 
firm's change in ROA. 
H!c 2a: 
Ceteris paribus, a negative relation exists 
between the write-off amount and the 
firm's stock return. 
H!c 2b: 
Ceteris paribus, a negative relation exists 
between the write-off amount and the 
firm's change in ROA. 
The likelihood of impairment is frequently assumed to be especially high where firms 
operate in industries with declining performance.1149 While the obsolescence of individ-
ual assets and technologies might affect whole industries, it seems more difficult to jus-
tify why poor industry performance as such, incremental to individual firm performance, 
should have explanatory power for goodwill impairment in individual firms. On the con-
trary, good performers in poorly performing industries might try to "get away" with eco-
nomically unwarranted write-offs. 
5.2.3 Financial reporting incentives 
Economic-consequences incentives and capital market-related incentives are argued to 
influence goodwill write-offs. Consequently, the two groups of hypotheses developed in 
this section are based on different sets of assumptions: First, predictions concerning eco-
nomic-consequences incentives as discussed in section 3.3.2.3 must consider how transi-
tional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs influence contractual outcomes and how they affect 
potential regulation. Second, hypotheses about capital market-related incentives as de-
scribed in section 3.3.2.4 presume certain beliefs on the part of management regarding 
1148 Considering changes (versus levels) in performance variables is more likely to capture economic 
impairments because accounting for impairment is not intended to capture low performance in abso-
lute terms, but declines in asset value that result from decreasing performance. No explicit assumption 
is made here regarding the temporal relation between accounting-based and price-based performance 
measures, i.e. accounting-based performance measures are not expected to lead price-based perform-
ance measures and vice versa. 
1149 See Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 123), Riedl (2002, pp. 9-10), and Segal (2003, p. 17). 
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the way transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs are perceived by capital market par-
ticipants, such as (potential) shareholders, debt holders, financial analysts and rating 
agencies. 1150 
5.2.3.1 Economic-consequences incentives 
5. 2. 3.1.1 Compensation 
As discussed in section 3.3.2.3.3, managements' income is frequently determined by re-
ported accounting earnings. To the extent that the present value of managers' current and 
future accounting earnings-based compensation is affected by transitional SFAS 142 
goodwill write-offs, this decision can be expected to be influenced by compensation con-
siderations.1151 Ideally, compensation plan details for each of the individuals relevant to 
write-off behavior would be used to test this prediction. Since the cost of procuring this 
information is prohibitive, several simplifying assumptions are necessary. 
First, the income of financial reporting decision makers is at least in part determined by 
the firms' accounting earnings, i.e. accounting earnings-based compensation plans exist. 
Previous research shows that CEO compensation is positively related to the firm's ac-
counting performance, even where no explicit accounting earnings-based plans are in 
place. 1152 However, since the actual existence of accounting earnings-based compensa-
tion plans cannot be positively ascertained, it is argued, consistent with prior research, 
that accounting-based plans are more likely to exist in firms with a greater portion of 
assets-in-place, because high-growth option firms are more likely to have compensation 
plans based on stock price. In the latter firms, future prospects are considered more rele-
vant to management compensation than is income generated by existing tangible as-
sets. 1153 
1150 "Managers", "management", or "firms" in this context refers to the person or group of persons ulti-
mately responsible for making financial reporting decisions. In most cases, this will be either the chief 
executive officer (CEO) or the chief financial officer (CFO). 
1151 See also Francis, Hanna and Vincent (I 996, p. 123). 
1152 Smith and Watts (1992, p. 275) report that CEO compensation varies with a measure of accounting 
ROA. See also Murphy (1985). 
1153 See, for example, Dunstan (1999, p. 17), Gaver and Gaver (1995), and Smith and Watts (1992, p. 
264). According to Skinner (1993, p. 419), assets-in-place are "those assets whose ultimate value does 
not principally depend on future discretionary investment by managers", measured by the ratio of the 
book value of PP&E to total firm value. He documents that the investment opportunity set "affects the 
nature of the firms' debt and compensation contracts. Specifically, firms with relatively more assets-
in-place are more likely to employ (i) accounting-based debt covenants in their public debt contracts 
and (ii) bonus plans that tie the bonus directly to accounting earnings" (p. 408). 
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Second, it is assumed that the transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off is ignored in 
accounting earnings-based compensation plans, i.e. the CEO's accounting earnings-based 
bonus is shielded from the effect of SF AS 142 adoption. It has been documented in prior 
research that executive income reflects positive developments, but is protected from 
negative accounting entries to the extent that these have an "unusual" character or result 
from potentially value-enhancing activities such as restructurings. 1154 Since transitional 
SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs can be argued to have both of these characteristics, 1155 it is 
assumed that SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs are unlikely to have an adverse effect on the 
CEO accounting earnings-based compensation in the year of adoption. 1156 
Third, it is expected that write-off behavior nonetheless does influence managers' future 
accounting earnings-based compensation and therefore the present value of that income 
component. Future goodwill write-offs, reported within income from continuing opera-
tions, are likely to be perceived as more pennanent earnings components, having rele-
vance for earnings-based bonuses awarded management. 
Based on these assumptions, managers with accounting-based plans are expected to re-
port transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs in order to shield future accounting earn-
ings and compensation from adverse effects of future write-offs. 1157 
H~ 1: 
Ceteris paribus, a positive relation exists between the write-off decision and the exis-
tence of accounting earnings-based compensation plans for top management. 
5.2.3.1.2 Debt covenants 
As discussed in section 3.3.2.3.4, most firms are a party to lending agreements that spec-
ify certain cutoff points in terms of accounting-based ratios. The violation of these re-
strictive covenants triggers default on the loan, which may result in substantial costs to 
1154 Refer to section 3.3.2.3.3 for a review of this literature. 
1155 For example, Deutsche Telekom AG justified their record-breaking write-off by arguing that it 
stemmed from a "strategic review". See Deutsche Telekom AG, annual report on form 20-F for the 
period ending on December 12, 2002. 
rn6 This assumption seems reasonable despite Healy, Kang and Palepu's {1987) findings that CEO com-
pensation is affected by voluntary changes in accounting procedures, because mandated accounting 
changes are more easily unraveled by compensation committees. Similar results are reported by Ab-
del-khalik ( 1985). 
1157 Because assets-in-place is intended to capture the probability that an accounting-based compensation 
plan exists at all, it is not expected to be linearly associated with the amount. Beatty and Weber 
(2004, p. 15) use recent bonus payments and the existence of a bonus plan based on net income as in-
dicators that a firm is likely to delay goodwill impairment charges. 
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the firm. To the extent that the accounting numbers and ratios specified in debt covenants 
are affected by transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs, it can be expected that write-
off behavior is influenced by managers' desire to avoid covenant violation and the cost 
associated with it. 1158 In order to assess whether debt covenant motivations play a role in 
transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-off behavior, the treatment of the write-off in each 
of the sample firms' covenants must be known. Since obtaining actual covenant data is 
associated with prohibitive costs, 1159 a proxy for firms' closeness to covenant restrictions 
and, consequently, the expected costs of covenant violation is used here.1160 
Regardless of the accounting-based proxy used, it is necessary to assume that the transi-
tional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off will have repercussions on the restrictiveness of 
sample firms' debt covenants at all. For the following reasons, it is assumed that this ac-
counting entry is not entirely ignored in the calculations of debt covenants: 1161 First, debt 
covenants frequently refer to promulgated GAAP for definitions of accounting num-
bers. 1162 The relevant GAAP rules are mainly those in force at the date of calculation 
("rolling" GAAP), not at the original date of debt issuance ("frozen" GAAP). Therefore, 
new accounting standards such as SFAS 142 have the potential to influence the probabil-
ity of covenant default where "rolling GAAP" is used. 1163 
Second, where debt covenants do rely on "fixed GAAP", such modifications to promul-
gated GAAP are regularly conservative, i.e. they decrease, rather than increase, income 
and assets.1164 Where no write-off is taken, the elimination of goodwill amortization, ce-
1158 See also Beatty and Weber (2004, p. 11). 
1159 See also Beneish and Press (1995, p. 338), Moehrle (2002, p. 410), and Press and Weintrop (1990, p. 
65). 
1160 It is not explicitly considered how the cost of technical default is likely to vary across firms. See 
Beneish and Press (1993). Therefore, a finn 's closeness to covenant restrictions is used as a proxy for 
the expected costs of covenant violation. 
1161 Much of the following relies on the findings of Leftwich (1983, pp. 35-6). 
1162 See, for example, Smith and Warner (1979, p. 144). Wans and Zimmerman (1986, p. 213) argue that 
"[t]he specification and preparation of an additional set of accounting statements solely for a debt 
contract is costly." By not specifying "fixed GAAP", managers accept that lenders will require favor-
able terms because of the risk of "covenant-relaxing" earnings management. See also EI-Gazzar, 
Lilien and Pastena (1989). 
1163 To the extent that borrowers and lenders do negotiate debt covenants that specify "tailored" account-
ing rules departing from promulgated GAAP ("fixed GAAP"), transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-
off are unlikely to affect the probability of default. However, recent evidence suggests that, while 
"fixed GAAP" covenants have been gaining importance in recent years, a large portion of extant 
covenants does resort to accounting numbers based on promulgated GAAP rules. See Mohrman 
(1996, pp. 79, 85). The author notes that failure to account for "fixed GAAP" in debt covenants im-
pairs researchers' ability to interpret empirical results pertaining to the debt covenant hypothesis. 
1164 See Leftwich (I 983, p. 36). 
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teris paribus, makes SFAS 142 an income- and asset-increasing accounting rule. On the 
opposite, substantial decreases in both income and assets result where write-offs do oc-
cur. 1165 Given that the treatment of transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs in actual 
lending agreements is unknown, the above finding suggests that write-offs do affect the 
probability of covenant default even where "fixed-GAAP" modifications to promulgated 
GAAP are in place. 1166 In a related study, Cotter (1998) finds no evidence that goodwill 
amortization is added back to the numerator of the interest coverage ratios in Australian 
private debt agreements. 1167 Leftwich's (1983) detailed analysis of "fixed GAAP" provi-
sions suggests that goodwill is "frequently excluded from the asset base against which 
firms may borrow."1168 In that sense, transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs would 
have no potential to influence the asset base, regardless of whether a write-off is taken or 
not. However, he also reports that "goodwill is eliminated from balance sheet numbers 
but amortization is required in the income statement."1169 To the extent that goodwill-
related charges are not added back, any transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off has the 
potential to decrease income and equity, which impairs certain accounting ratios such as 
the DTE ratio. 1170 
Third, departures from GAAP are more common in private rather than public lending 
agreements. 1171 Where sample firms rely at least in part on public debt, the arguments set 
forth above are likely to apply to them. In conclusion, transitional SFAS 142 goodwill 
write-offs are likely to be influenced by debt contracting considerations with regard to 
both decision and amount. 
Since no actual covenant data is available, a relevant proxy variable is used to capture the 
restrictiveness of debt covenants. As discussed in section 3.3.2.3.4, prior research fre-
quently and justifiably relies on the DTE ratio as such a proxy, since a firm's expected 
cost of covenant violation is assumed to increase in its financial leverage. Even though 
other ratios are common in actual covenants, the DTE ratio can be considered a suitable 
1165 Refer to White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, pp. 527-8). 
1166 However, Mohrman (1996, p. 85) finds that "there is no one standard way of writing fixed GAAP 
provisions". 
1167 While this finding alone implies nothing about the treatment of transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-
offs, it does indicate that lenders view goodwill-related charges to be relevant for assessing borrow-
ers' creditworthiness. 
1168 Leftwich (1983, p. 39). See also Foster (1986, p. 595). 
1169 Leftwich (1983, p. 39). 
1170 In addition, even where such write-offs do not occur, debt covenants potentially require that some 
form of amortization charge related to goodwill is made nonetheless. 
1171 See Leftwich (1983, p. 36) and Smith and Warner (1979, p. 144). 
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proxy since most other leverage-related ratios are affected when the DTE ratio deterio-
rates.1172 In addition, capital market participants can be assumed to use the DTE ratio as 
an indicator of firm risk. 1173 Interestingly, an economic standpoint would suggest that 
financially distressed firms (where financial distress is approximated by the extent of 
financial leverage) are more likely than others to have impaired goodwill. 1174 Thus, the 
observation that write-offs are larger and more frequent where financial leverage is com-
paratively low would be strong evidence that write-off behavior is at least in part deter-
mined by financial reporting incentives. Because the absolute DTE ratio in itself is not 
meaningful, industry-adjusted figures are used. 1175 
u: 2 : 
Ceteris paribus, a negative relation exists 
between the write-off decision and the 
firm's industry-adjusted DTE ratio. 
5.2.3.1.3 Political costs 
H~R 2: 
Ceteris paribus, a negative relation exists 
between the write-off amount and the 
firm's industry-adjusted DTE ratio. 
As argued in section 3.3 .2.3.5, adverse legislation and other regulation is frequently di-
rected towards firms with high, allegedly monopolistic earnings. Therefore, "politically 
visible" firms have incentive to take write-offs in order to decrease earnings and firm 
size, reducing political visibility and associated costs. Political visibility is assumed to 
relate to firm size, 1176 market share, industry concentration, and sharp increases in ac-
1172 See Watts and Zimmerman (I 986, p. 216). Dichev and Skinner (2002, pp. 1101-4) find that net worth, 
or equity, is also frequently used in debt covenants. In line with this finding, Beatty and Weber (2004, 
p. 11) predict that SF AS 142 write-off behavior is affected by the presence of net worth-based cove-
nants. See also Mohrman ( I 996, p. 86). However, since this variable is highly correlated with the 
DTE ratio, it is not explicitly considered here. 
1173 See Bernstein (1993, pp. 619-20). As discussed in sections 3.3.2.3 .4 and 5.2.3.1.2 above, similar 
measures are used, for the same reason, in private lending agreements between a firm and its deb-
tholders. See also White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, pp. 130-3). This assumption is supported by the 
common observation that managers attempt to minimize the level of debt by keeping debt off the bal-
ance sheet. S&P (2003, p. 22) reports that, for many firms, "debt leverage ( calculated without any ad-
justments to reported figures) is the only focal point of[financial] policy considerations." Apparently, 
it is quite common to strive for a debt-to-capital ratio of 35%. 
1174 For example, one of the components of Altman's (1968) Z score, a popular predictor of financial 
distress, is the DTE ratio. See also White, Sondhi and Fried (2003, pp. 652-3). 
1175 See also Moehrle (2002, p. 410), who uses the difference between the sample firm's debt-to-assets 
ratio and its weighted average in the firm ' s (four-digit SIC code) industry. 
1176 Since firm size potentially is a proxy for various economic and non-economic effects, it is considered 
as a control variable, not as a political costs proxy. Refer to section 5.2.4 below. 
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counting perfonnance. 1177 However, managers might likewise assume that regulators are 
concerned with post-transition earnings rather than earnings "distorted" by SFAS 142 
adoption, in which case there would be incentive to avoid transitional write-offs, storing 
up future write-off potential. Due to this uncertainty, the following open hypotheses are 
posited.1178 
H~R 3a: 
Ceteris paribus, the write-off decision is associated with the finn ' s market share. 
H~R 3b: 
Ceteris paribus, the write-off decision is associated with measures of concentration in 
the finn's industry. 
H~R 3c: 
Ceteris paribus, the write-off decision is associated with the finn's pre-write-off in-
crease in ROA. 
5.2.3.2 Capital market-related incentives 
5.2.3.2.1 Target accounting 
5 .2.3 .2.1.1 General decision model 
Based on the capital market-related considerations discussed in section 3.3.2.4 above, 
transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs are also expected to reflect the incentive to 
influence stock price favorably, inter a/ia by achieving earnings targets. To be relevant in 
this context, these thresholds must be affected by any transitional SFAS 142 goodwill 
write-off.1179 Because measures of operating earnings exclude accounting changes, bot-
tom-line net income is presumed to be the relevant earnings number. 1180 
1177 Refer to section 3.3.2.3.5, especially Figure 8. Membership in certain industries is also argued to give 
rise to political exposure; however, this notion is not explored here in a regression setting. Refer in-
stead the descriptive information presented in Table A. 2 and Table A. 4. 
1178 Because these variables can be thought of as dummy variables capturing whether or not a firm is 
politically visible, no linear relation to the write-off amount is expected. 
11 79 Refer to section 3.3.2.4.8 for a discussion of this critical assumption. 
1180 The seminal paper, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, pp. 101 -2), also adopts this approach. According to 
S&P (2001), COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual item DATA18 (income before extraordinary items), 
another target figure used by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), excludes transitional SFAS 142 good-
will write-offs and would therefore be unaffected by them. This is because COMPUST AT Industrial 
Annual item DATA192 (extraordinary items) explicitly includes the cumulative effect of accounting 
changes. See S&P (2001, ch. 4, p. 130). 
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Figure 14 contains a simple model of earnings management behavior expected to occur 
when management is concerned about reaching a simple earnings target, T.1181 Following 
prior literature, 1182 two earnings targets are considered: First, prior-year annual earnings 
capture the incentive to avoid earnings declines and, second, zero earnings are relevant 
where management attempts to avoid losses.1183 With respect to the first target, it is as-
sumed that annual 2002 earnings are managed towards a target defined by annual 2001 
earnings. 1184 
0 Decrease earnings by amount ~ (PME - T) 
• 
Figure 14: Earnings management relative to a simple earnings target 
1181 Similar models have been developed by Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000, figures I and 2). See also 





Again, refer to section 3.3.2.4 .5 above. 
Below, these targets are collectively referred to as "the earnings target", T. A third target, analysts' 
(consensus) earnings forecasts, is not explicitly considered here due to lacking data availability as 
well as uncertainties regarding analysts' treatment of transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs. For 
example, Philbrick and Ricks (1991, p. 401) state that "IBES provides no specific instructions to indi-
vidual analysts about the treatment of extraordinary items. While analysts typically forecast EPS be-
fore extraordinary items, 'extraordinary' is undefined." They report that "!BES refers to extraordinary 
items as 'write downs which are at the discretion of management,' while according to GAAP, not all 
discretionary write-downs qualify as extraordinary items" (emphasis in original). Therefore, although 
transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs are not extraordinary items under APB Opinion 30, they 
might or might not nonetheless be adjusted out of 1/8/E/S forecasts . Similarly, Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser (1999, p. 16) state that, according to 1/B/E/S, 1/B/E/S forecasts exclude unusual or non-
recurring charges. For more detail on this issue, refer to section 3.3.2.4.8 above. 
In the special setting considered here, adoption of SF AS 142, the relevant measurement date for both 
actual earnings and earnings targets is not entirely self-evident. On the one hand, any goodwill im-
pairment is to be measured as of the date of initial application (i .e. as of January I, 2002, for calendar-
year firms) and disclosed via a restatement of the first quarterly report of the fiscal year. In that re-
spect, the relevant earnings number would be (restated) first-quarter earnings, and the relevant target 
would be the prior period's first-quarter earnings. However, because firms are given up to 12 months 
to detect and measure any goodwill impairment, more than nine months may elapse before investors 
would learn whether the first-quarter earnings target has been met. It is not reasonable to assume that 
investors attach much relevance to a restated earnings figure for a past time period. Since the year-end 
of fiscal 2002 is the date by which firms are required to complete their initial goodwill impairment 
tests, information on the outcome of the test was not available on a broad scale before the time by 
which annual reports for 2002 were published. 
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If pre-managed earnings, PME, is above the target, management is expected to take ac-
tion O, i.e. engage in earnings management that decreases earnings to a level equal to or 
just above the target. This behavior has been referred to as "cookie jar reserving", 1185 and 
is based on the rationale that reserves are valuable and, by decreasing earnings, manage-
ment reserves a portion of current earnings to balance potential future earnings shortfalls. 
Applied to the SF AS 142 setting, action O would imply that management has incentive 
to take a goodwill write-off equal to or less than the amount by which pre-managed earn-
ings is above the target, (PME - T). Alternatively, if managers of "target beaters" on av-
erage expect to beat targets again in future periods, these firms can be expected to avoid 
transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs altogether, storing up write-off potential for 
future "cookie-jar reserving" purposes. 1186 Since the literature reviewed in section 
3.3.2.4.5.1 indicates that (PME - T) is usually very small, 1187 small or no write-offs 
would be expected in both scenarios. 
On the other hand, if PME is already below the target, management's expected behavior 
depends on the amount of earnings management reserves, R, available to offset the defi-
cit by which PME falls short of T. If reserves are sufficient to achieve T by income-
increasing earnings management, i.e. PME lies between T and (T - R), action e is ex-
pected. In this case, management attempts to achieve earnings in the amount of T by in-
come-increasing earnings management, using up all or part of R in the process. In the 
partial analysis focusing on SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs, R is necessarily zero, since 
negative write-offs (i.e. "write-ups") are not permitted under the standard. 1188 Conse-
quently, alternative e is not available to management in this setting. 
Finally, if R is insufficient to balance the deficit (T - PME), managers are expected to 
maximize future reserves by taking action O. As a second-best solution when achieving 
T is impossible, earnings are decreased by the largest possible amount in order to antici-
pate future write-offs in the current period. This behavior is referred to as the "big bath" 
1185 See Levitt (1998) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000, p. 8). 
1186 Duvall et al. (1992) suggest that investors find it difficult to unravel goodwill-related financial state-
ment effects in later periods, implying that regular goodwill write-offs are likely to be less "visible" 
than transitional ones. 
1187 See, for example, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), who indicate that firms frequently employ earnings 
management to push earnings just beyond the target. In such cases, it would be unreasonable to as-
sume that transitional SFAS 142 write-offs would be used to manage earnings in the opposite direc-
tion. 
1188 Reversals of prior impairment losses are explicitly prohibited by SFAS 142.20. If goodwill could be 
written up ( or goodwill write-offs reversed), a more comprehensive test of the model could be con-
ducted. For example, Moehrle (2002) analyzes whether restructuring charge reversals are used to 
meet or beat earnings targets. 
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strategy. 1189 Applied to the SFAS 142 setting, this rationale implies that managers have 
incentive to write off the highest possible amount of goodwill. 1190 This is especially true 
to the extent that managers expect transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs to be ig-
nored by investors due to their (perceived) transitory nature. 1191 Taken together, the 
write-off amounts are expected to be significantly different where PME ~ T versus 
PME < T, with larger write-offs expected for the second group. 
H~R 4: 
Ceteris paribus, a negative relation exists between the write-off decision and the firms' 
pre-write-off earnings meeting earnings targets. 
5.2.3.2.1.2 Firms exceeding earnings targets 
Consistent with the considerations above, firms that, before the transitional SF AS 142 
goodwill write-off decision is made, exceed their target earnings are assumed to either 
avoid write-offs altogether or engage in "cookie-jar reserving", writing off no more than 
the amount by which pre-write-off earnings exceed the target. 
H?' 5: 
Ceteris paribus, for firms with pre-write-off earnings in excess of targets, a positive 
relation exists between the write-off amount and the amount of the excess. 
5.2.3.2.1.3 Firms falling short of earnings targets 
Where the above model predicts action O ("big bath"), it is not reasonable to assume that 
the available goodwill book value will be written off in full in all cases. Generally, man-
agement will increase the write-off amount as long as the marginal benefits of this behav-
ior exceed the marginal costs. Certain factors are expected to limit the extent to which 
management's net benefits increase in the amount of goodwill written off. 1192 In general, 
where a firm expects that a higher write-off will cause some accounting-based heuristic 
used by (potential) investors to exceed (or fall short of, respectively) some cutoff point, 
the amount written off will be limited by the lower amount of goodwill book value and 
the number relevant to such cutoff point. 
1189 As has been discussed in section 3.3.2.4.6 above, the capital market penalties associated with large 
shortfalls have been found to be proportionately less than those following relatively small shortfalls. 
In other words, managers might consider the benefits of"big bath" accounting to outweigh its cost. 
1190 See also Hitz and Kuhner (2002, p. 285) and KUting, Weber and Wirth (2001, p. 192). 
1191 See also Eberle (2002b, p. 190), Pellens, Sellhom and Weinreis (2002), and Segal (2003, p. 21). Refer 
to section 3.3.2.4.8. 
1192 Among these factors are the contracting considerations discussed in the previous section. 
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Extant empirical research surrounding the debate on goodwill accounting and the pur-
chase/pooling decision mainly focuses on the impact of these procedures on firms' in-
come statements and assets. 1193 It might also be important how a firm's equity and lever-
age are influenced by financial reporting decisions related to goodwill. In the simplest 
case, the write-off amount will be limited by the amount of equity on the firm's books, 
since managers have incentive to avoid negative equity. However, this restriction will 
only apply where goodwill book value is large enough to, where written off completely, 
jeopardize the amount of equity. 
H~ 6: 
Ceteris paribus, for firms that fall short of earnings targets, a positive relation exists 
between the write-off amount and the smaller amount of goodwill and equity. 
While firms that fall short of earnings targets are expected to practice "big bath", the ob-
servation of frequent, large write-offs in that group is not sufficient to conclude that these 
write-offs result from earnings management. This conclusion can be strengthened when 
write-offs are observed to coincide with other indicators of a "big bath" strategy. Accord-
ing to the considerations discussed in section 3.3.2.4.6 above, "big bath" can be expected 
to be most successful when the signal conveyed by management is credibly associated 
with good news. Such circumstances include recent changes in top management, where a 
new CEO re-evaluates corporate strategy and abandons unprofitable operations. 1194 In 
these situations, goodwill write-offs frequently coincide with other restructuring-type 
charges, which have found to be associated with positive stock market reactions. 1195 
Likewise, the assumption that write-offs are recorded as part of a "big bath" strategy 
would be further supported if other income-decreasing earnings management measures 
were observed concurrently. 1196 The focus is placed on coinciding special items, because 
this specific accrual has been documented in prior research to be a low-cost instrument of 
earnings management that might have special relevance in a setting where management 
1193 Refer to section 2.4.4.3 above. 
1194 For a similar hypothesis, refer to Beatty and Weber (2004, p. 12). 
1195 See, for example, Brickley and Van Drunen (I 990). Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks (I 998, p. 328) distin-
guish write-offs that purely reflect declines in asset values from those that result from the decision to 
change operations. Consistent with the notion that the latter category is assumed to convey ( at least in 
part) good news to investors, the authors find positive, albeit insignificant, market reactions to these 
write-offs. For similar evidence, refer to sections 3.3.2.4.6 and 3.4.3.1 above. 
1196 In contrast to this notion, Rees, Gill and Gore (1996, p. 168) argue that "documented abnonnal accru-
als in the write-down year .. . imply that managers are responding to changes in economic circum-
stances as opposed to acting opportunistically." 
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is concerned about achieving earnings targets. 1197 Overall, it must be noted that the si-
multaneous occurrence of goodwill write-offs, restructuring-type charges, and manage-
ment changes does not necessarily imply earnings management, because it might indicate 
that an actual restructuring is under way. 1198 
H~ 7a: 
Ceteris paribus, for finns that fall short of earnings targets, a positive relation exists 
between the write-off decision and a recent CEO change. 
H~R 7b: 
Ceteris paribus, for finns that fall short of earnings targets, a positive relation exists 
between the write-off decision and concurrent restructuring charges. 
H~R 7c: 
Ceteris paribus, for finns that fall short of earnings targets, a positive relation exists 
between the write-off decision and concurrent special items. 
5.2.3.2.2 Rating 
As discussed in section 3.3 .2.4.7, it is proposed that a manager's financial reporting deci-
sion is influenced by its expected repercussions on rating agencies' assessments of the 
finn and potentially resulting changes in the cost of capital. The discussion in that section 
outlines the rating process and the role of financial ratios in that process. Measures of 
financial leverage are crucial elements in arriving at a rating. Therefore, it is likely that 
managers are concerned about the effect that transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs 
might have on measures of financial leverage. 
S&P is concerned about a lack of balance sheet comparability due to internationally dif-
ferent accounting treatments of goodwill. 1199 With specific regard to SF AS 142, S&P 
recommends in its proposal of a "core earnings" measure that goodwill impainnent 
charges be excluded from core earnings. 1200 However, no statement is made to the effect 
1197 See Marquardt and Wiedman (2002, pp. 29-30). In a related study, Kinney and Trezevant (1997) 
report that firms incur negative special items to achieve "big bath" results. See also Pourciau (1993, p. 
330). Although special items are by definition expected to average out to zero under normal circum-
stances, both studies report negative means for special items. 
1198 It is the coincidence of all those factors combined in firms that have a powerful "big bath" incentive 
(i.e. falling short of a target) that provides a strong indication that earnings management is behind the 
write-off. 
1199 See S&P (2003, p. 31). 
1200 See S&P (2002). Charges due to other asset write-offs are also added back to earnings, which affects 
earnings-based ratios. See S&P (2003, p. 53). 
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that write-offs are adjusted for in the balance sheet. On the contrary, an S&P analyst 
states that, "in general [the way in which a finn's SFAS 142 goodwill write-off impacts 
its credit rating] is not a yes or no answer and the impact on rating, if any, will be as-
sessed based on numerous qualitative as well as quantitative attributes associated with 
the writedown, and the reasons thereof, as well as any other potential consequences such 
as violation of debt covenants, minimum regulatory capital requirements, etc." 1201 This 
statement suggests that S&P treats SFAS 142 write-offs similar to direct deductions of 
goodwill from equity. Therefore, transitional SFAS 142 write-offs have the potential to 
alter leverage ratios via their effect on stockholders' equity. Managers, then, have incen-
tive to limit the write-offs effect on financial leverage ratios.1202 
Elliott and Hanna (1996) report that bond ratings, as a measure of financial risk, decline 
as finns record discretionary asset write-offs, especially where such write-offs occur re-
peatedly in consecutive years. 1203 Knowing this, managers might have incentive to avoid 
such write-offs. 1204 Therefore, it is assumed here that finns with low bond ratings are 
more reluctant than others to further jeopardize their rating by recording a write-off.1205 
H~8: H~R8: 
Ceteris paribus, a negative relation exists Ceteris paribus, a negative relation exists 
between the write-off decision and the between the write-off amount and the 
bond rating. 1206 bond rating. 
5.2.4 Control variables 
Because transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-off behavior is expected to be influenced 
by factors that are not explicitly modeled, the following control variables are considered: 
1201 Email correspondence dated June 23, 2003, with Neri Bukspan, credit analyst with Standard & 
Poor's. 
1202 It must be noted that other rating-relevant ratios are affected positively by SFAS 142: Even if write-
offs are not simply backed out of earnings but replaced by some amortization charge, ratios such as 
"return on capital" (S&P (2003, p. 55) will increase due to lower equity. However, it is not plausible 
that firms are rewarded for decreased equity and impaired assets. 
1203 See Elliott and Hanna ( 1996, p. 152). 
1204 On the other hand, causality is not clear: Write-offs and rating downgrades are likely to be jointly 
determined by adverse changes in the firm's future prospects. To that extent, it is difficult to distin-
guish empirically between economic and incentive factors influencing write-off behavior. Refer to 
section 3.3.2.3.6. 
1205 More accurately, this reluctance should increase in the probability of a downgrade and the amount of 
costs anticipated to follow from it. Measuring these more subtle criteria is beyond the scope of this 
study. 
1206 As explained in Table 6 below, the bond rating is coded as an integer descending in the firm's rating. 
Therefore, the lower the rating, the higher the rating variable. 
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First, the amount, economic characteristics, and fair value of the goodwill asset are ex-
pected to vary across industries. Therefore, industry membership is expected to be an 
explanatory factor behind write-off behavior, although no specific relation is pre-
dicted. 1207 
Second, finn size is possibly associated with a multitude of factors, including leverage, 
infonnation production costs, competitive advantage, management ability, quality of ac-
counting advice, and risk (income variability). 1208 Further, it might be a proxy for bar-
gaining power, implying that smaller finns are forced to pay the full net present value for 
their acquisitions and incur larger goodwills that tend to fall below fair value more 
quickly when adverse economic developments occur. 1209 Also, prior research indicates 
that smaller finns are to a lesser extent followed by analysts, possibly implying that capi-
tal market-related incentives are less strong for them. 1210 
Third, finns adopting SFAS 142 as of January l, 2002, possibly face different economic 
and incentive environments than do early or late adopters. Therefore, a fiscal year-end 
indicator variable is included to capture any difference. 
Finally, the write-off amount (deflated by total assets in order to eliminate size effects) 
might be associated with the relative significance that overall goodwill book value has 
for the firm. For example, firms for which goodwill represents a substantial portion of 
their asset base might be reluctant to record large write-offs, which would significantly 
diminish their earnings and size. Also, an association of the two variables is expected 
simply because the write-off amount is limited by the absolute amount of goodwill. 1211 
For these reasons, goodwill book value, also deflated by total assets, is considered as a 
control variable. 
1207 Industry membership is explicitly considered in the descriptive analysis below (Table A. 2 and Table 
A. 4). But since there is no economic reason to assume a linear relation between the write-off amount 
and the firm's SIC code, it is not included as an explanatory variable in the regression analysis. 
1208 Refer to Moses (1987, p. 363 fn . 6). See also Ball and Foster (1982, p. 184 fn . 36). Bujaki and 
Richardson (1997) provide a review of the uses of firm size in accounting research. 
1209 See Clinch (1997, p. 344). 
1210 See Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984). 
1211 Furthermore, firms with larger goodwill (scaled by total assets) will, ceteris paribus, record higher 
goodwill write-offs (scaled by total assets). 
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5.3 Research design and descriptive information 
5 .3 . I Variable definition 
Since transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs are presented as a first-quarter account-
ing change in the adoption year,1 212 COMPUSTAT quarterly item DATAI 17 (accounting 
changes - cumulative effect) is used to capture the transitional write-off amount. 1213 This 
variable is subject to potential measurement error because accounting changes other than 
the adoption of SFAS 142 might be included in COMPUSTAT quarterly item 
DATA117. In an attempt to minimize this potential measurement error, recent FASB 
statements are examined in order to ascertain the extent to which their adoption has pos-
sibly resulted in accounting changes being disclosed within COMPUSTAT quarterly 
item DAT Al 17. This analysis suggests that such effects are limited at most: First, SFAS 
140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of 
Liabilities -A replacement of FASB Statement 125, issued in September 2000, was to be 
applied to transfers and servicing of financial assets and extinguishments of liabilities 
occurring after March 31, 2001 (SFAS 140.19-25). Therefore, no effect on the Ql/2002 
accounting change is expected. 
Second, According to SF AS 141.62, any unamortized ,,negative goodwill" balances from 
pre-SF AS 141 periods were to be written off and recognized as the effect of a change in 
accounting principle. This accounting change was, as a rule, to be recognized at the adop-
tion date of SF AS 142. Before SFAS 141 was issued, "negative goodwill" was accounted 
for under APB Opinion 16. APB Opinion 16.91 requires that "negative goodwill" first be 
allocated to reduce proportionately the values assigned to non-current assets, and that any 
remainder be classified as a deferred credit and amortized systematically to income over 
no more than 40 years. This implies that accounting changes disclosed in the first quarter 
of 2002 potentially include write-offs of such unamortized ,,negative goodwill" balances. 
However, according to economic reasoning, such remaining deferred credits should be 
observed only in very exceptional circumstances, because acquirers will in most cases 
have to pay an acquisition price that is at least equal to the book value of net assets. 
Therefore, it is assumed here that any measurement error in the transitional SFAS 142 
goodwill write-off variable that is introduced by this SF AS 141 effect is immaterial. 
1212 Refer to section 4.7.3. 
1213 COMPUST AT annual items DAT A368 and DAT A369 (goodwill impairment pre-tax and after tax, 
respectively) are not adequate in this respect, since they only capture write-offs taken subsequent to 
the transitional impairment test. 
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Third, although SF AS 143, Accounting for Asset Retirement Obligations, issued in June 
2001, is only effective for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2002 (SFAS 143.24), 
early adopters of this statement also present its adoption effect as a Q 1/2002 accounting 
change (SFAS 143.24, 26). Therefore, firms with asset retirement obligations that also 
choose to adopt SF AS 143 early as of the beginning of fiscal 2002 might distort the tran-
sitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-off variable. However, due to the infrequent concur-
rence of these two conditions, any measurement error is assumed to be immaterial. 
Finally, SFAS 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets, 
issued in August 2001, takes effect at the same time as SFAS 142 (SFAS 144.49). How-
ever, its initial application does not result in Ql/2002 accounting changes. All other 
F ASB statements issued subsequent to SF AS 144 were effective after the first quarter of 
2002 and did, even where applied early, in most cases not involve disclosure as a first-
quarter change in accounting principle. In addition, some of these statements involved 
only minor changes to existing GAAP. Consistent with the considerations explained 
above, any measurement error in the transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-off variable 
potentially introduced by (early) adoption of other FASB statements is assumed to be 
immaterial. 
Table 5 provides further reassurance on this issue; documenting that negative DATAl 17 
entries are observed relatively frequently in goodwill firms (13.40%), whereas they 
hardly occur at all (0.71 %) in firms having no goodwill at the end of fiscal 2001. This 
finding further corroborates that negative effects of accounting changes in the goodwill 
sample are the result of transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs. 
Firms on the COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual tape1214 
Cumulative effect of 
Positive goodwill Zero goodwill accounting change in 2001 
(DATA117_Ql) (DATA204_2001 > 0) (DATA204_2001 =0) 
N I % N I % 
DATAll7_Ql unavailable 182 6.02 215 5.85 
DATAI 17_QI > 0 30 0.99 18 0.49 
DATAI 17_QI = 0 2,406 79.59 3,418 92.96 
DATAll7_Ql < 0 405 13.40 26 0.71 
Total 3,023 100.0 3,677 100.0 
Table 5: Potential measurement error in the dependent variable 
In addition, since transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs are negative items, a small 
number of firms that reported a positive number in the Q 1/2002 COMPUST AT quarterly 
1214 For the remaining firms, no goodwill data are available. 
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item DAT A 117 were excluded from the sample. Likewise, since the write-off cannot be 
higher than goodwill book value, all firms that wrote off more than that amount were also 
not considered. 
The write-off amount is defined as a positive number. 1215 Deflators encountered in the 
literature include total assets, 1216 the market value of equity, and the number of shares.1217 
Another possibility would be the book value of goodwill itself; however, this deflator has 
the disadvantage that even enormous write-offs, relative to goodwill book value, might 
still be immaterial to both financial statement preparers and users where goodwill book 
value itself is immaterial. In contrast, measuring the goodwill write-off as a percentage of 
total assets ensures that the materiality of the resulting financial statement effect is ade-
quately captured. 
Table 6 describes all the variables used below. 
1215 For non-write-off firms, the write-off amount is entered as zero. 
1216 Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 125) and Segal (2003, p. 17). 
1217 Heflin and Warfield (1997, pp. 24, 26-8) use both of these deflators. 
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Verbal explanation Calculation and data source1218 
TGWO Di Dichotomous variable: I where firm i records a transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-off; 0 otherwise. 
Firm i's amount of Iran-
sitional SF AS 142 
goodwill write-off, de-
(-l)·DATAl17 QI TGWO_Ai flated by prior-period COMPUSTAT quarterly item DATAI 17, as a positive number. TGWO_A = 
DATA6 2001 total assets, measured at 
the end of the first fiscal 
quarter 2002. 
Explanatory variables - economic factors 
H5c I (-) Firm i's MTB ratio, DATA25 2001-DATAl99 2001 MTB; measured at the end of MTB= 
H~c 1 (-) 2001. DATA60 2001 
H5c 2a (-) 
Firm i's cumulative 
stock performance, RET= 
DATA199 2001 
1 RET; 
Hr 2a (-) measured over the fiscal DATAl99 1999 
years 2000 and 200 I. 
.6.ROA = ROA0 1- ROAOO , where 
Firm i's percentage point 
ROA0l= DATAI72_200I+DATAl5 2001 and 
.6.ROAi 
H5c 2b (-) change in ROA between ½ [DATA6_ 2000 + DATA6 _2001-(DATAl 72_2001 + DATAI 5 _2001)] 
H~c 2b (-) the fiscal years 2000 and 
2001. ROAOO= DATAl72 2000+ DATAl5 2000 . 
½[DATA6_1999+ DATA6_2000-(DATAl72_2000 + DATAl5_2000)] 
Continued on next page 
1218 The items listed denote COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual data items, unless otherwise stated, with suffixes representing the respective fiscal years. With the excep-
tion of stock price (DATA199; measured in dollars and cents) and common shares outstanding (DATA25; measured in millions), all data are measured in millions 
of dollars. Stock price data is not adjusted for dividends and stock splits. 













Verbal explanation Calculation and data source 
Explanatory variables - economic-consequences incentives 
Mean of firm i's assets- AIP = .!_ (AIP02 + AIPO I), where in-place, measured as the 2 
relation of PP&E (net of DATA8 2002 
AIPi H~R I (+) accumulated deprecia- AIP02 = and 
tion) to total market 
DATA25 _2002 · DATA 1999 _2002 + DATA9 _2002 + DATA34_2002 
value, at the end of 200 I AIPOI = 
DATA8_200\ 
and 2002. DATA25_2001 · DATA! 999 _2001 + DATA9_2001+ DATA34_2001 
Mean of the differences DTE= (DTE02-INDDTE02)+(DTEOI-INDDTEO!), where 
between firm i's DTE 
2 
Hif 2 (-) ratio and the median DATA9 2002+ DATA34 2002 DTEOl = DATA9 200l+DATA34 2001 DTE; 
H? 2 (-) 
DTE ratio in firm i's DTE02= 
' two-digit SIC industry, DATA60_2002-DATAl\7_Ql' DATA60 2001 
at the end of 200 I and INDDTE02=industry median (DTE02), and 
2002. INDDTEOI= industry median (DTEOI). 
MSHi Hif 3a (?) 
Mean of firm i's market shares, measured as the relation of firm sales (DATA 12) to two-digit SIC industry sales, at the end of200\ 
and 2002; industry sales based on all available firms. 
HERFi Hif 3b (?) 
Mean of the Herfindahl indexes of firm i's two-digit SIC industry, measured as the sum of the squares of the market shares of each 
firm in the industry, at the end of200\ and 2002; industry sales based on all available firms. 
Firm i's change in ROA 
~PWOROA= DATAl72 2002+DATA\5 2002-DATAl\7 QI (before transitional 
6PWOROAi Hif 3c (?) SFAS 142 goodwill ½[DATA6_2001 + DATA6_2002-(DATA\72_2002 + DATA\5_2002)- DATA! 17 _QI] 
write-oft) in 2002 over 
regular ROA in 200 I. 
Continued on next page 













Verbal explanation Calculation and data source 
Explanatory variables - capital market-related incentives 
TARGET_PPi Dichotomous variable: 1 where firm 
H~ 4 (-) 
i's annual pre-write-off net income is TARGET_PP: (DATA172_2002- DATAI l7_QI):?: DATAl72_2001 and 
TARGET_Zi above the prior year's level (above TARGET_Z: (DATAI72_2002- DATAI 17_QI):?: 0 
zero) in 2002; 0 otherwise. 
DIF _ppi Difference between firm i's annual DIF PP= DATA172_2002-DATAll7 QI-DATAl72 2001 and - DATA6_2001 H~R 5 (+) pre-write-off net income and the 
prior year's level (and zero), deflated 
DIF Z= 
DATAl72 2002-DATAI 17 QI DIF _Z; by prior-period total assets, in 2002. - DATA6 2001 
Firm i's pre-write-off common eq- EQ= DATA60 2002-DATAll7 QI EQi Hf 6 (+) uity, deflated by pre-write-off total 
assets, at the end of 2002. DATA6_2002-DATAI 17_QI 
t1CEO; H~ 7a (+) Dichotomous variable: I where firm i experienced a change in the CEO position during 200 I or 2002; 0 otherwise. t1CEO; is coded based on ExecuComp data items BECAMECEO and PCEO. 
Firm i's restructuring cost (pre-tax), DATA376 2002 RESTRi HtR 7b (+) deflated by total assets, measured at RESTR = 
the end of 2002. DATA6 2002 
HtR 7c (+) 
Firm i's special items and write- DATAl7 2002+DATA384 2002+DATA380 2002 SPECi downs (pre-tax), deflated by total SPEC= 
assets, measured at the end of 2002. DATA6_2002 
HtR 8 (-) Firm i's long-term domestic issuer DAT A280. RA TING is coded as an ascending series of integers, running from 2 for AAA RATING, 
H~R 8 (-) credit rating in 200 I. 
through 29 for SD (selective default). Therefore, the better a firm's rating, the lower 
DATA280. 
Continued on next page 













Explanatory variables - control variables 
Verbal explanation Calculation and data source 
FYRi (?) 
Dichotomous variable: I where finn i' s fiscal year-end in 2001 is December 3 I; 0 otherwise. FYR is coded based on COMPUSTAT 
annual item FYR. 
Firm i's size, measured by the mean 
SIZE =½[(DATA25_2001 · DATAI99_2001) + (DATA25_2002 · DATA199_2002)] SIZEi (?) of firm i's market values of equity at 
the end of2001 and 2002. 
SIZE_LOGi (?) Natural logarithm of SIZE. SIZE_LOG = log(SIZE) 
Firm i's goodwill book value, de- DAT A204 2001 
GWi (?) flated by total assets, measured at the GW= 
end of 2001. DATA6 2001 
Table 6: Definition and explanation of variables 
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5.3.2 Sample selection 
Previous studies of SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs analyze firms that publicly announce 
their write-off decision in addition to publishing their financial statements. 1219 By an-
nouncing the write-off without being required to do so, firms self-select into a sample not 
strictly comprised of write-off firms but of firms that, having written off their goodwill, 
chose to disclose this fact. Arguably, this group is different from write-off firms that 
choose not to announce the write-off. 1220 To mitigate potential problems stemming from 
this sample selection procedure, a broad sample of publicly listed U. S. firms is used. 
These firms are subjected to certain requirements. Table 7 describes the sample selection 
procedure. 
Panel A: Basic sample firms remain 
o/o ofavail-
able 
Observations included on the COMPUST AT Industrial Annual 22,078 22,078 100.0 
tape ("available") 
Less: Observations not included on the COMPUSTAT Indus- -4,193 17,885 81.0 
trial Quarterly tape 
Less: Banking and financial institutions (SIC category 6) -4,087 13,798 62.5 
Less: Firms for which not all data items re<Juired for the full- -11,120 2,678 12.1 
sample regression analyses are available' 21 
Less: Firms with negative equity -459 2,219 JO.I 
Basic sample 2,219 IO.I 
Panel B: Goodwill and non-goodwill samples firms 
o/o of o/o of basic 
available sample 
Basic sample 2,219 JO.I 100.0 
Less: 16 firms excluded due to problems with the dependent 
variable 1222 
2,203 10.0 99.3 
Goodwill sample: Firms with positive goodwill 1,248 5.7 56.2 
Non-goodwill sample: Firms without positive goodwill 955 4.3 43.0 
Continued on next page 
1219 Refer to Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002) and Segal (2003). 
122° Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996, p. 119) acknowledge this problem, stating that their "analyses of 
the causes and shareholder wealth effects of write-offs are joint tests of managements ' decisions to 
write off assets and to disclose in press releases that they have done so." They document that a sub-
stantial portion of write-off firms do not specifically disclose the write-off. The authors also point to 
other studies potentially suffering from this same shortcoming. 
1221 Smaller sub-samples are later formed for specific regressions. Data required for these regressions may 
not be available for the full sample. 
1222 11 firms were excluded due to posWve effects of a change in accounting principle (DAT A 117) in the 
first quarter of 2002. 5 more firms were excluded because DATA! 17 is larger in absolute value than 
goodwill itself. 
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Panel C: Write-off and non-write-off samples 
Goodwill sample 
Non-write-off sample: Firms without transitional 
SFAS 142 goodwill write-ofr 223 
Write-off sample: Firms with transitional SFAS 142 
goodwill write-ofr 224 
















The starting point is the population of the COMPUST AT Industrial Annual tape. As of 
the retrieval date, 22,078 firms were included in the database. 1225 Since annual as well as 
quarterly data are required for my analysis, 4,193 firms are deleted that are not included 
on the COMPUST AT Industrial Quarterly tape. 1226 Next, 4,087 banks and financial insti-
tutions are excluded because the financial statement structures of these firms are widely 
different from those of most other firms and therefore would be likely to distort re-
sults.1227 Subsequently, it is required that firms have available the data required to calcu-
late the variables summarized in Table 6 above.1228 This requirement represents the most 
substantial cut, resulting in 11 ,120 observations being dropped. Finally, 459 firms with 
negative equity in fiscal 2001 or 2002 are excluded, because not only are these firms' 
financial ratios difficult to interpret, they are also likely to operate in radically different 
economic and incentive environments than the rest of the sample. This procedure (Panel 
A) results in a basic sample of2,219 firms. 
Panel B reconciles this basic sample to a sample of firms that are potential candidates for 
transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs. These firms meet two additional data re-
quirements: First, they are adopters of SF AS 142 in the year of transition. According to 
SFAS 142.48, that is the case when a firm has positive goodwill on its balance sheet as of 
1223 Thereof firms with regular (post-transitional) SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs in 2002: 116 (11 .3% of 
the non-write-off sample). 
1224 Thereof firms with regular (post-transitional) SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs in 2002: 27 (12.1% of 
the write-off sample). 
1225 Annual data was retrieved on June 4, 2003, i.e. before the annual update for 2003 was available. Re-
peating the analysis subsequent to the annual update would result in far fewer firms being eliminated 
from the sample due to missing data. 
1226 Quarterly data was retrieved on July 22, 2003 . 
1227 Like in Riedl (2002, pp. 20, 36), firms falling within the SIC 6 category are excluded. 
1228 However, since data items required for computing some of the capital market-related incentives vari-
ables (e.g. change in the CEO position for 2002) are not available for the majority of firms, the sam-
ple size would be unduly reduced if firms lacking those data were a priori excluded from the sample. 
Therefore, tests relying on these data are restricted to a smaller sample size, as will be indicated where 
applicable. 
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the beginning of the fiscal year. For 955 finns, goodwill (COMPOST AT item 
DAT A204) is zero. Second, only those finns are included for which a potential transi-
tional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. There-
fore, 11 £inns are eliminated from the sample because they report positive accounting 
changes (DAT A 117) in the first quarter of 2002, and 5 more £inns are excluded because 
DATA117 is larger in absolute amount than goodwill itself. Consequently, the basic 
sample disaggregates into a non-goodwill sample of 955 and a goodwill sample of 1,248 
usable observations. 
Finally, Panel C distinguishes two sub-samples of the goodwill sample. The 1,024 finns 
in the non-write-off sample did not write off their goodwill as a result of the transitional 
impainnent test upon adoption of SFAS 142. Conversely, the 224 £inns included in the 
write-off sample did write off their goodwill upon adoption, 1229 which amounts to 17.9% 
of the whole goodwill sample. 
5.3.3 Descriptive statistics and comparative analyses 
In this section, descriptive statistics for the four samples are provided and preliminary 
comparative tests undertaken. First, the four samples are compared based on the most 
important variables defined in Table 6 above, and equality tests for the median and mean 
are provided. Second, the significance of goodwill write-offs is assessed for the £inns in 
the goodwill sample. Third, preliminary evidence on some of the hypotheses posited in 
section 5.2 is presented. 
Table 8 provides descriptive comparisons of the two groups comprising the basic sample: 
the non-goodwill finns and the goodwill finns (see Panel B of Table 7). 
1229 A total of 143 regular (post-transition) SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs were reported by the firms in 
the goodwill sample during fiscal 2002. 
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Panel A: Non-goodwill sample (N = 955) 
Variable Mean StDev Min I" qrt Med 3 rd qrt Mu 
MTB 5.10** 23 .61 0.00 0.89 1.74 3.73 547.64 
RET 2.96 67.62 -1.00 -0.59 -0.16** 0.48 2,049.00 
AflOA -0.03 0.90 -24.00 -0.08 -0.02 0.04 7.32 
AIP 0.39** 0.47 0.00 0.06 0.23 0.60 5.09 
DTE02 1.70 17.02 0.00 0.00 0.20*** 0.78 455 .39 
MV0 1,075*** 9,703 0 10 44*** 234 250,846 
TA0 863*** 5,906 0 II 45••· 220 147,909 
SAL0 793*** 6,989 0 6 32••· 167 183,210 
MSH 0.005••• 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.001 0.413 
HERF 0.075 0.067 0.015 0.044 0.050*** 0.085 0.569 
t.PWOROA -0.03** 0.36 -7.16 -0.09 -0.01*** 0.05 1.46 
EQ 0.56*** 0.25 0.00 0.37 0.57*** 0.76 1.00 
Panel B: Goodwill sample (N = 1,248) 
Variable Mean StDev Min I" qrt Med 3rd qrt Max 
MTB 3.49•• 12.49 0.00 0.96 1.73 3.01 250.66 
RET 0.65 16.46 -1.00 -0.45 -0.07** 0.36 576.78 
t.ROA -0.01 0.35 -0.80 -0.06 -0.02 O.QI 11.05 
AIP 0.34** 0.47 0.00 0.10 0.23 0.48 11.17 
DTE02 1.32 3.77 0.00 0.16 0.52*** 1.14 73.79 
MV0 3,569*** 17,173 0 42 269*** 1,230 320,299 
TA0 3,578*** 20,175 1 84 400••· 1,552 535,134 
SAL0 2,803*** 11,046 0 83 402*** 1,551 176,470 
MSH 0.017*** 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.002••· 0.012 0.623 
HERF 0,075 0.060 0.015 0.046 0.050*** 0.087 0.623 
t.PWOROA -0.01•• 0.13 -2.18 -0.04 o.oo••• 0.03 0.66 
EQ 0.47••· 0.22 0.01 0.31 0.46*** 0.62 0.99 
••••••• Differences in mean (t-test) and median (adjusted x2-test), respectively, significant at the 10, , , .
5, or 1% levels. Test statistics and p-values are reported in Table A. 1 in the appendix. 
0 MV, TA, and SAL represent mean values (fiscal 2001 and 2002) for the market value of equity, total 
assets, and sales, respectively. 
For other variable definitions, refer to Table 6. Monetary amounts are in million $. 
Table 8: Comparison of the non-goodwill and goodwill samples 
The comparative analysis suggests that the two sub-samples are significantly different in 
several respects, albeit widely similar in others. The median MTB ratios are roughly 
equal, while the mean in the non-goodwill sample is substantially larger due to outlying 
observations. Accounting performance measured in terms of ROA change during 2001 is 
also comparable, whereas goodwill firms experienced a significantly (at the 5% level) 
higher median stock return during 2000 and 2001. Most strikingly, goodwill firms are 
vastly larger and more highly in debt, whereas the respective portions of assets-in-place 
are similar on average. Furthermore, goodwill firms seem to have higher market shares in 
their industries, which are also more concentrated. Overall, the goodwill sample appears 
to consist of larger, more established firms than the non-goodwill sample. 
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Structurally equivalent to Table 8, Table 9 provides comparative evidence for the non-
write-off and write-off samples. Goodwill-related information is also reported for these 
firms. 
Panel A: Non-write-off sample (N = 1,024) 
Variable Mean StDev Min 1'1 qrt Med 3rd qrt Max 
Goodwill 2002 
in million$ 354•u 1,390 0 4 29*** 181 26,093 
% total assets 15.17 14.61 0.00 4.07 10.63 22.14 78.19 
% BY equity 58 .13** 178.46 0.00 8.88 24.83* 58.43 4,102.99 
% MY of equity 42.54** 133.51 0.00 4.84 15.64* 37.80 3,083.67 
Goodwill 2001 
in million$ 311 ... 1,309 0 5 27*** 147 29,791 
% total assets 14.76*** 14.12 0.04 4.22 10.49*** 21.11 80.97 
% BY of equity 60.85 202.32 0.06 9.11 24.89*** 52.97 3,973.02 
% MY of equity 112.66 1,628.51 0.01 4.02 12.12••· 32.88 39,413.53 
MTB 3.84** 13.57 0.00 1.07 1.88*** 3.19 250.66 
RET 0.82 18.17 -1.00 -0.41 -0.04*** 0.43 576.78 
~ROA -0.01 0.38 -0.80 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 11.05 
AIP 0.33** 0.47 0.00 0.09 0.21 ••· 0.47 11.17 
DTE02 1.34 4.01 0.00 0.13 0.49** 1.12 73 .79 
MY0 3,191 • 13,922 0 40 242 1,137 170,960 
TA0 2,660*** 10,623 I 68 327*** 1,317 190,514 
SAL0 2,402*** 9,819 0 70 311 ... 1,324 176,470 
MSH 0.013••· 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.002••· 0.010 0.623 
HERF 0.072*** 0.056 o.oi5 0.046 o.o5o••• 0.087 0.623 
~PWOROA -0.01 0.14 -2.18 -0.04 0.00 O.o3 0.64 
EQ 0.48*** 0.22 0.01 0.31 0.47** 0.64 0.99 
Continued on next page 
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Panel B: Write-off sample (N = 224) 
Variable Mean StDev Min 111 qrt Med 3rd qrt Max 
Goodwill 2002 
in million$ 722*** 2,931 0 IO 66*** 457 39,138 
% total assets 15.65 15.68 0.00 2.46 I 1.02 25 .06 77.14 
% BV of equity 4,454.71 ** 65,076.97 0.00 6.71 31.87* 76.62 965,312.50 
% MV of equity 68.40** 162.55 0.00 4.42 22.84* 57.54 1,620.16 
Goodwill 2001 
in million$ 919*** 2,878 I 32 139*** 593 28,287 
% total assets 22.46*** 17.57 0.44 8.56 11.21••· 34.18 81.96 
% BY of equity 71.81 154.05 2.17 21.43 47.46*** 85 .80 2,177.68 
% MV of equity 81.15 129.17 0.30 17.33 35.14*** 92 .78 1,100.70 
MTB 1.94** 4.86 0.06 0.62 1.14••· 2.01 67.87 
RET -0.12 0.67 -0.97 -0.54 -o.,s••• 0.17 5.57 
6ROA -0.02 0.09 -0.43 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.35 
AIP 0.40** 0.48 O.Q3 0.15 0.29••· 0.57 6.03 
DTE02 1.24 2.37 0.00 0.30 0.67** 1.38 25.47 
MV0 5,294* 27,502 I 72 347 1,736 320,299 
TA0 1,115••· 41 ,675 6 188 313••· 3,259 535,134 
SAL0 4,635*** 15,360 5 220 832*** 2,863 162,499 
MSH 0.032*** 0.067 0.000 0.001 0.006*** 0.024 0.501 
HERF o.oss••• 0.Q75 0.015 0.046 0.059*** 0.091 0.471 
APWOROA 0.00 0.09 -0.42 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.66 
EQ 0.43*** 0.19 0.02 0.31 0.43** 0.57 0.96 
••••••• Differences in mean (t-test) and median (adjusted )()-test), respectively, significant at the ' ' . 
I 0, 5, or I% levels. Test statistics and p-values are reported in Table A. I in the appendix. 
0 MV, TA, and SAL represent mean values (fiscal 2001 and 2002) for the market value of equity, total 
assets, and sales, respectively. 
For other variable definitions, refer to Table 6. Monetary amounts are in million $. Goodwill figures are 
scaled by beginning-of-period balance sheet numbers. 
Table 9: Comparison of the non-write-off and write-off samples 
The two subgroups of the goodwill sample exhibit significant differences. The median 
goodwill book value in the pre-adoption period, expressed in absolute and relative terms, 
is much larger in the write-off sample. At the end of 200 I, median goodwill was more 
than five times larger in the write-off sample ($ I 39 million) than in the non-write-off 
sample ($27 million). Due to substantial goodwill write-offs in 2002, these differences 
tend to disappear in 2002, making the subgroups much more homogenous. Consistent 
with economic factors hypothesis I, the MTB ratios of write-off firms are, on average, 
significantly lower. These companies also underperform non-write-off firms in terms of 
stock return, albeit not on change in ROA. Moreover, write-off firms have significantly 
higher exposure to debt and operate with a higher proportion of assets-in-place. They are 
also significantly larger and more dominant in their respective markets. This preliminary 
evidence on economic differences between the subgroups is consistent with the assump-
tions expressed in the economic factors hypotheses: Write-offs occur in large firms that 
are viewed by market participants as undergoing a phase of economic difficulty. 
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Table A. 2 in the Appendix contains a classification of firms by industry membership. 25 
two-digit SIC categories, each with a membership of more than 1 % of all 13. 798 avail-
able firms, are reported explicitly, while the rest, including the category "non-classifiable 
establishments" (two-digit SIC category 99), is grouped into the "all other" category. The 
analysis suggests that industry representation differs among the sub-samples. While the 
majority of industries are represented almost equally in the non-goodwill and goodwill 
samples, goodwill firms seem to be distinctly over-represented in the industrial machin-
ery/equipment, transportation equipment, fabricated metal products, printing/publishing, 
and paper industries, perhaps suggesting that these industries underwent significant con-
solidation in recent years. A reverse relation exists in the chemicals, oil/gas extraction, 
and metal mining industries, where goodwill firms are much less frequently represented 
than are non-goodwill firms. 
A comparison of the non-write-off and write-off samples indicates that, on average, 
write-offs occur more frequently in the durable goods wholesale, amusement/recreation, 
and paper industries. Conversely, firms in the electronics, instruments, oil/gas extraction, 
food, and nondurable goods wholesale industries apparently are less susceptible to re-
cording transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs, given that they have any goodwill. 
Notably, the fact that oil/gas firms record write-offs less frequently provides preliminary 
corroboration to the notion brought up in section 3.3.2.3.5, according to which "politi-
cally visible" firms could expected to avoid transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs. 
Table 10 describes transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs in the write-off sample.'230 
TWGO_A Mean StDev Min I'' qrt Med 3rd qrt Max 
in million$ 149 315 0 7 28 129 2,944 
% total assets 7.4 8.8 0.0 1.6 4.7 9.3 55.8 
% common equity (BY) 18.8 23.1 0.1 3.8 12.7 23 .8 197.9 
%goodwill 38.8 3 I.I 0.2 10.4 32.1 62 .2 100.0 
% common equity (MV) 32.2 61.3 0.0 2.4 9.4 34.6 438.6 
%sales 16.1 105.4 0.0 1.3 4.0 10.6 1,560.3 
Goodwill figures are scaled by beginning-of-period balance sheet numbers and end-of-period sales. 
These data comprise write-offs taken by the 224 firms in the write-off sample. 
Table 10: Descriptive analysis of transitional write-offs 
1230 It would be interesting to compare transitional SFAS 142 write-off amounts to prior-period goodwill 
amortization charges. However, goodwill amortization is rarely disclosed separately, so data avail-
ability on this item is insufficient. See, for example, Duvall et al. (1992), who document the problem 
of extracting goodwill-related information from published financial statements. Furthermore, the 
amounts of amortization and write-off do not necessarily compare, because the write-off may relate to 
only part of entity-level goodwill, whereas amortization represents an arbitrary charge based a 
weighted average of the individual useful lives of all the components of entity-level goodwill. 
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The analysis indicates that the write-offs represent substantial accounting events for the 
affected finns . The median amount is $28 million, whereas the considerably higher mean 
($149 million) as well as the large standard deviation suggest that several much higher 
write-offs distort the distribution. The maximum of the distribution is at nearly $3 bil-
lion. 1231 The median finn wrote off 4. 7% of total assets and almost 13% of equity upon 
transition, with mean amounts, again, being much higher. Transitional write-offs slashed 
about a third of goodwill book value and represented more than 9% of the market value 
of equity. Finally, the median transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off amounted to 4% 
of sales. 
Further descriptive information on the SF AS 142 goodwill write-off is given in the Ap-
pendix: Table A. 3 mirrors Table 10, reporting descriptive infonnation on regular SFAS 
142 goodwill write-offs taken by the finns in the goodwill sample during 2002. These 
charges are smaller, on average (median = $7 million), than the transitional ones, and are 
also less significant in relative tenns. The fact that they also represent, on average, about 
one third of goodwill book value (median= 29. l %), reflects the circumstance that these 
write-offs are mainly taken by finns in the transitional non-write-off sample. These 
finns, as shown in Table 9, have smaller goodwills than their write-off counterparts. 
Furthennore, Table A. 4 in the Appendix additionally breaks down the infonnation pro-
vided in Table IO by industry. The analysis indicates that the most substantial write-offs 
(in absolute dollars) are recorded in the communications industry (median= $393 mil-
lion), followed by the miscellaneous manufacturing ($246 million) and special trade con-
tracting ($243 million) industries. Write-offs in the latter group also represented the larg-
est percentages of total assets (23.7%) and of the book value of equity (44.1%). How-
ever, these industries represent only a small fraction of the write-off sample. Large write-
offs were also taken by the 18 finns in the chemicals industry (median= $45 million) and 
by the 16 finns in the industrial machinery/equipment industry (median = $50 million). 
However, because finns in these industries are typically large, these write-offs are minor 
in relative tenns. The highest percentages of goodwill were written off in the eat-
ing/drinking places (median = 62.6%), rubber/plastics (60.0%), and amuse-
ment/recreation ( 56. 7%) industries. 
1231 Extreme amounts such as the one recorded by AOL Time Warner are not represented here because 
these firms were eliminated from the sample during the sample selection procedure. 
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Table 11 reports the distribution of fiscal year-ends among the firms in the four samples 
in order to assess whether calendar-year firm are more or less likely than other firms to 
record an SFAS 142 goodwill write-off upon transition. 
Total firms Non-goodwill Goodwill Non-write-off Write-off 
Fiscal available sample sample sample sample 
year-end 
I I I I I N % N % N % N % N % 
January 336 2.9 20 2.1 26 2.1 20 2.0 6 2.7 
February 127 I.I I 0.1 2 0.2 2 0.2 0 0.0 
March 672 5.7 2 0.2 2 0.2 2 0.2 0 0.0 
April 184 1.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
May 184 1.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
June 904 7.7 102 10.7 120 9.6 108 10.5 12 5.4 
July 180 1.5 24 2.5 23 1.8 21 2 .1 2 0.9 
August 181 1.5 27 2.8 22 1.8 21 2 .1 I 0.4 
September 750 6.4 67 7.0 106 8.5 88 8.6 18 8.0 
October 323 2.7 33 3.5 43 3.4 38 3.7 5 2.2 
November 147 1.2 16 1.7 21 1.7 19 1.9 2 0.9 
December 7,776 66. l 663 69.4 883 70.8 705 68.8 178 79.5 
Total 11 ,764 100.0 9SS 100.0 1,248 100.0 1,024 100.0 224 100.0 
Total firms available represent those firms for which information on the fiscal year end 2001 is observed. 
Table 11: Distribution of fiscal year-ends 
This table shows that a higher proportion of the write-off firms have December year ends 
(79.5%) than would have been expected based on the percentages of calendar-year firms 
in the other sub-samples. This finding might indicate that firms with deviating year ends 
were reluctant to record transitional write-offs because they were unsure whether inves-
tors would be aware of their transitory nature. Speculating further, management of calen-
dar-year firms observed (neutral and or positive) market responses to early adopters' 
write-offs and thus might have overcome any reluctance to incur these charges. 
Table 12 provides information on whether firms in the four samples differ systematically 
based on whether their MTB ratios at the end of 200 I are higher or lower than one. Of 
special interest here is a comparison of the write-off and non-write-off samples because 
economic factors hypothesis I implies that firms with MTB ratios below one are more 
likely than others to have impaired goodwill. 
MTB 
Goodwill sample Non-goodwill sample Non-write-off sample Write-off sample 
N % N % N % N % 
~ I 921 73 .8 677 70.9 797 77.8 124 55 .4 
< 1 327 26.2 277 29.0 227 22.2 100 44.6 
Total 1,248 100.0 9S4 100.0 1,024 100.0 224 100.0 
Table 12: MTB ratios in the write-off and non-write-off samples 
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Consistent with what the impainnent test procedure in SFAS 142 would suggest, finns in 
the write-off sample more frequently have MTB ratios below one than do non-write-off 
finns . This difference is highly significant, 1232 which further corroborates the notion that 
transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs more clearly reflect economic developments 
rather than financial reporting incentives. 
Table A. 5 in the Appendix explores this notion further. In addition to significant differ-
ences in MTB ratios, the MTB~l finns appear to be significantly smaller, on average, 
most notably in tenns of the market value of equity. They are also more reliant on debt 
financing than their MTB> l counterparts, and underperfonn them significantly in tenns 
of stock return. These findings suggest that write-offs in the MTB~l group reflect eco-
nomic problems experienced by smaller finns. As of the transition date, the MTB> l 
finns, on average, had MTB ratios (median= 1.78) almost as high as those in the non-
write-off sample (l.88) and outperfonned them in tenns of stock return. This suggests 
that economic causes for write-offs recorded by MTB> l finns are not so readily appar-
ent. Possibly, these large, successful finns, concerned about the potentially adverse ef-
fects of regular write-offs becoming necessary in future periods, take the opportunity of 
accelerating write-offs into the transition year. Regarding the development of the MTB 
ratio over time (not tabulated), the median MTB ratio for the first group declined from 
1.78 in 2001 to 1.66 in 2002, while that of the second group rose from 0.57 in 2001 to 
0.72 in 2002. This diametrical development suggests that write-offs in the first group 
were perceived negatively, possibly as indicative of future problems. Conversely, those 
reported by the second group might have been viewed as part of a restructuring effort, 
promising future improvement, or simply as reflections of past problems that had already 
been impounded in stock price. 
Financial reporting incentives hypothesis 4 predicts that managers' desire to reach earn-
ings targets influences finns' transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off behavior. In 
Table 13, the write-off and non-write-off samples are compared based on the frequency 
with which sample finns' earnings figures before the transitional SFAS 142 goodwill 
write-off are above or below different earnings targets. Two earnings targets are consid-
ered: Panel A reports on the frequency with which finns in the four samples meet prior-
period net income, while Panel B contains equivalent infonnation for an earnings target 
embodied by positive net income. 
1232 An AN OVA F-test on equality of means yields an F-statistic of 49.853 (p-value = 0.000). 
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Goodwill Non-goodwill Non-write-off Write-off 
Earnings target sample sample sample sample 
N % N % N % N % 
Panel A: Prior-year NI 
NI 2002 ~ NI 2001 754 60.4 498 52.1 625 61.0 129 57.6 
NI 2002 < NI 200 I 494 39.6 457 47.9 399 39.0 95 42.4 
Total 1,248 100.0 955 100.0 1,024 100.0 224 100.0 
Panel B: Zero NI 
NI 2002 ~ 0 818 65 .5 461 48.3 681 66.5 137 61.2 
NI 2002 <0 430 34.5 494 51.7 343 33.5 87 38 .8 
Total 1,248 100.0 955 100.0 1,024 100.0 224 100.0 
Table 13: Pre-write-off earnings performance relative to earnings targets 
The results provide weak evidence that write-off behavior is influenced by the desire to 
avoid losses (Panel B). Write-off firms avoid pre-write-off net losses less frequently than 
do non-write-off firms, although the difference between the two groups is not strictly 
significant. 1233 Significant results are also not found where prior-period net income is 
considered as the relevant target (p-value = 0.340). 
In Table 14, further evidence is provided on financial reporting incentives hypothesis 4. 
The transitional write-off amounts (as a percentage of total assets) are compared between 
subgroups of the write-off sample that are defined based on whether a firm meets or falls 
short of a simple earnings target. 
TGWO_A (N = 224) 
Earnings target 
Mean StDev Min 1st qrt Med 3rd qrt Max 
Panel A: Prior-year NI 
NI 2002 ~ NI 2001 7.2 9.2 0.1 1.3 4.3 9.3 55.8 
NI 2002 < NI 2001 7.6 8.2 0.0 2.0 5.2 9.8 42.1 
Panel B: Zero NI 
NI 2002 ~0 7.4 9.7 0.1 1.3 4.1 9.3 55.8 
NI 2002 <0 7.3 7.1 0.0 2.1 5.7 9.3 32.9 
Table 14: Comparison of write-off amounts depending on earnings performance 
A pattern similar to that observed in Table 13 above emerges: Where firms are unsuc-
cessful in meeting their net income-based earnings targets, they appear, on average, to 
record large write-offs suggestive of a "big bath" strategy. Write-offs are significantly 
larger for net loss firms than they are for firms that meet or beat this specific target (Panel 
,m An ANOVA F-test on equality of means yields an F-statistic of2.324 (p-value = 0.128). 
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B). 1234 This relation, albeit insignificant, is also found where prior-period net income is 
used as the relevant target (p-value = 0.224). 
Table 15 provides information on whether non-write-off firms and write-off firms differ 
systematically depending on whether they experienced CEO changes in the years 2001 or 
2002 (financial reporting incentives hypothesis 7a). 
Goodwill Non-goodwill Non-write-off Write-off 
CEO change sample sample sample sample 
N % N % N % N % 
in 2001 43 3.45 14 1.47 33 3.22 IO 4.46 
in 2002 9 0.72 2 0.21 7 0.68 2 0.89 
in either year 52 4.17 16 1.68 40 3.91 12 5.36 
Table 15: Frequency of CEO changes 
It appears that CEO changes, on average were more frequent in write-off firms than they 
were in non-write-off firms during both 2001 and 2002. Due to small sample size, these 
differences are not found to be statistically significant. 1235 This is also true when the oc-
currence of CEO changes in either year is considered (p-value = 0.325). The stable find-
ing in prior literature that "big bath" behavior frequently coincides with top management 
turnover has mostly been documented using samples of firms where (routine or non-
routine) executive changes had been observed, ensuring that sufficiently large samples of 
such firms were available. 1236 
Financial reporting incentives hypothesis 8 suggests that firms with low credit rating 
might be reluctant to record transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs out of concern 
about the resulting financial statement effects and any negative repercussions on credit 
rating and the cost of capital. Therefore, it would be expected that highly rated firms are 
more frequent in the write-off sample, and vice versa. Table 16 reports the distribution of 
rating categories at the end of 2001. 
1234 The adjusted x2-test of equality of medians generates a test statistic of 4.229 (p-value = 0.040). 
1235 For 2001 (2002), an ANO VA F-test of equality of means yields an F-statistic of0.006 (0.017). The p-
values are 0.936 and 0.898, respectively. 
1236 Refer to section 3.3.2.4.6 above. 
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Total firms Non-goodwill Goodwill Non-write-off Write-off 
RATING1231 available sample sample sample sample 
N I % N I % N I % N I % N I % 
AAA (2) 25 1.2 I 0.9 8 1.8 5 1.5 3 2.6 
AA+ (4) 17 0.8 0 0.0 2 0.4 2 0.6 0 0.0 
AA (5) 30 1.4 I 0.9 7 1.6 6 1.8 I 0.9 
AA- (6) 65 3.0 2 1.8 8 1.8 6 1.8 2 1.8 
A+ (7) 127 5.9 3 2.6 21 4.7 16 4.8 5 4.4 
A (8) 155 7.2 7 6.1 28 6.3 23 6.9 5 4.4 
A- (9) 174 8.1 5 4.4 35 7.8 29 8.7 6 5.3 
BBB+ (10) 195 9.1 8 7.0 40 8.9 33 9.9 7 6.1 
BBB (11) 227 10.6 8 7.0 53 11.9 37 II.I 16 14.0 
BBB- (12) 183 8.5 II 9.6 48 10.7 30 9.0 18 15.8 
BB+ (13) IOI 4.7 10 8.8 32 7.2 22 6.6 10 8.8 
BB (14) 147 6 .9 13 11.4 53 11.9 41 12.3 12 10.5 
BB- (15) 157 7.3 II 9.6 42 9 .4 30 9.0 12 10.5 
B+ (16) 204 9.5 14 12.3 40 8.9 30 9.0 10 8.8 
B (17) 113 5.3 8 7.0 16 3.6 12 3.6 4 3.5 
8- (18) 73 3.4 7 6.1 7 1.6 6 1.8 1 0.9 
CCC+ (19) 33 1.5 2 1.8 2 0.4 I 0.3 I 0.9 
CCC (20) 19 0.9 0 0.0 I 0.2 I 0.3 0 0.0 
CCC- (21) 11 0.5 I 0.9 I 0.2 I 0.3 0 0.0 
cc (23) 12 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
D (27) 67 3.1 I 0.9 2 0.4 I 0.3 I 0.9 
SD (29) 7 0.3 I 0.9 I 0.2 I 0.3 0 0.0 
Total 2,142 100.0 114 100.0 447 100.0 333 100.0 114 100.0 
Median 12.0 14.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 
(StDev) (4.7) (4.0) (3 .7) (3 .7) (3 .6) 
Table 16: Distribution of rating categories 
Since rating categories represents ordinal (rank) numbers, the conditions for calculating 
the mean and standard deviation are not given. 1238 With this caveat in mind, the standard 
deviation is reported as a crude proxy for the distribution of the rating categories. Based 
on the median and on visual inspection of the distributions, no support for financial re-
porting incentives hypothesis 8 is found. 1239 
1237 Codes no. I, 3, 22, and 25 are unassigned. Code no. 28 is labeled "not meaningful". Refer to S&P 
(2001). The rating categories C (24) and CI (26) are not represented in the data. 
1238 See, for example, Bamberg and Baur (2002, pp. 17, 21 ). 
1239 The summary figures must be interpreted with caution because of the lacking categories. 
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5. 4 Regression analysis 
5.4.1 Methods employed in studies of write-off determinants 
Most of the studies related to the determinants of discretionary asset write-offs1240 em-
ploy regression analysis, the specific variant of which depends on whether or not the de-
pendent variable is observable on a continuous and unrestricted scale. While the funda-
mentals of regression analysis are not explicitly discussed here, 1241 specific issues fre-
quently encountered in discretionary write-off studies and relevant to the regression 
analysis below are the subject of this section. 
Regression analysis is appropriate when analyzing hypothesized functional relations be-
tween a dependent variable1242 and one or several independent variables. 1243 For example, 
researchers interested in the causes of discretionary asset write-offs hope to find a statis-
tically significant relation between the existence and/or amount of a write-off (the de-
pendent variable) and certain explanatory variables that represent factors hypothesized to 
have caused that write-off and/or influenced its amount (independent variables).1244 Con-
ditional on the nature of the dependent variable, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estima-
tor might or might not be the optimal estimator.1245 Below, specific problems stemming 
from the dependent variable being, first, a dichotomous variable (i.e. the decision 
whether or not to write off at all) or, second, a censored variable (i.e. the amount written 
oft) are discussed. 
1240 Refer to section 3.3 above. 
1241 For excellent textbook expositions of regression analysis, refer to Backhaus et al. (2003, ch. I), Bam-
berg and Baur (2002, pp. 42-51), Greene (2003), Gujarati (2003), Kennedy (1998), von Auer (1999), 
and Winker(l997, ch. 7). 
1242 Common synonyms include explained variable, predictand, regressand, response, and endogenous 
variable. See Gujarati (2003, p. 24). However, the term "response" is inadequate in this context be-
cause it suggests a causal relation, which cannot be readily ascertained in discretionary asset write-off 
studies. 
1243 The terms explanatory variable, predictor, regressor, stimulus, and exogenous variable are frequently 
used synonyms. See Gujarati (2003, p. 24). The term "stimulus" should be avoided for the same rea-
son given in connection with the term response. 
1244 Similarly, authors analyzing the effects of discretionary asset write-offs attempt to ascertain a statisti-
cally significant relation between a market-based metric (the dependent variable) and certain explana-
tory variables related to write-off behavior (independent variables). 
1245 For an overview, refer to Greene (2003, ch. 2), Gujarati (2003, ch. 3), and Kennedy (1998, ch. 2). 
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5.4.1.1 Qualitative dependent variables: The write-off decision 
If the researcher intends to distinguish statistically between two separate groups, the de-
pendent variable represents qualitative as opposed to quantitative characteristics. In dis-
cretionary asset write-off studies, for example, the data consists of firms belonging to two 
groups: Write-off firms and non-write-off firms. The researcher intends to relate the 
probability of observing a write-off, regardless of the specific amount, to potential ex-
planatory factors. The dependent variable is a binary or dichotomous variable, referred to 
as WO_ D, which assumes a value of one where a firm decides to record a write-off, and 
zero otherwise. This indicator variable partitions the sample into two subgroups: Write-
off firms, i.e. firms that decided to record a non-zero write-off (WO_D = l), and non-
write-off firms, i.e. firms that have not recorded any write-off (WO_ D = 0). 
In this case, special estimating problems make applying OLS methodology inappropri-
ate.1246 If WO _D is regressed on the explanatory variables, the predicted values should 
fall within the 0-1 interval because, for each firm, the predicted value would be inter-
preted as the likelihood that the firm, given its characteristics represented by the explana-
tory variables, is a write-off firm. However, the estimated OLS line ( or, in a multivariate 
context, the multidimensional regression hyper space) will also yield estimated probabili-
ties that are outside the 0-1 range. 1247 Under this linear probability model, predicted val-
ues for WO_D that are larger than one would converted to one, and those that are smaller 
than zero, to zero. 1248 
However, this conversion implies that there is no difference between those firms for 
which the probability of them being a write-off firm was estimated at l and those for 
which the probability was estimated at, say, 2.5. Also, estimates such as zero and one 
suggest that outcomes, for which certainty does not exist, are predicted with certainty. To 
alleviate this concern, a function is required that "squeezes" the probability estimates 
asymptotically inside the 0-1 range, without creating estimates that are exactly zero or 
exactly one. In other words, the 0-1 observations on the dependent variable are inter-
preted as dichotomous realizations of a "true" latent variable. In the context of discre-
tionary asset write-off studies, this latent variable could be interpreted as the amount that 
1246 For much of the following, refer to Kennedy (I 998, pp. 233-5). 
1247 For a graphical depiction of this problem, see Kennedy (1998, p. 234) and Maddala (2001, p. 320). 
1248 See Maddala (2001, pp. 318-20) and Maddala (1991, p. 789). 
244 
Thorsten Sellhorn - 978-3-631-75498-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:09:55AM
via free access
the firm would "desire" to write off, which is coded as one, if positive, and as zero, if 
negative. 1249 
Two methods are frequently used: In the Probit model, the probability of obtaining the 
dependent variable is written as a cumulative normal function of the explanatory vari-
ables, while in the Logit model, this probability is written as a logistic function of the 
explanatory variables. Estimation itself is undertaken using a maximum likelihood (ML) 
procedure. 1250 Maddala (2001) notes that the cumulative normal and the logistic distribu-
tions are so close to each other that the two methods are likely to generate similar re-
sults_ 1251 
Although Probit and Logit are frequently used in classificatory accounting research, 1252 
few discretionary asset write-off studies actually apply this methodology, most being 
interested in the write-off amount or other quantitative (in most cases, continuous) vari-
ables. Examples include Chen and Lee (1995), Kim and Kwon (2001), Loh and Tan 
(2002), and Strong and Meyer (l 987). 1253 Discriminant analysis is occasionally used as 
an alternative methodological approach. 1254 Comparisons of the OLS and Probit/Logit 
approaches in accounting choice studies are provided, respectively, by Noreen (l 988) 
and Stone and Rasp (1991). 
5.4.1.2 Limited dependent variables: The write-off amount 
In several of the studies presented in section 3.3 above, it is tested whether the amount 
written off can be statistically linked to economic factors and/or variables that stand for 
financial reporting incentives. In these studies, the write-off amount, commonly scaled 
by a size proxy such as total assets and expressed as a positive number (hereafter, 
WO_A), is the dependent variable in a regression on one or several explanatory vari-
ables. WO_ A does not have an unlimited range. Because most of the studies analyze a 
1249 See Maddala (200 I, p. 322). 
1250 See Greene (2003, p. 670). For an in-depth explanation of this topic area as well as a discussion com-
paring the relative merits of the Logit and Prob it specifications, refer to Backhaus et al. (2003, ch. 3), 
Kennedy (1998, pp. 237-40), Maddala (1983, esp. pp. 22-7), and Maddala (1991, pp. 788-94). 
1251 See Maddala (2001, p. 323). 
1252 See Noreen (1988, p. 119 fu . I). 
1253 See Chen and Lee (1995, p. 108-9), Kim and Kwon (2001 , pp. 10-3), Loh and Tan (2002, pp. 142-8), 
and Strong and Meyer ( 1987, p. 651 fu . 18). 
1254 See, for example, Strong and Meyer (1987, p. 649-51). Maddala (1991 , pp. 788-94) contrasts Logit 
and Probit analysis with discriminant analysis. 
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setting in which upward revaluations are prohibited, 1255 WO_ A is either positive or zero. 
In this context, the OLS estimator is not appropriate because the dependent variable is 
limited in its range, causing OLS estimates to be biased as well as inconsistent, i.e. the 
estimates are biased even asymptotically. 1256 
A censored regression model is applicable when the data on some observations on the 
dependent variable is censored or unobserved, meaning that for some known values of 
the independent variable(s), the corresponding exact values of the dependent variable are 
not observable for some reason. It is only known whether they are above or below a cer-
tain threshold. 1257 However, these observations remain included in the sample, and the 
unobservable values of the dependent variable are coded to assume some limit value, 
frequently zero. 1258 In other words, the known observations on the dependent variable are 
a function of a "true" latent variable, 1259 which is partially unobservable. The observable 
dependent variable, y, assumes the value of this latent variable, y*, where the latter is 
above (below) the censoring limit, but is censored to assume the value of the censoring 
limit where the latent variable is below (above) the censoring limit. 1260 In the case of the 
censoring limit being zero, the probability of observing y = 0 is equal to the probability 
ofobserving y* ~ 0. 
Applied to the transitional SF AS 142 setting, the write-off amount actually observed, 
TGWO_A, is either zero or positive. 1261 However, TGWO_A values smaller than zero 
may theoretically exist in cases where the impairment testing procedure shows that not a 
decline, but rather an appreciation in the value of goodwill has occurred. The unob-
1255 Riedl (2002) analyzes write-offs under SFAS 121 and under the pre-SFAS 121 accounting regime. 
SFAS 121.11 explicitly prohibits "(r]estoration of previously recognized impairment losses." Previ-
ously, the general historical cost framework of GAAP also provided no basis for asset write-ups over 
and above historical cost. 
1256 More technically, the coefficient estimates are biased because the expected value of the disturbances 
is not zero. See Gujarati (2003, p. 616), Kennedy (1998, p. 114), and Maddala (I 991, p. 795). Accord-
ing to Greene (2003, p. 762), "(c]onventional regression methods fail to account for the qualitative 
difference between limit (zero) observations and nonlimil (continuous) observations" (emphasis in 
original). For much of the following, refer also to Kennedy ( 1998, ch. 16). 
1257 Refer to Maddala (I 983, pp. 3-6). The problems associated with censored data are also discussed in 
Greene (2003, pp. 761-80), Gujarati (2003, pp. 616-9), and Kennedy (1998, ch. 16). 
1258 In the words of Greene (2003, p. 761), "values in a certain range [here: below zero] are all trans-
formed to (or reported as) a single value (here: zero]." 
1259 See Greene (2003, p. 764). 
1260 Stated technically, where the censoring limit is zero, y = y* ify* > 0 and y = 0 otherwise. See Mad-
data (1983, p. 149) and Greene (2003, p. 764). 
1261 This implies that, as is custom in the literature and also the chosen approach in this study, write-offs 
are measured as positive numbers. 
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served, latent variable, then, is the amount of change in goodwill value. SF AS 142, pro-
hibiting upward revaluations such as write-off reversals (i.e., negative values of 
TGWO_A), in effect censors TGWO_A to exclude values below zero. It is worth noting 
that, in this example, the threshold or cut-off point of zero for TGWO _A is known and 
identical for all observations. 1262 Therefore, negative values of TGWO _ A cannot be ob-
served although firms exist that would have recorded upward asset revaluations, had it 
not been for the restriction imposed by SFAS 142. The explanatory variables for these 
firms are available. The data is censored at zero. 
The applicable procedure for regression analysis using censored data was developed by 
Tobin (1958) and is called the Tobit model. 1263 The Tobit model is a censored normal 
regression model. 1264 Here, estimation is undertaken employing an ML estimator. 1265 The 
parameter estimates generated by an ML estimator are those for which the probability of 
having obtained the particular sample used is greatest. 1266 Specifically, the canonical To-
bit model is appropriate in this setting, since the dependent variable is a censored variable 
with a left limit value of zero and no right limit value. 1267 
Studies also applying this methodology include Riedl (2002), Francis, Hanna and Vin-
cent (1996), and Loh and Tan (2002). Riedl (2002) examines the determinants of the 
amounts of long-lived asset write-offs. 1268 He assumes that his data is censored, arguing 
that "the explanatory .. variables are available for all the observations, but the explained .. 
variable is equivalent to O because it falls below some .. threshold value .. for a subset of 
observations". 1269 However, he documents robustness of his findings to different distribu-
1262 For settings in which the threshold is either unknown, different for each observation, or both, refer to 
Maddala (1983, pp. 3-6). 
1263 See Greene (2003, pp. 764-6), Kennedy (1998, pp. 250-2, 255-6), Maddala (1983, pp. 151-162), and 
Maddala (1991, pp. 794-7). 
1264 SeeMaddala(l983,p. 151). 
1265 Characterizing it as "rather involved", Gujarati (2003, p. 617) considers ML estimation beyond the 
scope of his "Basic econometrics" textbook. 
1266 See, for example, Greene (2003, ch. 17), Gujarati (2003, pp. 114-7), and Kennedy (1998, pp. 21-2). 
For a more technical definition, see Kennedy ( I 998, pp. 30-1 ). 
1267 Regression analysis using ML estimation requires specifying the distribution of the error term. In the 
context of this study, no specific distribution of the errors is known. Since, according to the central 
limit theorem, large numbers tend to be approximately normally distributed, the normal distribution is 
assumed to describe the error terms. See Kennedy (1998, p. 30). This corresponds to the assumption 
used in the Tobit model. See Maddala ( 1983, p. 151 ). 
1268 His variable WOT Ai" denoting the net of tax amount of the asset write-off recorded by firm i in pe-
riod t, divided by beginning-of-period total assets, is largely equivalent to WO_ A defined above. 
1269 Riedl (2002, p. 8). 
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tional assumptions, inter a/ia an OLS model. 1270 Arguing against the applicability of the 
Tobit specification in his setting, he maintains that, "because GAAP during [the] sample 
period does not allow firms to record .. increases in asset values, the distribution is not 
censored", 1271 implying that the data is truncated instead.1272 In the case of truncated 
data, calling for a truncated regression model, 1273 an observation is entirely omitted from 
the sample when the value of the dependent variable falls above (or below) the threshold 
discussed above. Applied to the write-off setting, this would be a case where only write-
off firms are considered and non-write-off firms are excluded from the sample. In this 
context, the Tobit model is not applicable and a different ML technique should be 
used.1274 Under the Tobit or censored regression model, in contrast, non-write-off firms 
are included in the study, but the write-off amount is censored to zero. 
While researchers are prudent to conduct sensitivity analyses by using different specifica-
tions, Riedl's latter line of reasoning with respect to the non-applicability of the Tobit 
model does not appear to be valid. As noted above, asset write-offs are supposed to re-
flect economic value declines of assets. Riedl assumes that economic value increases do 
not occur in the sample just because the accounting regime happens to have determined 
an arbitrary cutoff point at zero, beyond which economic value fluctuations cannot be-
come reflected in accounting numbers. In reality, write-offs may range above (fair value 
< book value) or below (fair value> book value) zero, implying that a data set that limits 
observations on WO _A to assume values of zero or above is censored. 1275 The fact that 
Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) also apply a Tobit procedure without explicitly ex-
pounding the problem whether or not their data is censored might be interpreted as con-
firming this notion. 1276 However, Maddala (1991) cautions researchers about using the 
Tobit model inappropriately. Because it is "tempting to use the tobit model every time 
1270 Among the studies using an OLS specification are Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt (1998) and Segal (2003), 
who do not, however, explicitly discuss the relative merits of the OLS and Tobit specifications. 
127 1 Riedl (2002, p. 25). Results for both specifications are reported in table 3 panel A and B, respectively. 
1272 The distinction between censored and truncated data is discussed in Kennedy (1998, pp. 250-1), Mad-
dala (I 983 , pp. 1-3, 149-51), and Maddala (1991 , pp. 794-7). 
1273 Refer to Maddala (1983, pp. 1-3, 165-70). 
1274 Refer to Kennedy (1998, pp. 251, 257-8). 
1275 As examples of data where use of the Tobit model is inappropriate due to the data being truncated, not 
censored, Maddala (1991 , pp. 795-6) refers to individual choices, e.g. automobile expenditures and 
hours worked, for which there is no way that the data can be negative. In this case, however, "nega-
tive" discretionary asset write-offs would be most likely be observed if standard setters did not arbi-
trarily prohibit write-ups and write-off reversals. For a slightly different take, refer to Gujarati (2003, 
p. 616), who interprets data on housing expenditures as censored. 
1276 See also Riedl (2002, p. 25). Francis, Hanna and Vincent's (1996, p. 125) variable WRITE-OFF; 
denotes the write-off recorded by firm i, deflated by total assets. 
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one has a bunch of zero (or other limit) observations on [the dependent variable] ... there 
are many more examples of the inappropriate use of the tobit model than of its correct 
use."1211 
5.4.2 Summary of hypotheses 
Table 17 provides a summary of the hypotheses developed in section 5.2 above, indicat-
ing that the majority of predictions are relevant to both the write-off decision and the 

















































In the following section, hypotheses pertaining to the dichotomous write-off decision are 
tested using primarily Probit regression methodology, whereas hypotheses about the 
write-off amount are subjected to Tobit regression analysis. While the economic factors 
hypotheses as well as the financial reporting incentives hypotheses 1-4 are tested on the 
whole goodwill sample, sub-groups of that sample are relevant for financial reporting 
incentives hypotheses 5-8. 
1277 Maddala (1991, p. 795). 
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5.4.3 Analysis of the write-off decision 
As discussed in section 5.4.1.1 above, ML estimation using the Probit model is appropri-
ate where determinants of the write-off decision, expressed as the dichotomous depend-
ent variable TGWO_D, are analyzed. Three multivariate models are considered in tum: 
Model D 1 represents explanatory variables derived from the economic factors hypothe-
ses as well as the financial reporting incentives hypotheses 1-4. It is tested using all firms 
in the goodwill sample. Model D2, considering only those firms in the goodwill sample 
that incur a pre-write-off loss in 2002 (TARGET_Z = 0), contains the "big bath" vari-
ables suggested by financial reporting incentives hypothesis 7. Model D3 is a variant of 
model D1 with RA TING as an added explanatory factor. Consequently, only those (high-
profile) firms for which S&P debt ratings are available are included in regression tests of 
model D3. The control variables defined in section 5.2.4 are included in all models. 
5.4.3.1 Full-sample test 
The correlation matrix for model D1 (reported in Table A. 6 in the Appendix) indicates 
that, on the whole, most of the variables are largely uncorrelated with each other. Notable 
positive correlation exists, inter a/ia, between TAR GET _PP and ~PWOROA (both re-
flect the change in accounting earnings over the prior year), DTE and MTB (highly lev-
eraged firms apparently trade at a premium), HERF and MSH (market share per firm is 
higher, on average, in concentrated industries), and SIZE and MSH (larger firms have 
higher market share). 
Probit regression results for model D1 are reported in Table 18 below. 
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TGWO_Di =a +1}1MTBi +1} 2RETi +1} 3.1.ROAi +1} 4AIP; +1} 5DTE; +1} 6 MSHi 
+1} 7 HERF; +1}8MWOROA; +1} 9 TARGET_PPi +1}10 TARGET_Z; 
+1} 11 SIZE; +1}12 FYR; +1} 13GW; +E ; 
Variable Hypothesis Coefficient z-statistic 
Significance level 
(predicted sign) estimate (p-value) 
C (?) -1.444665 -10.05380 0.0000 
MTB H5c I (-) -0.031350 -2.401063 0.0163 
RET H5c 2a (-) -0. I 94186 -3 .116553 0.0018 
.1.ROA Hiic 2b (-) -0.041955 -0.186227 0.8523 
AIP H~l (+) 0.145979 1.796326 0.0724 
DTE H~ 2 (-) 0.001259 0.077649 0.9381 
MSH HtR 3a (?) 4.152666 4.089040 0.0000 
HERF HtR 3b (?) 0.755804 1.019518 0.3080 
MWOROA HtR 3c (?) 0.704047 1.531942 0.1255 
TARGET PP 
H~ 4 (-) -0.207617 -1.870725 
0.0614 
TARGET Z -0.015156 -0.146019 0.8839 
SIZE (?) 0.000001 0.527720 0.5977 
FYR (?) 0.281511 2.754562 0.0059 
GW (?) 0.019001 6.771698 0.0000 











Variable definitions (refer to Table 6 for further details): 
MTB MTB ratio, measured at the end of200 I . 
RET Cumulative stock performance, measured over the fiscal years 2000 and 2001 . 
.1.ROA Percentage point change in ROA between the fiscal years 2000 and 200 I. 
AIP Mean of assets-in-place, measured as the relation of PP&E (net of accumulated depre-
ciation) to total market value, at the end of 2001 and 2002. 
DTE Mean of the differences between firm and median two-digit SIC industry DTE ratios, at 
the end of2001 and 2002. 
MSH Mean of market shares, measured as the relation of firm sales (DATA12) to two-digit 
SIC industry sales, at the end of 2001 and 2002; industry sales based on all available 
firms. 
HERF Mean of the Herfindahl indexes of the two-digit SIC industry, measured as the sum of 
the squares of the market shares of each firm in the industry, at the end of 200 I and 
2002; industry sales based on all available firms . 
.1.PWOROA Change in ROA (before transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off) in 2002 over regular 






Dichotomous variable: I where annual pre-write-off net income is above the prior year' s 
level (above zero) in 2002; 0 otherwise. 
Size, measured by the mean of the market values of equity at the end of2001 and 2002. 
Dichotomous variable: 1 where fiscal year-end in 2001 is December 31 ; 0 otherwise. 
FYR is coded based on COMPUSTAT annual item FYR. 
Goodwill book value, deflated by total assets, measured at the end of 2001 . 
Table 18: Probit regression results for model Dl (full sample) 
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The likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic of 122.04 indicates that the overall model contrib-
utes significantly to explaining variation in the dependent variable. 1278 The McFadden R2, 
an analog to the R2 in the OLS regression context, is l 0.4%.1279 The majority of coeffi-
cient estimates carry the expected signs. Both MTB and RET have a highly significant 
(p-values = 0.016 and 0.002, respectively), negative association with the probability of 
observing a transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off. For the change in ROA over the 
pre-adoption period, however, this relation is insignificant. 1280 Also according to expecta-
tions, the proportion of assets-in-place is positively associated with write-off probability 
(p-value = 0.072). To the extent that high assets-in-place stand for the existence of an 
accounting-based compensation plan, this result suggests that management operating 
under such plans are more likely to record a (potentially compensation-neutral) transi-
tional write-off, possibly to decrease the likelihood of having to record future, compensa-
tion-decreasing write-offs. On the other hand, it must be noted that a pure earnings-
management explanation might be premature since assets-in-place potentially proxy for 
other factors, such as industry membership. The coefficient estimate on DTE neither is 
significant nor does it have the predicted sign, suggesting that the extent to which a 
firm ' s DTE ratio is below the industry median does not influence the likelihood of ob-
serving a write-off. 1281 All three political visibility proxies, for which no signs were pre-
dicted, are found to be positively associated with write-off probability, albeit only MSH 
significantly so. A possible earnings-management interpretation is that dominant, high-
profile firms, ceteris paribus, accelerate write-offs in order to decrease bottom-line in-
come and firm size, reducing potential exposure to regulatory scrutiny. However, alterna-
tive economic interpretations include the notion that such firms to a large extent had to 
1278 In the Probit and Logit models, the LR test is used to assess whether all the slope coefficients are 
zero. See Greene (2003, p. 678). LR tests for all of the independent variables individually (not tabu-
lated) produce results largely identical to those indicated by the corresponding z-statistics. The z-
statistic is the equivalent to the OLS I-statistic in estimating situations where normality holds only as-
ymptotically, as is the case in the Probit, Logit, and Tobit models. Z values follow a standard normal 
distribution. See Gujarati (2003 , p. 619). They are obtained by dividing the coefficient estimate by its 
standard error. 
1279 This measure is selected from a multitude of goodness-of-fit measures applicable in binary models. It 
assumes values between zero and one and increases as the fit of the model increases. See Greene 
(2003, pp. 683-6), Maddala (2001 , pp. 327-9), and Veall and Zimmermann (1996). 
1280 Substituting the change in sales from 2000 to 2001 for ~ROA as an alternative accounting-based 
perfonnance measure (not tabulated) yields a significantly negative coefficient estimate (p-value = 
0.008). The other coefficients are largely unchanged. However, this variable is likely to capture 
changes in firm size rather than firm profitability, and is therefore difficult to interpret. Another sub-
stitute, the change in income before extraordinary items from 2000 to 200 I, generates results equiva-
lent to ~ROA (not tabulated). 
1281 When the pre-write-off DTE ratio at the end of2002 is used alternatively, the coefficient estimate has 
the expected negative sign but remains insignificant (p-value = 0.363). 
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rely on external growth, forcing them to overpay in acquisitions.1282 Regarding the target 
variables, both coefficient estimates carry the expected signs, which might indicate that 
especially prior-period net income (p-value = 0.061) is an earnings target that manage-
ment deems important to obtain. The control variable FYR exhibits a significantly posi-
tive relation with the likelihood of observing a write-off. Calendar-year firms are more 
likely to record transitional write-offs, although the reasons for this finding can only be 
speculated upon. 1283 Finally, the significant positive coefficient estimate on GW indicates 
that a write-off is more likely to occur where goodwill is a significant portion of the 
firm's overall asset base. On the whole, consistent with the tenor of the descriptive evi-
dence presented in section 5.3.3 above, this finding suggests that economic factors 
strongly contribute to explaining variation in write-off probability, with write-offs being 
more frequent in firms that are viewed unfavorably by the market. The effects of finan-
cial reporting incentives, on the other hand, are open to several explanations. 
Since economic factors hypothesis I suggests that firms for which MTB> I have no eco-
nomic inducement to record a write-off,1284 model DI is re-estimated using only this sub-
sample (not tabulated). The number ofobservations drops to 921 firms, only 124 (13.5%) 
of which record a transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-off. As expected, the economic 
factors lose their explanatory power in this sub-sample. From among the other explana-
tory factors, AIP (p-value = 0.075) and TAR GET _PP (0.032) yield coefficient estimates 
that are significant and carry the expected signs. MSH is also highly explanatory (p-value 
= 0.000), suggesting that dominant firms are more likely to report write-offs. Overall, 
these results are consistent with the notion that economically successful firms' write-offs 
are motivated by factors other than goodwill impairment. 
1282 In any event, MSH to some extent seems to capture size effects, which is also indicated by the fact 
that the SIZE variable itself is insignificant. The insignificant, positive coefficient estimate on the 
SIZE variable is stable to alternative measures such as total assets (p-value = 0.168) and sales (0.475). 
However, the estimates are significantly positive when the logarithmized variants SIZE_LOG are 
used (not tabulated). In that event, the other inferences remain unchanged. Since the coefficient esti-
mate on MSH also retains its significance, it can be concluded with some confidence that MSH cap-
tures earnings-management motivations. 
1283 Refer to the interpretation of Table 11 above. 
1284 See also the descriptive evidence presented in Table 12 and Table A. 5. Again, it must be cautioned 
that the entity-level MTB ratio is a potentially noisy proxy for goodwill impairment in diversified, 
multi-segment firms. 
253 
Thorsten Sellhorn - 978-3-631-75498-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:09:55AM
via free access
5.4.3.2 Tests for robustness 
Applying a Logit specification to model DI yields widely similar results (not tabu-
lated). 1285 The only exception is that the coefficient estimate on AIP is insignificant in 
this setting (p-value = 0.235). These similarities are consistent with Maddala's (2001) 
statement that the Probit and Logit models generate comparable estimates. 1286 
In order to restrain the influence that outlying observations on the regressors have on the 
inferences, model DI is re-estimated using a truncated sample (not tabulated). Truncation 
is achieved by excluding those firms representing the bottom 5% and the top 5% of the 
respective distributions. As a result of truncation, the sample size drops to 687 firms, I 06 
(15.4%) of which record a transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off. Apparently, write-
off firms are overrepresented in the outlying firms (21.0%). Applying the Probit estima-
tor to model DI based on this truncated sample yields results that are somewhat different 
from the initial estimate reported in Table 18. While the coefficient estimate on MTB 
remains highly significant with the expected negative sign (p-value = 0.000), RET and 
~ROA lose the predicted sign and are insignificant. This latter fact might indicate that 
economic developments resulting in the write-off had not yet been captured by previous 
performance measures. AIP, while retaining the predicted sign, is also no longer found to 
have significant explanatory power. Again, the size effect is captured by SIZE_LOG (p-
value = 0.025), rendering the coefficient estimate on MSH insignificantly positive 
(0.537). Both target variables are insignificant with the expected sign. Overall, the write-
off decision in the outlier-adjusted sample still appears to be predominantly associated 
with the MTB ratio, suggesting that financial reporting motivations play only a minor 
role in "average" firms' write-off decisions. 
5.4.3.3 Sub-sample tests 
Probit regression results for model D2 are reported in Table 19 below. 1287 Because SPEC 
is only observed for a small minority of firms, this variable is omitted from the regression 
equation. 1288 
1285 Despite the theoretical shortcomings of OLS regression in the context of dichotomous dependent 
variables, Noreen (1988) documents empirically that, for certain kinds of data and sample sizes com-
monly encountered in classificatory accounting studies, OLS performs as good as the theoretically 
superior Probit model. However, because it is not certain that the write-off decision setting at hand 
corresponds to those investigated by Noreen ( 1988), OLS methodology is not applied here. 
1286 See Maddala (2001, p. 323). 
1287 The correlation matrix is reported in Table A. 7 in the Appendix. 
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(predicted sign) estimate (p-value) 
C (?) -1 .092868 -6.511958 0.0000 
ACEO Hi,c 7a (+) -0.034432 -0.124063 0.9013 
RESTR HtR 7b (+) 2.389634 1.050848 0.2933 
SIZE (?) 0.000006 1.981839 0.0475 
FYR (?) 0.136248 0.804718 0.4210 
GW (?) 0.019043 4.218368 0.0000 






where TARGET Z = 0 
Total: TGWO_D=0: 
391 288 (73.7%) 
TGWO_D= I: 
103 (26.3%) 
Variable definitions (refer to Table 6 for further details): 





2002; 0 otherwise. 
Restructuring cost (pre-tax), deflated by total assets, measured at the end of 2002. 
Size, measured by the mean of the market values of equity at the end of2001 and 2002. 
Dichotomous variable: 1 where fiscal year-end in 200 I is December 31; 0 otherwise. 
FYR is coded based on COMPUST AT annual item FYR. 
Goodwill book value, deflated by total assets, measured at the end of 200 I . 
Table 19: Probit regression results for model D2 (partial sample of firms missing earnings 
targets) 
The analysis indicates that financial reporting incentives hypothesis 7 does not appear to 
predict the write-off decisions of finns with pre-write-off net losses. While the overall fit 
of the model is significant (p-value = 0.000), LR tests for the explanatory factors indi-
vidually (not tabulated) yield insignificant results. These findings are stable in a Logit 
specification (not tabulated). The explanatory power that the model does exhibit can be 
traced back to the control variables SIZE and GW. This finding suggests that there is no 
significant association of "big bath"-type incentives and/or restructuring situations with 
the write-off decision in finns that fail to avoid net losses in the adoption year of SF AS 
142. 
Finally, the variable RA TING is added to the set of explanatory variables in model DI, 
yielding model D3 . As shown in Table A. 8 in the Appendix, this variable is highly cor-
related with several of the other regressors. Most notably, it is negatively associated with 
SIZE and MSH, suggesting that larger, more dominant finns are viewed more favorably 
1288 Its inclusion truncates the sample to 51 observations (TGWO_D = 0: 32; TGWO_D = 1: 19). Probit 
regression analysis of this smaller sample (not tabulated) yields no significant coefficient estimates. 
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by S&P .1289 Conversely, positive correlation is found between AIP and DTE. Probit re-
gression results for model D3 are reported in Table 20. 
TGWO_D; =a +f]1MTB; +f]2 RET; +f]36ROA; +f]4 AIP; +f] 5DTE; +f]6 MSH; 
+f]7HERF; +f]86PWOROA; +f]9TARGET_PP; +f]10TARGET_Z; 




MTB H5c I (-) 
RET H5c 2a (-) 
MOA H5c 2b (-) 
AIP H~l (+) 
DTE HbR 2 (-) 
MSH H~ 3a (?) 
HERF H~ 3b (?) 
6PWOROA H~ 3c (?) 
TARGET_PP 
HbR 4 (-) TARGET Z 




L1kehhood ratio (p-value) 
McFadden R2 
Observations 
Goodwill sample where 
RA TING available 




































Total: TGWO_D = 0: 
447 333 (74.5%) 





















Thorsten Sellhorn - 978-3-631-75498-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:09:55AM
via free access
Variable definitions (refer to Table 6 for further details): 
MTB MTB ratio, measured at the end of 2001. 
RET Cumulative stock performance, measured over the fiscal years 2000 and 200 I . 
~ROA Percentage point change in ROA between the fiscal years 2000 and 200 I. 
AIP Mean of assets-in-place, measured as the relation of PP&E (net of accumulated depre-
ciation) to total market value, at the end of2001 and 2002. 
DTE Mean of the differences between firm and median two-digit SIC industry DTE ratios, at 
the end of2001 and 2002. 
MSH Mean of market shares, measured as the relation of firm sales (DAT A 12) to two-digit 
SIC industry sales, at the end of 2001 and 2002; industry sales based on all available 
firms. 
HERF Mean of the Herfindahl indexes of the two-digit SIC industry, measured as the sum of 
the squares of the market shares of each firm in the industry, at the end of 200 I and 
2002 ; industry sales based on all available firms. 
~PWOROA Change in ROA (before transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off) in 2002 over regular 







Dichotomous variable: I where annual pre-write-off net income is above the prior year's 
level (above zero) in 2002; 0 otherwise. 
Long-term domestic issuer credit rating in 200 I . 
Size, measured by the mean of the market values of equity at the end of200I and 2002. 
Dichotomous variable: I where fiscal year-end in 200 I is December 31; 0 otherwise. 
FYR is coded based on COM PUST AT annual item FYR. 
Goodwill book value, deflated by total assets, measured at the end of200 I. 
Table 20: Probit regression results for model D3 (partial sample of firms rated by S&P) 
Restricting the analysis to a set of goodwill firms for which S&P domestic issuer credit 
ratings (RA TING) are available yields a completely different sample. Only the largest, 
most visible firms are represented, which decreases the number of observations to a total 
of 447.1290 The write-off firms (114) represent a larger portion of the sample (25.5%) 
than is the case in the overall goodwill sample (17.9%). Interestingly, economic factors 
no longer significantly explain the write-off decision in these firms. The formerly signifi-
cantly negative coefficient estimates on both MTB and RET are insignificant, while still 
negative. While most of the other coefficients are roughly unchanged, avoiding a pre-
write-off net loss (TAR GET_ Z) appears to be a powerful incentive for these high-profile 
firms (p-value = 0.031 ).1291 The RA TING variable itself, however, does not appear to be 
associated with write-off probability, indicating that the costs of recording a transitional 
write-off are not a linear function of the rating category. 1292 Consistent with the findings 
1290 For example, these firms are, on average, more than six times larger in terms of the market value of 
equity (median= $1,747 million) than are firms in the overall goodwill sample. They also have sig-
nificantly higher market shares (median= 1.3%). Their median MTB ratio is 2.00. 
1291 Recall that, in model DI, the coefficient estimate on this variable is insignificant. 
1292 Possibly, downgrades are more costly for firms in the higher rating categories because such events 
potentially trigger large increases in financing cost. Likewise, these costs might be especially high 
around certain cutoff points, e.g. where a firm is in jeopardy of losing its investment grade rating. 
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discussed above, financial reporting incentives appear to play a more important role in 
large, high-profile firms than they do in the overall sample. 
Re-estimating model D3 using only firms for which MTB> 1 generates results similar to 
those discussed in the context of model D 1 above (not tabulated). 1293 In this setting, eco-
nomic factors largely lose their explanatory power, whereas TARGET_Z (p-value = 
0.029) yields a highly significant coefficient estimate that carries the expected sign. The 
findings are consistent with the interpretation that these high-profile firms avoid write-
offs where in perceived jeopardy of recording a net loss. The RA TING variable, again 
insignificant, appears to proxy for the high profiles and capital market following of the 
firms in this sub-sample. 
5.4.4 Analysis of the write-off amount 
The determinants of the write-off amount, expressed as the left-censored dependent vari-
able TGWO_A, are analyzed using the Tobit model. 1294 Four separate models are esti-
mated: Model A 1 contains explanatory variables derived from the economic factors hy-
potheses as well as financial reporting incentives hypothesis 2. It is tested using all firms 
in the goodwill sample. Model A2 is used to investigate financial reporting incentives 
hypothesis 5, considering only those firms in the goodwill sample that meet the zero pre-
write-off net income target in 2002 (TARGET_Z = 1). Model A3, a test of financial re-
porting incentives hypothesis 6, is applied to the other half of the goodwill sample 
(TARGET_Z = 0) in an attempt to ascertain whether "big bath"-type write-offs are lim-
ited by the available amount of equity. 1295 Finally, model A4 is an analog to Probit model 
D3, where RA TING is added as an explanatory factor to the initial model, A 1.1296 
1293 This sample comprises 368 observations, of which 79 firms (21.5%) record a write-off. 
1294 Tobit regression coefficients must be interpreted somewhat differently from those obtained in OLS 
estimation. Refer to Kennedy (1998, pp. 255-6) and McDonald and Moffitt (1980, pp. 318-9). The 
Tobit slope coefficient indicates the degree of change in the independent variable necessary to bring 
about a one-unit change in the desired transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off. The expected actual 
change in write-off is comprised of two components, owing to the fact that the write-off amount is 
left-censored at zero. Due to the censoring limit, observing any change in write-off at all for a given 
firm is conditional on the probability with which that firm is a non-limit observation, i.e. a write-off 
firm. Consequently, the components are, first, the change in expected write-off of above-limit obser-
vations times the probability of being above the limit, plus, second, the expected write-off of above-
limit observations weighted by the change in probability of being above the limit 
129s To exclude firms for which the amount of equity is not a limiting factor, this test is restricted to firms 
where goodwill > equity. The restriction of positive equity imposed during the sample selection pro-
cedure (see Panel A of Table 7) is removed to allow for write-offs to cause negative equity. 
1296 Again, only those (large) firms for which S&P debt rating data is available are included in this model. 
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5.4.4.1 Full-sample test 





MTB H!c I (-) 
RET H~c 2a (-) 
~ROA H!c 2b (-) 




Log hkehhood ratio (p-value) 
Adjusted R2 













Variable definitions (refer to Table 6 for further details): 


























RET Cumulative stock performance, measured over the fiscal years 2000 and 200 I. 
~OA Percentage point change in ROA between the fiscal years 2000 and 200 I . 
DTE Mean of the differences between firm and median two-digit SIC industry DTE ratios, at 




Size, measured by the mean of the market values of equity at the end of2001 and 2002. 
Dichotomous variable: I where fiscal year-end in 200 I is December 31; 0 otherwise. 
FYR is coded based on COMPUSTAT annual item FYR. 
Goodwill book value, deflated by total assets, measured at the end of 200 I . 
Table 21: Tobit regression results for model Al (full sample) 
The results yielded in the Tobit specification correspond to a large extent to those found 
for model DI in the dichotomous setting: The write-off amount is significantly higher 
when price-based performance measures such as MTB and RET are lower, whereas for 
.!1ROA, the accounting-based performance variable, such association is not found. 1297 
Also, DTE lacks explanatory power. 1298 This finding suggests that economic factors, 
more significantly than do variables associated with financial reporting incentives, ex-
1297 As in model DI above, substituting the change in sales from 2000 to 2001 for ~ROA as an alternative 
accounting-based performance measure (not tabulated) yields a significantly negative coefficient es-
timate (p-value = 0.042), while the other coefficients remain largely unchanged. Likewise similarly, 
the change in income before extraordinary items from 2000 to 200 I generates results equivalent to 
~ROA (not tabulated). 
1298 As in model DI, when the pre-write-off DTE ratio at the end of2002 is used alternatively, the coeffi-
cient estimate has the expected negative sign but remains insignificant (p-value = 0.304). 
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plain not only the write-off decision itself, but to some extent also the amount written off. 
Again, the control variables FYR and GW significantly account for the overall fit of 
model A 1, 1299 which is evidenced by the high LR test statistic. 1300 
Parallel to the procedure adopted in section 5.4.3.1 above, model Al is re-estimated in-
cluding only those firms for which MTB> 1 (not tabulated). In contrast to the dichoto-
mous setting, the economic factors variables MTB (p-value = 0.064) and RET (0.063) 
retain significant explanatory power for the write-off amount. Apparently, write-offs are 
lower where price-based performance is higher. Furthermore, the SIZE variable exhibits 
a significantly positive association with the write-off amount (p-value = 0.072), espe-
cially when logarithmized (0.001), suggesting that larger firms, on average, record larger 
(in relative terms) write-offs. 
5.4.4.2 Tests for robustness 
A robustness check of the preceding findings is undertaken by re-estimating model Al 
using an OLS estimator (not tabulated). With the exception of the SIZE variable, all of 
the coefficient estimates retain their signs from the Tobit setting. 1301 However, the coeffi-
cients on all variables but GW become insignificant, indicating that the adjusted R2 of 
11.5% is largely attributable to that variable. Considering the methodological discussion 
in section 5.4.1.2 above, Tobit rather than OLS estimation, is appropriate to this censored 
dependent variable situation. Therefore, the results presented in Table 21 are regarded as 
relevant. 
Corresponding to the procedure used for the binary model D1 in section 5.4.3.2 above, 
the Tobit model Al is re-estimated for the same truncated sample. 1302 The results are 
very similar to those yielded and explained above. Most notably, MTB remains highly 
1299 Parallel to model DI, firm size only contributes significantly to explaining variation in the write-off 
amount when the logarithmized variant SIZE_LOG is used (p-value = 0.060). 
1300 As in the binary setting, the LR test is an overall significance test for Tobit models as well. See, for 
example, Kennedy (1998, pp. 60-1, 67-8, 70-1). The LR test statistic has an unknown small-sample 
distribution, but is asymptotically distributed as a x2. See also Quantitative Micro Software (2002, pp. 
451-2). It indicates whether specified (groups of) independent variables contribute to the fit of the 
model or must be classified as redundant. 
1301 As a general rule, the OLS coefficient estimates are approximately obtained by multiplying the Tobit 
estimates with the proportion of non-limit (i.e. non-write-off) observations in the goodwill sample. 
See Kennedy (1998, p. 255). 
1302 As indicated above, truncation is achieved by excluding those firms representing the bottom 5% and 
the top 5% of the respective distributions. 
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significant (p-value = 0.000), consistent with the fact that economic factors are highly 
associated with the write-off amount even after adjusting for outlying observations. 
5.4.4.3 Sub-sample tests 















































DIF PP Difference between annual pre-write-off net income and the prior year's level (and 
DIF _ Z zero), deflated by prior-period total assets, in 2002. 
SIZE Size, measured by the mean of the market values of equity at the end of2001 and 2002. 
FYR Dichotomous variable: I where fiscal year-end in 200 I is December 31; 0 otherwise. 
FYR is coded based on COMPUST AT annual item FYR. 
GW Goodwill book value, deflated by total assets, measured at the end of200 I. 
Table 22: Tobit regression results for model A2 (partial sample of firms meeting earnings 
targets) 
Estimating model A2 yields mixed evidence on financial reporting incentives hypothesis 
5, according to which firms that obtain net income-based earnings targets will tend to 
record transitional write-offs in the amount of the "slack", i.e. the difference between 
actual pre-write-off earnings and the relevant target. While the results shown in Table 22 
suggest such behavior where prior-period earnings are the target (p-value = 0.016), the 
negative coefficient estimate on DIF _Z calls for a different interpretation: Apparently, 
the amount written off decreases in pre-write-off net income, which again indicates an 
economic, rather than earnings-management explanation for the write-off amount. This 
1303 The correlation matrix for this model is shown in Table A. 9 in the Appendix. 
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notion is further corroborated by the fact that write-off firms are underrepresented in this 
sub-sample (16.7%). 1304 
Results for the firms that fall short of earnings targets are presented in Table 23. 1305 
Variable Hypothesis Coefficient z-statistic 
Significance level 
(predicted sign) estimate (p-value) 
C (?) -0.262342 -4.206014 0.0000 
EQ H? 6 (+) 0.058459 2.012433 0.0442 
SIZE LOG (?) 0.005440 0.835508 0.4034 
FYR (?) 0.072110 1.720265 0.0854 
GW (?) 0.003297 3.918789 0.0001 





Goodwill sample including firms 
with negative equity, where 
TARGET_Z = 0 and 












Pre-write-off common equity, deflated by pre-write-off total assets, at the end of 2002. 
Natural logarithm of size, which is measured by the mean of the market values of equity 
at the end of2001 and 2002. 
Dichotomous variable: I where fiscal year-end in 200 I is December 31; 0 otherwise. 
FYR is coded based on COMPUSTAT annual item FYR. 
Goodwill book value, deflated by total assets, measured at the end of 2001. 
Table 23: Tobit regression results for model A3 (partial sample of firms missing earnings 
targets) 
The coefficient estimate on the EQ variable has the expected sign and is significant at the 
5% level. From these results, it appears that financial reporting incentives hypothesis 6 is 
supported by the data. 1306 Where firms record "big bath" write-offs, the amount of equity 
seems to represent a behavioral threshold that is difficult to explain in economic terms. 
1304 Because DIF _PP and DIF _Z are highly correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient= 0.342), the re-
gressions are repeated by including each of these regressors individually (not tabulated). This proce-
dure yields an insignificantly positive coefficient estimate on DIF _PP (p-value = 0.523), suggesting 
that the amount by which prior-period net income is beaten, in itself, does not explain variation in the 
transitional write-off amount. However, the significantly negative coefficient estimate on DIF _Z is 
almost unchanged (p-value = 0.000), which validates the initial interpretation. 
1305 The correlation matrix for this model is shown in Table A. IO in the Appendix. 
1306 Further analysis shows that only five firms recorded transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs that 
caused their equity to become negative. 
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Finally, similar to the procedure followed in the Probit setting above, the initial model 
A I is re-estimated after adding RA TING as a supplementary regressor. The results are 











TGWO_Ai =a +P 1MTBi +P 2RETi +P 36ROAi +P 4DTEi +P 5RATING 




(predicted sign) estimate (p-value) 
(?) -0.117314 -3 .855549 0.0001 
H~c I (-) -0.002259 -1.641569 0.1007 
H~c 2a (-) -0.018327 -2.319798 0.0204 
H~c 2b (-) 0.047800 0.613279 0.5397 
H~ 2 (-) -0.000051 -0.025661 0.9795 
HtR 8 (-) 0.001623 0.808696 0.4187 
(?) 0.000000 0.858702 0.3905 
(?) -0.002053 -0.142883 0.8864 
(?) 0.002403 5.755406 0.0000 




Observations Goodwill sample where 
RA TING available 
Total: 
447 
Variable definitions (refer to Table 6 for further details): 





RET Cumulative stock performance, measured over the fiscal years 2000 and 2001 . 
6ROA Percentage point change in ROA between the fiscal years 2000 and 200 I . 
DTE Mean of the differences between firm and median two-digit SIC industry DTE ratios, at 





Long-term domestic issuer credit rating in 200 I. 
Size, measured by the mean of the market values of equity at the end of 200 I and 2002. 
Dichotomous variable: I where fiscal year-end in 200 I is December 31; 0 otherwise. 
FYR is coded based on COMPUST AT annual item FYR. 
Goodwill book value, deflated by total assets, measured at the end of 200 I . 
Table 24: Tobit regression results for model A4 (partial sample of firms rated by S&P) 
As in the Probit setting, the economic factors variables lose their initial explanatory 
power compared to the initial model, while the coefficient estimate on the RA TING vari-
able itself turns out insignificant. Again, this effect arguably relates to the dramatically 
altered sample composition achieved by focusing on firms rated by S&P. 
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5. 5 Inferences 
5.5.1 Summary of findings 
Guided by the hypotheses derived in section 5.2 above, the preceding analysis of deter-
minants of transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs comprised three steps: First, 
descriptive evidence and comparative significance tests were presented in order to 
portray the sample, deriving preliminary conclusions about differences between goodwill 
and non-goodwill firms and, primarily, write-off and non-write-off firms. Second, 
multivariate Probit regression analysis was conducted to assess the aggregate explanatory 
power of a set of potential write-off determinants for the dichotomous write-off decision. 
Third, multivariate Tobit regression analysis was employed to explain the transitional 
SF AS 142 goodwill write-off amount. A cautious interpretation of the results follows. 1307 
Transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs, on average, represent significant accounting 
events in terms of their effects on write-off firms' financial statements. The analysis 
strongly indicates that write-off behavior predominantly reflects economic circum-
stances. In the overall goodwill sample, Probit regressions indicate that write-offs are less 
likely where MTB ratios and stock performance are higher. Using Tobit regression meth-
odology, the same relation is found for the amount written off, which decreases, on aver-
age, in firms' price-based performance. On average, write-off firms are also larger and 
more highly in debt than their non-write-off counterparts. The findings are further consis-
tent with the notion that managers are concerned with avoiding losses and earnings de-
clines. Also, calendar-year firms are more susceptible to write-offs, possibly because 
they used their opportunity to observe capital market reactions to early adopters' write-
off announcements and judged that transitional write-offs are not penalized by inves-
tors. 1308 
These findings, especially regarding the MTB ratio, are largely stable to alternative esti-
mation procedures, sub-sample analyses, and the truncation of outlying observations. 
Despite the enormous discretion that characterizes SF AS 142 especially upon adoption, 
the impairment-only approach is apparently successful at capturing goodwill impairment 
at least to some extent, inducing weak performers to record write-offs. 1309 The fact that 
1307 Hong, Kaplan and Mandelker (1978, p. 44) accurately point out that "[n]o single study is ever com-
pletely convincing on settling a controversy. Problems in sample selection, financial and statistical 
models, and interpretation ofresults are inherent in all empirical work." 
1308 A similar conclusion is reached by Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002, p. 26). 
1309 Segal's (2003, p. 29) conclusion is somewhat less optimistic; his comparison of SF AS 121 and SFAS 
142 "raises questions with respect to the new rule's ability to deliver." 
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transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs apparently represent the accounting "echo" of 
economic declines occurring as long as two years previously is consistent with the as-
sumption that such transitional write-offs partly "catch up" impairments that the weaker 
SF AS 121 trigger was unable to detect. 
A prominent pattern emerging in the sub-sample analysis indicates that the transitional 
SF AS 142 goodwill write-off behavior of large, dominant firms is clearly different from 
that of smaller, less "visible" companies. Several proxies of "high profile", including 
size, market share, and the availability of S&P rating data, are associated with large 
write-offs even where goodwill impairment is not necessarily apparent a priori. In these 
firms, write-off behavior seems to reflect financial reporting incentives rather than eco-
nomic developments. Apparently, the transition period is perceived to be a window of 
opportunity, in which goodwill, the "Sword of Damocles" hanging above many firms' 
financial statements, can be discarded at low cost. Write-offs are accelerated into the 
transition period, possibly in order to decrease political visibility, shelter future manage-
ment compensation, and avoid future hits to earnings that might be viewed more nega-
tively by capital market participants. Nevertheless, this finding is likewise open to differ-
ent interpretations, including conservatism. 
Most of the economic-consequences hypotheses do not appear to be descriptive, possibly 
due to data availability constraints and the resulting reliance on inappropriate proxy vari-
ables. In addition, among the hypothesis not corroborated by the data are those related to 
"cookie-jar reserving" and, in part, "big bath" behavior. There is only weak evidence that 
write-offs coincide with CEO changes or restructuring efforts in firms falling short of 
earnings targets. Likewise, firms beating earnings targets do not appear to coordinate 
write-off amounts with the available "slack", possibly because financial reporting deci-
sions other than the write-off amount are made after the latter is ultimately determined. 
However, the data indicates that the amount of equity presents a strong limiting factor for 
the amount written off. 
Overall, the stable core findings suggest that write-off behavior differs with the degree of 
firms' "visibility" in the capital markets. In smaller, less exposed firms, write-offs seem 
to mainly reflect difficult economic circumstances, whereas larger, more dominant firms 
appear to more actively coordinate their write-off behavior with management's financial 
reporting strategies. However, even where the findings appear to be consistent with earn-
ings management behavior, the availability of alternative, economic explanations rules 
out premature conclusions. Further, while financial reporting objectives might play a 
significant role in explaining most firms' overall financial reporting behavior in the 
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SF AS 142 adoption period, it is not necessarily the transitional write-off that is used to 
achieve them. This fact might in part be explained by the notion that outstanding, non-
recurring income statement items, especially those met with substantial prior attention, 
are too costly to be suited for certain subtle types of earnings management, such as target 
accounting. Possibly, other financial reporting incentives that are not captured by my 
hypotheses explain part of the variation in write-off behavior. 
5.5 .2 Limitations 
A possible limitation of this study relates to potential measurement error in the dependent 
variable. While every attempt was made to ascertain that TGWO reflected nothing but 
the transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-off, disclosed as a change in accounting princi-
ple, the discussion in section 5.3. l above indicates that other effects might be captured by 
that variable. To the extent that such measurement error does not introduce systematic 
bias, it is incorporated in the disturbance term and the resulting coefficient estimates are 
unaffected. 1310 
Further, the results might, at least to some extent, be influenced by measurement error in 
some of the independent variables. As has been discussed at length in sections 3.3.2.3 
and 5.2.3.l above, this study, like much of the preceding earnings management literature, 
had to rely on potentially imprecise proxy variables, which might have decreased the 
power of the regression tests. 1311 For example, recent research has increasingly relied on 
actual contract data to circumvent these problems.1312 However, due to restrictions in 
data availability, no superior surrogate variables could be devised at this point. To the 
extent that the proxies used measure the underlying variables with error, the resulting 
coefficient estimates might be biased and also inconsistent. 1313 Measurement error might 
also plague the economic-factors variables because these are based on firm-level as op-
1310 See, for example, Kennedy ( 1998, p. I 40). However, the estimates might have larger variances than 
would be the case in the absence of measurement error. See Gujarati (2003 , pp. 524-5). 
1311 See, for example, Huijgen (1996, pp. 48-50). Watts and Zimmerman (1990, pp. 143-6) also discuss 
research method issues typical to empirical tests of positive accounting theory. 
1312 See, for example, Dichev and Skinner (2002, p. 1101) for actual accounting-based debt covenant 
restrictions. Some of the most frequent ratios used (debt to cash flow, interest coverage, fixed charge 
coverage, tangible net worth) are not influenced by transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs. Also, 
AOL Time Warner, in its annual report on form 10-K/ A for the period ended on December 31 , 2001, 
states that its expected $54 billion goodwill write-off "will not result in a violation of any of the 
Company's covenants." 
131 3 Refer to Gujarati (2003, pp. 526-8) and Kennedy (1998, pp. 140-3). The fact that measurement error 
might hamper the conclusions from goodwill write-off studies is also discussed by Wilson (1996, p. 
173). 
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posed to reporting unit-level data. The analysis could be further refined by using segment 
data where more detailed information is unattainable. 1314 Overall, a possibility remains 
that, while the hypotheses accurately described the data, the testing methods and vari-
ables lacked the power necessary to find at least some of the expected relations. Inference 
problems might also stem from the fact that management expects financial statement 
users to respond differently to transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-offs than what is 
predicted here. 
In addition, it has not been explicitly tested whether all the conditions required for using 
limited dependent variable models are fulfilled in the data. 1315 For example, since finn 
size appears to be a significant explanatory factor, heteroskedasticity is a potential prob-
lem. On the other hand, autocorrelation should not be of concern because cross-sectional 
data is used. While these methodological concerns might preclude exact, quantitative 
inferences, the findings appear to be sufficiently stable to allow general, qualitative con-
clusions to be drawn. 
Finally, caution must be exercised with regard to generalization of the results found here. 
First, the transition to the SFAS 142 goodwill impairment-only approach represents a 
unique setting in which to study write-off determinants. 1316 Future, "regular" write-offs 
might be associated with vastly different determinants, one possible reason being that any 
"catching-up" effect is likely to be out of the way. The way in which future SF AS 142 
write-offs will be considered in accounting-based contracts, in the political arena, and, 
perhaps most importantly, by capital-market participants, is likely to be far less uncertain 
to management. 1317 Second, since the sample selection and truncation procedures resulted 
in significant trimming of the available observations, some of the findings do not neces-
sarily generalize to the entirety to of publicly listed U. S. corporations, let alone to firms 
domiciled in other economies. 
1314 See also Riedl (2002, p. 3). 
1315 Refer to Greene (2003, ch. 21, 22), Maddala (2001, ch. 8), and Maddala (1983, ch. 2, 6). 
1316 For a similar "disclaimer", refer to Segal (2003, p. 30). 
1317 Henning, Shaw and Stock (2002, p. 2) provide evidence suggesting that ''the market will view .. tran-
sition write-offs differently from [pre-SF AS 142) write-offs of goodwill." 
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6 Conclusion 
Published in 2001, SFAS 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, preliminarily con-
cludes decades of heated debate about the appropriate accounting procedures for acquired 
goodwill. The impairment-only approach, which replaced goodwill amortization, met 
with a largely critical echo from the financial community. While the theoretical, concep-
tual soundness of this method is largely acknowledged, constituents are concerned about 
the tremendous degree of subjectivity that the goodwill impairment test involves. The 
predecessor standard, SFAS 121, also relied heavily on management's judgment, but the 
goodwill amortization requirement assured that this dubious asset was charged to earn-
ings over a predictable, if arbitrary, period of time. Under the new rules, however, good-
will can be carried on a firm's books indefinitely under certain circumstances. 
Firms applying U.S. GAAP adopted SFAS 142 in the fiscal year 2002. Due to the stan-
dard's immense discretionary freedom and the uncertainty regarding its perception by 
financial statement users, firms had the opportunity to harmonize transitional goodwill 
write-off behavior with their financial reporting incentives and objectives. In this setting, 
the study at hand analyzes whether managers of a large sample of publicly traded U. S. 
firms took advantage of this opportunity or whether firms' economic circumstances ex-
plain transitional write-off behavior. 
In order to generate hypotheses regarding managers' expected write-off behavior, two 
distinct areas of research are analyzed in detail. In chapter 2, a review of empirical evi-
dence on the goodwill debate suggests that managers are concerned about the financial 
statement effects of goodwill accounting. Apparently, the assumption is widespread 
among managers that financial statement users take accounting information at face value, 
which induces them to avoid and/or delay goodwill-related charges where possible. In 
contrast to that, tests of investors' perceptions indicate that management's "cosmetic" 
earnings management is not rewarded because market participants, on average, appear to 
see through it to the firms' underlying economic characteristics. 
In chapter 3, it is argued that a transitional SF AS 142 goodwill charge can be character-
ized as a discretionary asset write-off. These accounting events, large and growing in 
economic significance, are governed by accounting guidance involving a high degree of 
flexibility and judgment. Because they are also extremely visible due to separate disclo-
sure, these charges have been thoroughly investigated. Based on the assumption that 
write-off behavior is largely at the discretion of management, empirical researchers are 
interested in the determinants of that decision and in its assessment by investors. This 
research is reviewed extensively in order to draw inferences about the extent to which 
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management's past write-off behavior is applicable to the transitional SFAS 142 setting 
and to lay the theoretical groundwork for hypothesis development. Studies of write-off 
determinants suggest that these charges can be explained to some extent by impairment 
of the underlying assets, but frequently to a greater degree by managers' contract-based 
as well as capital market-related financial reporting incentives. Perhaps the most stable 
finding is that discretionary asset write-offs are taken when a new CEO adopts a "big 
bath" strategy, signaling to investors that past problems are being aggressively dealt with. 
With regard to investors' perception of write-offs, empirical findings indicate that these 
charges are frequently anticipated and that the market reaction depends on the kind of 
information conveyed. 
Predicting earnings management explanations behind transitional SFAS 142 goodwill 
write-offs requires that the new standard actually provides sufficient subjective elements 
for being applied at management's discretion. Therefore, much of chapter 4 is devoted 
to exposing the manifold discretionary parameters in the impairment-only approach. The 
analysis shows that management's subjectivity and judgment is called upon at all levels, 
especially during the period in which SF AS 142 is applied for the first time. 
Finally, chapter 5 contains an empirical study of transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-
offbehavior exhibited by a large sample of publicly traded U.S. firms. Based on theory 
and empirical findings presented in chapters 2 and 3, hypotheses are derived about the 
determinants of write-off behavior. These predictions are grouped into three main catego-
ries: First, since the impairment-only approach is designed to detect declines in goodwill 
value (impairment), variables representing economic downturns affecting the sample 
firms are expected to be associated with write-off behavior. Second, to the extent that 
management expects write-offs to affect the firm's exposure to contractual consequences, 
write-off behavior is predicted to relate to proxies for these consequences. Third, because 
firms are expected to gear write-off behavior towards favorably influencing investors' 
perceptions, variables representing such incentives are assumed to explain write-offs. 
Descriptive analyses, univariate significance tests, and multivariate Probit and Tobit re-
gressions were used to examine these hypotheses. A persistent pattern emerging from the 
data suggests that write-off behavior, on average, reflects the economic situation of sam-
ple firms. In full sample tests, Probit regressions indicate that write-off probability is 
lower where MTB ratios and price-based performance are higher. Tobit regression tests 
reveal a similar relation of these variables to the write-off amount. In addition, write-off 
firms are larger and more highly in debt than their non-write-off counterparts. Further, 
sample firms are concerned about achieving simple earnings targets and maintaining 
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positive equity. They are also more likely to record a transitional write-off when their 
fiscal year is the calendar year. These core results are largely stable to robustness checks 
and alternative specifications, suggesting that the highly discretionary impairment-only 
approach does capture goodwill impairment at least to some extent. Possibly, transitional 
SF AS 142 write-offs in part represent a "catching up" of value declines that the weaker 
SF AS 121 procedure was unable to reveal. 
Comprehensive sub-sample analyses indicate that transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-
off behavior is not homogenous throughout the goodwill sample. Large, high-profile 
firms apparently record write-offs even where goodwill impairment is not apparent from 
observation of economic conditions. Rather, write-off behavior seems to be consistent 
with financial reporting incentives, suggesting that "visible" firms use the window of 
opportunity presented by the adoption of SFAS 142 to inexpensively discard goodwill, 
the "Sword of Damocles" hanging above their financial statements. Such accelerating of 
write-offs is consistent with political cost considerations and a desire to shelter future 
earnings and compensation. 
Overall, the qualitatively established core findings indicate that write-off behavior differs 
with the degree of sample firms ' "visibility" in the capital markets. On average and espe-
cially in smaller firms, write-offs appear to be economically induced, while high-profile 
firms apparently harmonize their write-off behavior with management's financial report-
ing objectives to a higher degree. However, premature conclusions about earnings man-
agement causes for the observed behavior are unwarranted due to the availability of al-
ternative, economic explanations. 
The impairment-only approach is likely to remain a fruitful area of research for some 
time to come, and the research approach chosen here can be extended into several prom-
ising directions. Perhaps the most natural complementary approach to this study would 
be an investigation of market reactions to transitional SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs in 
order to ascertain investors' perception of the "quality" of these charges. However, re-
searchers must be mindful of several methodological problems associated with this ap-
proach. For example, market reactions can only be studied where write-offs are voluntar-
ily announced in a timely manner. The fact that not all write-offs fulfill this criterion is 
likely to introduce selection bias into the sample. Further, an analysis of market re-
sponses usually takes the form of an event study. This research design involves specific 
difficulties, which include determining the exact event date, modeling the expected mar-
ket development absent the write-off, estimating the amount of write-off expected by 
investors at the write-off date, and taking into account the effects of any concurrent 
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events affecting the write-off finn. These problems invariably imply that two or more 
joint hypotheses are tested, which enonnously complicates the drawing of inferences. 
Another viable avenue would be to compare goodwill write-off determinants and/or mar-
ket responses between SFAS 142 and its predecessor regimes. However, due to changed 
economic and institutional circumstances, such comparison might be hard to interpret 
and conclusions regarding the superiority of one set of rules over the other difficult to 
justify. In order to keep as many factors as possible constant, it might be rewarding to 
analyze management' s goodwill-related write-off behavior post-adoption, where finan-
cial statement users' interpretation of these "regular" write-offs is likely to be much more 
predictable to management. 
Finally, future research could investigate what other concurrent indicators of earnings 
management, e.g. aggregate discretionary accruals or individual discretionary accounts, 
suggest about management's financial reporting strategy. As noted above, the highly 
visible transitional SF AS 142 goodwill write-off might not have been the earnings man-
agement instrument of choice for some firms, and the extent to which firms preferred 
other instruments might vary cross-sectionally. A small-sample or case study approach 
might be a worthwhile methodological alternative to using large samples and relying on 
crude proxy variables construed from commercially available data. Further progress 
could also result from studies of auditors' role in the context of discretionary financial 
reporting decisions. 
Currently, the FASB and the IASB are contemplating another radical change in the ac-
counting procedures for business combinations: In acquisitions of less than l 00% of the 
acquiree's equity, any resulting goodwill will be grossed up to reflect the entire differ-
ence between the acquiree's overall fair value and the fair value of its net assets. The 
resulting goodwill, to be allocated in part to non-controlling shareholders' remaining 
interest in the acquiree's equity, can no longer be termed "purchased" goodwill in its 
entirety. This "full goodwill method" introduces new discretionary elements into the ac-
counting for goodwill .1318 Exploring management's use of this flexibility will be another 
interesting research opportunity. 
1318 See, for example, Pellens, Basche and Sellhom (2003). 
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Non-goodwill/ goodwill samples Non-write-off/ write-off samples 
Variable 
Equality of medians Equality of means Equality of medians Equality of means 
(Adj. median x,2 - test) (t-test) (Adj. median x,2- test) (t-test) 
i I p-value I-statistic I p-value i I p-value t-statistic I p-value 
Goodwill 2002 
In million$ NA NA NA NA 14.51783 0.0001 2.796869 0.0052 
% total assets NA NA NA NA 0.056044 0.8129 0.433348 0.6648 
% BV of equity NA NA NA NA 2.978007 0.0844 2.142716 0.0323 
% MV of equity NA NA NA NA 3.514072 0.0608 2.495752 0.0127 
Goodwill 2001 
In million$ NA NA NA NA 53.32575 0.0000 4.849931 0.0000 
% total assets NA NA NA NA 21.59473 0.0000 7.053583 0.0000 
% BV of equity NA NA NA NA 27.42732 0.0000 0.763602 0.4452 
% MV of equity NA NA NA NA 74.47977 0.0000 0.289259 0.7724 
MTB 0.016646 0.8973 2.059759 0.0395 45.05566 0.0000 2.060898 0.0395 
RET 4.182144 0.0409 1.162877 0.2450 8.275530 0.0040 0.777743 0.4369 
~ROA 0.090626 0.7634 0.718982 0.4722 0.266602 0.6056 0.491423 0.6232 
AIP 0.010946 0.9167 2.444166 0.0146 I 1.01772 0.0009 2.115625 0.0346 
DTE02 76.21605 0.0000 0.746498 0.4554 5.228655 0.0222 0.359825 0.7190 
MV 0 165.8758 0.0000 4.023226 0.0001 2.399414 0.1214 1.661461 0.0969 
TA0 269.1145 0.0000 4.028126 0.0001 27.42732 0.0000 3.452232 0.0006 
SAL0 331.6193 0.0000 4.918754 0.0000 24.42397 0.0000 2.747248 0.0061 
MSH 244.3230 0.0000 7.004372 0.0000 35.69741 0.0000 5.795052 0.0000 
HERF 18.77189 0.0000 0. 163767 0.8699 8.463352 0.0036 3.538952 0.0004 
~PWOROA 19.06767 0.0000 2.126163 0.0336 0.005441 0.9412 0.858409 0.3908 
EQ 39.63488 0.0000 8.926660 0.0000 3.966378 0.0464 2.723789 0.0065 
0 MV, TA, and SAL represent mean values (fiscal 2001 and 2002) for the market value of equity, total assets, and sales, respectively. 
For other variaole definitions, refer to Table 6. Monetary amounts are in million $. 
--
Table A. 1: Univariate comparisons of the non-goodwill/goodwill and non-write-off/write-off samples 








Industry 2-digit SIC Total firms Non-goodwill sample Goodwill sample Non-write-off sample Write-off sample 
category N I % N I % N I % N I % N I % 
Business services 73 2,155 15.6 IOI 10.6 133 10.7 111 10.8 22 9.8 
Electronic, electric equipment 36 990 7.2 66 6.9 91 7.3 83 8.1 8 3.6 
Chemicals, allied products 28 983 7.1 133 13.9 86 6.9 68 6.6 18 8.0 
Industrial machinery, equipment 35 879 6.4 52 5.4 108 8.7 92 9.0 16 7.1 
Instruments, related products 38 853 6.2 74 7.7 88 7.1 79 7.7 9 4.0 
Communication 48 739 5.4 17 1.8 32 2.6 26 2.5 6 2.7 
Electric, gas, sanitary services 49 567 4.1 18 1.9 18 1.4 15 1.5 3 1.3 
Oil, gas extraction 13 543 3.9 89 9.3 32 2.6 29 2.8 3 1.3 
Engineering, management services 87 407 2.3 26 2.6 25 1.9 21 2.0 4 1.6 
Wholesale trade: Durable goods 50 367 2.7 21 2.2 46 3.7 30 2.9 16 7.1 
Health services 80 328 2.4 24 2.5 24 1.9 21 2.1 3 1.3 
Food, kindred products 20 316 2.3 28 2.9 22 1.8 21 2.1 I 0.4 
Miscellaneous retail 59 313 2.3 17 1.8 26 2.1 22 2.1 4 1.8 
Transportation equipment 37 276 2.0 13 1.4 37 3.0 30 2.9 7 3.1 
Wholesale trade: Nondurable goods 51 245 1.8 II 1.2 24 1.9 22 2.1 2 0.9 
Eating, drinking places 58 219 1.6 14 1.5 30 2.4 26 2.5 4 1.8 
Metal mining 10 200 1.4 28 2.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Fabricated metal products 34 195 1.4 11 1.2 34 2.7 25 2.4 9 4.0 
Printing, publishing 27 188 1.4 3 0.3 22 1.8 17 1.7 5 2.2 
Amusement, recreation services 79 188 1.4 19 2.0 16 1.3 11 I.I 5 2.2 
Primary metal industries 33 184 1.3 16 1.7 32 2.6 24 2.3 8 3.6 
Rubber and misc. plastics products 30 166 1.2 11 1.2 27 2.2 20 2.0 7 3.1 
Misc. manufacturing industries 39 166 1.2 10 1.0 17 1.4 14 1.4 3 1.3 
Motion pictures 78 152 I.I 4 0.4 7 0.6 6 0.6 I 0.4 
Paper, allied products 26 135 1.0 10 1.0 25 2.0 17 1.7 8 3.6 
All other0 2,044 15.3 139 14.7 246 19.4 194 19.1 52 23.7 
Total 13,798 100.0 955 100.0 1,248 100.0 1,024 100.0 224 100.0 
The following 2-digit SIC categories are not represented (reasons given in parentheses): 3-6, 11, 18, 19, 66, 68, 69, 71, 74, 77, 85, 90-98 (unassigned), 43 (U.S. 
Postal Service), 60-65 and 67 (depository institutions, eliminated during sample selection), 84 (cultural institutions), and 88 (private households). 
0 Includes category 99 (non-classifiable establishments, 1.4% of"total firms available") and all other categories representing less than I% of"total firms available". 
Table A. 2: Industry breakdown of the four samples 
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RWGO_A Mean StDev Min 111 qrt Med 3rd qrt Max 
in million$ 94 356 0 2 7 43 2,876.0 
% total assets 6.9 9.5 0.0 0.7 3.4 8.7 54.9 
% common equity (BV) 19.1 44.0 0.0 1.6 7.3 22.3 442.3 
%goodwill 54.8 87.9 0.0 7.3 29.1 85 .3 660.2 
% common equity (MV) 134.0 1,395.2 0.0 0.7 5.1 17.8 16,870.8 
% sales 31.2 119.8 0.0 0.6 4.2 13.8 992.8 
RGWO_A is the regular SFAS 142 goodwill write-off. Goodwill figures are scaled by beginning-of-
period balance sheet numbers and end-of-period sales. These data comprise write-offs taken during fiscal 
2002 by 143 firms in the goodwill sample. 
Table A. 3: Descriptive analysis of regular SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs taken during fiscal 
2002 by firms in the goodwill sample 
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Transitional write-off 2-digit SIC N in million$ % total assets % BVofequity % goodwill % MV of equity 
Industry category Md Mn Md Mn Md Mn Md Mn Md Mn 
Agricultural production - crops I 3 55 60 4.37 4.64 16.29 26.51 45.44 33.40 8.00 25.42 
Oil and gas extraction 13 3 73 499 6.61 5.84 12.50 12.85 38.57 32.78 12.65 13 .61 
Special trade contractors 17 4 243 244 23 .71 24.16 44.07 44.66 52.44 55.50 100.51 98.61 
Textile mill products 22 3 12 26 5.80 5.09 18.31 25.48 16.57 13 .16 19.43 33.60 
Apparel and other textile products 23 6 15 97 4.82 5.40 7.84 12.81 45.21 37.28 9.68 21.19 
Lumber and wood products 24 3 14 19 8.13 9.45 17.66 15 .34 34.02 42.56 27.65 20.65 
Paper and allied products 26 8 42 149 1.42 3.17 4.63 10.36 10.22 17.62 2.44 18.10 
Printing and publishing 27 5 24 60 4.99 5.31 10.86 10.38 13 .53 19.49 I 1.03 9.34 
Chemicals and allied products 28 18 45 304 2.43 6.63 6.57 16.83 39.97 42.94 6.13 18.06 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 30 7 8 33 6.58 12.94 10.12 26.01 59.95 63.67 34.97 85.12 
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 32 4 95 168 5.10 11.61 23.31 29.82 41.45 44.92 35.03 42.07 
Primary metal industries 33 8 24 37 5.11 5.25 17.42 15 .74 42.48 43.13 25 .52 64.07 
Fabricated metal products 34 9 30 49 4.45 7.63 19.70 22.60 19.89 31.03 25.97 35.13 
Industrial machinery and equipment 35 16 50 123 4.70 4.83 10.82 14.91 23.72 34.91 4.80 8.93 
Electronic and other electric equipment 36 8 16 27 7.34 7.41 12.72 17.58 32.20 38.07 16.29 20.67 
Transportation equipment 37 7 5 214 3.60 4.48 10.99 11.06 26.16 51.88 10.67 18.57 
Instruments and related products 38 9 14 94 3.60 5.09 7.80 9.65 I 1.39 31.74 2.71 10.66 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 39 3 246 167 7.29 8.92 18.16 19.54 32.27 30.77 8.75 18.76 
Motor freight transportation and warehousing 42 5 17 25 0.77 2 .36 7.09 10.40 6.47 20.69 3.39 14.I6 
Communications 48 6 393 581 2 . .77 3.91 7.30 16.50 26.27 25 .82 4.41 I 1.22 
Electric, gas, and sanitary serv ices 49 3 2 6 0.47 1.14 1.42 2.30 13.43 10.91 1.38 1.56 
Wholesale trade - durable goods 50 16 12 130 5.35 5.75 17.49 28.26 54.03 53.97 15 .81 42.23 
Food stores 54 3 28 248 0.97 1.69 11.89 I0.27 13.80 37.00 2.29 1.94 
Eating and drinking places 58 4 52 71 2.95 6.30 6.69 20.40 62.58 56.54 13.27 15.48 
Miscellaneous retail 59 4 38 137 2.84 4.57 7.55 9.56 13 .27 26.85 3.69 17.74 
Personal services 72 3 30 61 1.96 6.37 9.46 13 .96 43.24 38.26 8.85 6.65 
Business services 73 22 14 121 10.81 15 .66 18.95 31.51 53.21 46.05 29.73 58.82 
Automotive repair, services, and parking 75 3 9 9 0.38 0.46 1.54 1.35 3.73 5.11 1.40 1.16 
Amusement and recreational services 79 5 91 335 6.85 10.79 17.75 22.40 56.66 55.87 24.50 20.80 
Educational services 82 3 48 47 11.11 11.40 17.82 18.12 19.71 21.77 15.16 48.67 
Engineering and management services 87 3 17 33 5.04 7.53 10.24 11.70 10.74 16.71 4.33 14.91 
Non-classifiable establishments 99 3 126 395 3.13 2.38 8.10 12.84 13.31 15.72 3.91 9.77 
The table is sorted by two-digit SIC category. Industries containing < 3 write-off firms are dropped. Overall, 179 out of 224 write-off firms are included. 







































 PubFactory at 01/11/2019 04:09:55AM
via free access
Panel A: WO sample with MTB>I (N = 124) 
Variable Mean StDev Mio J'' qrt Med 3rd qrt Max 
Goodwill 2002 
In million$ 1,149•• 3,842 0 43 234 ... 865 39,138 
% total assets 16.19 14.99 0.00 4.77 13.31 24.19 77.14 
% BV of equity 8,048.82 87,749.30 0.00 13.14 39.91• 76.65 965,312.50 
% MV of equity 41.32* .. 70.00 0.00 7.69 20.29 40.44 523.17 
Goodwill 2001 
In million$ 1,378* .. 3,705 I 65 303••• 1,101 28,287 
% total assets 20.59*** 15.45 1.00 8.28 16.67••· 29.17 74.60 
% BV of equity 78.74 198.19 3.20 22.03 48.55 82.08 2,177.68 
% MV of equity 33.47*** 33.59 0.30 11.21 23 .00* .. 37.86 152.79 
MTB 3.03*** 6.33 1.02 1.38 1.13••• 2.84 67.87 
RET 0.10••· 0.73 -0.97 -0.29 0.03••· 0.31 5.57 
6ROA -0.03 0.08 -0.43 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.22 
AIP o.3o••• 0.23 0.03 0.11 0.25••• 0.42 1.05 
DTE02 1.32 2.67 0.00 0.30 0.61 1.34 25.47 
MV0 9,262** 36,535 3 379 972••· 4,161 320,299 
TA0 12,831 .. 55,480 6 557 1,738*** 5,118 535,134 
SAL0 7,527** 20,121 5 546 1,630*** 5,134 162,499 
MSH 0.046··· 0.084 0.000 0.002 0.008*** 0.044 0.501 
HERF 0.086 0.080 0.015 0.042 0.052 0.091 0.465 
MWOROA 0.00 0.09 -0.26 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.66 
EQ 0.41•• 0.17 0.02 0.29 0.42 0.54 0.92 
Panel B: WO sample with MTB:51 (N = 100) 
Variable Mean StDev Mio J'' qrt Med 3 rd qrt Max 
Goodwill 2002 
In million$ 200•• 790 0 0 24*** 102 7,090 
% total assets 14.99 16.54 0.00 0.00 10.o9 26.88 70.03 
% BV of equity 61.92 120.99 0.00 0.01 27.50* 74.68 826.46 
% MV of equity 1 o 1.50••• 225.91 0.00 0.13 33.03 88.34 1,620.16 
Goodwill 200 I 
In million$ 350••· 1004 I 15 59••· 250 6,875 
% total assets 24.78••· 19.73 0.44 8.83 18.82••· 37.84 81.96 
% BV of equity 63 .21 67.24 2.17 20.96 44.95 86.15 501.36 
% MV of equity 140.28••· 172.64 3.67 39.53 79_32••· 193.63 1,100.70 
MTB 0.58*** 0.25 0.06 0.40 0.57*** 0.81 0.99 
RET -0_39••· 0.47 -0.95 -0.73 -0.48*** -0.13 2.19 
aROA -0.01 0.10 -0.31 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.35 
AIP 0.53*** 0.66 O.o3 0.19 0.37*** 0.74 6.03 
DTE02 1.14 1.94 0.00 0.26 0.74 1.42 17.25 
MV0 375** 1094 I 20 77*** 221 9094 
TA0 1,506** 4036 7 102 283*** 946 31,554 
SAL0 1,048** 2,224 7 125 362* .. 1,026 18,131 
MSH 0.015*** 0.032 0.000 0.001 0.003*** 0.009 0.148 
HERF 0.090 0.069 0.015 0.050 0.069 0.100 0.471 
6PWOROA 0.00 0.10 -0.42 -0.03 0.00 O.o3 0.33 
EQ 0.46•· 0.20 O.o3 0.32 0.44 0.60 0.96 
•, ••, ***: Differences in mean (t-test) and median (adjusted x;2-test) significant at IO, 5, or 1%. 
0 MV, TA, and SAL represent mean values (fiscal 2001 and 2002) for the market value of equity, total 
assets, and sales, respectively. For other variable definitions, refer to Table 6. 
Monetary amounts in million $. Goodwill figures scaled by beginning-of-period balance sheet numbers. 
Table A. 5: Comparison ofwrite-offfinns with MTB>l versus MTBSl 
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TGWO_D MTB RET DROA AIP DTE MSH HERF DPWOROA TARGET_PP TARGET_Z SIZE FYR GW 
-0.058 -0.022 -0.014 0.060 -0.019 0.162 0.100 0.024 -0.027 -0.043 0.047 0.090 0.196 
-0.003 0.003 -0.066 0.496 -0.002 -0.047 0.131 0.055 0.023 0.046 0.043 -0.039 
0.047 0.013 -0.008 0.010 -0.001 -0.107 -0.031 0.035 -0.009 0,021 -0.019 
-0.029 -0.022 -0.004 0.004 -0.186 -0.029 0.010 -0.010 0.027 0.006 
0.058 0.047 0.143 0.039 -0.024 -0.050 -0.061 0.051 -0.187 
-0.009 -0.014 0.097 0.044 -0.045 -0.010 O.o38 -0.009 
0.406 0.001 0.062 0.110 0.369 0.045 -0.037 
0.060 0.067 0.044 0.035 -0.004 -0.029 
0.508 0.223 -0.006 0.044 0.014 
0.354 0.014 0.023 0.056 
0.098 0.012 -0.023 
0.069 -0.068 
0.076 
Table A. 6: Correlation matrix for model DI 
Variable TGWO_D CH_200X RESTR SIZE FYR GW 
TGWO D 0.000 0.150 0.007 0.154 0.338 
CH 200X -0.067 -0.062 -0.118 -0.012 
RESTR 0.061 0.137 0.159 
SIZE -0.050 -0.007 
FYR 0.211 
Table A. 7: Correlation matrix for model D2 








Variable MTB RET DROA AIP DTE MSH HERF DPWOROA TARGET_PP TARGET_Z RATING SIZE FYR GW 0 
TGWO D -0 075 -0.090 -0.016 0.075 -0.007 0.157 0.127 0.032 0.014 -0.107 0.031 0.019 0.058 0.211 
MTB 0.014 0.068 -0.134 0.386 -0.001 -0.054 0.073 0.117 0.145 -0.157 0.115 0.088 -0.041 
RET 0.430 -0.100 -0.038 -0.028 0.010 -0.399 0.054 0.097 0.034 -0.073 0.002 0.044 
DROA -0.008 0.010 0.019 -0.010 -0.772 -0.123 0.061 0.003 -0.025 -0.066 -0.007 
AIP 0.114 0.039 0.128 0.036 -0.080 -0.187 0.339 -0.146 0.052 -0.287 
DTE -0.053 0.042 0.073 0.057 -0.078 0.283 -0.050 0.080 o.oi8 
MSH 0.536 0.027 0.089 0.095 -0.254 0.326 -0.002 -0.151 
HERF 0.043 0.080 0.028 0.010 0.037 -0.092 -0.097 
DPWOROA 0.394 0.252 0.025 0.000 0.080 0.055 
TARGET PP 0.372 0.057 0.010 0.029 0.076 
TARGET Z -0.314 0.112 -0.030 0.016 
RATING -0.491 -0.070 0.129 
SIZE 0.074 -0.144 
FYR 0.094 
Table A. 8: Correlation matrix for model D3 
Variable TGWO_A DIF_PP DIF_Z SIZE FYR GW 
TGWO_A 0.066 -0.088 -0.039 0.027 0.340 
DIF PP 0.342 -0.050 -0.005 0.063 
DIF Z 0.109 -0.0 I 2 -0.050 
SIZE 0.084 -0.087 
FYR 0.068 
Table A. 9: Correlation matrix for model A2 
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Variable TGWO_A EQ SIZE FYR GW 
TGWO_A 0.039 -0.037 0.096 0.348 
EQ -0.064 -0.090 -0.066 
SIZE 0.014 0.014 
FYR 0.096 
Table A. 10: Correlation matrix for model A3 
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